投资者动机对众筹投资决策的影响

基于慈善理论,投资者动机分为内源动机、外源动机和提升声誉动机,这些动机既能影响众筹投资者的投资决策,也会相互影响。本文借助"众筹网"的投资数据,对投资者进行分类,考察投资者动机对众筹决策的影响。研究结果显示外源动机投资者、提升声誉动机投资者的投资金额更高;进一步探究内源动机与声誉动机的相互影响,结果显示二者负相关,内源动机投资者更关注内心满足,而对声誉需求较少。该研究可以辅助筹资者设置项目内容吸引不同动机投资者,并帮助众筹平台优化服务,从而提高项目融资效率和成功率。     

税收优惠因抵免制而失效?——基于美国对华直接投资的研究

在国际直接投资研究领域,人们普遍认为,当母国对来源于外国的所得实行抵免制以避免国际重复课税时,东道国对外资企业的税收优惠往往转化为母国政府的财政收入,母国的投资者无法获得东道国给予的税收优惠.通过对1990～2004年实行抵克制的美国及实行豁免制和饶让抵免制的其它西方发达国家在华直接投资进行比较,未发现美国与其它西方发达国家在华直接投资的积极性存在显著差异.由于美国对该国投资者给予税收递延,使得投资者依然能够获得东道国的税收优惠,美国实行的抵免制并未阻碍该国投资者的在华投资热情.     

Dividend valuation,trading and transactions costs: the 1997 partial abolition of dividend tax credit repayments

Although UK resident tax-exempt shareholders lost the right to repayment of tax credits on dividends paid by UK resident companies in July 1997, they could continue to receive tax credit repayments in respect of dividends received from Irish resident companies until December 1998. In July 1997 the rate of tax credit on Irish companies' dividends was 21%, and this was reduced to 11% in December 1997. We obtain insights into the incentives and behaviour of UK tax-exempt investors in response to these changes in the relative ‘tax attractiveness’ of investments in Irish resident companies. We find that only at its highest rate, 21%, was the level of dividend tax credit on Irish companies' dividends sufficient to induce changes in UK tax-exempt shareholders' investment strategies; and that the propensity for dividend capture by tax-exempt investors is heightened when the dividend tax credit yield is of the order of 0.8 or more and dividend yield is of the order of 2.6% or more.     

Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs

We examine how a firm's incentive to commit fraud when going public varies with investor beliefs about industry business conditions. Fraud propensity increases with the level of investor beliefs about industry prospects but decreases when beliefs are extremely high. We find that two mechanisms are at work: monitoring by investors and short‐term executive compensation, both of which vary with investor beliefs about industry prospects. We also find that monitoring incentives of investors and underwriters differ. Our results are consistent with models of investor beliefs and corporate fraud, and suggest that regulators and auditors should be vigilant for fraud during booms.     

Capital Gains Tax Rules, Tax-loss Trading, and Turn-of-the-year Returns

Changes in the capital gains tax rules facing individual investors do not affect the incentives for "window dressing" by institutional investors, but they can affect the incentives for year-end tax-induced trading by individual investors. Empirical evidence for the 1963 to 1996 period suggests that when the tax law encouraged taxable investors who accrued losses early in the year to realize their losses before year-end, the correlation between early year losses and turn-of-the-year returns was weaker than when the law did not provide such an early realization incentive. These findings suggest that tax-loss trading contributes to turn-of-the-year return patterns.     

税收信用体系建设与建立征信国家

市场经济的本质是信用经济，税收信用是信用体系的一部分。建立税收信用体系，一方面可以为建立征信国家提供纳税信用信息，完善信用数据库；另一方面，一个征信国家有完善的征信服务。信息资源共享，可以帮助税务部门更好地监控税源，激励纳税人提高纳税信用。所以，应尽快在我国建立起税收信用体系。     

Optimal leverage strategy: Capital structure in real estate investments

This article examines the optimal leverage strategy for real estate investors who are investing in income-producing properties. Within a discounted cash-flow context, the investment objective for the equity investor is to maximize the contribution to net present value of using mortgage financing. Utilizing more debt decreases the required equity investment and increases the size of the tax shelter. On the other hand, as the loan-to-value ratio increases, the interest rate charged by the lender increases, which indicates a higher cost of debt. This article goes beyond the simple conventional wisdom that debt financing should be used when financial leverage is positive by developing an equation that allows one to determine the optimal level of debt financing to use when positive leverage is possible. The optimal loan-to-value ratio is found to be a function of the investor's characteristics. Several hypotheses about the relationships between such an optimal loan-to-value ratio and the investor's characteristics are derived.     

Arguments in Favour of Tax Neutral Cost Allocation

When considering corporate taxes in a cost allocation context a trade‐off is generated for shareholders. On the one hand, accelerated depreciation increases the value of a project due to the depreciation tax shield. On the other hand, accelerated depreciation most likely does not induce robust goal congruency between managers and shareholders when utilizing residual income as an incentive system and, as a consequence, over‐ or underinvestment could result. In this context, the literature suggests the application of particular allocation rules. When extending the relative marginal benefits cost allocation rule (Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) to include corporate taxes we find it to be tax neutral and to maintain its properties of generating robust incentives. As a consequence the over‐/underinvestment problem is solved, but the depreciation tax shield is often not maximized. However, we illustrate that in competitive markets shareholders ought to prefer a tax neutral allocation scheme over an accelerated depreciation schedule. Thus, we show that shareholders as well as regulators have—for different reasons—a preference for tax neutral cost allocation.     

Determinants of Regional Investment Decisions in China: An Econometric Model of Tax Incentive Policy

This paper examines whether concessionary tax rates and tax incentives can attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into certain designated areas in China. Since China opened its doors to foreign investors in 1979, tax benefits have been used extensively to attract FDI into different areas. In 1991, a new tax law was introduced which superseded two previous income tax laws. This new law provides additional tax benefits which improve the investment environment for foreign investors. This study investigates the effect of China's tax rates and tax incentive policy on FDI and on the locational choices of foreign firms. Our empirical results indicate that tax rates and incentives are important determinants of regional investment decisions in China, after controlling for potential confounding variables covering infrastructure, unemployment rate, wage rate and agglomeration economics. Specifically, areas offering lower tax rates and increased tax incentives are found to attract greater amounts of FDI. The impetus of the tax effect on FDI is more apparent in the post-1991 period due to changes in the tax laws. Our results also suggest that infrastructure variables are important determinants of regional investment decisions.     

Changes to Income Trust Taxation in Canada: Investor Reaction and Dividend Clientele Theory

Abstract:  This paper explores the relationship between tax-induced dividend clientele theory and the recent changes to the taxation of income trusts in Canada. On October 31, 2006, the Canadian government announced the Tax Fairness Plan ( TFP ) calling for the elimination of the considerable tax advantage enjoyed by income trusts. Generally, distributions from income trusts are now taxed at rates comparable to those imposed on corporate dividends. We examine market reaction to the  TFP  to address three issues: first, whether the valuation effect of a dividend tax increase is consistent with the traditional or the new view of dividend taxation; secondly, whether the market reaction to tax increases has a differential impact on firm value that is related to the tax preferences of taxable, tax-exempt, and foreign investor tax clienteles; and thirdly, whether firms change their dividend policies in response to the preference of institutional investors (tax-based dividend policy effect) or whether institutional investors are sorting themselves across firms based on their dividend policies (investor sorting effect). Our results provide strong evidence as follows. First, the valuation effect in reaction to the  TFP  announcement is consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation – i.e. that taxes on dividends reduce the net return to investors, increase the firm's cost of capital and lower the firm's ability to access capital markets, thereby discouraging investment and savings. Secondly, we saw that trusts with a larger percentage of their units held by tax-exempt, low-tax, and foreign investors had a higher decline in value when compared with trusts held mostly by ordinary taxable investors. These results support dividend tax clientele theory. Finally, we observed changes in institutional investor clienteles consistent with the investor sorting effect.     

Cross-Border Investing with Tax Arbitrage: The Case of German Dividend Tax Credits

German dividends typically carry a tax credit which makes thedividend worth 42.86% more to a taxable German shareholder thanto a tax-exempt or foreign shareholder. This results in a penaltyfor foreign investors who buy and hold German dividend-payingstocks. I document that, as a result of the credit, the ex-daydrop exceeds the dividend by more than one-half of the tax credit,and show that futures and option prices embed more than one-halfof the tax credit. The existence of the credit creates opportunitiesfor cross-border tax arbitrage—in which foreign holdersof German stock transfer the dividend to German shareholders—andimplies that it is tax efficient for foreign investors to holdderivatives rather than investing directly in German stocks.The empirical findings are consistent with costly tax arbitrageactivity by German investors, who face tax risk due to antiarbitragerules. Since dividend tax credits exist in many other countries,the findings are potentially of broad interest.     

The value of a flow-through entity in an integrated corporate tax system

In an integrated corporate tax system, resident shareholders receive a tax credit for corporate tax paid that can be used to offset personal tax on dividend income. Nonresident and tax-exempt (pension plan) investors cannot use the tax credit on corporate dividends and thus prefer to invest in flow-through entities. We estimate the value of the flow-through entity to nonresident and pension plan investors by examining the price change around the date of an unexpected announcement of a change in tax law related to Canadian publicly traded income trusts units creating an entity-level tax that makes them no longer tax-favored to these investors.     

质量信号、投资人参与、项目经济性对农产品众筹融资达成率的影响——基于众筹网884个农业众筹项目的数据

使用众筹网884个农业众筹项目的数据,基于投资者需求的角度,结合农产品特色,从质量信号、投资人参与、项目经济性三个维度对农产品众筹融资达成率进行分析。结果表明:相比质量信号,农产品众筹中的"羊群效应"显著;目标融资额反向影响农业众筹融资达成率。进一步研究发现:发起人有项目经验时,投资人更加注重时间成本,发起人无项目经验时,投资人更加注重货币成本;目标融资额显著负向调节管理质量(项目更新次数)对农业众筹融资达成率的影响。因此,为提高农业众筹融资达成率,发起人应当积累项目经验与社会资本,提高项目经济性;平台方应建立健全优质项目筛选机制,提高平台知名度,引导正向"羊群效应"。     

Valuation implications of socially responsible tax avoidance: Evidence from the electricity industry

Prior literature suggests that firms may bear reputational costs associated with corporate tax avoidance, which could in turn reduce the net present value of firms’ tax planning strategies. However, these studies do not consider the fact that firms may have opportunities to avoid tax in socially responsible ways. We investigate the equity valuation implications of one form of socially responsible tax avoidance: claiming the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC). We predict and find that investors more positively value tax savings generated from PTCs compared to other forms of corporate tax avoidance, consistent with the notion that socially responsible tax avoidance should not subject firms to reputational costs. Additionally, consistent with the role that CSR can play in enhancing a firm’s reputational capital, we find evidence of a spillover effect in which investors more positively value other sources of tax avoidance to the extent the firm also reduces its taxes in a socially responsible way. Our results demonstrate the importance for managers to consider socially responsible tax avoidance as a component of a firm’s tax planning portfolio and for policymakers to recognize the appeal of socially responsible tax strategies as the reputational consequences of tax avoidance become more prominent.     

Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment

We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of allocating incentives primarily to firms that would have invested even in the absence of special tax treatment. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the wrong firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but result in a form of tax shifting and may reduce FDI. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc suggests that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

Mutual funds' capital gains lock-in and earnings management

Capital gains taxation creates a lock-in effect, increasing investors' incentives to monitor and decreasing portfolio firms' incentives to cater to short-term investors. We show a negative relation between lock-in and portfolio firms' earnings management, and this relation is stronger for capital gains held by tax-sensitive investors. Further, the relation between lock-in and earnings management is stronger when the capital gains tax rate is higher. We show that locked-in funds vote against management and against audit committee members' reappointment following earnings management. Locked-in funds are less likely to exit a position following disappointing earnings announcements, reducing firms' incentive to manage earnings.     

Tax Incentives to Hedge

For corporations facing tax-function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax-code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax-code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.     

Interaction of investor trades and market volatility: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This paper examines the relation between market volatility and investor trades by identifying who supplies and demands market liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Because the different trading patterns of various investor types such as individual investors, institutional investors, and foreign investors affect market liquidity differently, we find that market volatility fluctuates significantly depending on which investor types participate in trade. We show that market volatility increases by more than 50% from the average level when there are greater buy trades by momentum investors that demand liquidity and there are less sell trades by contrarian (or profit-taking) investors that supply liquidity. On the other hand, volatility dampens by more than 57% when there are greater sell trades by profit-taking investors, mostly by domestic investors, while there are less momentum buy trades.     

Privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk

We study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible, the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors. The lower the productivity difference, the greater the equity stake offered to investors. On the other hand, if the fraction of efficient investors is significant or productivity differentials are large, the optimal policy consists of a dual method of privatization in which it offers two methods of privatization to outside investors. The first method consists of a sale of 100% equity together with a subsidy and charges higher price. Under the second option, the investor pays a smaller price but buys less than 100% equity without any subsidy. Efficient investors opt for the first method while inefficient investors prefer the second. The dual privatization method screens investors and provides them with maximum incentives to invest while minimizing the risk of post-privatization bankruptcy.