信用与法律

市场失信的实质是法律的失范，信用的基础是法制，信用制度的建立与法制制度的建立是一个相互促进的演进过程，同时与法制演进的方式联系在一起。要确立适应市场经济的信用体系必须改变巳有变法模式，变控制-命令变法模式为合作式规制模式。     

Credibility and endogenous societal discounting

We consider a dynamic moral hazard economy inhabited by a planner and a population of privately informed agents. We assume that the planner and the agents share the same discount factor, but that the planner cannot commit. We show that optimal allocations in such settings solve the problems of committed planners who discount the future less heavily than agents. Thus, we provide micro-foundations for dynamic moral hazard models that assume a societal discount factor in excess of the private one. We extend the analysis to allocations that are reconsideration-proof in the sense of Kocherlakota [Kocherlakota, N., 1996. Reconsideration-proofness: A refinement for infinite horizon time inconsistency. Games and Economic Behavior 15, 33–54]. We show that these allocations solve the choice problem of a committed planner with a unit discount factor.     

市场经济体制下的信用制度及其运行机制——国外信用制度介绍和比较

在一个国家现代经济生活中，信用制度是必不可少的。它是整个市场经济运行的基础。在国外，社会信用制度管理体系主要包括以下几方面：征信数据及评估，法律和法规和确立和健全，政府和专业协会的监督和管理，教育和研究。信用管理行业分为以产品为主和以服务为主两大分支。     

Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

This paper studies a game of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when the listener's decision is binary, neither randomization nor commitment have any value for the listener, and commented that the binary nature of the decision was important for the commitment result. In this paper, I show that concavity is the critical assumption for both results: no value to commitment and no value to randomization. Specifically, the key assumption is that the listener's utility function is a concave transformation of the speaker's utility function. This assumption holds vacuously in the binary model. The result that concavity implies credibility allows us to dispense with the assumption that the listener's decision is binary and significantly broadens the scope of the model.     

货币政策的时间不一致性、可信性与透明度

货币政策的时间不一致性导致了政策的可信性问题,这已为实践所证明。本文提出,货币政策透明度以其声誉效应为基础,对时问不一致性形成双重约束：正向约束与逆向约束,正向约束,是限制中央银行的通货膨胀倾向;而逆向约束,是克服中央银行在反时间不一致性中的过度保守倾向。     

Pre-commitment Mechanism and Policy Credibility in African Trade Reform

In the absence of a binding pre-commitment mechanism, a government has an incentive to renege on announced policy. This is a well-established result in the literature. The paper applies this theory to tariff policy by developing a two-game model to analyze the credibility of government tariff reform announcements. The pre-commitment solution is subgame-imperfect; therefore, government's announcement of tariff reforms is time-inconsistent. Using a sample of African countries operating under IMF structural adjustment programs, the study finds only weak evidence that countries implemented their announced tariff reforms. However, SAP agreements seem to enhance private sector confidence in government reforms.     

Credibility and commitment of monetary policy in open economies

We study the delegation of monetary policy to independent central bankers in a two-country world with monetary spillovers. It is shown that, under the hypotheses of imperfect commitment and private information, the equilibrium degree of commitment depends on the correlation structure of the shocks hitting the economies. When the correlation is negative (as when the variance of output depends mainly on shocks to the terms of trade) there is strategic complementarity in the degree of commitment in the two countries. When the correlation is positive (common technological or demand shocks) there is strategic substitutability. In this latter case, the degree of commitment is shown to be increasing in the correlation among shocks. Common components in the international business cycle have been shown in several studies to be relatively more relevant in developed countries. Therefore, our results may contribute to explaining why the institutional solution to the inflationary bias has been adopted in the most advanced countries.     

Cooperation and Institution in Games

Based on recent developments in non‐cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. First, I present basic results of the random‐proposer model and apply them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labour market. I discuss extensions to cooperative games with externalities and incomplete information. Next, I consider the enforceability of an agreement as an institutional foundation of cooperation. I re‐examine the contractarian approach to the problem of cooperation from the viewpoint that individuals may voluntarily create an enforcement institution.     

计量经济学应用研究的可信性革命

可信性是计量经济学应用研究的重要问题,其核心在于实现经济理论、统计学、数学在实证研究中的科学结合。本文基于国际计量经济学界对可信性问题的三次大讨论取得的重要进展,厘清了计量经济学探索客观经济世界过程的本质特征;进而针对应用研究中存在的滥用和错用现象,从计量经济模型的随机性设定、经济变量之间的因果关系识别以及模型的统计适切性评价等三个方面阐述计量经济学应用研究的可靠性来源。我国计量经济学的应用研究面临进一步提高可信性的重要问题,需要全面吸收和借鉴国际计量经济学界对于可信性问题的成果,改变研究模式和教学模式。     

自学考试的公信危机与对策

从就业、考试、招生、教学等环节分析了自学考试公信危机,提出了开展自学考试公信力建设,正确培育自学考试公信力,需要全社会共同关注,需要建立公平的就业准入机制,需要教育界出重招,树立科学考试观,加强法制建设,强化监督机制,建立质量监控与评价体系,增强自学考试的透明性,保障学生公正平等获取信息,加强道德建设,增强行列自律。让自考文凭持有者能够与全日制文凭持有者真正享有同等权力、共享社会资源,维护社会和谐发展。     

Two Crises: Inflationary Inertia and Credibility

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 and the Chilean crisis of 1982 to assess to what extent exchange-rate-based stabilisation programmes are successful in reducing – or even eliminating – inflationary inertia. The paper provides a brief overview of the Chilean and Mexican reform and stabilisation programmes. A theoretical model that emphasises the role of credibility is developed to analyse the effects of exchange-rate based stabilisation programmes on inflationary inertia. According to the model, less than credible stabilisations will not eliminate inertia and will generate major real exchange rate overvaluation. Detailed data are used to test the hypothesis     

劳动分工与信誉之间的关系

在人类文明发展的长河中,信誉成一个倒抛物线的规律出现。一方面,随着人类交往范围的不断增大,人们守信誉的愿望越来越弱;另一方面,随着分工的不断细化,人们守信誉的动力越来越强。两者的结合就形成了人类的信誉曲线。在完全没有社会分工的情况下,人们之间没有信誉可言,过着一种完全自给自足的生活;在社会成员处于完全分工状态下,人们之间的信誉状况将最好;而在社会成员不完全分工状态下,人们之间的信誉状况在两者之间变化,好坏与劳动分工的程度、是否接近于重复博弈的条件有关。     

Credibility of Protection and Incentives to Innovate

In recent trade policy debates it is often argued that temporary protection stimulates innovation. This paper shows that the validity of the argument depends on the perceived credibility of protection policy. If it is suspected that temporary protection will be removed early should innovation occur before its terminal date, the protected firm invests less in R&D than it does under free trade. If it is expected that protection will be extended should no innovation have occurred by its terminal date, investment falls below the free-trade level, and eventually to zero, as the terminal date is approached.     

诚信的经济学分析

本文从经济学的角度来分析诚信的问题。笔者分别从交易费用、道德风险问题和博弈三个不同的视角,分析了诚信是如何来影响经济绩效的,以及诚信对信息不对称的市场经济运行的作用。同时得出了一个重要结论:即使交易双方守信不违约的情况下,诚信的交易费用也是存在的,诚信度的大小决定了这种交易成本的大小。正是各种交易成本对经济绩效产生了重要的影响。最后提出了建设无形制度的观点。     

Common Pool Games are Convex Games

For the class of cooperative common pool games the paper focuses on the question of how, during the preplay negotiation process, the ability of coalitions to enforce their claims imposes externalities on the opposition by having an impact on the jointly produced resource. One of our main results is that common pool games are clear games. Based on this result we are able to derive sufficient conditions for the convexity of the characteristic function, which establishes the second main result in the paper, namely that cooperative common pool games are characterized by increasing returns with respect to the coalition size.     

Free-Riding and Cooperation in Environmental Games

This paper examines the negotiation of an international environmental agreement in which different countries determine the (nonenforceable) promises of investment in clean technologies to be included in the agreement. Furthermore, it analyzes countries' optimal investment in emission-reducing technologies, considering that, in addition to the utility that a country perceives from an improved environmental quality, it is also concerned about the relative fulfillment of the terms specified in the international agreement either by itself or by others. I show, first, why countries may prefer to shift most promises of investment in clean technologies to other countries, despite the fact that these promises are usually nonenforceable by any international organization. Second, I determine countries' optimal investments in these technologies, and analyze how their particular investments depend on how demanding the international agreement is, and on the importance that countries assign to each others' relative fulfillment of their part of the treaty.     

Credibility costs in the monetary integration game*

Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two‐stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy‐maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a ‘last devaluation’, a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.     

非典危机考验企业诚信

文章以非典危机为背景 ,分析了诚信对经济、法律和社会生活的影响以及在这次危机中诚信企业和失信企业的种种表现 ,指出市场经济是诚信经济和信用经济 ,在我国必须形成诚信经营的市场运作机制 ;我国企业要参与国际竞争 ,就必须坚持诚信经营的市场经济原则 ;本文指出此次非典危机使诚信重新上升为全国人民统一的价值观念 ,这将促使全社会以讲诚信讲信用为荣的社会风气的升扬。     

公信力与传媒竞争

公信力是传媒的核心竞争力,导致部分新闻传媒公信力降低的原因主要有欺骗受众的虚假新闻、毒害受众的低俗新闻和侵扰受众的“有偿新闻”等等。根据中国新闻传媒公信力的现状,打造和提升传媒的公信力应从以下几方面着手:增强传媒的责任意识,切实提高传媒的可信度;加强道德修养,提高传媒品位;彰显社会良知,树立传媒的权威形象。