Confidence in Keynes and Hayek: Reply to Burczak

We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the economic environment in a world with novel events. We think the evidence favors our view over Burczak's. Finally, we put in a plea for framing the issues in a way that facilitates empirical testing.     

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups. We assume that agents are located in different villages, cities, etc. The groups are the agents of the same village. We introduce a rule for dividing the cost of connecting all agents to the source among the agents taking into account the group structure. We characterize this rule with several desirable properties. We prove that this rule coincides with the Owen value of the TU game associated with the irreducible matrix.     

Mixed Duopoly with Product Differentiation: Sequential Choice of Location

We investigate the sequential choice of location in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare–maximising public firm competes against a profit–maximising private firm. We examine the desirable role of the public firm in a mixed market. We also consider the effect of price regulation. We find that the public firm should become the follower (leader) if a price regulation is (is not) imposed. We also find that neither price regulation nor privatisation of the public firm improves welfare.     

Economic depression in the world

We create a dataset of country experience with economic depression around the world. We define a depression episode as a period of cumulative decline in per capita output of 20% or more lasting at least four years. We find depressions are surprisingly common. We describe their incidence and onset over decades, regions, and levels of development. We identify economic, political, financial, and cultural variables that are associated with depressions. Probit analysis reveals that the probability of entering or exiting a depression is influenced by domestic and international shocks.     

Testing the integrability of consumer demand functions: Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1973

The purpose of this paper is to implement a new econometric methodology for testing the theory of consumer behavior. We begin by fitting systems of indirect and direct demand functions without requiring integrability. We then impose restrictions on the parameters of these functions implied by integrability. We test restrictions corresponding to homogeneity, summability, symmetry, nonnegativity, and monotonicity of systems of demand functions. We formulate tests based on two-sided critical intervals for restrictions that take the form of equalities. We employ tests based on one-sided critical intervals for restrictions that take the form of inequalities. We present empirical results for tests of integrability for German time series data on personal consumption expenditures for the period 1950–1973.     

The ‘Puzzles’ methodology: En route to Indirect Inference?

We review the methods used in many papers to evaluate DSGE models by comparing their simulated moments with data moments. We compare these with the method of Indirect Inference to which they are closely related. We illustrate the comparison with contrasting assessments of a two-country model in two recent papers. We conclude that Indirect Inference is the proper end point of the puzzles methodology.     

Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts

We compare the characteristics of real-world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory. We do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. The distinguishing characteristic of VC financings is that they allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights. We describe and measure these rights. We then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories. We also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights.     

Illiquidity, position limits, and optimal investment for mutual funds

We study the optimal trading strategy of mutual funds that face both position limits and differential illiquidity. We provide explicit characterization of the optimal trading strategy and conduct an extensive analytical and numerical analysis of the optimal trading strategy. We show that the optimal trading boundaries are increasing in both the lower and the upper position limits. We find that position limits can affect current trading strategy even when they are not currently binding and other seemingly intuitive trading strategies can be costly. We also examine the optimal choice of position limits.     

Imperfect public choice

We model imperfect governments with public choices that are sequential, myopic and not free of error. We first use this framework to explore governmental incremental budgeting. We argue that a model of bounded rationality is required to capture the empirical reality of incremental budgeting. We then provide a model that integrates bounds errors and systematic errors. We argue that the empirical evidence is that bounds errors and systematic errors are inextricably intertwined—some level of bounded rationality is required for systematic errors to emerge. We use this to explore political information lobbying. A testable hypothesis is that lobbyists will focus efforts on policy-makers of low ability. We show that choosing leaders with high ability, that is Madison's wisdom to discern, is important, especially when policy decisions concern dangerous products (rifles) or dangerous environments (pandemics).     

Globalization, rent protection institutions, and going alone in freeing trade

We construct a two-country North-South Product-cycle model of trade with endogenous growth and trade barriers. We remove the scale effects on growth by incorporating rent protection activities by Northern incumbents. We examine the effects of two forms of globalization - an expansion of the relative size of the South and unilateral trade liberalization by either country. We find that the location of rent protection institutions and the sectoral trade structure determine whether or not globalization raises steady-state economic growth. We demonstrate that for accelerating worldwide economic growth, contrary to conventional wisdom, unilateral Northern trade liberalization is preferable to bilateral trade liberalization.     

Responsiveness to priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice

We consider the priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice. We weaken the responsiveness to affirmative action policy by requiring at least one minority student to be weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We find that under both the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycles mechanism at least one minority student becomes weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We also strengthen the responsiveness to affirmative action policy by requiring all minority students to be weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We call this property strict responsiveness to affirmative action policy. We find that there is no nonwasteful, individually rational, mutually best, and strategy-proof mechanism that is strictly responsive to affirmative action policy. We then find a sufficient condition for the affirmative action policy to satisfy for the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism to be strictly responsive to affirmative action policy by setting restrictions on the priority improvements made by the policy.     

Where are we in the political economy of reform?

We review the experiences of developing countries with market-oriented reforms, using the tools of modern political economy. We impose intellectual discipline by requiring that actors behave rationally using available information and that basic economic relationships such as budget constraints be accounted for. We attempt to integrate two approaches, one based on dynamic games played by interest groups, with one that focus on limited information and the dynamics of learning.

We describe the “starting point” as the set of “old” policies and we attempt to explain the dynamics (political, economic and informational) that lead to reform (section II). We analyze strategies for reformers subject to political constraints (section Ш). We evaluate the aggregate and distributional costs of reforms, emphasizing the importance of looking at the right counterfactuals (section IV).

We conclude by pointing to the challenges ahead: the second-stage institutional reforms necessary to take off from underdevelopment.     

The impact of the judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards

We investigate the influence of a judge’s objective function on the type of sanctions used for enforcing environmental standards. We focus on the difference between monetary and non-monetary penalties. We examine the extent to which judges take social costs of sanctions into account when making judgments in court in the context of environmental violations. We also conduct an empirical analysis to test the main findings of the theoretical model using court data from several Belgian jurisdictions. We find that besides minimizing environmental damages judges also take social costs of sanctions into account in their decision-making.     

ESTIMATION WITH CENSORED REGRESSORS: BASIC ISSUES*

We study issues that arise for estimation of a linear model when a regressor is censored. We discuss the efficiency losses from dropping censored observations, and illustrate the losses for bound censoring. We show that the common practice of introducing a dummy variable to “correct for” censoring does not correct bias or improve estimation. We show how censored observations generally have zero semiparametric information, and we discuss implications for estimation. We derive the likelihood function for a parametric model of mixed bound‐independent censoring, and apply that model to the estimation of wealth effects on consumption.     

Information technology investment and firm performance in US retail trade

We examine the relationship between investments in information technology (IT) and retail firm performance. We use untapped firm and establishment micro data from the Censuses of Retail Trade and the Assets and Expenditures Survey. We show that large firms account for most retail IT investment, employment, and establishment growth. We find evidence of a significant relationship between IT investment intensity and productivity growth.     

Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort

Summary. We provide a characterization of participants' behavior in a contest or tournament where the marginal productivity of effort varies across contestants and individual productivity is private information. We then consider the optimal design of such a contest. We first analyze contestant behavior for the usual type of contest, where the highest output wins. Abilities need not be independently distributed. We demonstrate that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium output function, that output is increasing in ability, and that marginal effort is increasing in ability, while effort decreases when the cost of effort increases. Next we consider the case where the highest output need not win, with independently distributed abilities. We analyze the contest designer's decisions in choosing contest rules optimal from her perspective. We show that the output produced, probability of winning, and contest designer's expected revenue are generally increasing in contestants' ability. We examine the relationship between the marginal cost of producing output and marginal utility per dollar of the net award for winning. Received: July 30, 1998; revised version: August 7, 2000     

Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state‐owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm. We also consider endogenous roles by adopting the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We find that, in contrast to Pal (1998) discussing a case of domestic competitors, the public firm should be the leader and that it becomes the leader in the endogenous role game. We also find that in contrast to Ono (1990) eliminating a foreign firm does not improve domestic welfare in mixed oligopolies.     

Nonlinear dynamics in CEE stock markets indices

We investigate the existence of nonlinearities in the dynamics of the returns of stock markets indices from CEE economies. We use several types of nonlinear tests. We discuss the implications of the results with respect to the efficient market hypothesis.     

Fire‐sale FDI? The Impact of Financial Crises on Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze the evolution of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to developing and emerging countries around financial crises. We empirically examine the Fire‐Sale FDI hypothesis and describe the pattern of FDI inflows surrounding financial crises. We also add a more granular detail about the types of financial crises and their potentially differential effects on FDI. We distinguish between mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investment, as well as between horizontal (tariff jumping) and vertical (integrating production stages) FDI. We find that financial crises have a strong negative effect on inward FDI in our sample. Crises are also shown to reduce the value of horizontal and vertical FDI. We do not find empirical evidence of fire‐sale FDI; on the contrary, financial crises are shown to affect FDI flows and M&A activity negatively.     

A two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model with physical and human capital accumulation

We study a two-country endogenous growth model in which the long-run growth is propelled by the accumulation of physical and human capital. We show that in the integrated world economy, there exists a unique and locally saddlepoint stable balanced growth equilibrium. We also show that the incorporation of adjustment costs in the process of human capital accumulation leads to a lower long-run growth rate. We then show that, in the 2-country world economy with international trade, balanced growth is possible. Finally, we present a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem concerning the pattern of international trade. We appreciate the constructive comments from an anonymous referee which have improved this paper significantly. We acknowledge also with gratitude the valuable comments of Hideyuki Adachi, Kosuke Aoki, Daniel Bernhofen, Eric Bond, Koichi Futagami, Ronald Jones, Tamotsu Nakamura and Raymond Riezman on earlier versions. We appreciate also the beneficial comments from the participants of the GEP conference on New Directions in International Trade Theory held in the University of Nottingham and of the Adachi OB Workshop in Kobe University.