Fiscal policy and capital mobility: the construction of economic policy rectitude in Britain and France

This research examines the regulatory response of the European Union to the global financial crisis, addressing the questions of whether, how and why the global financial crisis has changed the ‘old’ politics of financial services regulation in the EU and resulted in the emergence of a ‘new’ politics. It is argued that, with a good dose of political opportunism and ‘anti-free market’ rhetoric, a continental advocacy coalition sponsoring a ‘market-shaping’ regulatory approach has capitalised on the crisis, tipping the balance of regulatory power in the EU in its favour, as compared to the pre-crisis situation.     

Neoliberal growth models,monetary union and the Euro crisis. A post-Keynesian perspective

The paper offers an account of the Euro crisis based on post-Keynesian monetary theory and its typology of demand regimes. Neoliberalism has transformed social and financial relations in Europe but it has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process. Instead, growth has relied either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe the financial crisis has been amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at restricting the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy. This neoliberal economic policy regime in conjunction with the separation of monetary and fiscal spheres has turned the financial crisis of 2007 into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe.     

Budget surplus goal experiments in Australia and Sweden

From the mid-1990s until the 2008 financial crisis, two countries, each with different political, administrative and capitalist traditions, embarked on a radical macroeconomic policy experiment. Australia and Sweden took earlier New Public Management reforms to an ideological extreme, and pursued a profit-like goal for the public sector, in promising and delivering annual budget surpluses. From a historical institutionalist perspective, we challenge existing public choice theories and the guardian-spender framework to show how fears of crisis, party dynamics and ideological reassessments on the centre-left, and the elevation of finance and economics ministers and ministries resulted in an unlikely political and electoral consensus. Furthermore, this occurred without constitutionalised or officially strict rules, as has been the trend in other countries, but was achieved through less formal yet influential ‘rules of the game’ with stricter interpretations. What is even more perplexing is that Australia and Sweden do not have superior economic records to show for this experiment and experienced the same challenges as other countries during the 2008 financial crisis. Yet, they are still reluctant to definitely abandon the policy.     

Integration,Diversity, Plurality: Territorial Governance and the Reconstruction of Legitimacy in a European ‘Postnational’ State

This article deals with the European ‘legitimacy crisis’ from a neglected perspective, looking at ‘Europe’ not primarily as a set of formal (or formalisable) institutions, but rather as an emergent, policy-driven institutional construct. In this perspective, European integration may be very much seen as the outcome of the policies that are enacted in the European supra-national arena as well as of the way such policies are continuously reinterpreted, renegotiated and re-enacted in the different arenas of its multi-level polity. What is at stake in adopting a policy approach to the European legitimacy issue is, hence, a critical appraisal of development of processes of ‘institutionalisation of Europe’ that range far beyond issues of constitutional design. A crucial consequence is the need to ‘spatialise’ discourse on European reforms. The conclusion is a plea for an integration model for Europe not only constitutionally respectful of diversity, but constitutively enhancing diversity, and for an approach to policy reforms acting upon a ‘political geography of differences’.     

Status Quo Conservatism,Placation, or Partisan Division? Analysing Citizen Attitudes Towards Financial Reform in the United States

Within the literature on financial governance a key question is why the 2008 financial crisis did not elicit a stronger regulatory reaction than it did – the ‘post-crisis stasis’ puzzle. We explore a neglected dimension of this puzzle: public attitudes toward financial regulation. Using a variety of survey data of the US public we find that there was persistent support for stronger financial regulation following the crisis, even support for radical reform in some instances, and support continued even after regulatory reform had been enacted. Despite such general sentiment, however, at nearly every stage public attitudes were highly conditional on partisan affiliation – a hugely consequential detail that meant that demand for reform was not channelled into more stringent policy but rather into a highly partisan, status quo protecting political machinery. Our analysis challenges notions of US public attitudes as either conservative in orientation or placated through modest reform, but also highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping financial reform options despite majoritarian support for more robust reform.     

The organisation for economic cooperation and development

The global financial and economic crisis has prompted some scholars to suggest that a fundamental regulatory shift away from neoliberalism will take place – both in general and in the field of EU competition regulation. This paper shows that so far no radical break with the neoliberal type of competition regulation is heaving into sight. It sets out to explain this from the vantage point of a critical political economy perspective, which identifies the circumstances under which a crisis can result in a regulatory paradigm shift. Contrasting the current situation with the shift in EC/EU competition regulation after the crisis in the 1970s, the paper argues that the preconditions for a fundamental shift in this issue area are not present this time around. Several reasons account for this: the current crisis has been construed by economic and political elites as a crisis within and not of neoliberal capitalism; the social power configuration underpinning the neoliberal order remains unaltered; no clear counter-project has surfaced; the European Commission has been (and remains) in a position to oppose radical changes; and finally, there are no signs of a wider paradigm shift in the EU's regulatory architecture.     

Varieties of Economic Crisis,Varieties of Ideational Change: How and Why Financial Regulation and Macroeconomic Policy Differ

One of the principal tasks facing post-crash academic political economy is to analyse patterns of ideational change and the conditions that produce such change. What has been missing from the existing literature on ideational change at times of crises however, is a sense of how processes of persuasive struggle, and how the success of those ‘norm entrepreneurs’ arguing for ideational change is shaped by two contextual variables: the most immediate material symptoms and problems that a crisis displays (the variety of crisis); and the institutional character of the policy subsystem that agents have to operate within to affect change. Introducing these two variables into our accounts of persuasive struggle and ideational change enables us to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of ideational change at times of crisis. The article identifies that a quite rapid and radical intellectual change has been evident in the field of financial regulation in the form of an embrace of a macroprudential frame. In contrast in the field of macroeconomic policy – both monetary and fiscal policy, many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent, there is evidence of ideational stickiness and inertia, and despite some policy experimentation, overarching policy frameworks and their rationales have not been overhauled. The article applies Peter Hall's framework of three orders of policy changes to help illuminate and explain the variation in patterns of change in the fields of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy since the financial crash of 2008. The different patterns of ideational change in macroeconomic policy and financial regulation in the post-crash period can be explained by timing and variety of crisis; sequencing of policy change; and institutional political differences between micro policy sub systems and macro policy systems.     

PUBLIC SERVICE PERSPECTIVES ON REFORMS OF ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY: A MODULAR ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT ** : This article analyzes organizational change in electricity distribution and retail businesses and its impact on public service issues. Organizational change has resulted from the European electricity directives, especially the EU Electricity directive 2003/54/EC , which has imposed major transformations on these activities, requiring legal unbundling of electricity distribution networks by 1 July 2007. Organizational change has also resulted from an adaptation of companies to the newly competitive environment. This has led to a diversity of organizational choices across Europe. We analyze this diversity by using a modular approach, which decomposes reforms in electricity distribution and retail into logical ‘blocks’. We then examine how European countries have dealt with two policy and regulatory issues related to customer protection in that new environment: the regulation of quality of distribution, which is a task of regulators, and energy affordability policies for vulnerable customers, which are a central aspect of public service policies in the electricity sector.     

Death by a Thousand Cuts? Financial Political Power and the Case of the European Financial Transaction Tax

Since the global financial crisis, a variety of explanations have been advanced to account for the weak response by policy-makers to the issue of financial regulation. This paper focuses upon the strategic political mobilisation of financial actors in order to provide a better understanding of their influence within regulatory battles in the post crisis era. It does so through a case study investigation of the European Union Financial Transaction Tax. Despite garnering support from leading member states, the European Commission and Parliament, and a majority of the European population, the policy has failed to materialise as a result of several postponements and unresolved negotiations at the Council of the European Union. Policy-makers have also gradually backed away from the aggressive proposal designed by the Commission, committing to a range of exemptions that threaten to render the policy ineffective at raising significant revenue and at preventing industry avoidance of the charge. The case provides evidence of a cohesive political strategy conducted primarily by transnational financial associations and demonstrates the unique capacity of financial actors to secure favourable regulatory outcomes. Specifically, this influence is exercised through the recruitment of non-financial sector allies and by exploiting the structural dependency fears of policy-makers.     

The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations

This paper contributes to our understanding of post-crisis financial regulation by reasserting the centrality of domestic politics in defining government preferences and explaining regulatory outcomes. It draws on Robert Putnam's two-level game approach and Foreign Policy Analysis to develop a model of a three-level informal ratification game. This adds value to existing approaches by capturing the contested nature of government preferences and delineating the causal mechanisms through which domestic groups shape international negotiations. The model is used to explain the UK's pivotal role in the reform of bank capital requirements in the European Union (EU). It demonstrates that governments are able to take advantage of a narrowing domestic ‘win-set’ by marginalising the influence of industry and building political momentum for regulatory reform. In particular, the paper shows how UK negotiators were able to exploit the increased domestic costs of agreement and synergistic strategies between negotiations to successfully oppose the maximum harmonisation of capital rules across the EU.     

Ten Years After the Financial Crisis in Thailand: What Has Been Learned or Not Learned?

The 1997 financial crisis provided many lessons about the weaknesses of Thailand's economic and financial system before the crisis, weaknesses that eventually led to the crisis. Since then, these lessons have led to many economic and financial reforms. This paper reviews the lessons and reforms that have been carried out. These include improvements to the data system needed for adequate macroeconomic monitoring, changes to the macroeconomic management framework and monetary policy regime, and various aspects of financial sector reforms. This paper also indicates the lessons that might not yet have been sufficiently learned and new risks to future economic stability. These include political interference in financial institutions, leading to inappropriate or excessive lending, and lack of transparency in fiscal liabilities that could mislead macroeconomic management.     

Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

The End of ‘Central Europe’? The Rise of the Radical Right and the Contestation of Identities in Slovakia and the Visegrad Four

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the effects of the migration crisis and the parallel rise of right wing parties on national and regional identities in Slovakia and the broader subregion of the Visegrad Four. It argues that the recent right wing political discourse around migration has been reshaping the meaning of ‘Central Europe’ as a normative project and an identity shared by the V4 countries. The post-Cold War narrative of Central Europe was a story of ‘returning to the West’, which in practice meant that normative conformity with the West was a precondition of membership in key Western institution. The situation has changed visibly after the migrant crisis, as the V4 political elites have now been constructing new identities, in partial juxtaposition with Western European liberalism. These new identities favour a culturalist, conservative interpretation of the nation and reject humanitarian universalism, epitomized by the European Union’s decision to welcome the refugees. This arguably devaluates the previous notion of ‘Central Europe’ as a region that seeks to identify itself firmly with the West. Slovakia is chosen as a case study because of the recent success of the radical right in the 2016 parliamentary elections. The article concludes that although the situation of being structurally locked into the EU does not allow the V4 countries to openly challenge its main principles, the V4 political elites pursue a counter-hegemonic strategy, subverting and resignifying some of its key political notions. One should, therefore, speak not of an end of ‘Central Europe’ but rather of its evolution into a new, hybrid stage, where normative conformity and identification with the West will only be partial. The article makes use of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse and related concepts as well as insights from constructivist geopolitics literature to track articulatory practices of the regional establishments. The study relies on evidence from recent political campaigning in Slovakia as well as official Visegrad Group documents from 2015 to 2016.     

Notes on Contributors

This research asks why the European Union (EU) ‘uploads’ financial regulation to international regulatory fora in some (few) cases, ‘downloads’ it in (many) other cases or neither. It uses the concept of ‘regulatory capacity’ with reference to the EU and the USA. It argues that the presence (or absence) of robust domestic regulatory templates strengthen (or weaken) the ability of these jurisdictions to shape international standards produced by regulatory fora. Timing is also important in that whichever of the two manages to be out in front and shape international standards in a given sector wins first-mover advantages. The paper considers variations across the main financial services (banking, securities and insurance) as well as over time.     

Reforming the public administration: The role of crisis and the power of bureaucracy

The need to balance austerity with growth policies has put government efficiency high on the economic policy agenda in Europe. Administrative reforms that boost the internal efficiency of bureaucracy can alleviate the trade-off between consolidation and public service provision. Against such a backdrop, this paper constructs (and makes available) a novel reform indicator to explore the determinants of public administration reforms for a panel of EU countries. The findings support political-economic reasoning: An economic and fiscal crisis is a potent catalyst for reforms, but a powerful bureaucracy constrains the opportunities of a crisis to promote reform. Furthermore, there is some suggestive evidence for horizontal learning from other EU countries, and for vertical learning associated with a particular type of EU cohesion spending.     

The International Labour Organization and the ambivalent politics of financial inclusion in West Africa

This article examines the role of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in promoting ‘financial inclusion’ in West Africa. The role of the ILO in microfinance and financial inclusion has often been overlooked, in contrast to the role played by the World Bank, G20 and like institutions. The ILO is significant here because it suggests a number of ambiguities and important political dynamics that have gone overlooked in previous critical discussions of microcredit, which have often focused on the politics of commercialisation, indebtedness and accumulation by dispossession. This article draws instead on Gramsci’s concepts of subalternity and organic crisis to suggest that the politics of ‘financial inclusion’ in practice are often shaped as much by the political dynamics engendered by the erosion of postcolonial order as by the imperatives of accumulation. The argument is illustrated empirically by examining ILO activities on microinsurance and ‘inclusive finance for workers’ in West Africa, with an emphasis on Senegal.     

The Institutionalist Roots of Macroprudential Ideas: Veblen and Galbraith on Regulation,Policy Success and Overconfidence

One consequence of the global financial crisis has been to prompt debate over macroprudential regulation – meant to limit private risk-taking that threatens systemic stability. In this paper, we stress the roots of macroprudential ideas in the Institutionalist economics of Veblen and Galbraith in a way that highlights both unrecognised policy possibilities and underappreciated impediments to policy effectiveness, arguing in particular that regulatory success can breed overconfidence. First, we argue that while Veblen's views anticipated macroprudential arguments, they also obscured tensions between the technocratic acumen of policy ‘engineers’ and popular legitimacy. Second, we argue that while Galbraith's views similarly shaped the postwar Keynesian policy mix, they also echoed Veblen in underrating the potential for populist resentment of an intellectual ‘technostructure’. We conclude that while this analysis can be seen as highlighting an overlooked century of macroprudential debate, it also demonstrates the potential for technocratic overconfidence – which can eventually undermine policy legitimacy and effectiveness.     

Hedging its Bets: The UK and the Politics of European Financial Services Regulation

Some argue that European financial services regulation is witnessing a shift from a ‘market-making’ to a ‘market-shaping’ paradigm after the global financial crisis. This so-called ‘new’ political economy explanation stresses the role of ideas to understand this change. We consider this claim by providing an in-depth examination of recent European hedge fund legislation from the perspective of two key ‘market-making’ coalition members: the UK government and the hedge fund industry. We accept that the legislation represents a set-back for the ‘market-makers’ but question whether it represents a victory for the ‘market-shapers’. Moreover, we cast doubt on the causal role of ideas, calling for a domestic politics approach.     

Deposit guarantee reform in Europe: does European deposit insurance scheme increase banking stability?

The financial crisis led to reforms of regulation and supervision in Europe, including Deposit Guarantee Schemes. The new rules for DGSs define their position and interaction within the safety net. DGSs form part of a system to maintain and enhance financial stability. According to the Five Presidents’ Report a European Deposit Insurance Scheme should be the third pillar of the Banking Union. The paper gives a contribution to the on-going debate providing an assessment of the DGSs reform and its evolution towards EDIS. It explains key elements of the new rules for DGSs putting them in a systemic perspective.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.