In Whose Interest? A First Look at National Survey Data on Interest‐Based Bargaining in Labor Relations

The first national survey data on interest‐based bargaining (IBB) in labor relations reveal broad awareness of IBB, contrasting union and management views, and variation by negotiator experience and gender. A majority of negotiators are aware of IBB, and approximately one‐third of management negotiators and nearly one‐half of union negotiators report using IBB in prior negotiations. An exploratory analysis of the relationships between IBB preferences and contract outcomes suggests that the process is producing more than a simple “mutual gains” pattern of outcomes. Based on these initial results, two hypotheses are suggested as the focus for future studies of the diffusion and sustainability of IBB in collective bargaining.     

Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of Labor Negotiations

The Behavioral Theory we have developed stands up well and helps us gain a better feeling for the behavioral dynamics of collective bargaining. As expected, economic variables such as bargaining power and the estimated cost and probability of a work stoppage are important determinants of bargaining behavior. Nevertheless, the variables have a differential effect on bargaining goals, with strong bargaining power and low probability of a strike contributing to both distributive and integrative bargaining, whereas high expected costs of a strike help to persuade constituents to support their negotiators (intraorganizational bargaining). Thus we see the roie of intraorganizational bargaining as an alternative to being able to obtain a better settlement from the opponents. Attitudinal structuring seems to be more closely tied to integrative bargaining than was indicated by Walton and McKersie. Furthermore, there seems to be less direct conflict between the tactics used in integrative bargaining and those used in distributive bargaining than predicted by theory. Perhaps the mixed nature of most bargaining keeps the majority of negotiators from applying all-out distributive tactics. At any rate, strong bargaining power, constructive relationships, clear and specific statements of issues, as well as exploring them in a noncommital fashion, seem to aid both distributive and integrative bargaining. We uncovered a number of relationships which varied significantly according to the side (labor or management) and/or team role (chief negotiator or other team member) of the respondent. Although we feel they should be included in the theory of bargaining as moderator variables, and have thus included them in our model, we have only hinted at their impact in this paper. Overall, bargaining behavior and conditions seem to have as much effect on bargaining success as do the economic variables. Of course, we did not measure every possible economic variable, but neither did we examine all possible tactics. Our study confirms that collective bargaining is an interpersonal, attitudinal process as well as an economic one and that there are several distinct goals for the process. We have also demonstrated that, despite problems of locating current negotiations and obtaining an adequate rate of response, field study of the behavioral aspects of collective bargaining is feasible. We hope that investigations along this line will continue.     

Bargaining Structure and Wage Outcomes in the British Coal Industry

The arguments below use case study and time series data to investigate the relationship between bargaining structure and wage settlements in the British coal industry. Consideration of the different bargaining structures in this industry suggests that bargaining power and wage outcomes are very sensitive to market conditions when the negotiating structure is decentralized; when negotiations are centralized in industry-wide bargaining, power and wage outcomes are quite insensitive to market conditions. These conclusions may help in understanding recent events in this industry and perhaps can be generalized to other cases where bargaining structures are undergoing change.     

Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain

The Freeman–Lazear works council/worker involvement model is assessed over two distinct industrial relations regimes. In non-union British establishments our measures of employee involvement are associated with improved economic performance, whereas for unionized plants negative results are detected. The suggestion is that local distributive bargaining can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen. Also consistent with the model is our finding that mandatory works councils do not impair, and may even improve, the performance of larger German establishments. Yet smaller plants with works councils under-perform, illustrating the problem of tailoring mandates to fit heterogeneous populations.     

Asset-Specific Investment and Unionized Labor

This article investigates the bargaining problem that exists when firms make asset-specific investments and then are subject to excessive union wage demands. In this context, the combination of both large asset specific investment and high union density is important in determining the magnitude of the bargaining problem. Using firm-specific union-density rates and various asset-specificity proxies, evidence is found that the bargaining problem results in substantially lower firm profitability, investment, and employment.     

Strategy implementation: A comparison of face-to-face negotiations in the peoples republic of China and the United States

Crucial to every business alliance are the face-to-face negotiations that occur during the formulation and maintenance of the commercial relationship. Our study of American and Chinese businesspeople in simulated intracultural negotiations suggests both similarities and differences in style. For example, negotiators in both cultures were more successful when taking a problem-solving approach. Alternatively, the Chinese negotiators tended to ask many more questions and to interrupt one another more frequently than their American counterparts. Such subtle differences in style may cause problems in Sino-American negotiations, which may, in turn, sour otherwise fruitful commercial alliances.     

Bargaining (De)centralization, Macroeconomic Performance and Control over the Employment Relationship

Based on data for 20 OECD countries, this paper analyses the effect of bargaining centralization on performance and control over the employment relationship. Rejecting both the corporatist thesis and the hump–shape thesis, the paper finds that performance either increases or decreases with centralization, depending on the ability of the higher level to bind lower levels. There is a clear effect on control in that bargaining coverage significantly declines with decentralization. Employers can therefore expect to extend management prerogatives, rather than improve performance, when enforcing decentralization. Hence the literature on bargaining structures when focusing on performance has lost sight of their contested nature.     

Pivotal Buyers and Bargaining Position

Securing sales to a large buyer can be pivotal to a supplier's decision to produce. While conventional wisdom suggests that being pivotal improves a buyer's bargaining position, the opposite is shown in a multilateral bargaining model. If other buyers' payments fall short of costs, a pivotal buyer must cover the shortfall or forfeit consumption. This affords leverage that the supplier lacks when bargaining with non-pivotal buyers. The analysis illuminates contracting in markets with high fixed costs, such as cable television programming, motion pictures, and large-scale project finance, and has implications for the FCC's horizontal ownership limits on cable system operators.     

Stakeholder value appropriation: The case of labor in the worldwide mining industry

Research Summary : We evaluate how the value appropriated by employees varies in response to an exogenous shock to the price of the firm's product and how this variation depends on institutional and ownership structures. Institutional and ownership structures that favor employees can influence firms’ location decisions and shareholders’ incentives to invest. Using data from the main copper mines in the world, we show that the value appropriated by employees rises in response to an exogenous increase in the price of minerals. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the increment in the value captured by employees is larger in stated‐owned companies, when labor regulations promote productivity‐based payments, when wages are determined through a centralized bargaining process, and when regulations associated with hiring and firing are more flexible. Managerial Summary : We show how labor regulations and state ownership affect the value appropriated by employees when there are exogenous changes in the price of the firm's products. Since the value generated by a firm is distributed among different stakeholders, a higher appropriation of value by employees results in lower appropriation by another party. Therefore, by changing the distribution of value, managerial decisions about location and entry could be affected. For instance, shareholders of firms with positive future expectations about the prices of their products might prefer to enter markets in which salary negotiations are not centralized or where partnership with the local government is not mandatory. Overall, our analysis calls for the consideration of the external environment when evaluating value appropriation by different types of stakeholders.     

Bargaining Theory Meets Interest‐Based Negotiations: A Case Study1

This is a case study of the 2005 national contract negotiations between Kaiser Permanente and the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions. Given the scale and complexity of these negotiations, their successful completion provides an exemplar for collective bargaining in this country. In 1997 Kaiser Permanente and the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions formed a labor management partnership, and negotiations were structured around the principles of interest‐based negotiation (IBN). Drawing on direct observation of all parts of the bargaining process, interviews with individuals from Kaiser and the Coalition of Unions, and surveys we conducted after bargaining was completed, we conclude that the parties employed a mix of interest‐based and traditional negotiation processes across an array of integrative and distributive issues. We find that IBN techniques were used extensively and successfully to reach mutually satisfying agreements when the parties shared interests. When interests were in greater conflict, the parties resorted to more traditional, positional tactics to reach resolution. Strong intraorganizational conflicts limited the use of IBN and favored the use of more traditional positional bargaining. While a high level of trust enabled and supported the use of IBN, tensions that developed limited the use of IBN and required surfacing and release before either IBN or more traditional positional processes could proceed effectively. The use of IBN tools helped the parties apply the principles underlying the partnership in which these negotiations were embedded. We conclude that IBN served as a way of applying or operationalizing integrative bargaining and affected the process dynamics in ways the Walton and McKersie theory predicted. As such we see IBN as techniques that neither displace nor render obsolete other aspects of bargaining theory or practice but that show considerable promise for helping collective bargaining to address the complex issues and challenges found in contemporary employment relationships.     

Mergers in Medicare Part D: Assessing market power,cost efficiencies,and bargaining power

We empirically examine horizontal mergers amongst Part D insurers with the aim of assessing how market power, cost efficiencies, and bargaining power affect premiums and coverage characteristics, including drug access and out-of-pocket (OOP) cost. Our results reveal that market power raises premiums, but this is only a local effect that occurs in markets where the merging firms overlap. Mergers alter the bargaining process with upstream suppliers at both local and national levels, affecting drug access and OOP cost. We find evidence of cost efficiencies when firms restructure by consolidating their plan offerings.     

The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.     

Estimating Bargaining Effects in Hedonic Models: Evidence from the Housing Market

Bargaining is common in markets for heterogeneous goods and differences in bargaining power between buyer and seller affect the negotiated transaction price. Previous research has found systematic evidence in the housing markets that weak buyers pay higher prices and weak sellers receive lower prices for their homes. Earlier work has modeled the bargaining effect as a parallel shift in the hedonic function, implicitly assuming that attribute shadow prices were unaffected by the bargaining process. In this paper, we use a sample of home sales where the seller's bargaining power is weakened by the fact that the home is vacant at the time of sale to test whether the effect of bargaining is best captured by a shift in the hedonic constant or whether the attribute shadow prices vary as well. The question is significant for property valuation where estimation of the marginal value of an attribute is commonly used to adjust comparable sales data. We find strong confirmation that bargaining power influences the negotiated price. We also find evidence that bargaining power alters attribute prices, although we do not find a consistent pattern across markets.     

Lopsided inclusion: The impact of multi-employer bargaining and class-based unionism on non-regular employment in South Korea

This study examines the impact of multi-employer bargaining on non-regular workers across different unions and types of non-regular employment. Using national representative survey data from South Korea, I find that multi-employer bargaining increases the likelihood that a workplace union would address a pay increase for non-regular workers when the union was affiliated with a confederation espousing class-based as opposed to business-unionism. However, such a relationship was weaker for temporary agency workers and subcontractors than for direct-hire fixed-term workers. This mechanism is further illustrated through a second round of data collection and analysis, namely in-depth interviews. I identify two factors that characterize the class-based confederation: (1) centralized pressure from the union and (2) activists and their identity work. Altogether, these results further an understanding of how the identities of national union confederations can influence local representatives’ approach to representing non-regular workers and how those influences are manifested through workplace-level collective bargaining.     

What Do Unions Do to Work Design? Computer Use,Union Presence,and Tayloristic Jobs in Britain

The task framework has focused on employee survey data to analyze how computer use changes the content of jobs. In this article, we add another factor of work design, namely trade union presence. Using data from the UK Skills and Employment Surveys for the period 1997–2012, we find that union presence is associated with more Tayloristic jobs involving less autonomy, lower relevance of problem solving, and more control. In line with theory, the union effect moves in the opposite direction to the effect of computer use. The article has two important general implications. First, the Tayloristic/holistic distinction is an instructive dichotomy to evaluate changes in work design. Second, the presence of unions may induce managers to design jobs in Tayloristic ways in order to curb union bargaining power.     

Collective Bargaining Coverage under Trade Unionism: A Sociological Investigation

Does high union density lead to high collective bargaining coverage? Since collective bargaining is seen as the raison d'être of trade unions, this is often assumed to be the case; some observers think that union density is ‘a floor’ below which collective bargaining coverage is unlikely to fall. With its very high union density, Denmark is a case in point. This article investigates the collective bargaining coverage issue in the Danish case, based on an individual-level employee survey with 1720 respondents. Collective bargaining coverage is shown to be much lower than union density, and some methodological issues in this connection are considered. In order to find some possible explanations for this surprising finding, the question of variance of collective bargaining coverage between groups of employees is discussed in the light of theories of service society and recent research results and theories. The impact of central variables is investigated through multivariate analysis, and it turns out that by far the most important variable predicting an employee's collective bargaining coverage is a variable mostly neglected in comparative analyses: occupational status. Salaried employees have a much lower collective bargaining coverage than manual workers in Denmark, and some possible reasons for this are given.     

Collective Representation Among High-Tech Workers at Microsoft and Beyond: Lessons from WashTech/CWA

The obstacles that discourage organizing among high-tech workers are well documented in the industrial relations literature. Discussion about factors that help workers overcome these obstacles, however, is sparse. This case study uses interviews and other evidence to analyze how high-tech workers formed the Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech/CWA). I find that WashTech/CWA improved constituents' working conditions through attempts to engage in collective bargaining, mutual benefit activities, and political action. WashTech/CWA is having greater success using mutual benefits, such as information and training services, and political action in part as a result of the obstacles workers encountered when trying to access collective bargaining.     

Collective Bargaining, Macroeconomic Performance, and the Sectoral Composition of Trade Unions

Strong exposed-sector unions and weak public-sector unions are seen as having beneficial effects on macroeconomic performance. Although these effects must work through the bargaining structure, the interaction with union composition is unclarified. This paper argues that the interaction effect qualitatively differs with the bargaining type. The findings show that the performance of pattern bargaining significantly increases with growing exposed-sector union strength whereas uncoordinated bargaining and centrally coordinated bargaining do not interact with union composition.     

A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets

This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.     

The Role of Mediation Institutions in Sweden and Denmark after Centralized Bargaining

This article compares coordinated collective bargaining in Sweden and Denmark after centralized bargaining. Existing theories — power resource and cross‐class alliance theory — seem capable of explaining the transition from centralized bargaining to pattern bargaining system. However, they do not explain the internal stability of bargaining coordination once established. This analysis stresses the role of mediation institutions of both countries for solving collective action problems in pattern bargaining by pegging other settlements to the manufacturing labour cost norm. Mediation capabilities, however, differ, which is reflected in more frequent defections in Sweden than in Denmark and thus a more unstable bargaining coordination. These differences have substantive consequences for bargaining outcomes in the two countries.