Employee types and endogenous organizational design: An experiment

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and active monitoring. This paper reports the results from a stylized laboratory experiment designed to test whether subjects in the role of firm owner rely on the social preferences of other (‘employee’) subjects with whom they are matched when choosing which payoff version of a simple trust game these employee subjects should play (‘the organizational mode’). Our main finding is that they do so, albeit in a different way than theory predicts. The importance of the first mover's social preferences for trusting behavior is recognized by the owner subjects, but the significant (first order) impact second movers’ social preferences have on trusting behavior of first movers seems to be overlooked.     

The social cost of living index

Household cost of living indexes reflect household preferences; analogous indexes for groups of households require a corresponding concept of group preferences. In this paper I investigate the ‘social cost of living index’, a group index based on the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. I first define the index and examine its properties under the assumption that the investigator constructing it expresses his distributional judgments in an explicit Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function; I then examine the ‘maximizing society’ and the ‘independent society’, two cases in which the index can be constructed from the information contained in the market demand functions. In these two cases a Laspeyres index (i.e. the fixed weight index based on the reference consumption pattern) is an upper bound on the exact social cost of living index. In general, however, the assumptions required to place bounds on the social cost of living index are much more likely to be satisfied than those required to place analogous bounds on a household's cost of living index.     

Networked innovation and coalition formation: the effect of group-based social preferences

In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences, such as ‘group belonging’ or ‘peer approval’, influence the stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large-scale surveys of open-source software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable but mixed coalitions.     

Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals' socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility, we employ panel data to construct ‘objective’ measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals. We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than ‘general mobility’ indexes. We also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one's position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the American society offers 'equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.     

Households' Preferences and Exchange Rate Overshooting

Abstract

This paper uses a ‘New-Open-Economy Macroeconomic’ model to study the effect of a shock to Households' preferences on exchange rate dynamics. The special features of the model are that Households' preferences exhibit a ‘catching-up with the Joneses’ effect and that international financial markets are imperfectly integrated. Results of numerical simulations of the model demonstrate that these features imply that, in an otherwise standard ‘New-Open-Economy Macroeconomic’ model, a shock to Households' preferences can give rise to an overshooting of the exchange rate.     

Weeds in the Ivy: college admissions under preference constraints

In a series of cases spanning more than three decades, the courts have attempted to establish boundaries on the permissible use of racial preferences in college admissions. Proponents of these policies believe that race-based preferences are needed to create a diverse student body that facilitates effective learning and social inclusion. Opponents of such policies contend that racial preferences are inherently discriminatory and eliminating them would yield a more able student body. Whereas race-based preferences have garnered the most attention, elite colleges regularly employ other types of preferences, including those for alumni and talented athletes. To inform this important policy debate, we develop a simple model comprised of a rational college administrator that maximizes a linear combination of student body ability and the college endowment through the choice of race, legacy and merit admission shares. We find that relaxing the racial-preferences constraint can produce a ‘less-able’ student body even when the college administrator places greater weight on student body ability than she does on the college endowment. The change in admissions policy may serve only to increase the number of admissions that can be ‘sold’ to wealthy alumni through legacy preferences and thereby foster the growth of weeds in the Ivy.     

Optimal Pollution Abatement Under ‘Sustainable’ and Other Social Time Preferences

This paper analyses optimal pollution abatement expenditure and the pricing of pollution under alternative social time preferences, including ‘sustainable’ preferences, defined as those that are consistent with two axioms of sustainable development introduced by Chichilnisky (Land Econ 73:467–491, 1997). These axioms state essentially that neither the welfare of present nor future generations ought to be favoured over the other in determining the socially optimal path of economic development. The method is to calibrate a modified Ramsey model of optimal global growth and saving, where pollution is generated by the global output of goods and services. Pollution in turn reduces output. The simulation results illustrate how sensitive the optimal pollution price and abatement expenditure can be over time to assumptions about the social time preference rate. They also show that ‘sustainable’ preferences impose a lower burden on future generations in terms of the pollution price and abatement expenditure. Hence there is a case for governments to make explicit their value judgments about intergenerational welfare, in the context of their notion of sustainable development, when setting target pollution abatement levels and pollution prices over time.     

Liberty,equality, and impossibility: some general results in the space of ‘soft’ preferences

This paper is concerned with examining the mutual compatibility of the ethical principles of equity and liberty in a social choice framework of ordinally formulated vague preferences. With sufficiently weakened versions of the liberty and equity principles, one can secure an existence result in a ‘relation‐functional’ setting. However, difficulties tend to re‐appear in a ‘choice‐functional’ setting, when one subscribes to the notion that while preference may be vague, choice must perforce be exact.     

Balancing the risk of ‘Lazearian’ interrupters and the benefits of educational and social peers: tracing parental preferences for class-size reduction

Using Danish survey data from a choice experiment, parental preferences for class-size reduction are estimated. While parents with children in large classes are willing to pay for class-size reduction, parents with children in small classes are reluctant and even express negative utility for further class-size reduction. We interpret this as parents balancing the risk of ‘Lazearian’ interrupters and the benefits of educational and social peers when forming their preferences for class size.     

A new definition of and role for preferences in positive economics

Positive economic models aim to provide truthful explanations of significant (aspects of) economic phenomena. While the notion of ‘preferences’ figures prominently in micro-economic models, it suffers from a remarkable lack of conceptual clarity and rigor. After distinguishing narrow homo economicus models (self-interest maximization) from broader ones (preference satisfaction) and rehearsing the criticisms both have met, I go into the most promising attempt to date at addressing them, developed by Hausman. However, his definition of preferences as ‘total comparative evaluations’, I argue, plays into the general disregard that economists have for human psychology. My alternative definition of preferences as ‘overall comparative evaluations’ – and hence as one of the many factors that influence people’s behavior – allows for more adequate causal explanations of people’s dutiful, committed, and norm-guided actions. Against Hausman but in agreement with Sen, it also allows for (motivated) counterpreferential choice.     

Mutual advantage, conventions and team reasoning

This paper proposes a conception of mutual advantage as a motivation for cooperative behaviour. This motivation is contrasted with the ‘emotional’ reciprocity that is represented in current theories of social preferences. The paper explores parallels between mutual advantage and Humean analyses of convention and between mutual advantage and theories of team reasoning.     

‘Us’ and ‘Them’: the origin of identity,and its economic implications

Abstract We investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. We propose an evolutionary explanation: we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival. In an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would distinguish between insiders and outsiders. We then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios, one entailing rent‐seeking behaviour and the other involving public good provision. Our results are in conformity with empirical evidence.     

CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES, PREFERENCE CHANGES AND THE 'SAMARITAN'S DILEMMA'

This paper examines the desirability of an exogenously induced change in the preferences of individuals in an economy characterized by (i) asymmetrical, localized positive consumption externalities, (ii) private, non-market, negotiation-free transfers, and (iii) the ‘Samaritan's dilemma.’ A model is analysed in which a benefactor (individual 1) makes an unrestricted voluntary transfer to a beneficiary (individual 2) who ran use the transfer to increase 2's consumption of either a purely private good x or a good y that generates external benefits for 1. Once 1 makes a transfer to 2, 1 cannot control how 2 spends it. If 2 fails to take into account this externality, then good y is under consumed and a loss in social welfare results. When such externalities and their concomitant welfare losses arise, conventional solutions are frequently inappropriate, impractical or impossible. This power shows that exogenously inducing the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences by the benefactor and the beneficiary not only increases the benefactor's transfer and the beneficiary's consumption of good y but also produces a ‘socially superior’ state. The welfare improvement is measured in terms of a welfare criterion that is based on the initial and new preferences of each individual     

A dynamic small open economy model with involuntary unemployment

Abstract It is well known that real business cycle small open economy (SOE) models rely on Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) preferences to match the countercyclical trade balance observed in open economies, as well as other second moments, while standard preferences à la King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) are commonly labelled ‘ineffective,’ owing to their inability to yield the countercyclical trade balance. In this paper, I show that an SOE model with standard preferences and ‘involuntary’ unemployment with efficient risk sharing can obtain a countercyclical trade balance and match main empirical regularities in small open economies.     

Karl Polanyi on economy and society: a critical analysis of core concepts

The Review of Social Economy was founded to highlight the irreducible social aspects of economic activity. Yet, the nature of the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ are both unresolved, and they are much more problematic than often assumed. This article probes Karl Polanyi’s depiction of the relationship between the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ and subsequent discourse on ‘embeddedness’. In his Great Transformation (1944) Polanyi associated the ‘economic’ with motives of material gain, while ‘social’ referred to norms of reciprocity and redistribution: his distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ then focused primarily on different kinds of motivation. But in a 1957 essay he brought in different kinds of institutions that engender different types of motivation. Polanyi (1944) argued that after 1800 Britain was transformed into a market-oriented ‘economic’ system, based on motives of greed and material gain. He also proposed that an effective market system had to be ‘self-adjusting’ and free of political interference, despite his important additional claim that the state was involved in its creation. Some of Polanyi’s core concepts and arguments are contradictory and problematic, and need to be reconsidered, especially if his enduring insights are to be salvaged.     

‘Linear’ income tax cuts: distributional effects,social preferences and revenue elasticities

The paper examines differential (yield-equivalent) distributional effects, social welfare and voting preferences as well as revenue elasticities of alternative ‘linear’ income tax cuts, each of which is progressivity-neutral with respect to a local progressivity measure. Judged by all criteria, there exists a unique preference for an income tax cut that preserves initial residual progression (or a tax increase that preserves initial liability progression).     

Oil,Local Content Laws and Paternalism: Is Economic Paternalism Better Old,New or Democratic?

Abstract

Although paternalism has long been studied, the ‘new paternalism’ has received relatively little attention, and much less attention in the oil and gas industry where interferences into preferences centre more strongly on the supply, rather than on the demand, side. The ‘choice architects’ in Ghana have succeeded in nudging local businesses to go into the provision of services for the oil industry and the supply of goods and services needed in the petroleum sector. Yet, the new paternalism in the petroleum industry has had major limitations too, including re-enforcing systemic inequality and labour exploitation, while paying scant attention to the destruction of local content. These problems can only be addressed through systemic redistribution, structural transformation of the economy, comprehensive social protection and deliberate interventions for ecological sustainability. In this process of social change, an embrace of old paternalism will not do neither will asserting a new paternalism as the philosophy behind local content laws and policies. A philosophy and praxis of democratic paternalism provide a surer path for more effective transformation.     

Global equilibrium dynamics with stationary recursive preferences

We study the global dynamics of capital accumulation for a general two-sector model which is not necessarily convex and where preferences of an infinitely-lived agent are stationary but not additively separable. We obtain monotonicity and convergence results for capital under ‘normality’ assumptions on preferences and factor intensity assumptions on technology. We then derive results on oscillatory dynamics under alternative factor-intensity conditions or under the assumption of inferiority of ‘future utilities’. Finally, in an exchange model with two agents we show that utilities will be monotonic or oscillatory depending on the normality or inferiority of the preferences.     

Personhood and Human Richness: Good and Well-Being in the Capability Approach and Beyond

This paper aims at developing the Capability Approach's (CA) underlying philosophical anthropology and ethics by focusing on the work of its major exponents, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. I first discuss CA's critique of happiness as subjective well-being and defend the idea of ‘flourishing’ which ultimately refers to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia. I then focus on the notions of ‘good’ and ‘well-being’ and address the problem of the compatibility between a substantive notion of the Good (expressed through universal moral values) and individual preferences. I thus tackle the issue of adaptive preferences (which is investigated both from a methodological and an ethical perspective) and suggest that the process of adaptation should be thought in the dynamic frame of the constitution of the self. Therefore, in the second half of the paper I investigate the CA's idea of personhood and focus on some important assumptions behind its underlying anthropological model – above all the notion of ‘human richness’. As a result, I first point out the dynamic dimension of personhood, according to which individuals are ‘becoming themselves’ in search of self-realisation and construction of their identities. Second, I highlight its relational dimension, according to which every one is the expression of the anthropological richness and at the same time represents the highest possibility of richness for every other one.     

An evening at the theatre: using choice experiments to model preferences for theatres and theatrical productions

This article examines people's preferences and demand for live theatre. It investigates the preferences for people attending a regional theatre, Northern Stage in Newcastle, in relation to other live theatres they could attend, and in relation to the attributes of theatrical productions and ticket price. It uses a Stated Preference (SP), discrete choice experiment, to assess people's utility and Willingness To Pay (WTP) for the different attributes of theatrical productions. The model assesses the effect of the attributes of plays on choice; and the impact of Socio-Economic (SE) and demographic variables on choice and demand. Results reveal the heterogeneity of theatregoers’ tastes for different types of plays and ticket prices. The models reveal the significance of ‘reviews’ and ‘Word Of Mouth’ (WOM) opinions on plays, as the most important variables determining choice.