Financial Intermediaries,Credit Shocks and Business Cycles

We document the cyclical properties of aggregate balance sheet variables of the US commercial banks: (i) Bank credits and deposits are less volatile than output, while net worth and leverage ratio are several times more volatile, (ii) bank credits and net worth are procyclical, while deposits, leverage ratio and loan spread are countercyclical. We then present a real business cycle model with a financial sector to investigate how the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates and balance sheet variables of the US banks are influenced by empirically disciplined shocks to bank net worth. Both calibrated and estimated versions of the model show that these financial shocks are important not only for explaining the dynamics of financial flows but also for the dynamics of macroeconomic variables. We find that the recent deterioration in aggregate net worth of the US banking sector contributed significantly to the 2007–09 recession.     

Risky bank lending and countercyclical capital buffers

We study the properties of a monetary economy with an essential role for risky bank lending. Banks issue deposits and lend to entrepreneurs. Because banks׳ lending rate cannot be made contingent on aggregate shocks, and because banks face capital adequacy regulations, they require a capital buffer against loan losses. Capital adequacy regulations are modeled on the Basel-III rules, including a minimum capital adequacy ratio, an endogenous capital conservation buffer, and a countercyclical capital buffer. We find that a countercyclical capital buffer leads to a significant increase in welfare. It also reduces the need for countercyclical adjustments in policy interest rates.     

Does financial regulation affect the profit efficiency and risk of banks? Evidence from China's commercial banks

The goal of financial regulation is to enable banks to improve liquidity and solvency. Stricter regulation may be good for bank stability, but not for bank efficiency. This research aims to examine whether banks have met the CBRC's standard of financial regulations and explores how the previously implemented financial regulations have affected bank efficiency and risk in the past. In addition, we also explored the trade-off relationship between efficiency and risk. Unlike other studies, this study used bank assets as a classification standard from the financial risk and differential regulatory perspective.The empirical results indicate that the CBRC regulates the provision coverage ratio and cost-to-income ratio, which seems relevant to large banks and the loan-to-deposit ratio, capital adequacy ratio, and leverage ratio, which seems relevant to small banks. The CBRC regulates the current ratio to reduce the risks of banks. Based on our empirical results, the current ratio did not affect the risks and led to different efficiency results between large and small banks. In an environment with asymmetric information, a bank decision-making is unobservable. The characteristics of financial regulation provide market clues if a bank is operating at the most efficiency and risk condition.     

Financial fragility,sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs

We show that with intertwined weak banks and weak sovereigns, bank recapitalizations become much less effective. We construct a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks lending to firms and holding domestic government bonds. Bond prices reflect endogenously generated sovereign risk. This introduces a negative amplification cycle: after a credit crisis output losses increase more because higher interest rates trigger lower bond prices and subsequent losses at banks. This further tightens bank leverage constraints, and causes interest rates to rise further. Also bank recapitalizations are then much less effective. Recaps involve swaps of newly issued sovereign bonds for bank equity, the new debt increases sovereign debt discounts, leading to capital losses for the banks on their holdings of sovereign debt that (partially) offset the impact of the recapitalization. The favorable macroeconomic effects of bank recaps on the recovery after a financial crisis are correspondingly lower.     

Oil structural shocks,bank-level characteristics,and systemic risk: Evidence from dual banking systems

By performing a structural VAR analysis on oil price shocks, we provide an evidence on how the origins of oil price shocks impact the risk level of banks in oil-exporting countries and whether bank-level characteristics can influence the sensitivity of risk to oil shocks. When conducting panel regression analysis, we document the following findings. First, not all shocks have the same effect on bank risk. Due to oil supply shocks, the increase in oil price raises bank risk, whereas the similar increase in price due to economic expansion or oil-market specific demand reduces that risk. Second, the business model (whether the bank is Islamic or conventional), size, income diversification, profitability, and financial leverage influence the bank risk exposure to oil shocks differently. Third, the two major recent crises (global financial crises and COVID-19 pandemic) magnified bank risk exposure to oil supply shocks and speculative oil demand shocks. Overall, the structural oil shocks explain a large fraction of the variation in financial stability in GCC countries.     

Does bank capitalization matter for bank stock returns?

We examine US bank capitalization and its association with bank stock returns, and find that the book- and market-based capital ratios show different patterns. Fama-MacBeth regressions and portfolio analyses suggest that banks’ market-based capital ratios are negatively associated with banks’ stock returns during the (tranquil) 1994–2007 period while book-based capital ratios are positively associated with banks’ stock returns during the (turbulent) 2008–2014 period. These results suggest that the effect of bank capitalization on bank stock returns depends on the capital measure used and the period considered.     

Monetary policy and risk taking

We assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk-taking channel – monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We first present VAR evidence confirming that this channel exists and is particularly significant on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macroeconomic model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk. In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output.     

The granularity of the Brazilian banking market

Bank size distributions concentrate in a few large banks – the big “grains.” This fact means idiosyncratic shocks at the bank level do not cancel out, thus affecting the business cycle. Here, we present evidence of granularity in the banking market using Brazilian data. We examine the explanatory power of the granular banking residual of the five largest banks on quarterly GDP changes from 2010 to 2019. We conservatively find that shocks to revenues of these top five banks explain nearly one-fifth of GDP fluctuations.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

Leverage Dynamics and the Burden of Debt

In addition to leverage, the debt service burden of households and firms is an important link between financial and real developments at the aggregate level. Using US data from 1985 to 2017, we find that the debt service burden has sizeable negative effects on expenditure. Its interplay with leverage also explains several data puzzles, including the lack of above-trend output growth during credit booms and the severity of ensuing recessions, without appealing to large shocks or nonlinearities. Estimating the model with data up to 2005, it predicts credit and expenditure paths that closely match actual developments before and during the Great Recession.     

Was the 2007 crisis really a global banking crisis?

We argue that the 2007 crisis was not a global banking crisis. Stock prices of banks in emerging countries faced a temporary shock but quickly recovered, while stock prices of banks located in industrial countries remained much lower than before the 2007 crisis. Our results also suggest that stock prices of large banks were affected more during the crisis than those of small banks. We also find that managerial efficiency, loan quality, leverage, and the volume of outstanding loans affect bank stock prices.     

Accounting enlightenment in the age of reason

We scrutinize the role financial reporting for fair values, asset securitizations, derivatives and loan loss provisioning played in the Financial Crisis. Because banks were at the center of the Financial Crisis, we focus our discussion and analysis on the effects of financial reporting by banks. We conclude fair value accounting played little or no role in the Financial Crisis. However, transparency of information associated with asset securitizations and derivatives likely was insufficient for investors to assess properly the values and riskiness of bank assets and liabilities. Although the FASB and IASB have taken laudable steps to improve disclosures relating to asset securitizations, in our view, the approach for accounting for securitizations in the IASB's Exposure Draft that would require banks to recognize whatever assets and liabilities they have after the securitization is executed better reflects the underlying economics of the securitization transaction. Regarding derivatives, we recommend disclosure of more disaggregated information, disclosure of the sensitivity of derivatives' fair values to changes in market risk variables, and implementing a risk-equivalence approach to enable investors to understand better the leverage inherent in derivatives. We also conclude that because the objectives of bank regulation and financial reporting differ, changes in financial reporting needed to improve transparency of information provided to the capital markets likely will not be identical to changes in bank regulations needed to strengthen the stability of the banking sector. We discuss how loan loss provisioning may have contributed to the Financial Crisis through its effects on procyclicality and on the effectiveness of market discipline. Accounting standard setters and bank regulators should find some common ground. However, it is the responsibility of bank regulators, not accounting standard setters, to ensure the stability of the financial system.     

BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS AND THE BASEL ACCORDS: A SYNTHESIS

Abstract.  In order to survey the mechanisms through which the introduction of Basel II bank capital requirements is likely to accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, this paper brings together the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel of propagation of exogenous shocks and the literature on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the Basel Accords. We conclude that the theoretical models that revisit the bank capital channel under the new accord generally support the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis and that the magnitude of the procyclical effects essentially depends on (i) the composition of banks' asset portfolios, (ii) the approach adopted by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements, (iii) the nature of the rating system used by banks, (iv) the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves through time, (v) the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by the banking institutions, (vi) the improvements in credit risk management and (vii) the supervisor and market intervention under Basel II. The recent events and instability in financial markets all over the world have led the procyclicality issue to enter the agendas of several political international  fora  and some measures to mitigate procyclicality are being put forward. The bank capital channel literature should now play an important role in evaluating their effectiveness.     

The impact of government intervention on the stabilization of domestic financial markets and on U.S. banks’ asset composition

The 2007–2009 financial crisis that evolved from various factors including the housing boom, aggressive lending activity, financial innovation, and increased access to money and capital markets prompted unprecedented U.S. government intervention in the financial sector. We examine changes in banks’ balance sheet composition associated with U.S. government intervention during the crisis. We find that the initial round of quantitative easing positively impacts bank liquidity across all bank samples. Our results show a positive impact of repurchase agreement market rates on bank liquidity for small and medium banks. We conclude that banks have become more liquid in the post-crisis period, especially the larger banks (large and money center banks). We show that real estate loan portfolio exposures have reverted to pre-crisis levels for money center banks and remained flat for all other bank samples.     

Banks’ capital,regulation and the financial crisis

This paper investigates whether regulatory capital requirements play an important role in determining banks’ equity capital. We estimate equity capital regressions using panel data of a sample of 560 banks for 2004–2010. Our results suggest that regulatory capital requirements are not first order determinants of banks’ capital structure. We document differences on the effect of most factors on banks’ share of equity according to the type of bank and to the region of the bank. Finally, we show that the determinants of this share are sensitive to the recent international financial crisis and to a set of regulatory country factors.     

Bayesian counterfactual analysis of the sources of the great moderation

We use counterfactual experiments to investigate the sources of the large volatility reduction in US real GDP growth in the 1980s. Contrary to an existing literature that conducts counterfactual experiments based on classical estimation and point estimates, we consider Bayesian analysis that provides a straightforward measure of estimation uncertainty for the counterfactual quantity of interest. Using Blanchard and Quah's ( 1989 ) structural VAR model of output growth and the unemployment rate, we find strong statistical support for the idea that a counterfactual change in the size of structural shocks alone, with no corresponding change in the propagation of these shocks, would have produced the same overall volatility reduction as what actually occurred. Looking deeper, we find evidence that a counterfactual change in the size of aggregate supply shocks alone would have generated a larger volatility reduction than a counterfactual change in the size of aggregate demand shocks alone. We show that these results are consistent with a standard monetary VAR, for which counterfactual analysis also suggests the importance of shocks in generating the volatility reduction, but with the counterfactual change in monetary shocks alone generating a small reduction in volatility. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Did small or large US banks transmit more risk during the Subprime crisis?

This paper investigates bank size as a factor of risk transmission in the US banking sector during the Subprime crisis. Risk transmission is examined in two directions: from large to small banks and from small to large banks. To do this, we estimated a Spatial Autoregressive model using information on all US commercial banks from 2005 to 2010. Our results show that risk transmission from small to large banks appeared during early stages of the Subprime Crisis and transmission from large to small banks appeared later but was more long lasting.     

Prices,debt and market structure in an agent-based model of the financial market

We develop an agent-based model in which heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents interact by trading a risky asset at an endogenously set price. Agents are endowed with balance sheets comprising the risky asset as well as cash on the asset side and equity capital as well as debt on the liabilities side. A number of findings emerge when simulating the model: we find that the empirically observable log-normal distribution of bank balance sheet size naturally emerges and that higher levels of leverage lead to a greater inequality among agents. Furthermore, greater leverage increases the frequency of bankruptcies and systemic events. Credit frictions, which we define as the stickiness of debt adjustments, are able to explain a key difference in the relation between leverage and assets observed for different bank types. Lowering credit frictions leads to an increasingly procyclical behavior of leverage, which is typical for investment banks. Nevertheless, the impact of credit frictions on the fragility of the model financial system is complex. Lower frictions do increase the stability of the system most of the time, while systemic events become more probable. In particular, we observe an increasing frequency of severe liquidity crises that can lead to the collapse of the entire model financial system.     

Fiscal reform,bank solvency,and the law of unintended consequences: a CGE analysis of Mexico

Whether due to random economic shocks or deliberate policy measures, sudden relative price changes can lower bank solvency. Whereas “winners”—i.e., those sectors experiencing improved net prices for their output—aren’t obliged to share their good fortune with banks, “losers” my share their bad fortune by electing to default on bank loans. This paper presents a disaggregated dynamic computable general equilibrium model, used to analyze specifically how current policy proposals to stimulate savings might affect solvency in different sectors. We find surprising capital losses in pesos for two of the three policies simulated, which would leave domestic currency debtors substantially worse off.     

What makes Islamic banks different? A multivariate approach

Using data from 8615 banks (including 123 Islamic banks) in 124 developed and developing countries for the period between 2006 and 2012, we examine the financial characteristics that distinguish between conventional and Islamic banks. As banks’ financial characteristics are multi-faceted concepts, our indicators are constructed using principal component analysis. We find that Islamic banks are more capitalized, more liquid and more profitable, but have more volatile earnings compared to US and European banks. However, similarities in terms of liquidity and earnings volatility are more noticeable when the sample is limited to banks operating in countries where both systems coexist. Finally, we find that higher capital makes the returns of Islamic banks more volatile, while higher liquidity decreases the profitability of conventional banks.