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1.
We study a model of Bayesian persuasion between a designer and a receiver with one substantial deviation from the standard setup—the designer offers once and for all a single statistical experiment from which the receiver can acquire costly i.i.d. signals over time. Taking a 2-state-2-action environment and employing a tractable continuous-time framework, we fully characterize the optimal persuasion policy. When the receiver features high skepticism, the optimal policy is to immediately reveal the truth, which is true for a large set of primitives. We construct the designer’s maximum payoff and find a discontinuous drop in it as compared with the standard model. Unlike in many standard persuasion models, the designer is not able to appropriate all the rents of information disclosure while the receiver often achieves the highest possible benefit from being able to repeatedly sample from the strategically offered information structure. 相似文献
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C. Jill Stowe 《Economics of Governance》2009,10(2):147-164
This paper incorporates morale into a standard principal-agent model. When morale is observable, the worker’s effort level, the optimal piece rate, and the firm’s expected profits are all generally increasing in the worker’s level of morale. Furthermore, under reasonable conditions, higher-morale individuals are more responsive to incentives. Finally, when considering morale interdependence, conditions are derived which determine optimal organization strategies in terms of pooling or separating workers, and corresponding staffing policies are discussed. 相似文献
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G. E. Rodriguez 《Review of Economic Design》2007,10(4):341-361
This paper shows that the marginal value of a “small amount of non-output information” is generally non-positive in the context
of the standard principal-agent model involving moral hazard, which suggests a non-concavity in the value of information.
However, when both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, even a small amount of non-output information may exhibit
a positive incremental value in presence of a liability constraint.
相似文献
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This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes׳ rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each player׳s strategy is a function not only of the player׳s type but also of experience. Second, we show that each player׳s initial belief about the population distribution converges almost surely to a “correct” belief. 相似文献
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随着智能技术在远程教育中的应用,教师教育的关注点由教学方法的学习向自主的远程学习发展。在此背景下,通过智能Agent技术应用,解决教师个性化学习的需求,探索教师远程教育新模式。 相似文献
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This paper studies a case when the government levies a payroll tax on the employee (agent) of an enterprise. We use a continuous-time principal-agent framework to analyze the impact of the tax on the employee’s working strategy and derive an incentive compensation scheme. The agent is supposed to be aware of his pre-tax and after-tax salary. Under the theory of behavioral economics, loss caused by taxation is taken into consideration. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of principal’s profits is derived. By exploiting the HJB equation, we get several properties of the optimal contract. We also perform comparative statics to show our results. The model suggests that the agent’s utility loss enlarges as the tax rate increases. However, an increase in the tax rate does not always decrease principal’s profits. 相似文献
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How much can be learned from a noisy signal about the state of the world not only depends on the accuracy of the signal, but also on the distribution of the prior. Therefore, we define a general information system as a tuple consisting of both a signal technology and a prior. In this paper we develop a learning order for general information systems and characterize the order in two different ways: first, in terms of the dispersion of posterior beliefs about state quantiles and, second, in terms of the value of learning for two different classes of decision makers. The first class includes all agents with quasi-linear quantile preferences, and the second class contains all agents with supermodular quantile preferences. 相似文献
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We develop in this paper a novel portfolio selection framework with a feature of double robustness in both return distribution modeling and portfolio optimization. While predicting the future return distributions always represents the most compelling challenge in investment, any underlying distribution can be always well approximated by utilizing a mixture distribution, if we are able to ensure that the component list of a mixture distribution includes all possible distributions corresponding to the scenario analysis of potential market modes. Adopting a mixture distribution enables us to (1) reduce the problem of distribution prediction to a parameter estimation problem in which the mixture weights of a mixture distribution are estimated under a Bayesian learning scheme and the corresponding credible regions of the mixture weights are obtained as well and (2) harmonize information from different channels, such as historical data, market implied information and investors׳ subjective views. We further formulate a robust mean-CVaR portfolio selection problem to deal with the inherent uncertainty in predicting the future return distributions. By employing the duality theory, we show that the robust portfolio selection problem via learning with a mixture model can be reformulated as a linear program or a second-order cone program, which can be effectively solved in polynomial time. We present the results of simulation analyses and primary empirical tests to illustrate a significance of the proposed approach and demonstrate its pros and cons. 相似文献
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作业预算对企业内部契约的改进研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
在委托代理理论下,预算管理是实现企业外部契约的内部契约保障机制,可以较好地协调各级委托人与代理人之间的利益冲突。但传统的预算管理模式重点研究所有者对高层管理人员的激励与约束经济权衡,忽视了企业治理结构下权力的分层授权控制理论,造成了高层管理人员对中低层管理人员及操作人员控制与考核的理论与实务缺失。本文认为,采用作业预算可以填补传统预算管理存在的空白,对企业的内部契约进行有效改进,设计出可靠的业绩合同和业绩评价体系,能降低契约中的代理成本和博弈成本。 相似文献
10.
Alan Felstead 《International Journal of Human Resource Management》2018,29(4):664-682
It is frequently claimed that some employers act to maximise short-term gains at the expense of long-term rewards, hence reducing the level of employee training. In addition, during a recession such employers are expected to be the keenest to make further cutbacks. This paper examines the empirical validity of these two claims by examining the links between three proxies for short-termism and the incidence and volume of training activity as well as recession-induced changes to training expenditure and the proportion of the workforce trained. The results are based on establishment-level data taken from 67,599 private sector employers in England in 2009 and enriched with data from other sources (with sample sizes falling accordingly). The results suggest that short-termism plays a role in explaining both the level of training activity supported by employers and its sensitivity to the economic cycle. However, the results are rather ambiguous with one of the proxies suggesting that, contrary to theoretical reasoning, training incidence and volume is higher, not lower, in establishments which belong to stock market listed rather than unlisted enterprises. To make further analytical headway, then, direct measures of short-termism are needed rather than indirect, albeit improved, measures of the type used here. 相似文献
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近几年,注册会计师(CPA)行业造假事件层出不穷,公众对于CPA出具的审计报告是否具有可信性已产生极大的怀疑。针对CPA诚信危机这一现象本文从经济学角度加以剖析。 相似文献
12.
Gunter Maris 《Statistica Neerlandica》2005,59(1):70-81
We show that for the purpose of testing a classical null hypothesis the posterior predictive check of Rubin (1984) may be inadequate. This inadequacy is caused by the estimation of the nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis. We show that this problem can be solved if the parameters are estimated under the encompassing model. 相似文献
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基于贝叶斯网络方法的客户忠诚研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
提高客户忠诚是企业的核心原则。在与传统的数据挖掘及决策分析方法比较的基础上,提出了用贝叶斯网络方法来对客户忠诚进行研究。用贝叶斯网络方法对客户数据进行分析,确定影响客户忠诚的各因素之间的贝叶斯网络结构,得出这些因素之间的相互决定关系,为采取有效措施提高客户忠诚提供了理论依据。 相似文献
15.
We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the nonseparable form u(y−c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost c(a) and with distributions of returns y that depend on a. The decision problem is shown to be concave if the primitive of the cdf of returns is jointly convex in a and y, a condition we call Concavity of the Cumulative Quantile (CCQ) and which is satisfied by many common distributions. Next we apply CCQ to the distribution of outcomes (or their likelihood-ratio transforms) in the principal-agent problem and derive restrictions on the utility function that validate the first-order approach. We also discuss another condition, log-convexity of the distribution, and show that it allows binding limited liability constraints, which CCQ does not. 相似文献
16.
We consider whether survey respondents’ probability distributions, reported as histograms, provide reliable and coherent point predictions, when viewed through the lens of a Bayesian learning model. We argue that a role remains for eliciting directly-reported point predictions in surveys of professional forecasters. 相似文献
17.
We study abstract macroeconomic systems in which expectations play an important role. Consistent with the recent literature on recursive learning and expectations, we replace the agents in the economy with econometricians. Unlike the recursive learning literature, however, the econometricians in the analysis here are Bayesian learners. We are interested in the extent to which expectational stability remains the key concept in the Bayesian environment. We isolate conditions under which versions of expectational stability conditions govern the stability of these systems just as in the standard case of recursive learning. We conclude that Bayesian learning schemes, while they are more sophisticated, do not alter the essential expectational stability findings in the literature. 相似文献
18.
As growing sales of insurance contracts with a saving feature, an issue of sharing investment outcome gets the attention of insurers and policyholders. This paper focuses on a systematic way of finding the sharing mechanism for an optimal contract design in such a way that a policyholder and an insurer maximize their expected utilities. We adopt the policyholder and the insurer as a principal and an agent, respectively, and regard a share of the investment performance as an incentive for the insurer to elicit efforts. As a result of this setting, the moral hazard issue generated from the insurer is unavoidable. For the purpose, the Holmström (1979)’s principal-agent model with limited observability of the insurer’s action plays a leading role in resolving a pie-cutting problem. Under our model assumption, the sharing mechanism states that a portion of the outcome belonging to the insurer is a nondecreasing function of the excess of the portfolio return over a benchmark return when the two parties are risk-averse. In particular, the sensitivity of the sharing portion has an S-shape curve which is consistent with the insurer’s risk propensity.An empirical study based on companies’ portfolio attributes and crediting rates verifies that our theoretical findings are consistent with statistically significant results. In particular, we confirm that the bargaining power of the insurer has a considerable impact on the sharing mechanism as it is theoretically important. 相似文献
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为了解决我国铁路货运站数量过多、布局过密、难以产生规模效应等问题,借鉴经典的糖域(Sugarscape)模型,将Agent的智能性和人元模型中主客观属性综合考虑的特性相结合,建立了基于Agent-人元模型的铁路货运站布局模型。该模型将货主视为自主Agent,将货运站作为资源,Agent在寻求资源的过程中能量会发生变化,并根据自己的能量多少来引起货运站价值的变化。按照模型中设定的规则,对该模型进行了仿真分析,得到了一定范围内的货运站布局方案。从仿真结果可以看出,该模型将所研究的车站划分成保留站、待定站和取消站三类,这对于货运站布局优化以及战略装车点的设置具有指导性意义。 相似文献