薪酬合约的激励有效性研究:一个理论综述

薪酬激励是组织中最常用的激励手段之一，薪酬合约的激励效果直接影响组织效率。本文尝试用激励理论系统阐述各类薪酬合约的激励有效性条件，为这方面研究梳理出一个统一的理论框架。     

建筑工程合同体系的协调

在工程项目中，业主为了成功的实施工程就要签订一系列合同，这些合同构成了建筑工程合同体系，这些合同之间应该协调，尤其在内容、技术、价格、时间和组织上。     

Exclusive territories and performance dimensions in industrial distribution channels

There are two main approaches to studying vertical restraints in distribution channels: the anti-competitive and the efficiency approach. This article sets out to analyze the effects of exclusive territories agreements on performance levels in the distribution channel by proposing a number of hypotheses based upon these two approaches and by testing them with paired data from a sample of 116 manufacturer-dealer relationships from the Spanish industrial market. Results show that manufacturers and dealers perceive higher role performance levels in their partners in relationships characterized by exclusive territories. In a similar way, both manufacturers and dealers obtain higher levels of business performance in exclusive territories relationships, but we found no support for a direct effect of this vertical restraint on business performance. Instead, this effect is completely mediated by the higher levels of role performance associated with the exclusive territories agreement. Thus, empirical findings suggest that the economic outcomes achieved in ET relationships are due not to the presence of monopoly rents, but rather to the better role performance of the participants.     

权力视角下的企业契约分解与变迁

本文以权力为逻辑起点,分析了企业契约中控制权的来源及其在不同企业成员之间的配置,本文认为企业控制权倾向于配置给企业成员中有权力的一方,企业契约的签订是双方权力结构的形式化过程。根据契约剩余和控制权配置的不同,可以将企业契约分解为市场契约、科层制契约和关系契约三种不同性质的契约,这一结论在理论上解释了企业契约与市场契约的不同。企业契约的剩余给契约调整提供了空间,在持续交易的过程中权力结构的变化则为契约调整和变迁提供了原动力。但是企业契约变迁具有路径依赖的性质,并且企业制度并不是效率演进的。     

隐性契约、专用性投资与资本结构

隐性契约以商品所有权分割为存在前提。专用性投资是企业传递履约动机与履约能力信息的重要通道，受资产专用性与隐性负债导致较高债务融资成本的双重约束，专用性投资应主要依靠权益融资。实证研究表明，专用性投资强度与资本结构呈负相关，隐性契约对资本结构产生影响。本文研究结论为企业融资政策选择提供了新依据。     

高级管理人员激励契约研究

本文首次通过收集上市公司披露的高级管理人员激励契约，对我国现阶段高级管理人员激励契约的现状和存在的问题进行了分析和研究。研究发现：我国上市公司中高级管理人员职责不清，容易出现高级管理人员自己给自己制定报酬、考核业绩的现象；我国高级管理人员业绩评价主要依赖财务指标（净利润、利润总额、净资产收益率），非财务指标与主观评价指标在高级管理人员业绩评价中使用较少；高级管理人员的业绩标准主要是董事会制定的预算指标：高级管理人员业绩评价指标的确定比较简单，往往没有考虑高级管理人员操纵会计指标的可能性。以及不可控因素对评价指标的影响。     

供应中断下双源采购的供应链契约设计

考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计问题,将可靠性服从随机分布的供应商作为主供应商,将完全中断供应商作为次供应商,建立以利润最大化为目标的签约和执行两阶段博弈的动态规划模型,得到制造商的最优契约设计。制造商根据产品零售价格的变化灵活做出只与一个供应商签约、与两个供应商同时签约或都不签约的决定,供应商根据契约设计内容决定自己的最优生产规模。研究表明：供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关,与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关;次供应商的订货量与其本身的可靠性呈正相关,与主供应商的可靠性呈负相关;供应商的固定支付与其相应的可靠性呈负相关。     

企业社会责任观的演进与发展:基于综合性社会契约的理解

利益相关者理论与主流企业理论在企业社会责任fq题上存在着根本的分歧，但从历史的视角来审视企业社会责任观的演进可以发现，企业社会责任与利益相关者的利益要求是紧密结合在一起的。企业在履行其囊括显性契约与隐性契约在内的综合性社会契约时，必须考虑其利益相关者合理的利益要求，进而主动承担起应有的社会责任。     

不完全合约理论的逻辑悖论与企业理论的创新

主流企业理论是企业的合约理论，而合约的“不完全性”又是其逻辑前提。例如：委托代理理论、股东至上论、剩余控制权的“独享”或“分享”论等都离不开合约的“不完全性”命题。但是，这些理论之间是存在矛盾的。研究发现，矛盾根源于“不完全合约”理论自身存在逻辑上的“悖论”。进一步分析发现，合约理论的“悖论”又根源于企业产权理论中的“两权分离”说。本文提出“资本分裂”说，以解决“两权分离”导致的矛盾。“资本分裂”说要求对企业的本质及其相关企业理论做重新解释，进行企业理论创新。     

对工程量清单与建设工程合同关系的思考

针对工程量清单计价中出现的实际问题，分析了FIDIC合同条件下工程量清单的特点和功用，研究了工程量清单与合同类型、与合同内容的关系问题，提出了解决问题的建议。     

Procurement auctions with entry of bidders

In procurement auctions with a fixed number of bidders there is a tradeoff between cost efficiency and rent extraction. An optimal mechanism, therefore, entails distortions of effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1987). If potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction, then decreasing the firms' rent may imply reduced entry. We show that if potential bidders are uninformed before entry, commitment to a plain, nondistortive auction is optimal. In contrast, if potential bidders learn all their private information before entry, the optimal mechanism entails the same distortions as in Laffont and Tirole's static model.     

Financial and operational decisions in the electricity sector: Contract portfolio optimization with the conditional value-at-risk criterion

The restructuring of electricity markets around the world have caused increased volatility and uncertainty of the price power. As a result, providers of power now face increased uncertainty and risk in the operational and financial decisions related to procurement. Providers must seek optimal ways to deliver the required volume of power to retailers and end users while managing risk. We consider a mixed-integer programming model for a power providing agent that jointly considers the problem of selecting custom electricity contracts and finding the optimal procurement strategy of meeting contract obligations under spot price uncertainty. A two-stage stochastic integer programming (SIP) model with a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) constraint to incorporate risk aversion is developed. Computational results are presented that demonstrates the CVaR approach and the results are compared with a corresponding expected cost minimization approach. The SIP model with CVaR will allow acceptance of contracts at lower prices compared to an approach based on a corresponding risk-neutral model as a hedge against uncertainty and mis-specified arbitrage.     

Heuristics for operational fixed job scheduling problems with working and spread time constraints

Operational fixed job scheduling problems select a set of jobs having fixed ready and processing times and schedule the selected jobs on parallel machines so as to maximize the total weight. In this study, we consider working time and spread time constrained versions of the operational fixed job scheduling problems. The working time constraints limit the total processing load on each machine. The spread time constraints limit the time between the start of the first job and the finish of the last job on each machine. For the working time constrained problem, we present a filtered beam search algorithm that evaluates the promising nodes of the branch and bound tree. For the spread time constrained problem we propose a two phase algorithm that defines the promising sets for the first jobs and finds a solution for each promising set. The results of our computational tests reveal that our heuristic algorithms perform very well in terms of both solution quality and time.     

Partnering with Foreign Firms: How Do Chinese Managers View the Governance and Importance of Contracts?

It is a widespread perception that the role of contract in Chinese society is limited because obligations often derive from personal relationships. It is not clear how Chinese managers view the governance and importance of contracts when they deal with foreign counterparts in their joint ventures. To addresses this issue, this study proposes and verifies the governance structure and performance implications of interpartner contracts in a setting of international joint ventures (IJVs). Extant research on IJVs has extensively examined IJV performance but inadequately assessed how this performance is influenced by contractual design. Our analysis of 114 sample IJVs in China suggests that the governance structure of an IJV contract includes four dimensions, namely, issue inclusiveness, term specificity, contingency adaptability, and contractual obligatoriness. Each of these dimensions is validated to be important to IJV formation, interpartner cooperation, and process efficiency as perceived by Chinese managers working in IJVs.