论我国税收源泉扣缴制度之完善

源泉扣缴是税款征收的重要方式之一,能有效地控制税源、节约税收成本、提高征管效率。我国源泉扣缴制度存在法律规定层级多、不同层级税收法律规定相抵触等问题。针对我国源泉扣缴制度中存在的问题,应在《税收基本法》中明确源泉扣缴的概念、原则;统一税收实体法中的相关规定,从而完善制度体系;在《税收征管法》中明确扣缴义务人的法律地位,改变扣缴义务人权利和义务失衡的状态,明确区分源泉扣缴和委托代征。     

Behavioral Effects of Withholding Taxes on Labor Supply*

In most advanced economies, income tax collection uses third‐party withholding for wage income. Because withholding taxes do not necessarily reflect true effective taxes, these may give false signals of net‐of‐tax pay. We test labor supply responses to such misconceptions using laboratory experiments. Withholding taxes (and the resulting tax refunds) should be behaviorally neutral, but our results show that tax adjustments lead to effort adjustments, which suggests that withholding blurs tax incentives. While there is no statistically significant response in the overall sample, the participants in the subgroup who self‐assess to be motivated by monetary incentives (about half of the total sample) reduce their effort in response to withholding taxes and increase their effort after receiving tax refunds.     

Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows

This paper considers withholding taxes and information exchange as alternative means to tax international interest income. For each regime, we consider the maximum level of taxation of foreign-source income that can be sustained as the equilibrium of a repeated game. The best regime is the one that brings the level of taxation in the repeated game closest to the cooperative level of interest taxation. Sustainable levels of taxation in either regime depend on the importance of bank profits and on the marginal cost of public funds, among other things. Simulations with the model illustrate the choice between withholding taxes and information exchange. An explicit possibility is the emergence of a mixed regime, with one country imposing a withholding tax and the other country providing information. The basic model is extended to allow for size differences between the two countries and to incorporate a third, outside country.     

On the Effects of Commodity Tax Under Free Entry Oligopoly in the Presence of Export Market

If the inverse demand function in the domestic country is concave, or it is not too convex even if it is convex, a small specific commodity tax raises the social welfare in the domestic country and lowers the welfare of the foreign consumers, and the optim- al tax for the domestic country is positive. The presence of an export market enlarges the possibility that a specific commodity tax raises the social welfare in the domestic country at the sacrifice of the welfare of the foreign consumers. [L13]     

Bargaining by Limiting Cooperation: Withholding Consent for the Level of a Public Good

This paper analyzes how the ability to limit cooperation influences the outcome of complete information bargaining between two players. When cooperation involves prompt resolution of a conflict, as in alternating-offer games and wars-of-attrition, the solutions equate the marginal rates of substitution between earlier resolution and more private goods. When cooperation involves consent for the level of a public good, the outcome again equates the marginal rates of substitution between greater cooperation (more public good) and more private goods (lower cost shares). Here, the equilibrium consists of balanced linear cost shares given by the ratio of marginal-willingness-to-pay to marginal cost.     

Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Background Risk

In this paper, we focus on how the presence of background risks – from sources such as labour and entrepreneurial income – influences portfolio allocations. This interaction is explored in a theoretical model that is calibrated using cross-sectional data from a variety of sources. The model is shown to be consistent with some but not all aspects of cross-sectional observations of portfolio holdings. The paper also provides a survey of the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on portfolio choice.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Subsidies

Abstract. According to a classical result, a move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination only improves welfare if total output increases. In this paper I show that the classical result fails in the presence of subsidies. This finding appears to be relevant for the pharmaceutical sector where a consumer pays a fraction of the actual drug price due to health insurance coverage.     

Patent Licensing in the Presence of Trade Barriers

We develop a two‐country duopoly model to explore the optimal licensing contract for an outsider licensor in terms of fixed‐fee and royalty licensing by taking into account trade barriers when firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in Bertrand competition in each market. The present paper focuses on the interaction between licensing and trade barriers in two international markets. We show that both royalty and non‐exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal. Furthermore, exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal, which is a result that is not discussed in the existing literature.     

在平行进口条件下的一个进口配额保护模型

在平行进口条件下,文章构造了一个进口配额保护模型.通过模型分析发现,与我们的常识相反的是:这种进口保护反而有助于提高两个国家的消费者剩余和社会总福利.究其原因是,进口配额能够诱导生产厂商进行降低成本的研究与开发活动,这既能够提高厂商的利润,又能够降低商品的市场价格,从而提高消费者剩余和社会总福利.另外,文章发现进口配额比进口关税更能改善平行进口输入国的社会总福利.     

Optimal Commodity Taxation in the Presence of Tourists

Abstract

This paper explores empirically whether Japanese consumers became more prudent in the second half of the 1990s, a decade in which Japan registered historically low economic growth. Employing the methodology developed by Dynan (1993), this study uses micro-level data from the Family Savings Survey and the Family Income and Expenditure Survey to estimate the coefficient of prudence for Japanese households in the second half of the 1990s. The estimates reveal that the coefficient of prudence is positive and statistically significant in the 1998–1999 period. The obtained value for the coefficient of prudence is four, which is much higher than that estimated for US households (not significantly different from zero) or UK households (around 2). The estimated coefficient for young households is higher still, which is consistent with simulation studies conducted by Gourinchas & Parker (2002) showing that precaution is the most important saving motive for younger households.     

Risk Pooling in the Presence of Moral Hazard

The size of an insurance pool that minimizes average risk per policy is derived for cases in which moral hazard offsets the benefits of pooling.     

Optimal Environmental Management in the Presence of Irreversibilities

We consider an environment of a fixed size that can be converted to another use. This conversion can be made in steps, but it is irreversible. The future benefits (per unit) from the original use, and from the alternative use, follow a diffusion process. For a fairly general case, we show that the value function must be the unique (viscosity) solution to the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. We also exhibit several properties of the solution for the case of constant relative risk aversion between 0 and 1, and a log-linear diffusion for the benefits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, D90, Q30.     

Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Black Markets

Received November 21, 2000; revised version received May 19, 2001     

International Capital Mobility in the Presence of Unemployment Insurance

The paper develops a general–equilibrium model with layoff unemployment to examine the effect of different unemployment insurance policies on international capital mobility. Conditions are derived under which capital will flow to the high–benefit country. Incentives for international capital movements are unaffected by how the burden of financing unemployment benefits is distributed between workers and firms. It is shown that capital outflows might have positive welfare effects for workers. This contrasts with results from standard models of international factor movements.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Strategic Trade Policy in the Presence of Network Effects

The paper analyzes strategic trade policy for national and international network effect goods. While tariffs are very effective in securing the domestic producer's sales in case of network effects, our results suggest that strategic trade policy does not pay from a welfare perspective. Another interesting result is the possibility of negative tariffs in equilibrium.     

Union Wage Effects in the Presence of Enterprise Bargaining

Previous research on union wage effects has underestimated the potential for unions to raise member wages since the data used do not enable differences across bargaining units to be properly accounted for. This study addresses this deficiency by utilizing matched employer–employee data that permit workplace-specific union wage effects to be identified. Results from the estimation of wage equations indicate that, while there is only a very small intra-workplace union wage effect, differences across workplaces are considerable. This differential, however, only exists at workplaces where there is substantial coverage by collective agreements.     

Environmental Policy in the Presence of Induced Technological Change

We examine the hypothesis that induced technological change (ITC) can dramatically lower the cost of a carbon tax in a static optimal tax model. The research and development sector is represented by an aggregate stock of energy-saving technology, which acts as a weak substitute with a polluting resource in the energy generation sector. Using this model, we analytically show how ITC occurs and affects the cost of a carbon tax. Applying quantitative estimates of the size of ITC to numerical simulations calibrated to the US economy, we find that existing empirical evidence can reduce the welfare cost of environmental tax reform by 12%. Our tests of alternative parameters show that this result is highly sensitive to the assumptions used, suggesting that ITC could result in much larger reductions in cost.