股价信息含量、董事会独立性与高管变更

高管变更作为公司治理的重要内容,不仅受到内部制度的制约,还受到外部信息环境的影响。通过研究本文发现在控制会计业绩、公司规模、董事会规模、资产负债率等一系列变量后,股价信息含量与高管变更存在显著正相关关系。同时,作为外部监督手段的股价信息含量和作为内部监管手段的董事会独立性都对公司高管有监督作用,即董事会独立性和股价信息含量之间存在着相互替代的关系。     

股权集中、股权制衡与企业投资行为

通过分析分散与集中的所有权结构所带来的两类代理问题对企业投资行为影响的文献,笔者发现．制衡型股权结构有助于解决这两类代理问题所导致的企业非效率投资行为,但多个大股东也可能进行合谋,形成控制联盟,共同分享控制权私利,从而使大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题更加严重。     

股权集中、股权制衡与会计稳健性

运用我国A股上市公司2002～2004年的数据,本文研究上市公司两个股权结构变量——股权集中度与股权制衡度——对会计盈余信息质量特征之一的会计稳健性的影响。研究表明,股权集中度高的上市公司将不利于会计盈余信息质量的提高,少数大股东可能通过及时确认“好消息”以及滞后确认“坏消息”的方式来掩盖对中小股东的“掏空”行为,会计盈余稳健性较低;而股权制衡度较高的上市公司会计盈余就有较高的稳健性,这将有利于抑制少数大股东对会计盈余信息的操纵从而保护中小投资者财富不受侵占。     

利益制衡与审计者独立性

本文解读了审计委托中的一种显性合约和两种隐性合约安排,剖析了合约关系中的五种利益关系,以及它们形成的两种相反力量对审计者独立性的制衡。本文认为,审计者的独立性反映了他在各种力量制衡下的利益倾向性,独立性完全可以通过适当安排的利益驱动得以保障。     

风险承担、股权制衡与企业绩效

通过实证研究,检验了2010-2018年非金融上市公司的风险承担、股权制衡与企业绩效的关系。结论表明风险承担与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,随着企业风险承担水平的增加,绩效先提高后降低。股权制衡的存在增强了这种倒U型关系,多个大股东的相互制衡可以增加风险承担水平从而提高绩效。     

产品市场竞争、董事会治理与上市公司信息披露质量

以我国627家上市公司为样本,通过实证研究发现董事会规模、内部董事比例、两职分离状况的系数有利于提高企业的信息披露质量;独立董事比例以及董事会会议召开次数对信息披露质量的提高没有影响。在高竞争度的样本内,企业的内部董事比例、董事会会议召开次数与信息披露质量存在一定的显著性,董事会规模、独立董事比例、两职分离状况的系数与信息披露质量均表现出关系不显著的特征,这说明产品市场竞争与董事会治理机制之间为替代关系;而在低产品市场竞争度样本回归中,董事会治理五个特征变量与市场披露的相关系数与全样本基本一致。     

公司治理对财务信息质量影响的实证分析

本文以2005-2010年的非金融上市公司为样本,就公司治理对财务信息质量的影响进行实证研究.通过回归检验发现,股权集中度对财务信息质量具有负面影响,股权制衡度对财务信息质量具有正面影响;审计委员会的设立对财务信息质量的提高具有正面显著影响.研究同时发现,没有证据表明两职合一和两权分离会降低财务信息质量;也没有证据表明独立董事比例对财务信息质量具有显著提高作用.这一系列实证结果从公司治理角度为财务信息质量的提高提供了新的证据.     

股利政策、股权制衡与公司成长性

本文以我国2005年-2007年中小板市场上市公司为样本（面板数据）,从公司成长性的角度考察了股权结构对现金股利政策的实证影响。具体检查了现金股利和第一大股东、股权制衡以及公司成长性之间的计量关系,经验结果表明：中小板公司的第一大股东具有强烈的发放现金股利的激励,公司成长性不能弱化第一大股东对现金股利的偏好,其他大股东不能够对第一大股东的行为进行监督和牵制,甚至存在附和第一大股东的倾向。     

股权制衡与公司业绩：理论与事实

运用中国上市公司2003年度的数据,比较股权制衡的公司与股权集中、股权分散公司经营业绩,得出股权制衡的公司业绩要好于股权分散和股权集的公司,因而股权制衡对上市公司绩效产生正面影响。     

对我国商业银行董事会独立性评价

随着战略投资者相继参股中国商业银行,银行董事会的建设成为保障各方投资者战略目标实现的关键环节。而董事会的独立性是董事会有效治理的核心。本文从独立董事的独立性、专业委员会的独立性和董事长与行长两职合一性三个方面对董事会的独立性进行分析与评价,以期为商业银行和监管机构对包括战略投资者及中小股东在内的所有利益相关者的利益保护提供参考与借鉴。     

审计独立性 会计信息质量与市场反应

会计盈余信息有用性的研究都是以无差别的审计服务和盈余作为现金流的替代指标为前提的。本文放宽了这些假设,通过模型建立、实证研究,经验地研究了审计独立性与市场反应的关系。研究结果发现,除非预期盈余具有信息含量外,审计意见具有增量的信息含量,尤其是非标审计意见的影响。     

Bank reforms,foreign ownership,and financial stability

Numerous studies have focused on foreign ownership of banks, but instead of linkages to financial stability, they typically analyzed other issues and used country-level data. This article fills the gap in the literature by applying the GMM techniques on dynamic panels using bank-level data for Asian countries to investigate the impact of foreign ownership on financial stability, as well as whether the relation between foreign ownership and stability changes under different conditions of bank reforms in the host country. Specifically, we reach five conclusions. First, the existence of the home field advantage hypothesis is supported; nevertheless, when considering the effects of bank reforms, the global advantage hypothesis holds. Second, an inverse U-shaped relation between foreign ownership and stability is supported. Third, a higher degree of credit control liberalization mitigates the negative effect of foreign ownership on stability. Fourth, liberalization of interest rate control and banking supervision do enhance stability. Fifth and finally, we confirm a significantly negative relation between an explicit deposit and stability.     

Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.     

Internal information quality and financial policy peer effects

This paper investigates how firms' internal information quality (IIQ) influences the peer effects of their financial policies. Using earnings announcement speed and insider trading profitability difference as measurements, we find that when IIQ is low, firms are more likely to change their leverage following a similar change made by peer firms in the same industry. Our further analysis shows that this mimicking behavior hurts firms' operating performance, and is more prevalent when firms are also characterized by poor corporate governance. Overall, our results indicate that poor information quality could amplify the agency problem, therefore leading to stronger peer effects in corporate financial policies.     

Monetary policy,ownership structure,and risk-taking at financial intermediaries

This paper examines how ownership structure interacts with monetary policy in shaping financial intermediaries' appetite for risk. By constructing a large panel of banks across Western Europe, we provide evidence that differences in bank ownership influence the transmission of monetary policy via the risk-taking channel. While shareholder banks actively adjust the riskiness of their portfolios to changes in interest rates, stakeholder banks appear to be less responsive to such changes. These findings call for greater attention to the nature of bank ownership when setting monetary policy.     

Central bank independence and financial instability

It has been argued that central bank independence (CBI) may not only be beneficial for reaching the objective of price stability, but also for maintaining financial stability. Greater independence from external pressure implies that central banks are less politically constrained in acting to prevent financial distress, while it also will allow them to act earlier and more decisively when a crisis erupts. We estimate the relation between CBI and a newly constructed measure of financial instability using a dynamic panel model for the period 1985–2005 with a large set of control variables. We find a significant and robust negative relation between CBI and financial instability, which is mostly due to political independence.     

The influence of director stock ownership and board discussion transparency on financial reporting quality

Seventy-two active corporate directors participate in an experiment where management insists on aggressive recognition of revenue, but the chief audit executive proposes a more conservative approach. Results indicate interactive effects of director stock ownership and the transparency of director decisions. Stock-owning directors are more likely to oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings when transparency increases. For non-stock owning directors, however, increasing transparency does not affect the likelihood that directors oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings. The current study challenges suppositions that equate director stock ownership with improved financial reporting and higher corporate governance quality, and it provides evidence that increased transparency is beneficial when director compensation plans threaten director independence.     

Subsidiary divestiture and acquisition in a financial crisis: Operational focus, financial constraints, and ownership

We exploit parent- and subsidiary-level data for publicly listed firms in Thailand before, during, and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to investigate the extent to which firms with different types of ownership restructure their business portfolios, in terms of divestitures and acquisitions. We compare restructuring choices made by firms mostly owned by (a) domestic individuals with block shares (family firms), (b) domestic firms and/or institutions (DI firms), and (c) foreign investors (foreign firms). We show that following the crisis (1) foreign firms' restructuring behavior is the least affected; (2) domestic firms owned by families and domestic institutions (DI) behave similarly to one another; (3) domestic firms do not increase divestiture in their peripheral segments to improve operational focus or to obtain cash in a credit crunch; they actually reduce divestiture in core segments; and (4) domestic firms also significantly reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries. Our results challenge traditional explanations for divestiture such as corporate governance, operational refocus, and financial constraints. They indicate that in the great uncertainty of a crisis, domestic firms are able to hold onto their core assets to avoid fire-sale. In essence, they act more conservatively in churning their business portfolios.     

Block ownership and firm-specific information

This study examines the impact of block ownership on the firm’s information environment. Previous research shows that stock price efficiency depends on the cost of acquiring private information, as well as on the precision of this information. Blockholders have a clear advantage over diffuse, atomistic shareholders in terms of the precision and acquisition cost of their private information. We hypothesize that this informational advantage will manifest itself primarily in the firm-specific component of stock returns. Our empirical findings confirm that blockholders increase the probability of informed trading and idiosyncratic volatility, and decrease the firm’s stock return synchronicity. These results hold for both inside and outside blockholders, but are insignificant for blocks controlled by employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Overall, our findings support the contention that ownership structure plays a significant role in shaping the firm’s information environment.     

运用信息技术促进金融创新提高金融信息服务水平

如何实现金融信息化?这是一个需要银行、保险、证券、税务等行业共同面对的课题。如何实现银行信息化?则需要人民银行和各商业银行以及IT企业一起回答。在日前召开的2002中国国际金融（银行）技术暨设备展览会上,银行数据大集中和管理信息化等话题成为备受关注的焦点。本刊特别刊发以几位银行系统高层管理者在第三届金融信息化发展论坛上的主题演讲为蓝本的精彩文章,以期与广大读者共同关注金融信息化的深层次问题,希望各界人士对此作进一步探讨。