Two scenarios for Europe: “Europe confronted with high energy prices” or “Europe after oil peaking”

A significant change in trends regarding energy prices (in particular oil) has taken place in 2003 at the beginning of the Iraq War. It has revealed a very strong tension between oil prices on the one hand and the relationship between global oil supply and demand on the other. The strong growth rates of emerging economies up to 2008 have generated a very sharp increase in oil prices. The temporary economic recession of 2008-2009 has resulted in turn into a significant decrease of oil prices, down to a level which remained, however, twice as high as that of early 2003. With the economy recovering from the recession, it is highly probable that energy prices will continue to increase and that Europe will be confronted with high energy prices in the coming decades. Against this general background, two scenarios have been elaborated which differ mainly by the time of occurrence of oil peaking.¹ The differences between the scenario hypotheses are therefore differences of context in relation to exogenous factors. Policies are also considered in the scenarios, but they are not at the forefront and their impact is considered as limited in relation to that of exogenous factors.The first scenario “Europe in a context of high energy price” assumes that the process of oil peaking will not take place before 2030, but that oil price increase will nevertheless be sustained and substantial until then. Numerous adjustments will have to be made in the economy and their territorial impacts will be significant (less polycentricity, more compact cities, decline of the importance of road and air transport). The second scenario “Europe after oil production peaking” assumes that oil production will peak around the mid-2010s (followed by gas production peaking around 2025), despite significant investments to increase production. In a context of steadily growing oil and gas demand, Europe will be confronted with serious economic difficulties. The territorial impacts will be different from those suggested by the first scenario, with stronger pressure put on rural areas and a loss of attractiveness of large cities related to increasing unemployment and social tensions. In both scenarios, the countries of central and eastern Europe will be more severely hit by the new energy context.The scenarios were elaborated in 2005 and slightly reviewed in 2009 in order to take account of the impacts of the economic recession in Europe and of the growing concerns about climate change.     

University of Texas Roundtable on Financing and Managing Energy Investments in a Low‐Price Environment

During the past 18 months, the U.S. oil industry has seen oil prices plunge from well over $100 a barrel to under $30. In a session that was part of a recent Private Equity Conference at the University of Texas in Austin, the CEO of a small independent producer and a representative of a large global oil and gas company discussed the challenges of financing and operating energy companies in today's low‐price environment with the director of energy research at a brokerage firm, the senior partner responsible for the natural resource investments of a well‐known private equity firm, and the head of the oil and gas restructuring practice of a national law firm. The panelists appeared to reach a consensus on at least the following three arguments:

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