Single versus multiple banking: lessons from initial public offerings

A vast research in banking addresses the question of the costs and benefits of multiple bank relationships versus a single bank relationship. Although no clear-cutting conclusion is reached, several contributions suggest that multiple bank relationships might lead to a sub-optimal level of monitoring, compared to a single bank relationship, as a result of free riding and coordination problems. We take a novel approach to tackle this research question, by looking at the role, if any, played by the number of lending relationships in initial public offerings (IPOs). We look at the short-term performances of IPOs as measured by underpricing and find that firms that go public with multiple bank relationships exhibit more underpricing than those that go public with a single bank relationship. This finding is independent of the number of bank relationships and/or whether any of the lending banks also acts as underwriter in the offering. We interpret our results as suggesting that the market attributes a weaker certification role to multiple bank relationships because of their less effective monitoring of IPO firms.     

The market valuation of share repurchases in Europe

We analyze a uniquely constructed data set of open market share repurchases across a sample of European firms. We find that the announcement date market reaction is lower than that in the US, mainly because of (i) the relatively large number of recurring announcements which generate significantly lower returns than the initial announcements of intention to repurchase shares; (ii) the rather low market reaction in France, due probably to specific governance and corporate cultural issues; and (iii) the regulatory reform that allowed UK firms to keep the repurchased shares as treasury stock, which decreased their market impact. Across our countries, taxation, shareholder protection, and the European Union’s Market Abuse Directive do not affect significantly the market valuation of repurchases. Our results imply that ultimately, domestic institutional specificities and reforms play significant roles in the market valuation and popularity of share repurchases.     

The effect of ownership and control on market valuation: Evidence from initial public offerings in The Netherlands

This study examines whether ownership and control variables influence market valuation at the time of the initial public offering (IPO). Using a sample of 118 IPOs on Euronext Amsterdam during the period 1984-2001, we find support for this conjecture. Management stock ownership, the proportion of independent supervisory directors, and board monitoring by large nonmanagement hareholders are positively related to IPO firm value. These factors are successful in reducing agency costs. We also find that supermajority management stock ownership and takeover defenses lower IPO firm value. Therefore, these mechanisms increase agency costs, resulting in a lower price that investors are willing to pay for IPO shares.     

Return and risk in initial public offerings of both shares and warrants

In the past few years there has been an increasing number of new issues of shares of common stock together with warrants intended to raise interest in initial public offerings of relatively young, growing firms. In this study we examine the pricing efficiency of stocks and warrants offered simultaneously to the public as a single unit. We present a model for evaluating the warrants in such offerings and test it empirically against data from the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, where such offerings have become standard. We find that the issued units are usually undervalued, allowing for significant abnormal positive returns. But, while the warrants are usually underpriced, the stocks are overpriced. Largely consistent with the evidence from other financial markets around the world, we also find abnormal negative rates of return in the long run.     

Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure in prospectuses of initial public offerings

Intellectual capital is recognised as the new economic era’s pivotal factor underlying value creation. Deficient and inconsistent intellectual capital reporting is escalating information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. This provides fertile ground for informed investors to extract higher abnormal returns and higher wealth transfers from uninformed investors, particularly during a firm’s initial public offering (IPO). This study investigates the association between intellectual capital disclosure levels in prospectuses of 444 IPOs listing on the Singapore Stock Exchange between 1997 and 2006, and three potential explanatory determinants: (1) ownership retention; (2) proprietary costs; and (3) corporate governance structure. Statistical analysis supports our conjecture of a positive association between intellectual capital disclosure and ownership retention. We also find, consistent with expectations, a negative influence of proprietary costs on the positive intellectual capital disclosure – ownership retention association. However, contrary to predictions, we do not find an IPO’s corporate governance structure significantly influences the negative interaction of proprietary costs on the ownership retention – proprietary cost association. Our findings have implications for various parties such as regulators who may impose unnecessary costs on issuers if they introduce mandatory disclosures whilst lacking an understanding of the factors influencing intellectual capital disclosures.     

Debt financing,venture capital,and the performance of initial public offerings

We examine the roles of two financial intermediaries, lenders and venture capitalists, in a sample of more than 6000 IPO firms during 1980–2012. Venture capitalists and lenders generally fund different types of firms and, on average, are substitutes; however, in some instances we observe interactions and complementary roles between the two funding sources. Firms with high debt have lower valuation uncertainty, and lower initial day returns than those backed by venture capital. However, firms with high debt levels underperform in the long-run, especially those without venture capital. We provide some evidence that firms backed by reputable venture capitalists perform better.     

Long-run stock performance of German initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues

We estimate the long-run stock performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) in the German capital market with a larger sample than prior studies and alternative benchmarks (the equally and the value-weighted market portfolio, size portfolios and matching stocks). In addition we present the first results on the long-run performance after seasoned equity issues (SEOs) in Germany. We conclude that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks than market portfolios. Using buy‐and-hold abnormal returns, we estimate that German stocks involved in an IPO or in a SEO, on average, underperform a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6% in three years. This is considerably less than the underperformance after IPOs and SEOs in the US market reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the underperformance after IPOs in Germany reported by Ljungqvist (1997). We also show that the apparent underperformance of the 1988–1990 IPO cohort discussed by Ljungqvist (1997) disappears when the abnormal performance estimate is based on size instead of market portfolios.     

Local corporate misconduct and local initial public offerings

This paper investigates the cost of going public through initial public offerings (IPOs) for firms located in regions with significant fraud density. We find that companies in regions with a high proportion of nearby firms that have committed corporate misconduct have more pronounced underpricing, experience higher post-IPO stock return volatility, and are more likely to withdraw their offerings. Overall, our results show that local corporate misconduct is associated with the pricing of IPOs, and the breach of trust is related to costly IPOs for newcomers.     

Litigation risk, strategic disclosure and the underpricing of initial public offerings

Using word content analysis on the time-series of IPO prospectuses, we show that issuers tradeoff underpricing and strategic disclosure as potential hedges against litigation risk. This tradeoff explains a significant fraction of the variation in prospectus revision patterns, IPO underpricing, the partial adjustment phenomenon, and litigation outcomes. We find that strong disclosure is an effective hedge against all types of lawsuits. Underpricing, however, is an effective hedge only against Section 11 lawsuits, those lawsuits which are most damaging to the underwriter. Underwriters who fail to adequately hedge litigation risk experience economically large penalties, including loss of market share.     

Patents and the performance of technology firms: Evidence from initial public offerings in Germany

The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between innovation and performance for German firms that went public at the “Neuer Markt” during the period from 1997 to 2002. In the empirical analysis we investigate in particular whether initial public offerings (IPOs) with more or higher quality patents outperformed IPOs with lower quality or no patented technology. For this we measure the impact of patents on underpricing and long-run performance and explain the magnitude of these valuation effects with the Fama–French value and growth factors, with patent-specific variables such as the number of IPC-classes, family size, the number of backward and forward citations, as well as with industry variables. The empirical evidence suggests that patents are a reliable indicator for the success and the short- and long-run performance of start-up technology firms that went public and that the valuation effects are more pronounced for higher quality patents.

The underpricing of initial public offerings: A theoretical and empirical reconsideration of the adverse selection hypothesis

In this paper we generalize Rock's theory regarding the underpricing of IPOs. In Rock's model, informed investors have a firm-specific informational advantage pertaining to a firm's cash flow. We derive the new results that the level of beta and the size of the market risk premium positively affect underpricing. These implications extend the adverse selection theory and further distinguish this theory from the current state of signalling theories of underpricing. The results put the “hot and cold” issue markets phenomenon in a theoretical context. Empirical results are consistent with the theoretical propositions and provide support for Rock's theory of underpricing.     

Investor sentiment and the underperformance of technology firms initial public offerings

This research examines the effect of individual and institutional investor sentiment toward the overall market at the time of Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the aftermarket performance of technology IPO shares. The study which is based on 1346 U.S. technology IPOs completed between 1992 and 2009 shows that the irrational component of individual investor sentiment negatively affects shares’ aftermarket performance: the more optimistic individual investors are at the time of IPO, the lower the shares’ aftermarket return. On the other hand, the rational component of institutional investor sentiment does not affect the shares’ short-run performance, yet positively affects their long-run performance. In contrast with prior theoretical models this paper shows that investor overconfidence positively affects technology IPO shares’ aftermarket performance. The paper extends the behavioral finance literature by providing evidence on the negative role played by noise trading in affecting technology and biotechnology IPO shares performance.     

How the quality of initial coin offering white papers influences fundraising: Using security token offerings white papers as a benchmark

In recent years, many initial coin offerings (ICOs) scams have been reported, attracting attention to this relatively new and unregulated ICO market, which lacks disclosure requirements and therefore suffers from intensifying problems of information asymmetry inherent in crowdfunding. As a prospectus-type document, an ICO white paper serves as a major means of voluntary disclosure practices adopted by ventures seeking external financing. Given the importance of an ICO white paper and the difficulty of assessing its quality, we propose to benchmark it against white paper content for security token offerings (STOs)—a more regulated ICO subset. Using the similarity of ICO white papers with STO white papers to proxy for disclosure quality, we document that the ICO campaigns that have white papers more similar to STO white papers are more likely to raise funding successfully. Our findings provide implications for policymakers, ICO fundraisers, and investors on the importance of white paper quality.     

Auditor Quality, Signalling, and the Valuation of Initial Public Offerings

The initial public offering (IPO) market represents a classic example of information asymmetries where the incumbent owners have good information about the value of the business but potential investors have little data to guide them on the attractiveness of the new issue. In order to mitigate these information asymmetry problems, the sponsors of the IPO will try to enhance the credibility of the share offer through various signalling mechanisms. Of interest to this study is the role that auditing firms play in adding credibility to the new issue. In particular we test some recent theoretical models of auditor choice by examining the initial public offering market in Singapore. Our empirical results show that high risk IPOs are associated with high quality auditors. Further, high quality auditors are associated with higher IPO market valuations and they allow entrepreneurs to retain lower ownership stakes in the IPO while maintaining market valuation.     

The over/underpricing of initial public offerings

This article shows that lawsuit avoidance motivation can lead entrepreneurs to overprice, as well as underprice, initial public offerings of equity. The article simplifies the lawsuit avoidance argument by addressing the entrepreneur's acceptable probability of lawsuit predicated on the loss of reputation capital, in lieu of the explicit offering revenue/litigation cost trade-off previously treated in the literature. The model yields offering price regimes which include rational cases of overpricing and correct pricing, as well as underpricing, and comparative statics results for the relationship of the optimal offering price with project size, project risk, investors' litigiousness, and the entrepreneur's acceptable probability of lawsuit. The article argues that existing empirical evidence previously used to refute the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis supports the hypothesis in the context of the model.     

Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of initial public offerings in the UK

In contrast to the US practice, rights issues is the predominant method of raising additional equity capital in the London market. the UK evidence for the period 1980-1991 provides no support to the hypothesis that IPO firms deliberately underprice to signal their quality and facilitate subsequent seasoned equity offerings. the level of initial returns is related neither to the size of the issue nor to the price response at the announcement of a rights issue. the results demonstrate, however, that firms with higher first day returns are quicker in returning to the market for additional equity capital. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering follows a period of significant rises in the stock prices of reissuing firms. Such gains are, however, dissipated quickly in the 18 months after the announcement of the seasoned equity offering. the level of underperformance is particularly pronounced for firms that raised relatively small subsequent amounts of capital in relation to funds raised at the initial offering. Thus, the paper documents a pattern of post-issue behaviour which is fundamentally similar for both unseasoned and seasoned equity offerings.     

Venture capital‐backed and commitments test entity initial public offerings on the ASX

This paper examines initial returns to venture capital (VC) backed and non‐VC‐backed IPO companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). We find support for the theoretical predictions of Rossetto (2008), by providing empirical evidence that VC‐backed CTE IPOs exhibit greater wealth losses to pre‐IPO investors compared to non‐VC‐backed CTE IPOs during hot issue markets. We also find that greater retained ownership increases IPO underpricing. In the subsample of IPOs with below the median level of retained ownership IPOs, VC‐backed CTE IPOs and VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs have significantly higher levels of underpricing and wealth loss compared to non‐VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs.     

Wealth effects of convertible-bond and warrant-bond offerings: a meta-analysis

The literature on wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible-bond and warrant-bond offerings is reviewed. The findings of 35 event studies, which include 84 sub-samples and 6310 announcements, are analysed using meta-analysis. We find a mean cumulative abnormal return of?1.14% for convertibles compared with?0.02% for warrant bonds, the significant difference confirming a relative advantage for warrant bonds. Abnormal returns for hybrid securities issued in the USA are significantly more negative than those issued in other countries. In addition, issuing hybrid securities to refund debt does not seem to be favoured by investors. Finally, several factors identified as important by theory or in prior research are not significant within our cross-study models, suggesting that more evidence is needed to confirm whether they are robust.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.