Are complementary reforms a “luxury” for developing countries?

This paper investigates the impact of complementarity reforms on growth and how it depends on GDP per capita. Based on reform data for six policy areas compiled from various sources during the period 1994–2006 for over 100 countries, we compute composite indicators of reform level and complementarity. We provide qualitative justification for the existence of pair-wise complementarities among policy areas. We then use cross-section and panel data estimates to test the effect of reform level and complementarity on GDP per capita growth. We found reforms to be positively related and their dispersion (or the inverse of complementarity) negatively related to growth, controlling for initial conditions, monetary stability and other structural and institutional variables, as well as endogeneity of reform level and complementarity. We show that the effect of policy complementarity is a stronger condition for sustainable growth in developing than in advanced countries, to conclude that complementary reforms are not a ‘luxury’ for developing countries.     

Understanding China’s monetary policy: an institutional perspective

Given China’s status as a large transitional economy, analysing the country’s monetary policy requires an understanding of the institutional and policy environment within which monetary policy operates. As China’s monetary policy has multiple objectives and the central bank is subordinate to the State Council in monetary policy decisions, addressing deep-rooted structural issues and improving governance and institutions are essential so that monetary policy can be more focused and effective. Confronted with the Impossible Trinity dilemma, China faces daunting challenges in tackling the inevitable policy choice between monetary autonomy and exchange rate control as its capital account increasingly liberalises. This article analyses China’s unique and evolving monetary policy framework from an institutional perspective and evaluates the challenges to monetary management and reforms. Relevant policy implications for monetary policy implementation are also discussed.     

The Policy Anticipation Hypothesis: Evidence from the Federal Funds Futures Market

In an era of increasingly transparent policy making by the Federal Reserve, market participants appear to interpret each economic announcement based on the implication for monetary policy. As a result, when macroeconomic news arrives economic agents revise their expectations of upcoming policy decisions and interest rates move accordingly. This article provides empirical support for this policy anticipation hypothesis utilizing the Federal funds futures market to proxy for policy expectations. The results indicate that once one controls for the role of policy anticipation the impact of many announcements on bond yields becomes statistically insignificant. (JEL E4 , E5 , G1 )     

SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS CARE ABOUT REGIONAL IMBALANCES?

Regional imbalances may arise both as a result of asymmetric shocks and of divergent responses to symmetric shocks, such as monetary policy shocks. This paper analyses flexible inflation targeting when regional imbalances are included in the loss function. By adding regional imbalances, the time‐inconsistency problem in monetary policy becomes more complex. The paper analyses alternative institutional arrangements designed to improve the discretionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an over‐ambitious output target, it is shown that the outcome of monetary policy is improved if the central bank places less weight on regional imbalances than the political authorities.     

Stock Market Responses Under Quantitative Easing: State Dependence and Transparency in Monetary Policy

This paper evaluates the effects of unconventional monetary policies adopted by the Bank of Japan from the year 2001 to 2006. A new measure is proposed to identify a nontraditional monetary policy shock from policy packages under the zero lower bound of short‐term nominal interest rates during the quantitative easing period, using data on intraday 3‐month Euroyen futures rates. We find that stock markets do not react to a policy surprise in an expected manner and negatively respond to a monetary easing surprise. Moreover, we find an asymmetric response during a boom and a recession and a nonlinear reaction because of increasing uncertainty concerning future inflation dynamics and the enhancement of monetary policy transparency. Our result suggests that it is difficult to implement unconventional monetary policy to manage agents’ expectations and a ‘lean against the wind’ policy to prevent asset bubbles, particularly at the zero bound.     

The role of monetary policy credibility in explaining the decline in exchange rate pass-through in South Africa

This paper investigates the key factors that explain the documented decline in the exchange rate pass-through in South Africa over the past two decades. The paper finds that this outcome is largely due to improved monetary policy credibility. The South African Reserve Bank has become more credible since the adoption of the inflation target regime through improved communication, transparency, and independence. We show that credibility is enhanced through a gradual disinflation process and reduction of inflation volatility. As result, expectations of agents have become well-anchored at levels that are consistent with its objectives of keeping inflation within the official target range of 3–6 percent even in the presence of external shocks. This in turn reduces the exchange rate pass-through. This finding is important from a monetary policy perspective not only for South Africa but other emerging economies such as Turkey as it shows that improving monetary policy credibility is a key ingredient to reducing exchange rate pass-through.     

Asymmetric monetary policy rules in Australia

In this study, the hypothesis that the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) implements an asymmetric monetary policy rule is tested. We estimate both linear and asymmetric monetary policy reaction functions for the period before inflation targeting was adopted, for the period when inflation targeting was explicitly adopted and for the full sample period. The results of the linear monetary policy rules are consistent with the estimates reported from other studies that estimate linear monetary policy rules for Australia. On the other hand, the results of estimating the asymmetric monetary policy rules for the pre-inflation targeting period shows that the RBA had reacted symmetrically, suggesting that it had acted with the same aggressiveness towards both inflation and output gaps of the same magnitude, over both phases of the business cycle. However, for the inflation targeting period, the results show that the RBA had reacted asymmetrically in its policy response to the inflation gap, output gap or both. A similar result is found for the full sample period. This asymmetric response supports the view that a non-linear monetary policy rule emanated from asymmetric preferences, rather than from the existence of a non-linear Phillips curve.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous households and imperfect risk-sharing

This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.     

货币政策透明度指数:理论方法与实证检验

文章通过建立货币政策透明度指数,并利用我国金融市场的利率数据进行检验,认为我国中央银行在基准利率调整和准备金率改变等重大政策决策上,货币当局更倾向于采用模糊的政策操作方式,由此可能会导致市场预期的混乱,并最终对政策实施效果产生负面影响。因此,我国有必要借鉴西方国家的政策操作经验,进一步有选择地增加货币政策操作的透明度,并借以最终建立一个简单透明、效率更高的政策调控框架。     

货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起

本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Financial market segmentation,stock market volatility and the role of monetary policy

We study a segmented financial markets model where only the agents who trade stocks encounter financial income risk. In such an economy, the welfare-maximizing monetary policy attains the novel role of redistributing the traders' financial market risk among all agents in the economy. In order to do that, optimal monetary policy reacts to financial market movements; it is expansionary in bad times for the financial markets and contractionary in good ones. In our quantitative exercise, a dividend shock generates different policy responses and consumption paths among the optimal and the 2% inflation targeting policy. The latter implies large distributional welfare losses and risk sharing losses of similar magnitude with those generated by business cycle fluctuations. In addition, the optimal monetary policy does not minimize stock price volatility and implies lower inflation volatility than other commonly used policies.     

Central bank design with heterogeneous agents

We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.     

Australian Monetary Policy in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century

This paper was delivered as the 1998 Shann Memorial Lecture. It describes the evolution of Australia's monetary policy over the past 25 years. It focuses on three aspects of this development: first, improvements to the institutional structure; second, the search for the optimal policy framework; and third, the issue of central bank independence. Particular attention is paid to the period between the end of monetary targeting (1985) and the introduction of inflation targeting (1993).     

Fiscal policy,macroeconomic performance and industry structure in a small open economy

We analyse how fiscal policy affects both the macroeconomy and the industry structure, using a multi-sector macroeconomic model of the Norwegian economy with an inflation targeting monetary policy. Our simulations show that the magnitude of the government spending and labour tax cut multipliers, whether monetary policy is active or passive, is comparable to what is found in the literature. A novel finding from our simulations is that the industry structure is substantially affected by an expansionary fiscal policy, as value added in the non-traded goods sector increases at the expense of value added in the traded goods sector. Moreover, expansionary fiscal policy reduces the mark-ups in the traded goods sector, while the mark-ups are roughly unchanged in the non-traded goods sector. The contraction of activity in the traded goods sector increases when monetary tightening accompanies the fiscal stimulus. Hence, we find that such a policy mix is likely to produce significant de-industrialization in a small open economy with inflation targeting.     

货币政策透明度的趋势、制度安排和宏观经济环境

近年来,透明度已经成为货币政策主要的特征之一,提高货币政策的透明度正在演变为一个国际趋势。根据Geraats(2009)使用Dicer和Eichengreen(2009)收集的数据测算的E-G指数,发现世界范围内货币政策的透明度已经取得了显著提高,但实践中呈现出执行较高行政透明度和经济透明度,而实行较低程序透明度和政策透明度的变化趋势;同时,还讨论了与透明度变化趋势相适应的制度安排及宏观经济环境。     

Transparency and central bank losses in developing countries

Recent evidence shows central banks suffering from losses in some developing countries. This is a surprise to economists and policymakers. At the same time, these banks are asked to conduct monetary policy within a more transparent framework. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the following question: Would more transparency in developing countries suffering from central bank losses be beneficial?This paper shows that the cost constraints of conducting monetary policy, central bank losses, in both transparency and opacity alike is significant and affects positively the error of the private sector in expected inflation rate and the output gap. In a country suffering from central bank losses, the expected benefits of transparency and the existence of cost constraint move in two opposite directions. As a result, it is unwise for developing countries suffering from central bank losses to focus on transparency. Priority should be given to fixing monetary policy and to developing financial markets.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.     

Indexing Out of Poverty? Fiscal Drag and Benefit Erosion in Cross-National Perspective

We assess how tax-benefit policy developments in 2001–11 affected the household income distribution in seven EU countries. We use the standard microsimulation-based decomposition method, separating further the effect of structural policy changes and the uprating of monetary parameters, which allows us to measure the extent of fiscal drag and benefit erosion in practice. The results show that despite different fiscal effects, policies overall mostly reduced poverty and inequality and both types of policy developments had sizeable effects on the income distribution. We also find that the uprating of monetary parameters not only had a positive effect on household incomes, meaning fiscal drag and benefit erosion were avoided, but generally also contributed more to poverty and inequality reduction than structural policy reforms.