担保物权制度改革降低了企业债务融资成本吗?——来自中国《物权法》自然实验的经验证据

本文运用双重差分法考察以《物权法》出台为标志的担保物权制度改革是否降低了企业的债务成本。实证结果显示,《物权法》出台后,与固定资产占比较高的企业相比,固定资产占比较低企业的债务成本显著降低。进一步,与《物权法》出台通过扩大可抵押资产范围、加强债权人保护等渠道降低企业债务成本的经济直觉一致,三重差分检验结果表明,担保物权制度改革对企业债务成本的降低作用表现出丰富差异性:其一,与法律制度环境较好地区相比,《物权法》对企业债务成本的降低作用在法律制度环境较差地区相对更大;其二,与金融市场化程度较高地区相比,《物权法》对企业债务成本的降低作用在金融市场化程度较低地区相对更大;其三,与融资约束较弱企业相比,对于融资约束较强的企业而言,《物权法》对债务成本的降低作用相对更强。这些基于中国经济实践的经验证据识别并揭示出了担保物权制度改革促使企业债务成本下降的作用机理,从而对有效缓解企业融资难、融资贵等问题具有借鉴意义。     

债务结构优化与企业创新——基于企业债券融资视角的研究

本文在我国保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景下,从债券融资的视角,探讨债务结构优化对企业创新的影响。研究发现,债券融资与企业创新之间显著正相关,表明债券融资优化企业债务结构、提升企业创新能力的积极作用占据主导地位。进一步研究表明:(1)债券融资能够通过降低整体债务融资成本并延长整体债务期限促进企业创新;(2)债券融资对于银行贷款存在溢出效应,即企业通过债券融资,还能降低银行贷款利率、延长银行贷款期限,进而促进企业创新;(3)产品市场竞争和代理问题会在一定程度上削弱债券融资对企业创新的促进作用;(4)不同类型的债券对企业创新能力的作用存在异质性,债券发行的便利性是其影响企业创新的一个重要因素。     

FINANCING INNOVATIONS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICES

The last two decades have seen a stream of innovation in financial markets, especially in corporate bonds. Some of these innovations—notably, hybrid debt—have provided firms with more flexibility in designing cash flows on borrowings, allowing them to match cash flows on financing more closely to cash flows on assets. In so doing, the use of such innovative securities has increased corporate debt capacity and hence firm value.
But if such changes have been mostly good news for corporate treasurers, the relentless torrent of innovation has sometimes resulted in firms issuing these new securities for the wrong reasons. Some have done so to take advantage of loopholes in the way ratings agencies and regulatory agencies define debt and equity—and others to exploit perceived pricing anomalies—without considering the effect of such securities on the firm's overall risk profile. In this context, it is worth noting that as corporate bonds have become more complex, investment bankers have made themselves indispensable to the process by providing pricing as well as selling support. This article aims to help managers distinguish when financing with complex securities serves their company's interests, and when it can end up hurting them.     

Long-Term Financing Decisions: Views and Practices of Financial Managers of NYSE Firms

This paper reports the findings of a 1990 survey of a sample of NYSE firms conducted to learn about the managerial opinions and practices with respect to longterm financing decisions. Relying on a hierarchy of financing sources is discovered to be a far more common practice among the sample firms than maintaining a target capital structure. The risk-return dimensions of the investment being financed are found to be the most important inputs in determining financing decisions. In spite of the perceived lack of fairness in the market pricing of their securities, the sample firms do not report making financing decisions to signal a need for reevaluation of their securities. Financial managers display a much greater flexibility with capital structure decisions than with either dividend policy decisions or investment decisions. The firms which attempt to maintain target capital structures are found to perceive the average debt ratios in their respective industries to be important determinants of their own debt ratios. The firms which follow financing hierarchies on the other hand, are found to view their firms' past profits and past growth to be important determinants of their debt ratios.     

Yield spreads,agency costs and the corporate bond call feature

This paper theoretically compares yields and optimal default policies for callable and non-callable corporate debt. It shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is possible for the yield spread (callable minus non-callable) to be negative. It also identifies the key determinants of the yield spread. Next, it shows that the optimal default trigger for non-callable debt is higher than the trigger for callable debt, resulting in additional default-related costs. Thus, the use of non-callable debt gives rise to an indirect agency cost of early default, which is the difference in total firm value with callable and non-callable debt. This agency cost provides a rationale for the existence of callable debt. By examining the determinants of the magnitude of this agency cost, the conditions that make callable debt more attractive (to the issuing firm) relative to non-callable debt are identified. This allows certain predictions to be made regarding the likelihood of a call feature in a corporate bond. The model's implications are supported by existing empirical studies.     

Corporate Behavior in Adjusting to Capital Structure and Dividend Targets: An Econometric Study

This study of financing decisions by U.S. corporations examines the issuance of long term debt, issuance of short term debt, maintenance of corporate liquidity, issuance of new equity, and payment of dividends. Given costs and imperfections inherent in markets, a firm's financial behavior is characterized as partial adjustment to long run financial targets. Individual firm data are used so that speeds of adjustment are allowed to vary by company and over time. The results suggest that financial decisions are interdependent and that firm size, interest rate conditions, and stock price levels affect speeds of adjustment.     

Nonfinancial Firms as Cross‐Market Arbitrageurs

I demonstrate that nonfinancial corporations act as cross‐market arbitrageurs in their own securities. Firms use one type of security to replace another in response to shifts in relative valuations, inducing negatively correlated financing flows in different markets. Net equity repurchases and net debt issuance both increase when expected excess returns on debt are particularly low, or when expected excess returns on equity are relatively high. Credit valuations affect equity financing as much as equity valuations do, and vice versa. Cross‐market corporate arbitrage is most prevalent among large, unconstrained firms, and helps account for aggregate financing patterns.     

Exploring the Agency Cost of Debt: Evidence from the ISS Governance Standards

Corporate governance is usually viewed in the context of strengthening shareholder rights and enhancing shareholders’ welfare. However, the impact of corporate governance on bondholders is much less understood. We explore how corporate governance influences the cost of debt financing. Using broad governance metrics encompassing fifty governance attributes reported by The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we document that stronger corporate governance is associated with a higher cost of debt. As governance strengthens by one standard deviation, the cost of debt rises by as much as 11 %. The results are robust even after controlling for both firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. Our results are important because they suggest that corporate governance has a palpable effect on critical corporate outcomes such as credit ratings and bond yields. More importantly, we show that, while corporate governance may mitigate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, it appears to exacerbate the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders (the agency cost of debt).     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

What we do and do not know about convertible bond financing

We review the literature on the issuance motives, shareholder wealth effects, and design of convertible bonds. Empirical studies on convertible debt issuance mainly focus on testing the predictions of four traditional theoretical models based on convertibles' potential to mitigate agency or adverse selection costs, and obtain mixed evidence. Recent studies on shareholder wealth effects of convertible bond issues highlight the need to control for arbitrage-related short selling and post-issuance risk changes. Studies on the determinants of convertible bond design uncover earnings management, as well as catering incentives to convertible arbitrage funds, as important determinants of innovations in convertible bond characteristics. Overall, our review indicates that recent empirical research on convertible debt provides valuable insights into issue motives and determinants of financial innovations, but also considers the broader question of how investor demand characteristics impact corporate finance decisions. We conclude with an overview of potential research questions to be addressed by future research on hybrid securities.     

CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES: A TOLLBOX OF FLEXIBLE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR CORPORATE ISSUERS

During the 1990s, convertible and equity-linked securities emerged as a major source of financing for U.S. corporate issuers. Issuance volume grew steadily throughout the decade and the secondary market value of U.S. convertible securities now exceeds $200 billion. In this overview of the market, the authors discuss the following: (1) the growth of issuance volume in the U.S. equity-linked market; (2) the basic characteristics of convertible securities; (3) convertible debt alternatives; and (4) convertible preferred alternatives.
As a result of the proliferation of new convertible structures, corporate issuers are now able to adjust coupon/dividend, conversion premium, and call protection in order to meet their tax, accounting, rating agency, and cost-of-capital objectives. Historically, the convertible new issue market has had a broad variety of issuers, spanning all industry sectors as well as both investment grade and high yield credits. But in the last two years, the most aggressive issuers have been technology-oriented companies, including telecommunications, Internet, hardware, software, and biotechnology concerns. Such technology-related issuers, which are often rated below investment grade and unable to secure straight debt capital, are generally in heavy-spending phases and view convertible bonds as a source of inexpensive financing. At the same time, investment-grade, "old-economy" issuers have continued to use convertible securities selectively, in most cases as cheap "quasi-equity" in the context of mergers and acquisitions, or as a tax-deferred strategy for selling cross-holdings of stock.     

Agency costs,taxes and debt: The UK evidence

This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.     

The Role of Investment,Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain

This paper analyses the determinants of ownership structure by focusing on the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions. The use of the Generalised Method of Moments allows us to provide new evidence on this important corporate governance topic, since it controls for the endogeneity problem. Our most relevant findings show that: i) increases in debt lead insiders to limit the risk they bear by reducing their holdings; ii) monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt; and iii) both inside and outside owners are encouraged to increase their stakes in the firm in view of higher dividends. Our results hold after controlling for equity issues and share repurchases.     

Corporate debt and financial balance sheet adjustment: a comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany

The level of UK corporate debt directly affects financial stability in the United Kingdom because a significant amount of the exposure of the UK financial system is to UK corporates. Our paper provides a comparison of the determinants of corporate debt in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The comparison serves to benchmark our findings about the determinants of UK corporate debt. In addition, the UK financial sector is significantly exposed to the corporate sectors in the United States, Germany and France. The model assesses the contribution of investment, acquisitions, cash flows and market-to-book values to the determination of debt, and also the tendency of debt to revert to its optimum level. Debt was found to be positively related to the financing needs of the firm, and the optimum level of debt to be negatively related to the market-to-book ratio. This casts some light on the procyclicality of debt.     

The real effects of bank taxation: Evidence for corporate financing and investment

This paper examines how bank taxation affects the financing decisions and investment activities of corporates. Exploiting exogenous tax variation at the bank level, we show that taxing banks' gross profits leads to higher bank leverage, and results in lower risk and credit supply. The contraction in credit supply has implications for corporate debt financing and investment activity. Corporates more exposed to banks subject to gross profit tax exhibit lower leverage and rely less on bank debt. Corporates partly offset lower bank financing by switching to bond financing. The cost of bond financing increases with corporate exposure to the tax. A greater exposure also impacts negatively on corporate investment activity. Overall, our results highlight the importance of bank taxation for corporate financing and investment decisions.     

Determinants and consequences of debt maturity structure: A systematic review of the international literature

We conduct a systematic review of the international research on the determinants and consequences of debt maturity structure in the accounting, finance, and corporate governance literature. Our review reveals that a large volume of empirical research has been conducted on the determinants of debt maturity structure, and we categorize these determinants into the following five factors: (1) firm specific; (2) tax; (3) corporate governance; (4) country-level institutional; and (5) macroeconomic. The literature on the consequences of debt maturity structure is relatively scant and generally focuses on the effect of debt maturity structure on financial reporting quality and investment and financing decisions. We consider endogeneity as one of the major concerns in the reported empirical studies that, unless addressed satisfactorily, may render some of the findings untenable. Based on the review, we also provide several future research directions.     

房地产企业债务期限结构及其优化研究——以沪深A股市场上市公司为例

基于债务融资成本理论,以沪深证券市场A股房地产上市公司为研究样本,实证考察债务融资期限结构对企业价值的影响,进而探讨债务期限结构的优化以实现企业价值的提升。通过逐步回归模型的实证分析结果表明,房地产企业债务期限结构与企业价值之间呈倒U型关系,行业最优债务期限结构比例均值为36.4929%,且抽样分析检验给出的最优长期债务比例区间为34%~38%。     

Corporate Financing Decisions: UK Survey Evidence

Abstract:  Despite theoretical developments in recent years, our understanding of corporate capital structure remains incomplete. Prior empirical research has been dominated by archival regression studies which are limited in their ability to fully reflect the diversity found in practice. The present paper reports on a comprehensive survey of corporate financing decision-making in UK listed companies. A key finding is that firms are heterogeneous in their capital structure policies. About half of the firms seek to maintain a target debt level, consistent with trade-off theory , but 60% claim to follow a financing hierarchy, consistent with pecking order theory . These two theories are not viewed by respondents as either mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Many of the theoretical determinants of debt levels are widely accepted by respondents, in particular the importance of interest tax shield, financial distress, agency costs and also, at least implicitly, information asymmetry. Results also indicate that cross-country institutional differences have a significant impact on financial decisions.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

Corporate bond yields and returns: a survey

Corporate bonds offer higher yields than government bonds with similar maturity. This higher reward comes at the cost of higher risk. The question then arises of how this risk is priced into corporate bonds. This literature review provides a classification and summary of papers studying corporate bond prices and the premium they offer to investors over the return on risk-free securities. The review ranges from theoretical models to empirical determinants of corporate bond prices. A specific section is dedicated to the liquidity impact as this component has received special attention.