The liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment: a political economy analysis

Abstract

In theory, the IMF could influence fiscal and monetary policy via several channels, among them advice to policy makers, conditionality, and the moral hazard it induces with the borrowers. This article tries to disentangle those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1975–2000 it analyzes whether IMF involvement indeed influences fiscal and monetary policy in program countries. There is evidence that participation in IMF Standby and Extended Fund Facility arrangements improves economic policy. Money disbursed and the degree to which a program is implemented does not have any systematic influence. The same is true for future availability of resources as measured by exhaustion of a country’s quota with the Fund. The final section discusses policy implications.     

Systemic risk: The coordination of macroprudential and monetary policies in China

The literature documents the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in controlling systemic risk, but empirical evidence of a systemwide framework that effectively coordinates the two policies is lacking. This study assesses the effectiveness, channels, and timeliness of monetary and macroprudential policies’ impacts on systemic risk in China from January 2009 to June 2018, and contributes to the discussion of how to coordinate these policies. Using an index synthesized from 28 indicators to proxy China’s systemic risk, we find the following: (1) A contractionary monetary (macroprudential) shock increases (reduces) systemic risk over the entire shock time period. (2) Macroprudential (monetary) policy is effective in the long (short) term. (3) The systemic risk intervention effect of monetary (macroprudential) policy is channeled through inflation control (asset price stability).     

The European Systemic Risk Board – governance and early experience

ABSTRACT

The European Systemic Risk Board is charged with the macroprudential oversight of the financial system in the European Union. We compare and contrast the ESRB with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, which some scholars proposed as a role model for systemic risk management. There are parallels and some differences between these organisations. Neither institution has direct regulatory power, which could paradoxically be beneficial as it may help preserve their independence and objectivity in the long run. We also review the ESRB’s activities after it started in 2010 and assess the effect of its first public recommendation.     

Openness,growth convergence and China’s development prospects

ABSTRACT

This paper examines China’s long-term growth prospects and the potential drivers of future growth, based on cross-country productivity convergence and China’s featured demographic evolution. In a nonlinear open economy catch-up growth model, per capital GDP growth of the followers depend on that of the leading economy and time varying convergence of the relative per capita GDP. Comparable open economies of China are identified in terms of relative per capita GDP and the historical data of which are used to project China’s trajectory of productivity convergence and then the growth of per capita GDP. Projection shows China’s future GDP growth will gradually descend from 6.6–6.7% (2016–2020) to 2.6–2.7% (2046–2050) in low variant. Predictions under medium and high variants are provided as well. The importance of further opening-up domestic markets, elimination of birth control policies and accumulation of human capital in the process of promoting urbanization are highlighted and have significant implications for the economic restructuring and transformation of China.

Abbreviations: ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; IMF: International Monetary Fund     

Charter value,risk-taking and systemic risk in banking before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008

ABSTRACT

We investigate how bank charter value affects risk for a sample of OECD banks by using standalone and systemic risk measures before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Prior to the crisis, bank charter value is positively associated with risk-taking and systemic risk for very large ‘too-big-too-fail’ banks and large U.S. and European banks but such a relationship is inverted during and after the crisis. A deeper investigation shows that such a behaviour before the crisis is mostly relevant for very large banks and large banks with high growth strategies. Banks’ business models also influence this relationship. We find that for banks following a focus strategy, higher charter value amplifies both standalone and systemic risk for large U.S. and European banks. Our findings have important policy implications and cast doubts on the relevance of the uniform more stringent capital requirements introduced by Basel III.     

The Institutionalist Roots of Macroprudential Ideas: Veblen and Galbraith on Regulation,Policy Success and Overconfidence

One consequence of the global financial crisis has been to prompt debate over macroprudential regulation – meant to limit private risk-taking that threatens systemic stability. In this paper, we stress the roots of macroprudential ideas in the Institutionalist economics of Veblen and Galbraith in a way that highlights both unrecognised policy possibilities and underappreciated impediments to policy effectiveness, arguing in particular that regulatory success can breed overconfidence. First, we argue that while Veblen's views anticipated macroprudential arguments, they also obscured tensions between the technocratic acumen of policy ‘engineers’ and popular legitimacy. Second, we argue that while Galbraith's views similarly shaped the postwar Keynesian policy mix, they also echoed Veblen in underrating the potential for populist resentment of an intellectual ‘technostructure’. We conclude that while this analysis can be seen as highlighting an overlooked century of macroprudential debate, it also demonstrates the potential for technocratic overconfidence – which can eventually undermine policy legitimacy and effectiveness.     

The IMF as just One Creditor: Who’s in Charge When a Country Can’t Pay?

ABSTRACT

The international community’s management of the 2010 financial crisis in Greece revealed a major gap in the international financial system. No single institution is any longer unambiguously in charge. Consequently, the path is open for narrow interests to predominate over global interests. An examination of postwar history shows that this problem has been growing gradually since the 1970s and has become much greater since the mid-1990s. To alleviate the problem, the International Monetary Fund needs to develop an effective strategy for reducing the opportunities for creditor countries to intervene in decisions on how crises should be resolved.     

For how long do IMF forecasts of world economic growth stay up-to-date?

This study analyses the performance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook output forecasts for the world and for both the advanced economies and the emerging and developing economies. With a focus on the forecast for the current year and the next year, we examine the durability of IMF forecasts, looking at how much time has to pass so that IMF forecasts can be improved by using leading indicators with monthly updates. Using a real-time data set for GDP and for indicators, we find that some simple single-indicator forecasts on the basis of data that are available at higher frequency can significantly outperform the IMF forecasts as soon as the publication of the IMF’s Outlook is only a few months old. In particular, there is an obvious gain using leading indicators from January to March for the forecast of the current year.     

WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS

This paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 118 countries over the period 1971–2000. Our results, based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that it is mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while most political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of IMF agreements than to the disbursement of IMF credits.     

Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund, 10 Years Later: Overview*

This paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997–1998, with an emphasis on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It provides a detailed account of the development of the crisis and analyses and evaluates the content of IMF advice and its consequences. The size of the IMF package for each of these three countries is judged to have been too small. This paper also has a comparative perspective; the Mexican crisis is reviewed as a precursor to the Asian crisis to see what the IMF learned, and how it prepared, for future crises. The causes of the crises and IMF conditionality for the post‐Asian crisis countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina, are also compared to the Asian crisis countries. By agreeing to maintain a fixed exchange rate, for example, the IMF is judged to have been “softer” in its approach to the post‐Asian crisis countries.     

EXTERNAL MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We employ relative size of International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit as a proxy for interdependent macro variables that are associated with external macroeconomic imbalances or balance of payment (BOP) crisis to investigate how they impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Relative size of IMF credit as a share of gross domestic product sends two mixed signals to multinational enterprises (MNEs). First, it is a signal that a country is facing an actual or potential BOP crisis. Second, countries that seek IMF credit typically agree to implement a set of “IMF conditionality” before financial credit is disbursed. This may signal to MNEs that policy reforms that must accompany IMF financial credit may result in ex ante positive economic outlook and stability. We find that relative size of IMF credit is negatively (positively) correlated with FDI inflows to developing countries below (above) a threshold value of economic freedom. The main implication of these findings is that MNEs may view developing countries with below average index of economic freedom as lacking institutional capabilities to implement recommended IMF policy reforms when faced with an actual or potential BOP crisis. Our results are robust across alternative model specifications and consistent with the theory of catalytic finance. (JEL F21, F23, F33)     

Countercyclical capital rules for small open economies

The growing literature on macroprudential regulation focuses on how a combination of monetary and macroprudential policies can boost macroeconomic and financial stability. We contribute to this literature by developing a DSGE model that assesses the effectiveness of countercyclical capital regulation in small open economies, in monetary unions or with exchange rate pegs, where policymakers do not have full control over traditional stabilisation instruments such as nominal interest and exchange rates. In such economies, macroprudential policy could potentially play an even more relevant role in mitigating the adverse effects of macro-financial feedback loops. To validate the model’s ability to replicate the stylised facts of financial crises, we calibrate using data for the Irish economy, the scene of a recent housing crash. Our results demonstrate that the pro-active use of countercyclical capital regulation – in the form of Basel III-type rules – can help attenuate boom-bust cycles driven by over-optimistic expectations. We also find that more aggressive action by regulators during the release phase can bolster the economy’s ability to absorb a negative shock.     

Security and the Subsurface: Natural Gas and the Visualisation of Possibility Spaces

ABSTRACT

Beneath the surface of the United Kingdom lies a sprawling natural gas infrastructure. Based on recent (2014/15) ‘follow the thing’ fieldwork conducted in the UK onshore gas industry, this paper explores the ways that dangers related to the subterranean circulation of natural gas come to be visualised, and how these visualisations make possible different security interventions. These practices are shown to be limited by the ground, which despite its enrolment as a security device conceals from view the shifting landscapes of risk that surround these gaseous movements. Drawing on Manuel DeLanda's concept of the possibility space, I provide a conceptual framework for attending to security’s visualisation practices, describing how attempts are made to overcome the subsurface obfuscation of natural gas. I argue that, rather than being understood as a process of circulatory ‘filtration’ or ‘maintenance’, security must instead be regarded as a series of transformative practices of ecological (re)organisation that are predicated upon the visualisation of entities’ spaces of possibility. In the process, I provide an account of how the three-dimensional geographies and materialities of gas circulations and their milieus are intimately tied up in their governance and politics.     

The Financial Stability Board and Switzerland’s WiR-Credit Mechanism

Abstract:

The incentives banks face, such as the Basel Capital Accords, motivate them to favor lending with collateralized assets, rather than lending to Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs), with associated profound economic consequences for society. Since the 1970s there has not been any direct oversight of whether or not credit contributes to GDP. We need a macroeconomic policy tool that can discriminate among different categories of credit extended to curb speculation in existing assets (non-GDP) and promote new business investment (GDP).

Government money creation and private credit growth are often presumed the only two ways to enhance nominal demand, yet the Swiss Economic Circle (Wirtschaftsring-Genossenschaft or WIR) is a Swiss Bank whose creation of purchasing power for SMEs has counter-cyclically stabilized the Swiss economy for over 80 years. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) should create localized credit-creation architectures utilizing a Swiss-WIR type currency to funnel credit that reflects systemic and macroeconomic risks that individually will never be rational for banks left to themselves.     

Measuring the consequences of pension reform applying liquidation and longevity considerations

In seeking to understand IMF lending early large sample econometric studies tended to focus on economic factors. Political and institutional influences were often deemed to be reflected in the frequently large residual. At the same time increasing anecdotal evidence was being amassed to suggest that political factors were indeed important. However, more recent studies have claimed that, by using superior estimating techniques, a satisfactory explanation of Fund lending can be provided without needing to include political and institutional factors, which are in any case difficult to measure and model. This study shows that there is large sample evidence supporting the importance of some of these variables, though their contribution to predicting the pattern of IMF agreements is minimal. It goes on to discuss some of the implications of this for the Fund as the world's premier international financial institution.

The research upon which this paper is based was supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). While this support is gratefully acknowledged, the views and opinions expressed are those of the authors alone. Thanks to Chris Worswick and two anonymous referees for comments, and Connie Tulus and Helgi Maki for research assistance.     

Communication and performance in Bank–Fund joint participation

In this paper I relate Bank–Fund performance to their willingness (or ability) to communicate. I find evidence that a Bank–Fund simultaneous loan is associated to an increase in economic growth and that such effect is diminished by factors preventing full communication, such as the degree of Bank-Fund competition and the salience of informational asymmetries. Politically motivated loans seem—at least to some extent—stimulate more IMF–WB interaction, which turns out to be associated to a better country’s performance.     

Effectiveness of the reserve option mechanism as a macroeconomic prudential tool: evidence from Turkey

This article assesses the effectiveness of a novel macroprudential tool – the reserve option mechanism (ROM) – which Turkey’s central bank developed during the post-2008 period and has employed to control the risk associated with excessive capital flows. We assess how capital flows have affected economic variable changes since the introduction and usage of the ROM. Empirical evidence gathered from Turkey suggests that the tool decreases the effect of capital flow on capital flow (positive shock to capital flow dies out faster or becomes less persistent) and diminishes the effects of capital flow shocks on exchange and interest rates.     

Cultural Political Economy: Logics of Discovery,Epistemic Fallacies,the Complexity of Emergence,and the Potential of the Cultural Turn

As a result of a long-running internal debate there have been notable incremental changes to how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) treats capital controls, particularly those directed at inflows. These changes combine new acceptance of these policy instruments with an older emphasis on their negative consequences and on the desirability of free movement of capital. Policy change of this sort is puzzling from the standpoint of the existing literature on international organisations (IOs), which has thus far paid little attention to transformative incremental change associated with long-term contestation. This article departs from this tendency by drawing on insights from principal–agent theory, constructivism and historical institutionalism to identify the conditions under which such change may originate. I argue that actors within IOs are likely to pursue incremental change by layering new policies on to old ones as a way to build coalitions and to respond to external organisational insecurity imperatives and diverse member state preferences and to internal path-dependent organisational cultural features. Over time the incremental shifts brought by layering can induce transformative rather than reproductive change because they fit with consequentialist and appropriateness behavioural logics. I illustrate this argument by investigating recent changes in IMF policy on capital controls.     

BRETTON WOODS - ORIGINAL INTENTIONS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS

The Bretton Woods institutions have been subjected to a variety of criticisms in recent years and have been faced with severe problems in carrying out their objectives. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have not performed in accordance with the original intentions of their founders. As shown in this article, this is in large measure because the world economic environment has been quite different from that envisaged by the participants in the Bretton Woods conference. Many of the original intended functions for these institutions are no longer relevant. This article examines the current problems facing the IMF and World Bank, with special attention to how they are related to the original intentions. For example, in recent years, a major problem has been the financial crises of member countries that have liberalized their economies in line with trends toward globalization. These crises have resulted in demands on the IMF and World Bank for financial assistance for purposes other than those for which their assistance was originally designed. Other problems of the two institutions include providing assistance to the world's poorest countries that have made virtually no development progress in recent years, and assisting the former communist countries in transition to market economies. The author gives his personal views on how these and other problems of the IMF and World Bank should be dealt with.     

The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift

From late 2008 onwards, in the space of six months, international financial regulatory networks centred around the Swiss city of Basel presided over a startlingly rapid ideational shift, the significance and importance of which remains to be deciphered. From being relatively unpopular and very much on the sidelines, the idea of macroprudential regulation (MPR) moved to the centre of the policy agenda and came to represent a new Basel consensus, as the principal interpretative frame, for financial technocrats and regulators seeking to diagnose and understand the financial crisis and to advance institutional blueprints for regulatory reform. This article sets out to explain how and why that ideational shift occurred. It identifies four scoping conditions of presence, position, promotion, and plausibility, that account for the successful rise to prominence of macroprudential ideas through an insiders' coup d'état. The final section of the article argues that this macroprudential shift is an example of a ‘gestalt flip’ or third order change in Peter Hall's terms, but it is not yet a paradigm shift, because the development of first order policy settings and second order policy instruments is still ongoing, giving the macroprudential ideational shift a highly contested and contingent character.