New Protagonists in Global Economic Governance: Brazilian Agribusiness at the WTO

The existing international economic order has been heavily shaped by US power and the US has been a key driver of globalisation and neoliberal economic restructuring, prompting speculation about whether the rise of new developing country powers could rupture the current trajectory of neoliberal globalisation. This paper analyses the case of Brazil at the World Trade Organization (WTO), a core institution in global economic governance. In the last decade, Brazil successfully waged two landmark trade disputes against the US and EU and created a coalition of developing countries – the G20 – which brought an end to the dominance of the US and EU at the WTO and made their trade policies a central target of the Doha Round. Brazil's activism has been widely hailed as a major victory for developing countries. However, I argue that rather than challenging the neoliberal agenda of the WTO, Brazil has emerged as one of the most vocal advocates of free market globalisation and the push to expand and liberalise global markets. I show that Brazil's stance has been driven by the rise of its export-oriented agribusiness sector. This case demonstrates that business actors from the Global South are becoming significant new protagonists in global economic governance; they are taking the tools created by the states and corporations of the Global North – in this case, the WTO and its neoliberal discourse – and turning them against their originators. At the same time, their interests are being wrapped in and advanced through a discourse of development and social justice and a strategic mobilisation of the politics of the North-South divide.     

American hegemony after 11 September: allies,rivals and contradictions

11 September heralded and provided a pretext for a more aggressive but increasingly contradictory American hegemony. Some of the consequences are contrary to the United States' own interests. Its new doctrine of ‘preemptive strike’ against other sovereign states encourages similarly belligerent behaviour by other governments, and yet more terrorism by nonstate actors, the very threats which were to be eradicated by a re-asserted US hegemony. This essay focuses on three partly overlapping themes: different strategies towards allies – multilateral and unilateral; different forms of power – civil and military; and different ideologies of globalisation – neoliberal and neo-conservative. It argues that while US policy may oscillate between such poles, it often combines the different elements. The overall strategy of the Bush administration is best characterised as unilateral multilateralism. The main issue for US hegemonists is the ways in which their hegemony might best be exercised, maintained and strengthened vis à vis allies and rivals. But for a safer, more democratic world, the choice does not lie between one faction of US hegemonists and another: we need other alternatives such as cosmopolitan democracy and a genuine internationalist movement which would give it some much-needed substance.     

The Managerial Lineages of Neoliberalism

Managerialism is often depicted as a key practice of neoliberalism yet relatively little has been written by scholars of neoliberalism about the actual relationship between managerialism and neoliberalism. Usually subsumed under a functional reading of neoliberalism, managerialism has too often been understood simply as a means for neoliberal ends (i.e. to promote market rule or competition). This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it conflates practices that stem from two different historical lineages. As we show, managerial governance not only has a very different history than neoliberal theory, but it also rests on different principles. Its development can be traced back to the US defence sector in the 1950s and the pivotal role of the RAND Corporation. On the basis of this historical perspective, we argue for the need to analyse managerialism on its own terms and make the case for considering the rise of managerial science as a paradigmatic shift in governance. In doing so, we show how managerial governance represented a radical rupture from previous management practices and show how it profoundly reshaped how we have come to understand governance.     

Region,Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New Synthesis

Latin American regional governance today represents a conglomerate of commercial, political and trans-societal welfarist integration projects. In this overlapping and sometimes conflicting scenario what Latin Americanness should mean, and how integration projects should respond to current challenges of global political economy are being redefined. The focus of the paper is twofold: to better understand current regional transformations and to discuss what new developments mean for how we theorise non-European regionalism. Looking at the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas and the Union of South American Nations we ask: How are we to understand regional agreements that are grounded in different systems of rules, alternative ideas and motivations that contest ‘open regionalism’? We argue that Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) represent different pathways to regional building, creating foundations for post-hegemonic and post-trade regional governance. We thus challenge New Regionalist approaches that assume regionalism as taking place within and modelled by neoliberal economics, establishing the debate around ‘old’ vs. ‘new’ regionalism. As these categories are limited in grasping the full meaning and implications of post-hegemonic regional orders, we discuss UNASUR and ALBA as ‘arenas for action’ to understand divergent practices, outcomes and types of regionness emerging in alternative regional spaces in South America.     

Thinking Like a Trader: The Impact of Neoliberal Doctrine on Habits of Thought

Neoliberalism has come out of the financial crisis unscathed. Moreover, it has further asserted its dominance over geopolitical discourse and ideology worldwide. I contend that neoliberal supremacy in the policy arena and upon domestic and international institutions has been largely uncontested because it has penetrated all aspects of life to the extent that it now represents what Thorstein Veblen referred to as “the modern point of view.” Understanding the global power of neoliberalism requires examining not only its well-established hegemony over institutions as social constructs, but also its impact on habits of thought as mental constructs. From a Veblenian perspective, I argue that the neoliberal doctrine generates habits of thought which legitimize the transformation of a marketoriented economy into a full-fledged market society. The impact of the normalization of the neoliberal mode of behavior may, in the end, worsen the fracture between nation and state and unravel the fabric of society by justifying fully detached, emotion-free, and self-centered actions that crowd-out pro-social behaviors and challenge any social conception of the common good.     

Neoliberal Entrenchment of North Atlantic Capital. From Corporate Self-Regulation to State Capture

After the financial crisis of 2007–8, neoliberal capitalism by all appearances has entrenched instead of being displaced. Its political–economic programme or ‘comprehensive concept of control’ continues to hold society in thrall. This was different in the crisis of 1974–5 when the corporate liberalism of the postwar years and its industry-centred class compromise were beginning to be replaced by finance-led neoliberalism and a compromise with asset-owning middle classes. Under corporate liberalism, real capital accumulation was protected from the ‘rentier’/‘money-dealing’ fraction of capital associated with speculative investment; neoliberalism has allowed its resurgence. Large corporations in the first phase of the transition (‘systemic neoliberalism’) embarked on a strategy of transnational restructuring no longer dependent on 1960s-style state support. In the process, financial group formation, here measured by dense director interlocks (≥2) amongst the largest corporations in the North Atlantic economy (where this type of corporate governance obtains), was intensified. The resurgence of money-dealing capital and rentier incomes in the 1990s led to a decline in real accumulation (‘predatory neoliberalism’), and after the crisis of 2007–8, to a demise of the financial group structure of Atlantic capital as the network of dense interlocks radically thins out and capital comes to rely on states again, this time to protect it from a democratic correction of the neoliberal regime and with state autonomy greatly reduced by public debt.     

Islamic Charitable Giving in the UK: A ‘Radical’ Economic Alternative?

ABSTRACT

Muslim financial actions have faced increased scrutiny as financial links to ‘terrorism’ have risen in political rhetoric with anything labelled as ‘Islamic’ being perceived to be in requirement of study in terms of its relation to ‘fundamental British values’ (Kundnani, A., 2014. The Muslims Are Coming! Islamaphobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. London: Verso.). Exploring Muslim charitable giving in the UK, it will be posited that much of Islamic charitable practices sustains a relationship with neoliberalism without being entirely reduced to it. The post-9/11 environment ‘has led to renewed scholarly interest in the relationship between the economy and Islam and more specifically the incorporation of Islamic value in daily economic life’ (Rethel, L., 2019. Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities. New Political Economy, 24 (3), 350–364, 2). Islamic charitable practices potentially offer a resistance to the inegalitarian effects of neoliberalism whilst simultaneously being both a part, and a consequence of, neoliberal dominance. Moreover, Islamic charity in the UK acts as an expression of the Muslim community against a backdrop of security and surveillance. Thus, while potentially offering a ‘radical’ alternative to neoliberalism it is a non-violent and non-conflictual alternative.     

Neoliberal and neostructuralist perspectives on labour flexibility,poverty and inequality: A critical appraisal

Numerous recent reports by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and international organisations have focused on so-called ‘climate refugees’. This article examines the turn from a discourse of ‘climate refugees’, in which organisations perceive migration as a failure of both mitigation and adaptation to climate change, to one of ‘climate migration’, in which organisations promote migration as a strategy of adaptation. Its focus is the promotion of climate migration management, and it explores the trend of these discourses through two sections. First, it provides an empirical account of the two discourses, emphasising the differentiation between them. It then focuses on the discourse of climate migration, its origins, extent and content, and the associated practices of ‘migration management’. The second part argues that the turn to the promotion of ‘climate migration’ should be understood as a way to manage the insecurity created by climate change. However, international organisations enacts this management within the forms of neoliberal capitalism, including the framework of governance. Therefore, the promotion of ‘climate migration’ as a strategy of adaptation to climate change is located within the tendencies of neoliberalism and the reconfiguration of southern states' sovereignty through governance.     

State Strategies and the Geopolitics of the Global Knowledge Economy: China,India and the Case of Regenerative Medicine

The global competition between states for position in the uncertain future of the life sciences brings a new dynamic to the intersection between geopolitics and the global knowledge economy. Armed with distinctive approaches to innovation in new health technologies, the emerging economies of China and India are determined to challenge the traditional hegemony of the developed countries in areas such as regenerative medicine where the promised biotechnology future is said to lie. Yet although the political belief that there is a future value for regenerative medicine is global, the precise nature of that future when measured in terms of the path of the science, the market demand, the cultural response, the commercialisation process and its associated business models is obscure. Drawing on theories of the competition and developmental state, I analyse the factors that shape a state's response to the promise of regenerative medicine, the strategies of ‘speculative innovation’ that may be adopted in pursuit of geopolitical advantage in this uncertain field, and the adaptive qualities necessary for a state's effective competition in an age of globalisation. This analysis is then applied to the emerging economies of China and India to assess their geopolitical strategies in regenerative medicine innovation, their current position in this part of the knowledge bioeconomy, and their likely impact on its continuing globalisation.     

The geopolitics of Slavic Union: Russia,Belarus, and multipolarity

Whether new ‘poles’ will rise to challenge American hegemony is an important issue for international relations theory and policymakers. This article examines the conscious effort by Russian and Belarusian politicians to promote multipolarity through the construction of a ‘Slavic Union’. Although largely theoretical, this union is a clear reaction to the sharp, relative increase in American power since the end of the Cold War and misgivings about its intentions, as evidenced by the expansion of NATO, the proliferation of US missile attacks, and the recent Kosovo conflict. This article suggests that American foreign policy is becoming counterproductive to its position in the international system.     

Oil conflict in Nigeria: Contending issues and perspectives of the local Niger Delta people

This article analyses the extent and nature of private authority in global political economy by examining one of its most publicised instances, the World Economic Forum (WEF). In Davos, Switzerland, the annual meetings of the WEF have attracted the world economic and political e´lite for more than 30 years. Appraisals of the WEF diverge widely. For many years, Le Monde Diplomatique, the French monthly close to the anti-neoliberal globalisation movement, has described the World Economic Forum as ‘the meeting place of the masters of the world [which] has undoubtedly become the centre of hyperliberalism, the capital of globalisation, and the main home of the “pensée unique” ’. George Soros, the well known hedge-fund manager turned philanthropist, has described the meetings of Davos, of which he is a regular participant, as a ‘big cocktail party’. These contrasting views on the influence and power of the WEF in global politics and economy mirror the position of those holding such claims: those closely associated with the Forum are inclined to deny its power and those fiercely opposed are likely to emphasise its overarching influence. From a theoretical perspective, however, these opposing views express disagreement on one outstanding feature of the changes associated with ‘globalisation’: the significance of new agents in the global political economy beyond states and markets.     

The New ‘Passive Revolution’ of the Green Economy and Growth Discourse: Maintaining the ‘Sustainable Development’ of Neoliberal Capitalism

This paper analyses the rapidly emerging discourse of a green economy based on green growth. It highlights inherent conflicts and contradictions of this discourse such as the myth of decoupling growth from the environment, pollution generations and resource consumption. Using key theoretical constructs of both Gramsci and Polanyi, the paper argues that the green economy/growth discourse can be seen as a Gramscian ‘passive revolution’ whereby the dominant sustainable development discourse, subsumed by capitalist hegemony, is protected in the context of global environmental, economic and development crises. The ‘neoliberalising of nature’, or in other words, the privatisation, marketisation and commodification of nature, akin to Polanyi's fictitious commodities, continues and intensifies with green economy/growth strategies. Greening the economy and associated strategies of green growth divert attention from the social and political dimensions of sustainability and issues of social and international justice. In this way, the inexorable march or ‘sustainable development’ of neoliberal capitalism is maintained. This paper goes on to argue that contesting the claims of green economy/growth discourse through political struggles by civil society against the neoliberalisation of nature is a sign of a slowly emerging counter-hegemonic ‘double movement’ which challenges capitalist hegemony and the commodification of society–nature relations.     

The Last Gasp of Neoliberalism

The ideas of both Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi shed light on understanding the last gasp of neoliberalism. The last gasp refers to Donald Trump’s abandonment of free trade, long considered a cornerstone of the neoliberal agenda, and his overt attacks on democratic institutions. In Trump, neoliberalism’s attempt to overcome the gridlock of liberal democracy has revealed its fascist leanings. Both Polanyi and Veblen warned about the trend towards fascism. Trump was elected, in part, by filling the void left by the factioning of neoliberalism, in part by the injustice felt by people in rural areas, those with stagnant incomes, white males, and others. Trump has transcended the neoliberal agenda, approaching market relations from the point-of-view of the fight. The emergence of a predatory culture, in both the domestic and international realms, resembles the culture outlined in Veblen’s The Theory of Business Enterprise. Trump’s actions reveal the need to extend Polanyi’s idea of social protection given the negative effects of modern technology and Trump’s efforts to dismantle or reduce some regulatory agencies. Changing demographics and the adverse reaction to Trump’s fascist leanings may yet see the emergence of a new progressive era, suggesting, at least, that Trump represents the last gasp of neoliberalism.     

Economic integration in an uneven world: an internationalist perspective

This paper discusses two progressive schools of thought that have evolved in response to international neoliberalism and the consequent competitive pressures in global markets emanating from the low-cost conditions obtained in many less developed countries. The paper identifies these as the ‘competitiveness-enhancing’ and the ‘competition-reducing’ approaches. The former is shown to be ill-suited to present circumstances of the global economy and, in any event, nationalist. The latter seeks to minimize the adverse consequences of international neoliberalism, and comprises proposals for expansive social charters and social tariffs. The paper provides a theoretical basis for this approach, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each of these proposals. The paper then develops and defends a new multilateral, rule-based trade proposal, called the ‘social index tariff structure’ (SITS), which would reward nations for high levels of development achieved relative to their economic means. Drawing on human development data from the Human Development Report (1993), a SITS-based trading scheme is developed for 77 countries. It is argued that a SITS regime would serve to protect the quality of life in developed countries while promoting human development in the less developed countries. The SITS proposal is assessed against Amartya Sen's ‘capabilities to achieve functionings’ approach to human development.     

Market Power and Marketisation: Japan and China's Impact on the Iron Ore Market, 50 Years Apart

ABSTRACT

How can we explain the marketisation of the iron ore market following the emergence of China, whereas the same market had seen change in the opposite direction following the emergence of Japan, 50 years earlier? I argue that relative coordination capacity – or relative market power – between domestic and international stakeholders explains market change at the global level. Via the study of Japan and China's impact on the iron ore pricing and shipping regimes, I show that China's rise led to the marketisation (liberalisation and financialisation) of the iron ore market pricing regime, and the demarketisation of the shipping regime, whereas Japan's rise led to demarketisation in both cases. This article's argument illustrates that China's impact is not equal across markets, contrary to characterisations of China as either a revisionist or status quo power. Second, it argues that China has caused the marketisation of the iron ore pricing regime, which is contrary to expectations on both sides of the debate on China's rise: China was unable to dictate outcomes via a strong state, nor did it seamlessly integrate the global economy. Third, it illustrates the importance of resonance dynamics at the interface of domestic and global market institutions.     

China in Global Economic Governance

China has made contradictory claims about its attitude toward the existing international order. Is China a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing international regimes? Or has China been a new type of great power seeking to reform the existing world order, making it more friendly toward the global South? In this article, we look beyond Chinese rhetoric and examine China's behavior in global economic governance. A comparison with other emerging powers and traditional major powers shows that China has been actively involved in global economic governance. But, thus far, China has not exercised substantive leadership nor has it pushed hard for change to benefit the developing countries. The level of its support of the current regimes varies across issue areas and is primarily driven by its changing economic interest.     

The organisation for economic cooperation and development

The global financial and economic crisis has prompted some scholars to suggest that a fundamental regulatory shift away from neoliberalism will take place – both in general and in the field of EU competition regulation. This paper shows that so far no radical break with the neoliberal type of competition regulation is heaving into sight. It sets out to explain this from the vantage point of a critical political economy perspective, which identifies the circumstances under which a crisis can result in a regulatory paradigm shift. Contrasting the current situation with the shift in EC/EU competition regulation after the crisis in the 1970s, the paper argues that the preconditions for a fundamental shift in this issue area are not present this time around. Several reasons account for this: the current crisis has been construed by economic and political elites as a crisis within and not of neoliberal capitalism; the social power configuration underpinning the neoliberal order remains unaltered; no clear counter-project has surfaced; the European Commission has been (and remains) in a position to oppose radical changes; and finally, there are no signs of a wider paradigm shift in the EU's regulatory architecture.     

Australian Opportunities through the Chinese Structural Transformation

China is now Australia's largest trading partner, continuing to increase its relative importance. Its growth and structural change have been the major determinants of the conditions under which Australia relates to global markets for goods, services and capital. China has been a labour surplus economy. Over the past half‐dozen years, China has entered the ‘turning point’ in economic development, in which labour becomes scarce, real wages rise rapidly, the surplus of savings over investment falls and there is some easing of growth rates in sectors that use resources intensively. This changes the nature of Australian opportunities in China.     

Impact of Chinese growth and trade on labor in developed countries

This paper examines the impacts of growth in China's economy and trade on the skill premium of labor in developed countries. We utilize a unique global dataset that disaggregates workers by occupations to identify impacts across labor categories with different skill sets, complementing the widely used GTAP Data Base in the CGE framework offered by the GTAP model. To study the impacts of China's fast-paced growth, we model the counterfactual, i.e., what if China grew and opened at a more modest rate; we then compare this baseline with China's actual growth. Results indicate that a strong rise in manufacturing exports from China to the US impacts output and employment in the US. The US shifts its production away from light manufacturing sectors to more service-oriented sectors that also tend to engage higher skilled labor. There is a small decrease in the real wages of unskilled labor and a rise in the real wages of skilled labor. Interestingly, not all categories of unskilled labor lose, rather those that are more directly linked with manufacturing sectors are impacted; unskilled ‘service and shop workers’ and the unskilled ‘agricultural workers, machine operators, assemblers, craft workers, and others’ observe a small decline in real wages, while the impact on unskilled ‘clerks’ is insignificant. For all categories of skilled workers, there is an increase in real wages primarily driven by the shift in production to services and high-skilled labor intensive categories, resulting in the rising skill premium. Hence disaggregating the labor data provides greater depth on the understanding of the differential impacts on domestic workers resulting from trade, and thereby guides policy on how these differential impacts can be smoothed through redistribution of benefits. Consistent with other study findings, there is a positive impact on overall growth and welfare in the US, EU and Australasia.     

Who benefits from China’s coal subsidy policies? A computable partial equilibrium analysis

Using a computable partial equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and based on global coal production, trade and consumption data in 2014, this study simulates the economic and welfare impacts of China’s coal subsidies at the industry level. Simulation results show that, first, the government’s subsidies have greatly promoted China's coal output, but may aggravate the overcapacity in China’s coal industry. Second, China's coal subsidies have significant trade destruction effects and its coal imports fall by more than 20% annually. Third, if considering the environmental cost, China's coal subsidies cause not only huge net welfare loss to China, but also harm to the global environment, thus no country benefits from China's coal subsidies.