The impact on broadband access to the Internet of the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks

In Portugal, until recently, the telecommunications incumbent offered broadband access to the Internet, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. We estimate the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these two businesses. Using a panel of consumer level data and a random effects mixed logit model, we estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of broadband access to the Internet. Based on these estimates, we simulate the effect of structural separation on prices and social welfare. Our estimates indicate that structural separation would cause a substantial welfare increase. These results raise questions about the policy of some countries of allowing the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks.     

“Open access:” the ideal and the real

“Open access” would allow ISPs to use a cable operator's broadband connection under regulated terms and conditions. Advocates stress the desirability of an “end-to-end” architecture for the Internet and the danger that cable operators will use their control over the last mile to limit consumer choice and stifle innovation. Opponents contend that wholesale price controls and other regulatory burdens under what they term “forced access” would in fact slow down the deployment of broadband, stifle innovation and harm consumers. The fears of “open access” advocates seem largely speculative at this point. Evidence from related policies also favors the opponents. “Closed” cable systems are beating their “open” DSL competitors in the market place; analogous regulation of cable TV did not serve consumers well; and forced “unbundling” of local service has been controversial and largely ineffective. In addition, relevant technology stocks declined in price with political and legal victories for “open access” and increased when it suffered setbacks.     

Municipal electric utilities’ role in telecommunications services

Municipal electric utilities (MEUs) are increasingly expanding into telecommunications services. Such entry is interesting in several respects. First, MEUs marry two potential pathways for the growth of telecommunications access infrastructure and services: public ownership of last-mile facilities and electric power company expansion into telecommunications. Second, municipalities are key early adopters of next generation access technology in the form of both fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) and broadband wireless (e.g., WiMax) systems. Third, MEUs are at the nexus of the debate over the proper role for local government in promoting broadband Internet access. Most homes in the United States are served by investor-owned local telephone and cable television providers, using company-owned wireline infrastructure. These providers have generally opposed municipal entry, arguing that it will crowd out private investment and represents an unfair and less efficient form of competition. A number of states have acted to limit—or in some cases—to promote such entry. Before engaging in this debate, it is necessary to have a clearer picture of the current state of municipal entry and the local demographic, cost, industry, and policy factors that influence its evolution. To address this need, this paper reports the results of an empirical analysis of MEUs that provide communications services to the public. This analysis shows that MEUs are more likely to offer such services if they also provide internal communication services to support their electric utility operations (scope economies); are relatively close to metropolitan areas (lower backhaul costs); are in markets with fewer competitive alternatives (cable modem and DSL service availability limited); and which are less encumbered by regulatory barriers to entry (in communities in states which do not restrict municipal entry into telecommunication services). Of these results, the competitive impacts are the least straight-forward to interpret, suggesting richer dynamics and avenues for further research.     

Technology and policy in cable TV development in the UK

Although cable TV is often viewed in an entertainment context, its importance for technology policy rests with its relation to future national broadband network development. The authors argue that it could provide a means of assessing the benefits and technical direction of this greater project and government support for early cable ventures is advised for this purpose. Government policy should stress incremental technical advance and address the development problems likely to be encountered by cable TV as an infant technology.     

Cost and benefits from infrastructure competition. Estimating welfare effects from broadband access competition

Competition between parallel infrastructures incorporates opposing welfare effects. The gain from reduced deadweight loss might be outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. Using data from broadband Internet access for western Europe 2000–04, this paper investigates which effect prevails empirically. Infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. However, comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable competition with the cable investments, it can be concluded that, in the absence of significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has probably not been welfare enhancing.     

Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?

Broadband over cable television networks has become a growing force on the retail market in the EU. Thus, a debate has always been raised whether cable television networks should also be subject to open internet access obligations as PSTN and fibre. This article aims to share its view from a legal perspective. In order to do so, it conducts a survey of the current regulatory measures on broadband over cable television networks within the 27 EU Member States, and then carries out an in-depth legal analysis on Member States that attempted to regulate broadband over cable television networks. The conclusion is that broadband over cable television networks is currently deregulated, and will probably remain so in the future.     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

Estimating broadband diffusion in the EU using NUTS 1 regional data

In this paper we use panel data on NUTS 1 regional data for 27 EU countries in the years 2006–2010 to analyze determinants of broadband diffusion. We estimate both linear demand specification and the logistic diffusion function. We find that, after controlling for regional differences due to socioeconomic factors, inter-platform competition approximated by an inter-platform Herfindahl index has a significant positive impact on broadband diffusion. Broadband deployment is lower in countries in which DSL has a greater share in Internet access and it is higher in countries in which cable modem has a greater share in Internet access. Moreover, we find that competition between DSL providers has a significant and positive impact on broadband penetration. First, higher prices for a fully unbundled local loop connection, which represent the cost of providing copper-based Internet services, have a significant and negative impact on broadband penetration. Second, a greater incumbent share in DSL connections has a significant and negative impact on broadband penetration.     

Maximizing the adoption of fixed number portability within the EU: An empirical analysis

Number portability (NP) is considered by the European Commission as a key measure for promoting competition within the telecom sector especially regarding network access infrastructure. However, NP requires several modifications to the network architecture and to the business processes of each operator that, depending on network size, may result in a significant financial cost. This is true for fixed networks in particular. Given the requirement for such an investment, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) desire a clear picture on what to expect, in terms of progress in access competition, when introducing fixed NP in their respective markets. The paper approaches this question by correlating several fixed telephony market indices related to access competition to the degree of success of fixed NP. Relevant analysis based on European Union member states’ data indicates that fixed NP does not significantly contribute to local loop unbundling (LLU) adoption in markets where there are other access technologies available. In these markets, access competition via these other technologies and fixed NP initially achieve similar penetration rates. Consequently, when access competition exceeds a certain threshold and given a reasonable pricing regime then fixed NP is further boosted to include broadband connections based on several broadband technologies/methodologies such as LLU and cable as well as existing narrowband access technologies (e.g. narrowband cable connections). In markets where LLU is the only alternative for access then the rate of Fixed NP adoption is directly correlated with the success of LLU. Consequently, these conclusions are considered within a high-level stepwise approach for NP implementation, which is based on the experience acquired from the respective Greek national project.     

Unbundling the incumbent and deployment of high-speed internet: Evidence from France

In this paper, we study the impact of competition on the legacy copper network on the deployment of high-speed broadband. We first develop a theoretical model, which shows that the relation between the number of competitors and investment in a quality-improving technology can be positive if the quality of the new technology is high enough, and is negative otherwise. We test these theoretical predictions using data on broadband deployments in France in more than 36,000 local municipalities. First, using panel data over the period 2011–2014, we estimate a model of entry into local markets by alternative operators using local loop unbundling (LLU). Second, using cross-sectional data for the year 2015, we estimate how the number of LLU entrants impacts the deployment of high-speed broadband with speed of 30 Mbps or more by means of VDSL, cable and fiber technologies, controlling for the endogeneity of LLU entry. We find that a higher number of LLU competitors in a municipality implies lower incentives to deploy and expand coverage of high-speed broadband with speed of 30 Mbps or more.     

Race to the top: Does competition in the DSL market matter for fibre penetration?

High speed broadband creates potential productivity gains and has a positive impact on economic growth. Achieving Europe's broadband access objectives will require large scale investment in next generation broadband networks, and it is imperative that an appropriate investment climate is created to encourage fibre network rollout. This study considers whether and how competition in the DSL market affects the incentives of operators to invest in the deployment of high-end fibre optic networks. Most earlier research on the drivers of investment in broadband technology has focused on the effect of mandatory access policies, such as local loop unbundling, or competing infrastructures. We posit that competition in the DSL sector may also influence fibre penetration, possibly to a considerable extent. We find that the relationship between service-based competition and fibre penetration is non-linear: a lack of or severe DSL competition is correlated with a negative effect on fibre penetration, but if a moderate degree of competition is already present in the market, more service-based competition may positively influence fibre penetration. The scale of these effects however varies with the openness of the DSL market: operators' incentives to invest in fibre appear to be more sensitive to changes in DSL competition if there is extensive local loop unbundling.     

The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications

The recent growth of the Internet is creating markets for broadband telecommunications networks. In the past, virtually all such 'infrastructure' networks have been subject to government regulation. Two reasons advanced for this market intervention are (i) such networks constitute a natural monopoly, and (ii) to achieve 'universal service', in which all citizens have access to services. In this paper, we develop a model and estimate it using engineering data which tests if these two hypotheses are likely to obtain for broadband networks. We find that oligopolistic competition is likely to emerge for demand levels approaching that of today's cable television.     

Is broadband the future? An analysis of broadband technology potential and diffusion

This paper examines the policy issues surrounding residential broadband technology, discusses how broadband extends Internet capabilities and at what cost, and makes recommendations for future applications of broadband. It focuses on residential broadband access, and in examining the future of broadband, it identifies three areas of concern: regulatory tendencies and tensions in the US, international diffusion of broadband, and the overall consumer appeal of broadband content. Specific policy recommendations center on providing regulation that guarantees open access, enforces reasonable pricing plans, and encourages innovative content.     

Fixed-to-mobile substitution in the European Union

This paper analyzes substitution between access to fixed-line and mobile telephony in the European Union using cross-section panel data on households’ choices of telecommunications technologies in years 2005–2010. We estimate a structural model of household?s demand for access to: (i) fixed-line only; (ii) mobile only; and (iii) both fixed-line and mobile. We find that growing Internet usage increases the share of ‘fixed + mobile’ households, which suggests that households keep their fixed-line connection to access Internet. However, the spread of 3G and cable broadband access decreases the share of ‘fixed + mobile’ households and increases the share of ‘mobile only’ households. Hence, fixed-to-mobile substitution was slowed down by the spread of Internet but it may continue with the spread of mobile broadband. Furthermore, bundling of telecommunications services increases the share of ‘fixed + mobile’ households and decreases the shares of ‘mobile only’ and ‘fixed only’ households. Therefore, operators which can bundle fixed-line connection with Internet or mobile services may slow down fixed-to-mobile substitution.     

Lessons from broadband development in Canada,Japan, Korea and the United States

Broadband network development does not always track closely a nations overall wealth and economic strength. The International Telecommunication Union reported that in 2005 the five top nations for broadband network market penetration were: Korea, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada. The ITU ranked the United States sixteenth in broadband penetration.Aside from the obvious geographical and demographic advantages accruing to small nations with large urban populations, broadband development thrives when it becomes a national priority. Both developed and developing nations have stimulated capital expenditures for infrastructure in ways United States public and private sector stakeholders have yet to embrace. Such investments have accrued ample dividends including the lowest broadband access costs in the world. For example, the ITU reports that in 2002 Japanese consumers paid $0.09 per 100 kilobits per second of broadband access compared to $3.53 in the United States.Economic policies do not completely explain why some nations offer faster, better cheaper and more convenient broadband services while other nations do not. This paper will examine best practices in broadband network development with an eye toward determining the optimal mix of legislative, regulatory and investment initiatives. The paper will track development in Canada, Japan and Korea as these nations have achieved success despite significantly different geographical, political and marketplace conditions. The paper also notes the institutional and regulatory policies that have hampered broadband development in the United States.The paper also will examine why incumbent local exchange and cable television operators recently have begun aggressively to pursue broadband market opportunities. The paper will analyze incumbents’ rationales for limited capital investment in broadband with an eye toward determining the credibility of excuses based on regulatory risk and uncertainty. The paper concludes with suggestions how national governments might expedite broadband infrastructure development.     

Market Power in US Broadband Services

The US residential broadband market is commonly characterized as a duopoly consisting of telephone carriers (digital subscriber lines) and cable TV operators (cable modems). The implication is drawn that market power obtains; this, in turn, drives recommendations for new competition policy remedies. Yet, market power cannot be directly deduced from market shares or price-cost margins. We develop an economic analysis that examines both static and dynamic factors in considering market power, finding that fixed broadband providers do not appear to generate supra-competitive returns. Public policies to regulate broadband providers should be informed by these marketplace conditions.     

Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry

In the telecommunications industry, the ladder-of-investment approach claims that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facilities) can serve as a “stepping stone” for facility-based entry (when entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services). In this paper, we build an empirical model that encompasses a complete ladder-of-investment, composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities. Using data from the European Commission’s “Broadband access in the EU” reports covering 15 European member states for 17 semesters, we test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. We find no empirical support for this hypothesis, that is, for the transition from local loop unbundling to new access infrastructures, and weak empirical support for the transition from bitstream access lines to local loop unbundling. These results are robust when we take into account the migration effect, the number of access rungs, the development of broadband cable, the regulatory performance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling prices.     

Diversification of cable television firms into broadband products

This research provides a new perspective to investigate the broadband diffusion in eight states of the U.S. by studying the two-stage entry decisions, namely, upgrading and subsequent product decisions, by the cable television system operators, one of the early dominant players in the broadband market, and examines the role of competition, market characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the cable company's decisions in a dynamic setting. Comparing the empirical results of the decision models of both stages can give new insights into the dynamics of broadband diffusion. The empirical results show that the subsequent product decision is affected more by the demand determinants, while the upgrading decision is affected more by the cost determinants. The results also indicate that policies which aim to reduce the entry cost such as a low city fee can largely encourage firms to upgrade the network, while subsequent policies that help boost the demand can help firms diversify into new digital services early. The effectiveness of competition policy in the broadband diffusion is confirmed in both stages. Strategic responses by cable firms to the presence of RBOCs are more noticeable in the second-staged product decision than in the first-staged upgrading decision.     

Non-discrimination rules for ISPs and vertical integration: Lessons from cable television

The experience of cable television indicates that vertically integrated ISPs have plausible incentives to favor their affiliated content and to restrict entry of nascent rival content services, but these incentives are weakened in some respects, and strengthened in others, by differences in the economic architectures of cable and Internet broadband. Non-discrimination regulations designed to control such behavior are potentially more effective than in cable, but rules governing discrimination both in the upstream access and the downstream retail markets (as the FCC's no-unreasonable-discrimination rule appears to do) are likely to be necessary for effectiveness. Beneficial effects of vertical integration on financing and entry of cable programming networks should also apply to Internet video content development, but emergence since the 1970s of a robust programming supply industry with few vertical ties to cable suggests that such benefits will be less significant in the ISP case. Finally, the history of both the cable and ISP industries makes evident that the fundamental policy concern should not be vertical integration but horizontal market shares of ISPs, both at the local and national levels.     

Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?

The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadband customers can access Internet content at high speeds. We consider the economic incentives of such a firm to engage in two distinct vertical foreclosure strategies: (1) conduit discrimination—insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting rival platform distribution of its affiliated content and services, and (2) content discrimination—insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content.