Private-to-private Corruption

The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private corruption, by contrast, has been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world's leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects.     

Regulating Supply Side Corruption

Abstract

Doing corruption-free business in developing countries is not easy. Government officials and politicians in developing countries demand monetary gains from multinational companies interested in seeking business deals in their nations. Multinational firms are willing to oblige them since they need the business in developing countries. Such unsavory business practices are extremely difficult to change. However, today more and more countries are concerned about corruption and are trying to combat it. Sociologists, political scientists, and economists have advanced various methods to combat corruption. Mainly, these methods are geared toward reducing the demand for corrupt practices. This paper using the case of the Republic of Kazakhstan suggests controlling the supply of corruption.     

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its Impact on International Companies

Corruption is a serious economic, social, political, and moral blight, especially in many emerging countries. It is a problem that affects companies in particular, especially in international commerce, finance, and technology transfer. And it is becoming an international phenomenon in scope, substance, and consequences. That is why, in recent years, there has been a proliferation of international efforts to tackle the problem of corruption. One such international cooperative initiative is the United Nations Convention against Corruption, signed in 2003, which came into force in December 2005. This is the first truly global instrument to prevent and combat corruption, built on a broad international consensus. The purpose of this article is to explain the origin and content of the Convention, what it adds to existing international instruments for combating corruption, and its strengths and weaknesses, mainly from the point of view of companies.     

Determinants of Bribery in Asian Firms: Evidence from the World Business Environment Survey

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes.     

Determinants of Bribery in International Business: The Cultural and Economic Factors

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for 47 countries reported by Transparency International were used to ascertain determinants of bribe taking in international business. Two sets of independent variables – economic and cultural – were used in a multiple regression analysis. Results indicate that bribe taking was more likely to be prevalent in countries with low per capita income and lower disparities in income distribution. Cultural factors such as high power distance and high masculinity in a country were also likely to be associated with high level of bribe taking. Both economic and cultural factors were important explanatory factors of bribery. Implications of the findings for combating bribery are discussed. Rajib Sanyal is an American Council of Education Fellow at George Mason University for 2004–2005, on leave from The College of New Jersey, where he is a professor of management. Dr. Sanyal has published widely, and is the author of a textbook on International Management.     

腐败侵蚀与财政支出扭曲

采用1995—2006年中国大陆省级面板数据,实证检验腐败对中国财政支出规模和结构的影响。研究发现:腐败激励了财政支出规模的膨胀,促使支出结构变形;腐败显著地推高了经济建设支出的比重,但降低了社会文教支出的比重。     

Institutional Pillars and Corruption at the Societal Level

This article studies the effects of social institutions on organizational corruption at the societal level by focusing on the possible interactions between the institutional pillars that have been identified in past research. Based on these three institutional aspects or pillars, this article tests the interactive effects of social institutions among societies throughout the world. The results suggest that the three institutional pillars have significant interactive effects on organizational corruption at the societal level. A discussion of the implications of the research findings for researchers and practitioners is given.     

Trade Liberalization, Corruption, and Software Piracy

As multinational firms explore new and promising national markets two of the most crucial elements in the strategic decision regarding market-entry are the level of corruption and existing trade barriers. One form of corruption that is crucially important to firms is the theft of intellectual property. In particular, software piracy has become a hotly debated topic due to the deep costs and vast levels of piracy around the world. The purpose of this paper is to assess how laissez-faire trade policies and corruption affect national software piracy rates. Using invisible hand theory, as well as literature from the fields of international strategy and ethics, formal research hypotheses are posited and tested. Results suggest that corruption mediates the relationship between economic freedom and software piracy. Implications for multinational managers and researchers are also addressed. Christopher J. Robertson (B.S. University of Rhode Island; M.B.A. and Ph.D., Florida State University) is an Associate Professor in the International Business and Strategy Group at Northeastern University. He has taught in Virginia, Florida, Spain, Peru and Ecuador and is a two time Fulbright Scholar. Professor Robertson’s Primary research stream is cross-cultural management with a focus on ethics and strategy. His work has been published in journals such as the Journal of World Business, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Business Ethics, Management International Review, Organizational Dynamics and Business Horizons. K Matthew Gilley (B.A and M.B.A University of North Texas; Ph.D., University of Texas at Arlington) is the Bill Greehey Endowed Chair in Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility in the Greehey School of Business at St. Mary’s University. His primary research explores issues of executive compensation, governance, international ethics, and outsourcing. His work has appeared in the Strategic Management Journal, the Academy of Management Journal, the Journal of Management, the Journal International Business Studies, and other outlets. William F. Crittenden, Senior Associate Dean, Dean of Faculty and Professor, General Management Group. A consultant and advisor to various private, public, and nonprofit organizations, Professor Crittenden has worked with such U.S based organizations as Boston Beer Company, BAE Systems, EG&G, Intronics, Lotus Software, Wal-Mart Stores, Boston Management Consortium, Head Start, Jefferson Hospital, Nazareth, the new England Association of Quality Clubs, and The Professional Council, and with Funducion CANE in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior of Monterrey, Mexico. He is a member of numerous professional organizations including the Strategic Management Society, the Academy of Management, and the Academy of Marketing Sciences. He is a former Chair of the Public & Nonprofit Division of the Academy of Management. Professor Crittenden holds a BA from the University of Michigan, an MBA from Aubum University, and a PhD from the University of Arkansas.     

电子政务对预防行政腐败的优越性浅析

行政腐败是行政权力在运行中由于缺乏制约和监督而产生异化和失控的现象.随着信息技术不断发展而诞生的电子政务,为预防腐败提供了一种高科技的技术预防手段.通过这一手段的运用,可以强化对权力行使行为的监控、实现政务公开、推动政府体制、民主制度和组织机构的创新等形式,更能够制约权力、防止权力被滥用,从而有效遏止腐败,建设廉洁、高效的政府.     

Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China

This paper extends the discussion of guanxi beyond instrumental evaluations and advances a normative assessment of guanxi. Our discussion departs from previous analyses by not merely asking, “Does guanxi work?” but rather “Should corporations use guanxi?” The analysis begins with a review of traditional guanxi definitions and the changing economic and legal environment in China, both necessary precursors to understanding the role of guanxi in Chinese business transactions. This review leads us to suggest that there are distinct types of, and uses for guanxi. We identify the potentially problematic aspects of certain forms of guanxi from a normative perspective, noting among other things, the close association of particular types of guanxi with corruption and bribery. We conclude that there are many different forms of guanxi that may have distinct impacts on economic efficiency and the well-being of ordinary Chinese citizens. Consistent with Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), we advocate a particularistic analysis of the different forms of guanxi.     

Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments

Making use of facilitating payments is a very widespread form of corruption. These consist of small payments or gifts made to a person – generally a public official or an employee of a private company – to obtain a favour, such as expediting an administrative process; obtaining a permit, licence or service; or avoiding an abuse of power. Unlike the worst forms of corruption, facilitating payments do not usually involve an outright injustice on the part of the payer as they are entitled to what they request. This may be why public opinion tends to condone such payments; often they are assumed to be unavoidable and are excused on the grounds of low wages and lack of professionalism among public officials and disorganisation in government offices. Many companies that take the fight against “grand” corruption very seriously are inclined to overlook these “petty” transgressions, which are seen as the grease that makes the wheels of the bureaucratic machine turn more smoothly. Despite this, facilitating payments have a pernicious effect on the working of public and private administrations: all too often they are the slippery slope to more serious forms of corruption; they impose additional costs on companies and citizens; and in the long run they sap the ethical foundations of organisations. Although many articles on corruption mention facilitating payments, there have been no systematic studies from a company’s point of view. This article thus focuses on facilitating payments from the point of view of the company that makes the payment, either as the active partner (when it is the company that takes the initiative) or as the passive partner (when the official or employee is the instigator).     

减少国有企业代理人腐败的激励契约分析

由于我国国有企业独特的委托—代理关系和其所处的独特政策环境,国有企业的腐败时有发生。解决腐败问题可以从制度安排上着手,也可以从委托代理契约设计着手。从委托人的角度论证良好的契约激励设计将促使委托人加强监督,减少代理人腐败;从代理人角度论证加大激励将减少代理人参与腐败的动机。     

Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes

Globalization has increased the need for managers (and future managers) to predict the potential for country corruption. This study examines the relationship between Hofstede's cultural dimensions and how country corruption is perceived. Power distance, individualism and masculinity were found to explain a significant portion of the variance in perceived corruption. A significant portion of country's risk, trade flow with U.S.A., foreign investment, and per capita income was explained by perceived corruption.     

Spiraling Down into Corruption: A Dynamic Analysis of the Social Identity Processes that Cause Corruption in Organizations to Grow

To date, theory and research on corruption in organizations have primarily focused on its static antecedents. This article focuses on the spread and growth of corruption in organizations. For this purpose, three downward organizational spirals are formulated: the spiral of divergent norms, the spiral of pressure, and the spiral of opportunity. Social Identity Theory is used to explain the mechanisms of each of these spirals. Our dynamic perspective contributes to a greater understanding of the development of corruption in organizations and opens up promising avenues for future research. Niki A. den Nieuwenboer is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Business & Society Management at RSM Erasmus University, The Netherlands. Her research interests include the growth and development of collective corruption in organizations. She holds a Master of Arts in Social Psychology from the University of Leiden, The Netherlands. Prior to starting her academic career, she worked as a consultant in business ethics and fraud prevention for KPMG Forensic in Brussels, Belgium. Muel Kaptein is Professor of Business Ethics and Integrity Management at the Department of Business & Society Management at RSM Erasmus University, The Netherlands. His research interests include the management of ethics, the measurement of ethics, and the ethics of management. His␣research has been published in the Academy of Management Review, Business & Society, Corporate Governance, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Organizational Behavior, and Organization Studies, among others. He is the author of the books Ethics Management (Springer, 1998), The Balanced Company (Oxford University Press, 2002), and The Six Principles of Managing with Integrity (Articulate Press, 2005). He is also director at KPMG Integrity, which he co-founded in the Netherlands in 1995.     

Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective

This study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms’ engagement in corruption. Building on a survey of 341 executives in India, we find that if executives have social ties with government officials, their firms are more likely to engage in corruption. Further, these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive. The results collectively illustrate the role that executives’ social ties and perceptions have in shaping illegal actions of their respective firms.     

Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging Countries

The globalizations of capital markets in the last 20 years has led to a historic degree of financial integration in the world. It is clear, however, that globalization is not conducive to a complete homogeneity of financial markets and institutions. Among others, one element of diversity is the importance of the impact of corruption in emerging countries. Corruption decreases the credibility of financial institutions and markets. Scandals and unethical behavior in financial institutions erode confidence in such firms. Relying on neoinstitutional literature, this article focuses on the link between corruption and organizational isomorphism in financial institutions in emerging countries. Therefore, our aim is to examine the institutional reasons for corruption in financial institutions in emerging countries. Our structural equation model is based on empirical research in financial institutions in emerging countries. A questionnaire was administrated to 70 top executives of financial institutions in 18 different emerging countries.     

Normalized Collective Corruption in a Transitional Economy: Small Treasuries in Large Chinese Enterprises

“Small treasuries” (xiaojinku) are off-book accounts found in many large enterprises in China for the purpose of rewarding managers and their subordinates, building up guanxi (personal networks), and even financing the business operations of their danwei (work units). We analyze CESTs with reference to their antecedents, constructs, and consequences. Our analysis indicates that while CESTs can, in some cases, help organizations deal with immediate financial problems, they have negative impacts on organizational performance in relation to the moral hazard of managers, as well as the allocation of organizational resources, in respect of sustainability of strategic advantages and growth, and mismanagement of organizations. Because of the involutionary behavior of managers in Chinese enterprises, we propose that it will require not only organizational controls, but also a fundamental change in these managers’ ideology for solving the problems of CESTs.     

民营科技企业家特质与企业绩效相关性研究--基于浙江省3937家民营科技企业的调查

企业家的特质就是企业家群体所具有的与众不同的且能够导致企业绩效的素质特征及能力水平,只有具备这些特质的人才能成为出色的企业家,使企业具有较高的业绩。民营科技企业作为民营企业中最具有创新活力和发展潜力的群体,在激烈的市场竞争中显示出强劲的生命力。文章认为,企业家学历与所学专业同企业绩效存在显著正相关性,而他们的性别和年龄不存在显著相关性;为促进民营经济发展,需要不断提高企业家学历,大力培养理工科和经济管理为主的企业家,尤其是以理工科为基础的懂管理的人才,并正视企业家年龄与性别等问题。     

转型时期腐败和地方政府公共投资效率的关联分析

运用寻租经济学的分析方法,本文对经济转型时期地方官员腐败和公共投资效率两者之间的内在关联进行了综合研究,结合中国情形进行简要的实证分析,指出基于转型时期有效监管制度的缺失,腐败对地方政府公共投资的规模效率、结构效率以及产出效率都产生了不同程度的负面效应.也就是说,作为带有高成本特性的一种"暗税",腐败租金的存在不仅会导致区域内私人投资偏离社会期望的适度投资率,也会人为增大区域公共投资规模、扭曲区域公共投资结构,并降低区域内公共投资的产出水平.