Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms

This paper deals with a cognitivist approach to the problem of how social and economic institutions are formed. The economic framework I use is Simon's model of procedural rationality, integrating a cognitivist approach into a game structure. In game theory norms are seen as conventions, but not all institutions can be explained by game theory models. In cognition-based approaches, the creation and maintenance of institutions is the outcome of a search for satisficing norms. According to Simon and Newell (1972), agents faced with problems to solve visualise a problem as an area of potential situations to examine in order to establish analogical problem structures. In my approach, a norm can be defined within a system of norms that form in a historical-evolutionary dimension, suggesting a path in norm-forming processes.     

Conventionalism,coordination, and mental models: from Poincaré to Simon

This article focuses on the conventions that sustain social interaction and argues that they are central to Simon's decision-making theory. Simon clearly identifies two kinds of coordination by convention: behavioral mores that shape human actions, and shared mental models that govern human perceptions. This article argues that Poincaré–Carnap's conventionalism provides powerful support for Simon's theory; it contends that this theory offers a more convincing account of decision and coordination than Lewis' concept of convention. Simon's approach to applying conventionalist logic to social interaction emphasizes the normative role played by mental models in solving coordination problems and considers rationality in terms of both cognitive and moral considerations. By connecting conventional phenomena to social identifications, Simon stresses the resulting complexity of coordination problems     

Financial repression and economic development: towards a post-Keynesian alternative ∗

The Shaw–McKinnon framework, the foundation of mainstream thinking on the role of financial markets and institutions in economic development and the basis for policy-making in many LDCs for the last 18 years, is shown to be flawed when viewed in a post-Keynesian perspective. Three interrelated aspects of post-Keynesian theory are used to challenge the financial liberalization models and to posit an alternative post-Keynesian perspective on the role of financial institutions and markets in economic development. These aspects are: (1) the finance-investment-saving-funding circuit; (2) the financial fragility hypothesis; and (3) the evolution of institutions and conventions in an uncertain world.     

Institutions and industrial policy in Brazil after two decades: have we built the needed institutions?

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to examine the design and implementation of industrial policy in Brazil based on their capacity to affect the prevailing institutions. We argue that the main reason for the failure of policies in Brazil, and in Latin America, is their inability to induce persistent changes in firms’ innovative behavior. Based on the analysis of national innovation indicators, and on previous empirical studies, we demonstrate that the Brazilian industrial policy was not able to change the prevailing conventions. The main problems related to this fragility are: institutional problems and related to industrial policy development conventions; serious coordination problems; maintaining a macroeconomic policy that is not convergent toward industrial policy efforts; policy instruments that were not able to change prevailing conventions, such as low R&D and innovative expenditures; a set of strategic choices that are inconsistent with innovation, technological catch-up and structural change.     

The role of economics in global management of whales: re-forming or re-founding IWC?

The global management of whale species, identified as an economic mixed good, is addressed by means of economic theory of bargaining and institution making. I will analyse (i) why it is important to take into account explicitly both (consumptive) use and non-use values within international conventions on global mixed goods; (ii) the role and nature of institutions dealing with global issues; (iii) the role of bargaining between conflicting interests as a focal feature of the institution-making process; and, (iv) the role of economic thinking in international conventions. Co-operative and non co-operative solutions are discussed, and instruments aimed at achieving co-operative bargaining, analysed. The study has both positive and normative implications, with insights on social welfare enhancing institutional reforms. Although the study is broad yet special focus is given to the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This paper concludes that we should make economic theory operational within the realm of global institutions. On the basis of the bargaining model, the conclusion is that IWC should necessarily be re-founded or at least re-formed, changing the convention from ‘whaling’ to a ‘whale’. It is suggested that the possibility of introducing compensatory side payments into the bargaining arena in order to increase social welfare and enforceability with respect to a ‘ban’ scenario be investigated. Ethical implications of monetary compensations are considered in parallel with economic efficiency. The limits and potentialities of economics and economic instruments are also tested globally with respect to the whale and other environmental issues.     

An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State

Individual's desires to expand wealth in the face of scarcity underlie the evolution of rules and institutions of governance, as individuals attempt to reduce the transactions costs that impede coordination and motivation in an uncertain world. Some wealth-seeking individuals have or develop comparative advantages in violence, however, and behavioral rules and governing institutions may evolve to coordinate joint production of extortion too. The process by which such institutions evolve into a state is discussed. To illustrate the plausibility of this theory, various historical and modern state and non-state governance institutions are shown to be consistent with it.     

Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions

The newly emerging subdiscipline of constitutional economics is dominated by adherents to social contract theory although this approach has been severely criticized many a time. In recent years, an alternative approach in which constitutions are conceptualized as conventions has emerged. It is argued here that this alternative approach is a step in the right direction but still does not go far enough. The central hypothesis of the paper is that conceptualizing constitutions as based on spontaneously arisen institutions can help to solve some of the problems left unanswered by the constitutions-as-conventions view.     

General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions

We consider a pure exchange economy, where for each good several trading institutions are available, only one of which is market-clearing. The other feasible trading institutions lead to rationing. To learn on which trading institutions to coordinate, traders follow behavioral rules of thumb that are based on the past performances of the trading institutions. Given the choice of institutions, market outcomes are determined by an equilibrium concept that allows for rationing. We find that full coordination on the market-clearing institutions without any rationing is a stochastically stable outcome, independently of the characteristics of the alternative available institutions. We also find, though, that coordination on certain other, non-market-clearing institutions with rationing can be stochastically stable.     

An Entrepreneurial Perspective of Institutional Change

Utilizing Kirzner's theory of entrepreneurial discovery, Schumpeter's two types of economic responses and the Austrian theory of institutions as building blocks, this paper constructs an entrepreneurial theory of institutional change. Focusing on the coordinating role of human institutions, this paper argues that entrepreneurial extraordinary discovery destroys the stability of institutions and creates uncertainty in the market (creative response). As a result, institutions are incapable of coordinating economic activities because market participants' stocks of knowledge are no longer adequate to solve new problems. Hence, profit gaps or mismatches of market participants' plans occur. Given new technologies, new relative prices and tastes, imitative entrepreneurs soon identify and capitalize on the opportunities created by Schumpeterian extraordinary discoveries (adaptive response). Imitators improve production methods, modify rules and alter property rights in order to improve coordination. Through learning, experimentation, trial and error, the more rewarding methods are then selected. Successful actions are imitated and repeated in the market, and gradually crystallized into new institutions which once again serve as social coordinators.     

Institutions, social norms, and decision-theoretic norms

This article attempts to contribute to the debate on how to define and theorize institutions, particularly regarding normativity and explanations for conformity. Firstly, it proposes some distinctions and concepts: it separates moral from epistemic values, leading to different types of legitimacy and social norms; then it distinguishes different meanings of the term ‘normative’ and introduces the concept of decision-theoretic norm. Secondly, the article defends a broad concept of institutions by arguing that some institutions are neither social norms nor decision-theoretic ones, a point that matters for institutional change and stability. Some conventions from which innovators break are highlighted as an example.     

Institutions and Development From a Historical Perspective: the Case of the Brazilian Development Bank

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the role played by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) in different periods of Brazil’s development process since its founding in 1952. The bank’s history is nonlinear, varying with socio-economic and political changes over time. Four major periods in its history are: (i) from its creation to the debt crisis in the 1980s, a period known as ‘developmentalism’; (ii) the neoliberal movement of the 1990s; (iii) the reintroduction of the BNDES as a relevant tool for development in the 2000s; and (iv) a new neoliberal movement that arose beginning in mid-2016. Each of these periods is characterized by certain development conventions that shape how institutions, such as the BNDES, operate, and at the same time are shaped by them. In contrast to mainstream economics, which focuses on a one-size-fits-all institution for development, this paper evaluates the interactions between development and institutions as historical processes, with an emphasis on the prevailing development conventions. The trajectory and different roles assumed by the BNDES over time exemplify this permanent relationship, rejecting the idea that particular types of institutions are related to development.     

Property rights,entrepreneurship and coordination

The notion of plan coordination enjoys a central place in the analysis of institutions and competitive market processes. The conventional wisdom is that institutions and policies vary in the extent to which they promote competition and how quickly and completely they bring individuals’ plans into closer coordination with one another. Kirzner has provided the most fully elaborated statement on the use of coordination as a positive analytical device for explaining market dynamics and as a normative criterion for evaluating economic policies. We identify the core propositions in his analysis that elucidate how economic coordination depends upon that most fundamental of market institutions – the system of private property rights. We also probe into Kirzner's claims about inherent limitations in our ability to compare the coordinative potential of alternative property rights systems. We unpack the consequences of these core propositions using the economic theory of property rights. We also examine Kirzner's assertion that dynamic competition – including Schumpeterian innovation – is necessarily coordinative in its market effects. We find that his argument rests on the implicit assumption that property rights remain constant during the process of market adjustment. We provide a case study of the advent of commercial aviation as a potential counterexample to his claims.     

Evolutionary selection of ‘chivalrous’ conventions in coordination games without common expectations

We study an evolutionary game-theoretic model where players have to choose within a predetermined set of mixed strategies in a coordination game. Players are of two different kinds, male and female. No common expectations assumption is made; players tend therefore to adopt the strategy that yields larger than average expected payoffs for their kind. In this framework, every stable stationary point of the population dynamics can be interpreted as the emergence of a particular convention. A classification of the possible conventions is provided; conditions for their emergence are determined.     

Conventions and Economic Change: A Contribution toward a Theory of Political Economy

This essay presents a perspective on the growth of knowledge as the source of economic growth. After a critical examination of the reasons why the crucial issue has been neglected in the dominant tradition in economics, a concept of paradigm-seeking as the essence of decision making under uncertainty and learning is proposed. Behavioral implications of paradigm-seeking include the generation of conventions by which people stabilize their expectations and build a network of coordination and cooperation. The stability of conventions, however, generates a dynamic process of change, by creating unexploited opportunities. Entrepreneurial successes and their emulation amount to the process of social learning and growth of knowledge. It is further suggested that implications of the proposed perspective are consistent with other observed phenomena.     

Market characteristics,intra-firm coordination,and the choice of human resource management systems: Theory and evidence

This paper begins by constructing a team-theoretical model of organizational adaptation and coordination with three distinct task coordination modes: vertical control, horizontal coordination, and hybrid coordination. The model is then used to provide fresh insights on complementarities involving team work organization, communication channels, training and hiring, and other human resource management practices, and illustrate how such choice of practices is affected by the firm's output market conditions. Our econometric analysis of new data from Japan which provide up-to-date information on the adoption of new team-based instruments for a horizontal coordination system (cross-functional problem solving project teams and Self-Managed Teams) yields results that are broadly consistent with the theory. First, new team-based instruments are more likely to be adopted by firms with well-established formal shop-floor-based communication channels (such as shopfloor committees), while they are much less likely to be adopted by firms with well-established information sharing institutions such as joint labor-management committees, which presumably enhance the efficiency of the vertical control system by minimizing labor-management communication errors. Finally, firms in more competitive markets and those with a higher concentration of sales among a small number of customers are more likely to adopt both types of team, whereas firms facing more erratic price movement tend not to adopt Self-Managed Teams.     

From The Sensory Order to the Liberal Order: Hayek's Non-rationalist Liberalism

Hayek's arguments for a constitutionally constrainted government are consistent with, and to some extent rest upon, his work in theoretical psychology. By exploring his view of the mind in The Sensory Order, we can see the psychological and epistemological underpinnings of Hayek's belief in the mind's limits and the indispensibility of spontaneously emergent social institutions. The Austrian view of microeconomic coordination is a logical outgrowth of Hayek's theory of mind. Constraints on government are necessary not because self-interest leads rational government actors into temptation, but because even altruistically-motivated actors are epistemically unable to intervene effectively in spontaneously emergent institutions.     

Waiting for an echo: the revolution in general equilibrium theory and the paralysis in introductory economics

The current framework for the introductory microeconomics course is predicated on the Invisible Hand lessons of mid-twentieth century General Equilibrium Theory. During the final decades of the century, however, the theory changed. Proofs of the path-dependent instability of general equilibrium, the multiplicity of equilibria and the problem of equilibrium selection, and the failure of asymptotic convergence to the properties of equilibrium (The General Theory of the Second Best) provided a sweeping disconfirmation of the Invisible Hand. This paper argues that these topics are fully teachable, even at the principles level, and that they point toward a new framework for the curriculum in which institutions can reclaim much of the explanatory space now occupied by market analysis.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

An Austrian view of expectations and business cycles

Austrian economists have contributed several important concepts to business cycle theory including: inter-temporal coordination of production and consumption, heterogeneous specificity of capital, non-neutrality of money, and the capital structure of production. Noticeably lacking, however, is a clear theory of expectations. Recent Austrian responses to rational expectations critiques—such as positing a prisoner’s dilemma, heterogeneous entrepreneurs, and adverse selection—try to fill this gap. But much work remains to be done developing an Austrian theory of expectations, one where they are endogenous to the market process and market institutions. This paper explores how people adapt their expectations to changing market phenomena based upon their perceived costs and benefits of doing so. It then applies endogenous expectations to the 2008 financial crisis.     

Economics is not always performative: some limits for performativity

The phenomenon of performativity has recently sparked debates about the status of the economic discourse. This paper aims to discuss the subjectivist idea that if economics ‘performs’ (shapes) social reality, rather than merely reflects it, then every theory can be considered ‘true.’ My main goal is to point out three limits of performativity. First, not all theories can be performative since some do not produce empirical landmarks for agents. Second, social institutions restrict performativity. Third, I emphasize the necessity that a theory to be self-fulfilling. This article is a prelude to a new kind of performative studies based on an original definition: a theory performs the world if it implies a behavioral regularity which leads to a general coordination between agents. That is to say, if it becomes a convention à la David Lewis.