Economic transition and the rise of alternative institutions

The economic transition from socialism in Russia has not resulted in the emergence of impersonal, rule-based institutions. Instead, the natural demand for institutions that protect property rights has led to the emergence of alternative, inefficient institutions such as that of cronyism – the practice of appointing personal acquaintances of the political leader to key positions. A political leader not constrained by institutions appoints cronies, as competent subordinates are more prone to switching allegiance to a potential challenger. As competence makes a bigger difference in a rule-based environment, such a leader has no interest in any institutional development. In a simple empirical exercise, using a dataset that covers the richest Russians, we find a positive and significant effect of direct connections to the personal circle of President Putin on the wealth of businessmen. The magnitude of the effect varies at different levels of rents available for redistribution and ‘network centrality of a businessman’: it is higher during the years of high oil prices, but is attenuated by the prominence of the businessman in the network.     

循环经济:从理想到现实的系统工程

从传统工业经济向循环经济转型,不仅意味着经济形态的转变,更意味着社会与文化形态的深刻变革。物质技术层面为循环经济的发展构筑了物化平台和技术层面的可能性;制度行为层面为循环经济的发展提供了社会运作的制度框架;从传统工业文明向生态文明的转型触及传统工业文明的精神内核,是保障循环经济良性发展的社会依托。     

财政分权、腐败与治理

财政分权对经济发展的影响已经成为转轨经济学研究的重要问题之一。大多数经济学家往往只看到财政分权对经济发展的促进作用,却忽视了在制度供给失衡的情况下,尤其是对像中国这样的转轨经济而言,它对长期经济发展是不利的,会产生诸如腐败等问题。文章运用中国省级面板数据检验了财政分权与腐败之间的关系。结果表明,财政分权恶化了腐败问题。因此,有必要通过完善财政分权体制来缓解其负面效应,这将有利于中国经济健康发展。     

Entrepreneurship prompts institutional change in developing economies

The Review of Austrian Economics - Entrepreneurship plays a pivotal role for institutional change and economic development in transition and developing economies. Formal and informal institutions...     

我国事业单位分类改革问题研究

事业单位是我国独有的机构组织,对推动我国的社会进步、促进我国社会主义现代化建设、推进我国经济发展起到重要的作用。随着改革开放的深化,我国市场经济体制不断完善,事业单位也要与市场经济体制相适应,对自身的管理机制、组织架构等进行改革。针对事业单位分类改革中出现的体制、管理、财政等方面的问题,进行了相应的分析,并提出了相关的对策建议。     

What explains persistent inflation differentials across transition economies?1

We document that a persistent inflation differential has opened across different groups of transition economies since 2001, with the CIS‐West seeing particularly high outcomes. We consider a range of non‐monetary explanations discussed in the literature (economic structure, policy and institutions), and controlling for economic shocks, we find a role for political stability, as emphasized in previous cross‐country work. However, our results suggest that lagging internal and external liberalization have been the key disincentives to disinflation. Consequently, lower inflation targets would not be credible in the absence of stronger structural and monetary policy frameworks.     

Economic Convergence,Capital Accumulation,and Income Traps: Empirical Evidence

This paper examines the factors that increase the likelihood of economic transition to higher income status, thereby attempting to answer the question of why some economies move to a higher income country group while others do not. Using a quintile income distribution approach, we identify 62 economies that moved to a higher quintile income group in each decade from 1960s to the 2010s out of a sample of 182 economies. Our findings show that higher physical and human capital growth and oil revenues are significantly associated with a greater probability of transitioning to higher quintile income group, although their effects vary not only across income groups within a sample period but also across different periods. Our results indicate that economies that have attained substantial capital accumulation (either physical or human, or combination thereof) and/or are blessed with natural resources have avoided income traps and demonstrated a successful and often steady transition to higher income groups.     

Geography,geopolitics, and policy in the performance of transition economies

The economic performance of the transition economies as of 2015 is well explained by three variables: (1) years of membership in the EU; (2) physical distance from the heart of the EU economy, taken to be Dusseldorf; and (3) annual revenues from oil and gas production, reflecting natural resource deposits. These three factors account for around 86 percent of the variation in per capita income across the 28 transition economies, and reflect the interplay of domestic policy, geopolitics, geography and natural resources.     

Reexamining the relationship between inflation and growth: Do institutions matter in developing countries?

Using a large panel of countries during the period 1950–2009, we estimate the inflation thresholds above which its association with economic growth is expected to be negative, taking into account differences in institutions across countries. First, in line with previous literature, we find that the estimated threshold is substantially higher for developing countries compared to that of developed countries. However, we further show that the inflation threshold in developing economies falls when we consider reduced groups that exceed certain levels of institutional quality. We also find that the cost of inflation increases with the quality of institutions.     

Seeds of Corruption – Do Market Institutions Matter?

Ten years into the transition process, corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon thatcan seriously jeopardize the best intentionedreform efforts. Because of the complex anddeep political economy dynamics surroundingthe process transition economies areundergoing it is essential for policy-makersto understand the causes of corruption. Thispaper develops an integrated analyticalframework of the role basic marketinstitutions play as determinants ofrent-seeking and illicit behavior intransition economies. Using data onlyrecently available on the incidence ofcorruption and institutional development inthese economies, we provide preliminaryevidence on both the systemic links betweendevelopment of market institutions andincentives for corruption and the relativeimportance of such institutions. The mainlesson from our analysis is that awell-established system of marketinstitutions – one characterized by clear andtransparent rules, fully functioning checksand balances, including strong enforcementmechanisms, and a robust competitiveenvironment – reduces rent-seekingopportunities and, in turn, the incentives forcorruption. The empirical results suggestthat high barriers to new business entrantsand soft budget constraints on incumbent firmsare particularly important institutionalfactors engendering opportunities andincentives for corruption. As in otherstudies, the empirical results also supportthe notion that economic development andmaturation of democratic processes both tempercorruption, as does, to a lesser extent,openness to trade.     

The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

The long term impact of economic development in developed countries on developing countries since 1820

The linkages between the economic development of developed and developing countries are analyzed historically. The analysis is divided into epochs, distinguished by global trade regimes and by common characteristics of long term economic growth. The break throughs in long distance transport technology which occured during the industrial revolution created a global economy in which the rythm of economic activity in developing economies became linked to that of developed economies. The major transmission mechanisms were international trade, international migration and international capital flows. Exports were the main engine of growth in developing countries. But the effects of export expansion varied across countries. The speed of transmission of the industrial revolution to developing countries depended on their institutional readiness; countries with most developed capitalist institutions in factor markets were the first to develop. The extent of diffusion of the benefits of growth from export expansion within developing countries also depended on the nature of their institutions, both economic and political. Finally, policies with respect to international trade, investment and agriculture were also critical to the speed and diffusion of economic development.The research underlying this paper is the result of a twentyfive year collaboration with Professor Cynthia Taft Morris. She is indebted to the World Bank for financing the research in this paper as part of the background studies for the World Development Report 1991. She is also indebted to Sherman Robinson for his comments.     

Determinants of cross‐border bank acquisitions in transition economies1

We analyse the microeconomic determinants of cross‐border bank acquisitions in 11 transition economies over the period 1992–2006. We find that foreign banks target relatively large and efficient banks when they enter transition economies with weak institutions. This evidence provides support for the ‘market power’ hypothesis. However, when foreign banks enter more developed transition economies that have made progress in economic reform, they acquire less efficient banks. This result is in line with the efficiency hypothesis. We use a multilevel mixed effects logit model that allows us to explicitly incorporate the macroeconomic and institutional heterogeneity of the transition economies into our analysis.     

Legal institutionalism: Capitalism and the constitutive role of law

Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates for inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm. Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development and are also vital for developing economies.     

Frontiers and sustainable economic development

Exploiting new resource “frontiers,” such as agricultural land and mineral reserves, is a fundamental feature of economic development in poor economies. Yet frontier-based development is symptomatic of a pattern of economy-wide resource exploitation in developing economies that: (a) generates little additional economic rents, and (b) what rents are generated are not being reinvested in other sectors. Such development is inherently unsustainable. The following paper explains this phenomenon, and provides evidence that long-run expansion of agricultural land and oil and natural gas proved reserves across poor economies is associated with lower levels of real income per capita. The paper proposes a frontier expansion hypothesis to explain why the structural economic dependence of these economies on frontier land expansion and resource exploitation is not conducive to sustained long-run growth. The key to sustainable economic development in poor economies will be improving the economic integration between frontier and other sectors of the economy, targeting policies to improved resource management in frontier areas and overcoming problems of corruption and rent-seeking in resource sectors.      

A Feminist Comparative Economic Systems

Abstract

This study proposes that feminist research be integrated into the field of comparative economic systems (CES) and that CES return to its traditional institutionalist methodologies to facilitate more complete analyses of economic systems and feminist alternatives to these systems and institutions. The study describes the evolution of CES, drawing attention to an increasing reliance on econometric modeling that reflects a shift in focus away from systems. An inventory of research on women and gender that has appeared in CES journals and textbooks finds little on topics other than formal labor markets in transition economies. The study contrasts this literature on women and gender in transition economies to research on this topic by women from transition economies, a literature that CES journal authors do not reference. It concludes by proposing a feminist economics approach that focuses on gender-differentiated impacts of economic systems, analyses of households, and equity as a measure of progress.     

The co‐development of economies and institutions

In this study, we model the Schumpeterian growth theory in a simple discrete‐time framework in which both economies and institutions need to be developed. Individuals need to borrow from an imperfect financial market to develop an economy. A government can adopt two potential strategies for improving the borrowing capacity of individuals and, as a result, enhancing economic performance: ‘the rule of law’ and ‘industrial policies’. We interpret market‐oriented reform in transition economies as a shift from ‘industrial policies’, exemplified at the extreme by the traditional planned economy, to ‘the rule of law’. The presented model shows that both strategies could be the best choice at different stages of development.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

制度变迁、金融结构与经济增长--基于中国的实证研究

本文采用理论分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,从理论上分析了制度变迁、金融结构调整与经济增长三者之间的相互作用机理;从实证上通过在金融结构与经济增长模型中引入能够综合反映制度变迁的制度变量,验证了国家制度变迁对一国金融结构与经济增长会起到促进或制约的作用.当制度供给与金融结构和经济增长对制度的需求达到均衡时,国家制度安排会优化金融结构、促进经济增长,否则便会出现规模与效率的"反比"现象,从而回答了转型国家规模与效率的悖论问题,进而给出了我国金融结构升级的选择路径及相关政策建议.     

中国地区工资水平差异的影响因素分析

本文运用模块数据和空间计量学的方法考察了中国改革开放以来影响地区工资水平及地区工资非均衡的各种政策体制因素和经济因素。实证结果表明,中国的地区工资水平及其差异既受制度变迁的影响又受市场机制的作用,具有典型的转型特征。具体而言,工资体制、对外开放、所有制改革、地方保护、教育水平和资本投入等因素对地区工资水平及其差异都有不同程度的影响作用。