Estimating the impact of exchange rate changes on the asset growth of multinational banks

The article develops an empirical model to explain how changes in exchange rates have affected the growth of total assets of a sample of the world's largest banks over the 17-year period of 1972–1989. The model was estimated over a period in which U.S. banks' assets grew less rapidly than the assets of large banks headquartered in other industrial countries. The model provides an estimate of the banks' allocation between home currency and foreign currency assets, which allows a calculation of the estimated impact of exchange rate changes on bank asset growth. The results of the model suggest that no single economic variable explains the faster growth of non-U.S. banks. Changes in real exchange rates were estimated to have had a significant but not overwhelming impact on bank asset growth through their impact on the dollar value of banks' home-currency assets. Other factors, such as faster home-country economic growth, an expanding trade and foreign investment sector, and the ability of large banks to retain their share of domestic intermediation, were also important factors in determining relative rates of bank asset growth.The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the views of the Department of State, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or its staff.     

The determinants of bank interest rate margins: an international study

This paper studies the determinants of bank net interest margins (NIMs) in six selected European countries and the US during the period 1988–1995 for a sample of 614 banks. We apply the Ho and Saunders model (Ho, T., Saunders, A., 1981. The determinants of bank interest margins: theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analyses 16, 581–600) to a multicountry setting and decompose bank margins into a regulatory component, a market structure component and a risk premium component. The regulatory components in the form of interest-rate restrictions on deposits, reserve requirements and capital-to-asset ratios have a significant impact on banks NIMs. The empirical results suggest an important policy trade-off between assuring bank solvency—high capital-to-asset ratios—and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers—low NIMs. The more segmented or restricted the banking system—both geographically and by activity—the larger appears to be the monopoly power of existing banks, and the higher their spreads. Macro interest-rate volatility was found to have a significant impact on bank NIMs; this suggests that macro policies consistent with reduced interest-rate volatility could have a positive effect in reducing bank margins.     

The Impact of Regulatory Changes on the Risk-Taking Behavior of State Chartered Savings Banks

This study investigates changes in the risk-taking behavior of state chartered savings banks resulting from three types of regulatory changes: the expansion of asset investment powers contained in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act (DIA) of 1982, the authority to change organizational structure from mutual to stock form contained in the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 and DIA, and the change in intensity of regulatory oversight contained in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Using data for New York state chartered savings banks for the period 1986 to 1991, the analysis found mixed results for the asset deregulation hypothesis that institutions eventually placed on the problem bank list invested more in deregulated assets. Strong support was found for the organizational structure hypothesis that stock savings banks have greater incentives to pursue value-maximizing levels of risk by using more leverage, growing at faster rates, and increasing credit risk. This finding suggests that the regulatory changes that permitted mutual to stock conversions may have had a significant negative impact on the severity of the thrift crisis. The results also suggest that increased regulatory scrutiny limited the risk-taking of New York state chartered savings banks after 1988.     

Exploring the nexus between banking sector reform and performance: Evidence from newly acceded EU countries

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between banking sector reform and bank performance – measured in terms of efficiency, total factor productivity growth and net interest margin – accounting for the effects through competition and bank risk-taking. To this end, we develop an empirical model of bank performance, which is consistently estimated using recent econometric techniques. The model is applied to bank panel data from ten newly acceded EU countries. The results indicate that both banking sector reform and competition exert a positive impact on bank efficiency, while the effect of reform on total factor productivity growth is significant only toward the end of the reform process. Finally, the effect of capital and credit risk on bank performance is in most cases negative, while it seems that higher liquid assets reduce the efficiency and productivity of banks.     

The output and profit contribution of information technology and advertising investments in banks

This paper examines the contribution of investments in Information Technology (IT) and in advertising to the output and profits of Spanish banks, in the period 1983–2003. We find that the growth in the stock of IT capital explains one third of output growth of banks, and that an additional investment in IT of one million euros may be substituted for twenty-five workers. The paper also finds that advertising investments increase the demand for bank services with an elasticity of 0.22 for deposits and 0.11 for loans. For all the assets considered, the null hypothesis that banks use the profit-maximizing amount of services per period cannot be rejected with the data.     

Are real estate specializing depositories viable? Evidence from commercial banks

This study investigates whether depository institutions that concentrate on real estate lending are economically viable by examining the behavior of a sample of commercial banks that chose over the last decade to specialize in real estate lending. The results show that over the 1978–1988 period, the average real estate specializing bank earnings performance was on par with regular commercial banks, and those that were in the business for a longer period of time had higher returns with less risk than substantially more diversified commercial banks. Real estate banks has relatively lower loan losses and relatively higher proportions of lower risk, one- to four-family mortgage loans than regular commercial banks. Finally, it appears that real estate banks exhibited substantial flexibility in their ability to adjust their real estate loan holdings.     

Bank mergers: Integration and profitability

The Treasury Department's 1991 recommendations for financial service reform would have allowed interstate branching by banks, eliminating the requirement that banking companies form a separate subsidiary for each state in which they do business. Supporters of the proposal argue that allowing bank holding companies to merge their subsidiary banks would improve performance. We tested this proposition by studying the before- and-after performance of all bank mergers in the New England states between 1982 and 1987. In the aggregate, merging banks did not achieve significant improvements in operating profits relative to other banks during the first two years after a merger. It is important to distinguish, however, between mergers of newly acquired banks and mergers of banks acquired earlier by the holding company. Mergers of previously acquired banks performed significantly better than mergers of newly acquired banks and, measured by operating return on assets, achieved significant performance improvements relative to the industry.This article may not be reproduced in any form without permission of the authors, who hold the copyright.     

Commercial bank mutual fund activities: Implications for bank risk and profitability

This paper examines the risk structure of bank holding companies and the effect of mutual fund activities on bank risk and profitability over the period 1987–1994. Findings from structural change tests indicate a significant decline in bank risk occurred near the mid-point of the study. Results from a confirmatory factor analytic model employed to examine the impact of mutual fund activities on banks suggest that mutual fund activities moderated bank industry systematic risk during the sample period. Mutual fund activities also increased the profitability of banks. These results suggest that mutual funds represent a productive avenue of expansion for bank holding companies.     

Banks’ regulatory capital buffer and the business cycle: Evidence for Germany

This paper analyzes the effect of the business cycle on the regulatory capital buffers of German local banks in the period 1993–2004. The capital buffers are found to fluctuate countercyclically over the business cycle. The evidence supports that low-capitalized banks do not catch up with their well-capitalized peers over the observation period and they do not decrease risk-weighted assets during a recession. This finding suggests that their low capitalization does not force them to retreat from lending.     

Competition in British retail banking

This article employs British cross-section time-series data to examine the competitive behavior of retail banks in the period 1985–1989. Product offerings are found to consist of both survivor and dominated products over time. In addition, there is evidence of price discrimination being practiced by banks. Individual banks are found to be influential in the setting of interest rates for retail bank products, though there is wide variation across banks and products.     

Assessing the riskiness and profitability of credit-card banks

This article measures the riskiness and profitability of financial institutions specializing in credit-card loans and related plans. Focusing on explicit accounting returns on explicit credit-card assets, we find that credit-card banks, whether subsidiaries of bank holding companies or independent banks, earned extraordinary returns over the years 1984 to 1991. On average, credit-card firms had pretax return on assets of 3.36 percent compared to .95 for noncredit-card banks. The costs of the higher returns are greater variability of ROA and higher probabilities of insolvency, indicating that credit-card banks are riskier than other commercial banks.After a decade of rapid and profitable growth, America's credit-card business is slowing down and turning cut-throat. Card companies must adap to survive.-The Economist, November 2, 1991     

Regulation,recession, and bank lending behavior: The 1990 credit crunch

This article utilizes a pooled time-series and cross-section sample of banks to investigate the causes of the credit contraction which occurred during the 1990–1991 period. The methodology involves an econometric model which recognizes that banks' decisions regarding lending and capital are simultaneously determined. Bank lending behavior is modeled as being determined by a combination of economic conditions, loan quality problems, and capital growth. The results of the econometric tests are consistent with a multiplicity of factors contributing to the reduction in lending. The evidence suggests that the credit contraction of 1990–1991 cannot be explained solely as a result of recession and low capital levels. Changes in the supervisory climate and in bank capital regulation, perhaps coupled with independent changes in bankers' assessments of the risk climate, were likely responsible for a substantial part of the credit contraction.     

Bank risk taking and changes in the financial condition of banks' small and midsized commercial customers, 1978–1988 and 1988–1991

This study examines the pattern of bank risk taking through the 1980s and early 1990s, as reflected in the reported financial condition of banks' small and midsized customer firms. Using industry data published in Robert Morris Associates'Annual Statement Studies, we examine the ten-year period 1978–1988 to ascertain changes in the financial condition of banks' commerical customers during the 1980s, and the following three-year period 1988–1991, to determine financial condition changes in customer firms during the early 1990s. Empirical results suggest banks' small and midsized commercial clientele shifted toward riskier organizations From 1988 to 1988, confirming the popularized notion of banks' increased tolerance for risk during the 1980s. From 1988 to 1991, however, banks' client firms evidenced a pattern of risk reduction, which is consistent with the argument that banks have retrenched in their risk taking in recent years, shifting back toward a more financially sound customer base.     

The marketability of bank assets, managerial rents and banking stability

Financial innovation and greater information availability have increased the tradability of bank assets and have reduced banks’ dependence on individual bank managers. We show that this can have two opposing consequences for banking stability. First, the hold-up problem between bank managers and shareholders becomes less severe. Consequently, banks’ capital structure needs to be less concerned with disciplining the management. Deposits – the most effective disciplining device – can be reduced, increasing banks’ resilience to adverse return shocks. However, limiting the hold-up problem also diminishes bank managers’ rents, reducing their incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers, with adverse implications for asset quality. Thus, the default risk of banks does not necessarily decline. We argue that this delivers a novel explanation for the origin of the recent subprime crisis.     

Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.     

Cost efficiency of the banking industry in the South Eastern European region

This paper analyses cost efficiency in the banking sector of six South Eastern European countries over the period 1998–2003. A stochastic frontier approach, incorporating firm-specific and country-related variables, indicates a generally low level of cost efficiency, with significant inefficiency differences among countries. Foreign banks and banks with higher foreign bank ownership involvement are associated with lower inefficiency. Furthermore, we observe a negative correlation of cost inefficiency with bank capitalization and firm market share, and a positive one with the fraction of loans in the asset portfolio.     

Modeling Foreign Bank Performance and Lending Behavior

This paper examines the profitability and commercial loan growth of foreign banks using a simultaneous‐equation framework. Maximizing behavior provides a two‐equation system in which bank profitability depends on variables related to expected returns, costs, and risks and in which loan growth is determined by risk and return variables. The model is tested to evaluate the determinants of foreign bank performace and lending behavior in the United States between 1987 and 1991. Overall the results indicate that factors such as capital strength, commercial and industrial loan growth, and assets composition were important in determining foreign banks' return‐on‐assets in the period under study. The role of capital appears to be particularly important in explaining foreign bank performance. The single significant determinant of loan growth was found to be previous period's loan growth.     

Interest rates and bank risk-taking

A recent line of research views the low interest-rate environment of the early to mid 2000s as an element that triggered increased risk-taking appetite of banks in search for yield. This paper uses approximately 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001-2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low-interest rates indeed increase bank risk-taking substantially. This result is robust across a number of different specifications that account, inter alia, for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and/or the dynamics of bank risk. Notably, among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for French institutions, which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets. Finally, the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off-balance sheet items.     

Do Lender of Last Resort Policies Matter? The Effects of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Banks During the Great Depression

The paper uses a unique set of Depression-era bank financial data in a two-step system of equations with instrumental variables to estimate the effectiveness of lender of last resort (LOLR) strategies in a survival model with self-selection bias. Decreasing RFC loan collateral requirements over 1932–1933 facilitate the analysis of a relationship between LOLR collateral and survival. The results suggest that the RFC's practice of subordinating depositors' and investors' interests through senior claims on banks' best assets may have caused banks to fail. Although recapitalization after March 1933 helped banks survive the Great Depression, recapitalization is not a typical LOLR strategy.     

Partial Anticipation and the Gains to Bank Merger Targets

We design an empirical model to determine the prior probability of a bank becoming an acquisition target. We find that the probability of a bank being acquired is higher for banks that are larger, have a lower return on assets, a higher capital level, more non-performing loans, higher runup in price, a lower market-to-book multiple, a higher core deposit ratio, and a higher loan concentration. The probability is also higher since the passage of the Riegle–Neal Act of 1994. We also examine whether the full gains to target banks are conditioned on the probability of being acquired. We find that the gains to target banks in the one-year pre-announcement period are more pronounced for banks that exhibit high-logit probability characteristics. The gains are large and significant in the short-term announcement period, but not significantly related to the logit probabilities among banks. Our results suggest that the share price adjustment for the characteristics that make some banks more appealing targets appears to be completed in the pre-announcement period. Thus, studies that estimate the gains to targets using only the announcement period are underestimating the gains.