A new‐institutionalist perspective on ISO 14000 and Responsible Care

This paper examines why US firms are lukewarm towards ISO 14000 while the US chemical industry has enthusiastically adopted Responsible Care. It also briefly explores why European and Asian firms are eagerly adopting ISO 14000. Employing a new‐institutionalist framework it argues that firms have incentives to adopt beyond‐compliance voluntary programs only if they perceive excludable benefits exceeding excludable costs. Institutions, the central conceptual pillar in a new‐institutionalist framework, are important in shaping perceptions of benefits and costs and the extent of their excludability. US regulators can encourage adoption of ISO 14000 by granting attorney–client privileges and enhancing levels of regulatory relief. Firms, in turn, need to appreciate the political constraints of the EPA on this issue. They could relax these constraints by addressing the apprehensions of EPA’s key constituents. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval

This paper empirically examines the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the length of time required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and approve new-drug applications between 1990 and 1992. The approach treats regulatory decisions as endogenous and explains the variation in regulatory behavior as a function of differences that exist between firms and drugs. Results show that, controlling for drug-specific characteristics, regulators respond to firm-specific characteristics when evaluating new drug applications. For instance, firms that are less diversified and more R&D-inten-sive receive shorter review times for their new-drug applications than more diversified and less R&D-intensive firms. The reason is that most firm characteristics signal information to reviewers about either firm reputation or application quality. This information reduces reviewers' uncertainty about approving a dangerous or ineffective drug and leads to faster review times. The results suggest that regulators respond to the heterogeneities among firms in the pharmaceutical market in systematic ways.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on IFRS Adoption Choices

We investigate the association between corporate governance strength and EU listed firms' choices with respect to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in 2005. We measure governance strength by aggregating variables such as board independence, board functioning and audit committee effectiveness. The firms exhibit heterogeneity in both compliance and disclosure quality; some firms do not even meet the minimum disclosure requirements. Regression results show that stronger governance firms disclose more information, comply more fully and use IAS 39's carve-out provision less opportunistically. These findings are germane to accountants, managers and regulators in countries soon to adopt IFRS.     

International Financial Reporting Standards and Private Firms’ Access to Bank Loans

Prior research has focused on publicly listed firms when examining the economic consequences of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This study extends the literature by examining the ability of private firms to attract bank loans through the use of IFRS. Based on firm-level data from 25 countries, we show that private firms that voluntarily use IFRS are associated with a higher propensity to attract debt from foreign banks. We find no such association when examining their relationships with domestic banks. Supplementary analyses show that the results are mainly driven by private firms operating in countries with strong regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that, conditional on adequate enforcement, the use of IFRS provides useful information for foreign non-relationship banks.     

Hiring,firing, and relocation under employment protection

We analyze how hiring and firing costs as well as firing regulatory delays affect firms’ hiring, firing, and relocation policy with a stochastic control model. These frictions are substantial; e.g. the firing delay can be almost a year. In the model hiring and firing costs depend on the firm size and the number of people hired or fired. Based on our simulations, hiring and firing elasticities without relocation are highest with respect to demand and productivity volatility and the hiring and firing variable costs. The elasticity of firing due to relocation is highest with respect to the firm-sized firing cost.     

Global value chains,local collective action and corporate social responsibility: a review of empirical evidence

A key debate in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature is the tension between global pressures and local responses. Developing country suppliers often grumble that CSR compliance adds costs. Yet, local collective action, articulated through industry associations, can potentially reduce costs and promote local embeddedness of CSR initiatives. Through case study analysis, this paper considers how demands for CSR compliance prompted collective action responses in selected developing country export industries. We argue that differences in collective responses can be partially explained by how local export industries are inserted into global value chains. We distinguish between ‘highly visible’ value chains, led by internationally well known brands as lead firms, and relatively ‘less visible’ chains, where external CSR pressures come from a variety of sources, including less dominant lead firms, international/national regulatory frameworks and national media. This differentiation suggests a possible trade‐off between the independence and the embeddedness of collective CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms

We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily independent. Among other things, we show that regulated firms issue more debt, invest more, and enjoy higher regulated prices when they face more independent regulators, are more privatized, and when regulators are more pro‐firm. Moreover, regulatory independence, higher degree of privatization, and pro‐firm regulatory climate are associated with higher social welfare.     

The Implications of Trade Credit for Bank Monitoring: Suggestive Evidence from Japan

Firms in modern developed economies borrow from both banks and trade partners. Using Japanese manufacturing data from the 1960s, we estimate the price of trade credit, and explore some of the ways firms choose between the credit and bank loans. We find that firms of all sizes borrow heavily from their trade partners, and at implicit rates that track the explicit rates banks would charge. They borrow from banks when they anticipate needing money for relatively long periods; they turn to trade partners when they face short-term unexpected exigencies. This apparent contrast in the term structures follows, we suggest, from the fundamentally different way bankers and trade partners cut default risk. Because bankers seldom know their borrowers' industries first hand, they rely on formal legal protection (like security interests). Because trade partners know the industry well, they reduce risk by monitoring their borrowers closely instead. Because the costs to creating legal mechanisms are heavily front-loaded, bankers focus on long-term debt; because the costs of monitoring debtors are ongoing, trade creditors do not. Apparently, banks monitor less than we have thought.     

Urban search models under high-relocation costs. Theory and application to spatial mismatch

We develop a search-matching model in which mobility costs are so high that it is too costly for workers to relocate when a change in their employment status occurs. We show that, in equilibrium, wages increase with distance to jobs and commuting costs because firms need to compensate the transportation cost difference between the employed and unemployed workers at each location in the city. We also show that the equilibrium land rent is negatively affected by the unemployment benefit because an increase in the latter induce firms to create less jobs, which, in turn, reduces the competition in the land market. We then use this model to provide a mechanism for the observed spatial mismatch between where black workers live and where jobs are. We finally show that a transportation policy consisting in subsidizing the commuting costs of black workers can increase job creation and reduce unemployment if the level of the subsidy is set at a sufficiently high level.     

The MultiJurisdictional Disclosure System: Model for Future Cooperation?

This study investigates whether the MultiJurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) was successful in meeting its stated objectives, namely, facilitating cross-border offerings and reporting by Canadian firms. The MJDS is a bilateral agreement implemented in July 1991 between Canadian and US market regulators. It is hypothesized that facilitating crossborder offerings via the MJDS will lead to an increase in the number of US listings by Canadian firms and reduced costs of US listing for extant Canadian listers. Data evaluated include changes in US exchange listings from 1987 to 1995 and questionnaires to two subgroups of Canadian firms: (1) the population of Canadian firms listing their securities in US and Canadian markets and (2) a sample of Canadian firms listing only on Canadian exchanges. We conclude that for most Canadian firms, the MJDS provides no significant benefit. Further, few firms reported that the MJDS affected their decision to list in the United States. Our results suggest that the MJDS has not, overall, provided the benefits originally envisioned under it, and we question whether it is an appropriate model for future cooperation between national regulatory groups.     

Barriers to the circular economy in European small and medium‐sized firms

The concept of the circular economy (CE) is currently gaining impetus as a way to move towards sustainable, low‐carbon, resource‐efficient, and competitive economies. However, despite the potential benefits of CE activities, their implementation remains relatively rare. We use a cross‐sectional survey of European small and medium‐sized firms (SMEs) to identify the main barriers firms face to promote the CE, focusing specifically on the following: those related to a lack of resources (human and financial) and capabilities (expertise) and those related to the regulatory framework (administrative procedures and the costs of meeting the regulations). Our results indicate that it is the complexity of administrative/legal procedures and the costs of meeting regulations/legal standards that constitute the most significant barriers, whereas the lack of human resources is also perceived to be an obstacle by firms engaged in CE activities. Those obstacles may be considered revealed barriers, and it is only when the firms become involved in these activities that they actually perceive them. Furthermore, when we consider the breadth of CE activities, administrative procedures and regulations once again emerge as the most significant obstacles. Finally, we stress the need to distinguish between different CE activities given that the perception of barriers differs substantially across these activities. Firms undertaking a disruptive innovation redesigning products and services to minimize the use of materials are more likely to perceive all barriers as important. However, firms implementing such activities as minimizing waste, replanning energy usage, and using renewable energy only perceive those obstacles related to administrative procedures and regulations.     

Bank capital regulation,loan contracts,and corporate investment

This paper studies the link between bank capital regulation, bank loan contracts and the allocation of corporate resources across firms’ different business lines. Credit risk is lower when firms write contracts that oblige them to invest mainly into projects with highly tangible assets. We argue that firms have an incentive to choose a contract with overly safe and thus inefficient investments when intermediation costs are increasing in banks’ capital-to-asset ratio. Imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs.     

Misallocation,informality, and human capital: Understanding the role of institutions

The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of formal-sector institutions in shaping the demand for human capital and the level of informality. We propose a firm dynamics model where firms face capital market imperfections and costs of operating in the formal sector. Formal firms have a larger set of production opportunities and the ability to employ skilled workers, but informal firms can avoid the costs of formalization. These firm-level distortions give rise to endogenous formal and informal sectors and, more importantly, affect the demand for skilled workers. The model predicts that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by relatively lower stocks of skilled workers, larger informal sectors, low allocative efficiency, and measured TFP. Moreover, we find that the interaction between entry costs and financial frictions (as opposed to the sum of their individual effects) is the main driver of these differences. This complementarity effect derives from the introduction of skilled workers, which prevents firms from substituting labor for capital and in turn moves them closer to the financial constraint.     

Negative Incentives and Regulatory Capture: Noncompliance with Price Ceilings on Essential Medicines in India

Nonmarket scholars have paid limited attention to noncompliance as an alternative strategy to capture regulators; yet noncompliance is particularly consequential given its potentially significant negative externalities. We exploit rich data on price ceilings introduced in India in 2013 on 255 essential medicines to test whether noncompliance by other firms drives the focal firm's noncompliance decision. Our results indicate that noncompliance by other firms, particularly those with larger products in the market, is positively associated with a focal firm's noncompliance. The focal firm's scope and sales positively moderate this relationship. Overall, our study indicates that firms are more likely conclude that the potential benefits of regulatory capture using negative incentives outweigh the potential financial and social costs in the presence of a greater number of firms that are already noncompliant. As such, our study draws attention to negative incentives as an important yet largely overlooked nonmarket strategy.     

Investment Frictions and the Aggregate Output Loss in China

Investment frictions reduce, delay or protract investment expenditure that is necessary for firms to capture growth opportunities. Using a capital adjustment costs framework, this article estimates the gap between China's actual and frictionless aggregate output. It applies the method of simulated moments to a fully structural investment model on a panel of Chinese firms and takes into account potential unobserved heterogeneities and measurement error in the data. The estimated capital adjustment costs imply that if Chinese firms had faced a lower level of adjustment costs such as in the US, China's aggregate output would be 25% higher.     

Workforce location and equilibrium unemployment in a duocentric economy with matching frictions

This article examines unemployment disparities and efficiency in a duocentric city where workers are non-uniformly distributed between the two job centers. We introduce commuting costs and search-matching frictions to deal with the spatial mismatch between workers and firms. In a decentralized economy job-seekers do not internalize a composition externality they impose on all the unemployed. With symmetric job centers, a change in the distribution of the workforce can lead to asymmetric equilibrium outcomes. We calibrate the model for Los Angeles and Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Simulations suggest that changes in the workforce distribution have non-negligible effects on unemployment rates, wages, and net output, but cannot be the unique explanation of a substantial mismatch problem.     

Institutional quality and corporate financing decisions around the world

We investigate the influence of the recent comprehensive institutional quality dimensions of Karolyi (2015), such as market capacity, operational efficiency, foreign accessibility, corporate transparency, legal protection, and political stability, on financing decisions of firms across 56 countries between 2000 and 2015. We find that stronger institutional quality or lower fundamental risks in a country ease firms' access to long-term debt, and equity financing. We attribute our results to institutional environments influencing financing decisions by shaping the severity of market frictions, such as agency conflicts and information asymmetry, and transaction costs. As a result, we conclude that any improvement in a country's institutional environment will boost firms' access to long-term financing, and thus longer-term investments that promote countries' economic growth will be more feasible. Our findings are robust to potential endogeneity issues.     

Determinants and Consequences of a Voluntary Turn Away from IFRS to Local GAAP: Evidence from Switzerland

Abstract

We examine determinants and consequences of a turn away from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), thereby exploiting a unique feature of the Swiss setting in which listed firms are allowed to switch from IFRS to Swiss GAAP, all else being equal. We posit that net benefits of IFRS are less for small firms with higher insider ownership. In addition, we predict that the net benefits of IFRS are not constant over time because of changes in IFRS and/or changes in firm-specific circumstances. To the extent that the switching firms’ costs of IFRS reporting outweigh its benefits, we do not predict adverse capital-market effects after a switch. Consistent with predictions, we find that (a) small firms with higher insider ownership and fewer foreign investor holdings are more likely to switch, (b) increasing reporting costs as well as changes in firm-specific circumstances affect switching propensity, (c) switching firms substantially reduce their disclosures after they switch, and (d) switching firms neither experience a decrease in liquidity nor negative announcement returns. Overall, our findings are important for standard setters and securities regulators in shaping (future) reporting requirements for listed firms.     

Performance compensation contracts and CEOs’ incentive to shift risk to debtholders: An empirical analysis

The paper investigates the relationships among CEO incentive contracts, manager ownership, charter value, and bank risk taking. We analyze whether the presence and magnitude of incentive contracts induce CEOs of financially distressed firms and firms with high manager ownership to take unprofitable risks that shift wealth from debtholders to equity holders. Our sample focuses on banks that had both the incentive and opportunity to shift risks, and compares them with those that did not. We compare weak and strong banks in periods when the banks’ principal creditor, the FDIC, was a lenient and then a stringent monitor. The evidence is consistent with bonus compensation inducing CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debtholders only if they do not have large insider ownership. The evidence is also consistent with these contracts rewarding CEOs for their effort to manage unforeseeable risk albeit not their ability. Low charter value banks with high managerial ownership took profitable risk during the lenient regulatory period.     

Search in the product market and the real business cycle

Empirical evidence suggests that most firms operate in imperfectly competitive markets. We develop a search-matching model between wholesalers and retailers. Firms face search costs and form long-term relationships. Price bargain results in both wholesaler and retailer mark ups, which depend on firms' relative bargaining power. We simulate the general equilibrium model and explore the role of product market search frictions for business cycles. We conclude from the simulation exercise that incorporating product market search structure and shocks improve the standard real business cycle model to reproduce US business cycle fluctuations.