Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games

I apply a version of Kandori et al. (1993, Econometrica, 61, 29–56) and Young's (1993, Econometrica, 61, 57–84) evolutionary dynamic to finitely repeated coordination games. The dynamic is modified by allowing mutations to affect only off path beliefs. I find that repetition within a match leads agents to sacrifice current payoffs in order to increase payoffs in later stages. As a consequence, evolution leads to (almost) efficiency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C79.     

On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games

This paper studies renegotiation-proof equilibria of Beno?̂t and Krishna (1993) in finitely repeated games with more than two players. We provide a simple characterization of the set of average payoffs from renegotiation-proof equilibria: the limiting set of average equilibrium payoffs is either efficient or dimensionally small as the horizon of the repeated game goes to infinity. Two sufficient conditions for the former to occur are provided. An example shows that those conditions cannot be weakened.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games

We study the set of limit points of equilibrium payoffs in n-player repeated games, with bounded recall, when the memory capacities of all the players grow to infinity. Two main issues are explored: (i) whether differential information enables players to play correlatively, and (ii) the extent to which boundedly rational players can learn others′ behavior patterns and conceal their own. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.     

Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring

We analyze repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and construct mixed trigger strategy equilibria. Such strategies have a simple representation, where a player's action only depends upon her belief that her opponent(s) are continuing to cooperate. When monitoring is almost perfect, the symmetric efficient outcome can be approximated in any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of such games. The efficiency result extends when there are more than two players. It requires that monitoring be sufficiently accurate but does not require very low discounting when a public randomization device is available. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D82.     

In-class Simulations of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The author developed a simple computer program for the in-class simulation of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with student-designed strategies. He describes the basic features of the software and presents two examples for the use of the program in teaching the problems of cooperation among profit-maximizing agents.     

生态旅游主要利益相关者演化博弈分析

生态旅游是可持续旅游的主要形式,建立各利益相关者的均衡机制是实现生态旅游的关键所在。文章从生态旅游的三个主要利益相关者入手,构建"政府-旅游企业""旅游企业-社区"两组动态演化博弈模型,分析和讨论利益相关者的动态演化过程,利用雅可比矩阵的稳定性判断影响博弈方策略选择的几个参数及参数之间的关系。结果表明:三方最终策略的选择受博弈初始支付矩阵及关键参数选择的影响;引入社会舆论机制监督政府;政府通过补贴倡导旅游企业实施生态旅游;旅游企业通过分享旅游收益,改善社区的公共设施及提高居民的文化素质等途径来促使社区居民与其合作,可最终实现博弈三方利益共赢及旅游业的可持续发展。     

Mindreading and Manipulation in an Ecology of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Laboratory Experiments

Synopsis Humans have a rational reason to seek out and selectively play Prisoner’s Dilemma games with others who (for whatever reason) will play cooperatively, while avoiding those who will defect. It follows that they also have reason to try and persuade others that they will personally cooperate if a game is joined (using the term from Evolutionary Psychology, to ‘manipulate’ others’ beliefs) and, thus, to penetrate to the truth underlying such efforts (to ‘mindread’ others intentions). We develop an economic model of mindreading and manipulation that can govern exchange relationships in natural circumstances, and report laboratory data showing that, absent constraining institutions that make play with cooperators likely, intending defectors are more likely to be chosen as partners than are intending cooperators. Intending defectors’ efforts at manipulation appear to be more successful than their potential victims’ efforts at mindreading. The findings suggest the nature of the problem that must be addressed for would-be traders in the absence of well-enforced rules governing contracts, and we discuss the patterns of behavior that are likely responses in such circumstances.     

信誉机制在欺诈行为中的运行分析--来自一次博弈与重复博弈的解释

信誉机制是维护市场经济中行为主体交易活动正常化的基石。没有信誉机制的市场是杂乱无章的市场，同时也将伴随着行为主体利益的损失，产生一种低效的市场绩效。本文将分别用一次博弈和重复博弈模型来说明信誉机制在欺诈行为产生及其演变过程中所起的作用，并以相应的结论来说明市场中信息的透明度、信息的传播方式与手段以及政府执法的及时性、公正性等制度因素对信誉机制发挥作用的影响。     

Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a mess causes agreement to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one period in order to achieve the other player's share of the surplus. Each player's share of the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game. As the probability of a break-down in negotiations becomes small (or discount factors become large), these bounds collapse on the subgame-perfect equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers C70, C78.     

Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72,D82.     

基于演化博弈视角的中小企业融资分析

本文运用演化博弈理论,建立了一个银行与企业系统信贷关系的理论模型,并对系统的长期动态演化过程进行了分析。理论分析表明:银行与企业系统演化的长期均衡结果与双方博弈的支付矩阵及初始状态有关。结合中小企业的特点,本文进一步发现,在没有其他制度安排的前提下,银行与中小企业的演化博弈向双方不合作均衡收敛的概率更大。     

Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game

This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions.     

Sex Differences in the Ultimatum Game: An Evolutionary Psychology Perspective

In the two-person ultimatum game, an allocator is required to split a given sum of money with a recipient. Subsequently the recipient can either accept or reject the offer. If it is accepted, both players receive their respective splits, while if it is rejected neither of them get anything. Using evolutionary psychology as the theoretical framework, we predicted and found that males made more generous offers when pitted against a female as opposed to a male. While females made equal offers independently of the sex of the recipient. That male allocators are altruistic towards female recipients and competitive with male recipients is construed as a manifestation of social rules, which evolve from the male pre-disposition to use resources for attracting mates. In contrast, females have not evolved such a pre-disposition, and thus, female allocators are more concerned about fairness when making offers to recipients. Several alternate explanations of the above findings are discussed and the evolutionary explanation is concluded as the most parsimonious one. Other potential moderators that are amenable to evolutionary explanations, namely, physical attractiveness, age and ethnicity of participants, are also discussed in this context. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game

A reciprocal action is an action meant to have a similar influence on another's payoff as another's action has on one's own. One hypothesis asserts that reciprocal action is triggered by the reciprocator's belief that another's action was good or ill intended. The other hypothesis says that the reciprocator is simply acting to implement fixed preferences over payoff allocations. We report on an experiment that allows us to study both positive (reward) and negative (punishment) reciprocal action in a single framework. Knowing the preferences for payoff allocations is sufficient to account for nearly all the reciprocal action we observe in our experiment.     

电信业技术变迁的演化博弈分析

本文利用演化博弈理论的最新研究成果,构造了一个电信技术市场模仿者动态博弈模型来考察电信业技术变迁过程。研究结果表明:在电信业技术变迁过程中,可能出现非效率技术"锁定",也可能出现非效率技术被更有效率的技术取代;电信技术"锁定"在一定条件下是可以被破解的,政府可通过对更有效率的技术的研发提供补贴或降低其交易成本等措施来打破非效率技术"锁定",使得电信业技术变迁向更有效的方向演进。     

区域创新网络中政府与企业的演化博弈

介绍了区域创新网络的研究现状,在此基础上运用演化博弈模型分析了区域创新网络中政府与企业的行为选择过程,分析了区域创新网络中政府和企业创新行为的影响因素,即企业的创新收益、政府补贴、政府从企业创新中所获收益以及企业创新的机会成本,并通过Matlab数值仿真进行了验证。最后,提出了促进区域创新网络形成和发展的对策建议。     

On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 72.     

员工反生产行为组织控制的演化博弈分析

基于演化博弈理论和员工反生产行为组织控制的行为博弈演化过程,构建企业与员工共同参与的演化博弈模型.博弈的复制动态方程表明:员工选择显性反生产行为的比例、员工因选择反生产行为所获得的额外收益、企业对员工的反生产行为进行监管所投入的成本,企业观测到员工选择反生产行为时所作出的处罚都将对博弈均衡的结果产生影响.对此,应加强人力资源管理,加大组织支持力度,建立有效的控制机制.     

Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games

Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be (Lyapunov) stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibria are also stable.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C72.