Managerial discretion in the choice among financial reporting alternatives

This paper considers the role of an agent choosing among reporting alternatives when that choice is unobserved by the principal, and the agent's compensation contract is optimal. The agent is allowed to take post-outcome costly actions which lead to more precise reports of actual profits than would be yielded by less precise, but costless conventional translations of outcomes (e.g., GAAP). The extent to which the principal allows the agent this discretion depends upon the improvement in profits as an indicator of the agent's pre-outcome effort when post-outcome actions take place versus the attendant cost of these actions.     

Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?

Safer firms receive funding from reputable venture capitalists and offer new securities underwritten by reputable investment banks. We offer a new explanation for these facts employing a moral-hazard model in which a firm and an agent are matched endogenously. More reputable agent's effort has a greater impact on output. Safer firm's output reflects the agent's hidden effort more accurately and therefore the agent's pay scheme tied with the output powerfully motivates her to exert effort. In equilibrium, a safer firm should be matched with a reputable agent since this combination allows to maximize effort of the reputable agent.     

Particle Swarm Optimization in Agent-Based Economic Simulations of the Cournot Market Model

The numerous variations of the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm originally proposed by Kennedy and Eberhart ( 1995 . Particle swarm optimization. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Neural Networks IV. IEEE: Piscataway, NJ; 1942–1948) have proven to be powerful optimization methods that rely on exploiting simple analogues of social interaction. In this study, PSO is adopted in lieu of the social or individual evolutionary learning algorithms as a model of individual adaptation in an agent-based computational model. In this examination of the simple Cournot market framework, each agent's individual strategy evolves according to the PSO algorithm. The model is one in which agents’ strategies must adapt interdependently. That is, a change in one particle may not only affect its performance but also other particles within the same swarm simultaneously. The dynamics and convergence properties associated with this model are compared with those where evolutionary learning algorithms are employed. Similar to evolutionary learning, convergence to equilibrium is dependent on the scope of learning, social or individual. While convergence is dependent on some of the algorithm parameters, prices resulting from the individual PSO are nearest the Cournot equilibrium and those from social PSO are nearest the Walrasian equilibrium in all cases. For particular parameterizations, certain advantages over evolutionary algorithms exist: in the main, decreasing volatility in market prices does not require an election operator or the addition of free parameters through two-level learning. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Background Risk in the Principal-Agent Model

We examine the effect of background risk in the standard two-state, two-action principal-agent model. We analyse situations where the background risk is environmental (always present) and where the background risk is contractual (only present if the contract is accepted). With contractual background risk, expected wages always rise and the incentive scheme is flatter if the agent's preferences satisfy weak decreasing absolute risk aversion. With environmental background risk, the optimal incentive scheme becomes flatter if the agent is weakly prudent. We provide conditions under which the environmental background risk decreases the agent's expected wage.     

Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks

This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk.     

Optimality of the Disclosure of Private Information in a Production-Exchange Economy

This study provides an analysis of the effects on individual welfare of information revelation in a production-exchange economy. It is shown that the total effect of information revelation on an agent's utility level may be decomposed into three elements: a price effect, a shareholding effect, and a production effect. Through this decomposition, it is demonstrated that, although a Pareto improvement need not result from information revelation, there are perspectives from which the release can be considered beneficial.     

Incentives for experimenting agents

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises—the more lucrative the agent's stream of rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives, giving the principal a motivation to reduce the project's continuation value. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. Efficient equilibria front‐load the agent's effort, inducing maximum experimentation over an initial period, until switching to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial phase concentrates effort near the beginning, when most valuable, whereas the switch attenuates the dynamic agency cost.     

The interaction among disclosures,competition, and an internal control problem

This paper studies the effect of an internal control problem on a firm's disclosure policy where firms compete in non-cooperative investment game, with each firm deciding to invest in its current technology or to invest in a non-proprietary innovation. By adopting the innovation, a firm earns higher revenues at the expense of its non-adopting rival. Each principal decides on a disclosure policy for its firm that entails releasing an agent's internal cost report of the firm's current technology to the rival firm. The agent has private information about the current technology's cost and an incentive to overstate the cost. An effect of disclosures is to increase coordination between the firms, which, without a control problem, increases firm profits. However, under the same conditions that disclosures were beneficial without the control problem, disclosures may be harmful to the principal with the control problem because increased coordination between the firms allows the agent to earn higher rents. Competition substitutes for commitment to an investment policy that limits the agent's rents and this disciplining role of competition is diminished with disclosures.     

Responding to a corruption crisis through disclosure and remedial action: The case of Petrobras

This case study adopts a positivist perspective to examine how Petroleo Brasileiro S.A (“Petrobras”), a high-profile company in its native Brazil with multiple listings including in Brazil and the US, responded to a major corruption scandal arising in 2014. We consider Petrobras's response both in terms of its visible activities – i.e. in relation to anti-corruption and compliance (“ACC”) disclosures in its annual report (AR) and sustainability report (SR), as well as actioned remedial policies that constitute the crisis plan – and how the company went about interacting with stakeholders during and after the immediate crisis period. We conducted a content analysis of ACC disclosures and assessed Petrobras's remedial activities in the eight-year period 2010–2017 as disclosed in its ARs, SRs and press releases. We find firstly that, consistent with legitimacy theory, Petrobras responded by voluntarily and substantially increasing its relevant disclosures so as to regain legitimacy, a finding which mirrors those found elsewhere following corruption and environmental crises. Secondly, the unique corporate governance situation at Petrobras combined with the fact that leadership was allegedly implicated in the scandal, led the post-crisis management team to undertake a series of remedial actions that prioritised the need to take and maintain executive control and independence from the government, whilst at the same time carefully managing the relationship with this influential stakeholder: - actions which argue strongly in favour of stakeholder-agency theory and multiple agency theory interpretations of the nature of stakeholder interactions that transpired during the crisis period of disequilibrium, and which precluded the type of stakeholder dialogue seen in some previous environmental crisis situations. Finally, we show that Petrobras's crisis management response actions align well with models of trust repair and legitimacy management, and suggest the company considered it had successfully regained legitimacy by 2017.     

First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems: A Generalization

The first-order approach (FOA) to principal agent problems is very convenient and mathematically tractable. However, existing results show that the FOA is valid only for additively separable utility functions. This is somewhat limiting. In this article sufficient conditions are identified that extend the validity of the FOA to nonseparable cases. The additional conditions involve restrictions on the agent's preferences, particularly interactions between action and the wage contract. These conditions imply that leisure is normal and the agent's absolute risk aversion increases with action. Comparative static results regarding the wage contract and its gradient are also discussed.     

Impact of intelligent decision aids on expert and novice decision-makers' judgments

Businesses have invested tremendous resources into intelligent decision aid development. A good match between user and aid may improve the expert decision‐maker's decision quality. However, novices may be prone to poorer decision‐making if intelligent decision aids are more expert than the user. The present paper provides an empirical test of the impact of decision aids on subjects with differential expertise levels. The results support the contention that intelligent decision aids aggravate bias in novices’ decision‐making but mitigate bias in experts’ decision‐making processes. Intelligent decision aids may be best viewed as complements to expert decision‐makers during complex problem analysis and resolution.     

Specific knowledge and performance measurement

I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on “input” measures related to the agent's actions and an “output” measure related to the principal's payoff. Whereas input‐based pay minimizes income risk, only output‐based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to use both kinds of performance measures. The results help to explain some empirical puzzles and lead to several new predictions.     

Changes in the market structure and risk management of Bitcoin and its forked coins

Inconsistency of consensus results in blockchain forks, which create a new financial risk. After filtering out Bitcoin’s linear, nonlinear, and lag impacts on forked coins, this study employs a bottom-up hierarchical clustering algorithm to examine the logarithmic return series for Bitcoin and its 14 forked coins from 2018 to 2021. The results indicate that the market for forked coins can be divided into three clusters: SegWit-supported forked coins, mature forked coins, and the latest forked coins. Bitcoin and the mature forked coins form a cluster, and its performance is superior to others. Although Bitcoin’s return significantly affects that of its forked coins, it does not affect the market structure. Furthermore, this study provides references for risk aversion among investors in forked coins and presents macro-level information for cryptocurrency market authorities.     

Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion

We consider the problem of delegated portfolio management when the involved parties are risk-averse. The agent invests the principal's money in the financial market, and in return he receives a compensation which depends on the value that he generates over some period of time. We use a dual approach to explicitly solve the agent's problem analytically and subsequently we use this solution to solve the principal's problem numerically. The interaction between the principal's and the agent's risk aversion and the optimal compensation scheme is studied and, for example, in the case of the more risk averse agent according to common folklore the principal should optimally choose a fee schedule such that the agent's derived risk aversion decreases. We illustrate that this is not always the case.     

Private monitoring,collusion, and the timing of information

When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.     

Modelling and predicting customer churn from an insurance company

Within a company's customer relationship management strategy, finding the customers most likely to leave is a central aspect. We present a dynamic modelling approach for predicting individual customers’ risk of leaving an insurance company. A logistic longitudinal regression model that incorporates time-dynamic explanatory variables and interactions is fitted to the data. As an intermediate step in the modelling procedure, we apply generalised additive models to identify non-linear relationships between the logit and the explanatory variables. Both out-of-sample and out-of-time prediction indicate that the model performs well in terms of identifying customers likely to leave the company each month. Our approach is general and may be applied to other industries as well.     

Public Information Precision and Coordination Failure: An Experiment

More precise public disclosure reduces uncertainty about economic fundamentals, but it can increase uncertainty about other agents' actions, leading to coordination failure. We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of public information precision and strategic complementarity on coordination failure. Information precision is operationalized in terms of “granularity” (level of detail). We found that (1) granular public disclosure, which is disaggregated and precise, increases the likelihood of coordination failure and decreases coordination efficiency when public information is pessimistic about future economic prospects; (2) the deleterious effect of granular disclosure is stronger when strategic complementarity is high; and (3) higher levels of strategic complementarity decrease coordination efficiency. Overall, the observed likelihood of coordination failure is higher and coordination efficiency is lower than predicted by theory. Our findings have implications for the Federal Reserve's decision to publicly disclose detailed stress test results for distressed banks, and the debate on whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should publicly release reports on firm‐specific quality‐control deficiencies of audit firms.     

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert’s bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert’s incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the contribution of each expert, but reduces them when only the collective contribution is identified by the market.     

Stock selling during takeovers

Stock sales during takeover negotiations weaken the target board's ability to recommend against the takeover, i.e., to resist. Sophisticated shareholders therefore face a coordination problem when deciding whether to sell-out early; and their actions generate a feedback loop between trading volumes and takeover outcomes. Bidding firms, anticipating the pressurising effect of future share sales on the target board, may reduce their bids. We study these tensions theoretically. We find that increasing the influence of shareholders during the bidding process lowers equilibrium bids; elongates the bidding process; but raises the overall probability of bid acceptance; and raises expected premia for unsophisticated shareholders.