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1.
Bettina Klaus 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):675-692
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity
among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation
of an indivisible object to a group of agents. We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonicity. We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations
as impossibility results.
Received: September 29, 1999; revised version: March 22, 2000 相似文献
2.
Biung-Ghi Ju 《Economic Theory》2005,26(1):115-128
Summary. We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and nulls, or dichotomous preferences for which each object is either a good or a bad. We characterize plurality-like social choice rules on the basis of the three main axioms, known as Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and independence.Received: 29 August 2003, Revised: 3 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D70, D71, D72.Biung-Ghi Ju: I am grateful to William Thomson and Jianbo Zhang for their helpful comments and discussions. I also thank Brandon Dupont, the participants in seminars at Iowa State University, University of Kansas, and the Midwest Theory Meeting at University of Notre Dame. I thank an anonymous referee for detailed comments and suggestions that were very helpful in simplifying the proof of Theorem 1 and in revising the paper. 相似文献
3.
Edward E. Schlee 《Economic Theory》2008,34(1):127-155
Except for a knife-edge case of preferences, the percentage error from using the change in expected consumer’s surplus (ECS) to approximate the willingness to pay for a change in the distribution of a random price is unbounded, in contrast
to Willig’s (Am Econ Rev 66:589–597; 1976) famous approximation result for nonrandom prices. If the change is smooth on the
space of random variables, and either the initial price is nonrandom or state-contingent payments are possible, then the change
in ECS locally approximates the willingness to pay well. Unfortunately, this smoothness fails in some important applications.
I thank Hector Chade, Glenn Ellison, Peter Hammond, Manuel Santos, seminar participants at Arizona State, Stanford and Yale
and participants of the Midwest Economic Theory meetings at Indiana University and the 2004 Summer Econometric Meetings for
comments. 相似文献
4.
No-envy in queueing problems 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Youngsub Chun 《Economic Theory》2006,29(1):151-162
We explore the implications of no-envy(Foley 1967) in the context of queueing problems. We identify an easy way of checking whether a rule satisfies efficiencyand no-envy. The existence of such a rule can easily be established. Next, we ask whether there is a rule satisfying efficiency and no-envytogether with an additional solidarity requirement how agents should be affected as a consequence of changes in the waiting costs. However, there is no rule satisfying efficiency, noenvy, and either one of two cost monotonicity axioms. To remedy the situation, we propose modifications of no-envy, adjusted no-envyand backward/forward no-envy. Finally, we discuss whether three fairness requirements, no-envy, the identical preferences lower bound, and egalitarian equivalence, are compatible in this context. 相似文献
5.
This paper proposes a new concept, a left-side relatively weak increase in risk (L-RWIR) order, that extends the definition of a relatively weak increase in risk (RWIR) order. We show that, for the class of linear payoffs, one can obtain an appealing comparative statics result for L-RWIR shifts imposing additional restrictions on risk preferences of a risk-averse decision maker.JEL classification: D81.revised version received October 10, 2003Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for insightful comments and useful suggestions. 相似文献
6.
Benedetta Giovanola 《Review of social economy》2013,71(2):249-267
This paper aims at developing the Capability Approach's (CA) underlying philosophical anthropology and ethics by focusing on the work of its major exponents, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. I first discuss CA's critique of happiness as subjective well-being and defend the idea of ‘flourishing’ which ultimately refers to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia. I then focus on the notions of ‘good’ and ‘well-being’ and address the problem of the compatibility between a substantive notion of the Good (expressed through universal moral values) and individual preferences. I thus tackle the issue of adaptive preferences (which is investigated both from a methodological and an ethical perspective) and suggest that the process of adaptation should be thought in the dynamic frame of the constitution of the self. Therefore, in the second half of the paper I investigate the CA's idea of personhood and focus on some important assumptions behind its underlying anthropological model – above all the notion of ‘human richness’. As a result, I first point out the dynamic dimension of personhood, according to which individuals are ‘becoming themselves’ in search of self-realisation and construction of their identities. Second, I highlight its relational dimension, according to which every one is the expression of the anthropological richness and at the same time represents the highest possibility of richness for every other one. 相似文献
7.
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez 《Economic Theory》2006,27(3):657-677
Summary. We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters preferences over running candidates, a probabilistic voting procedure selects a lottery on the set of running candidates. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to withdraw their candidacy at any set of potential candidates. More flexible probabilistic voting procedures can be devised if we restrict our attention to the stability of specific sets of potential candidates.Received: 4 February 2003, Revised: 14 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D71, D72.This is a revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona. I am indebted to my supervisor Salvador Barberá for his advice and constant support. I am grateful to Dolors Berga and an anonymous referee for their detailed comments and suggestions. I thank José Alcalde, Walter Bossert, Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó, Diego Moreno, Clara Ponsatí, Yves Sprumont, and William Thomson for many helpful comments and discussions. I thank the hospitality of the C.R.D.E. at the Université de Montréal and the Department of Economics of the University of Warwick where parts of this research were conducted. Financial support through Research Grant 1998FI00022 from Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca, Generalitat de Catalunya, Research Project PB98-870 from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and Fundación Barrié de la Maza is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
8.
Summary. It is widely believed that call options induce risk-taking behavior. However, Ross (2004) challenges this intuition by demonstrating the impossibility of inducing managers with arbitrary preferences to always act as if they were less risk averse. If preferences and price distributions are unknown, risk-taking behavior cannot be always induced by an option contract. Here, we prove a new result showing that, with no information about preferences and some knowledge about prices, one can write a call option that makes all managers prefer riskier projects to safer ones. This points out that in order to design options that induce risk taking it is sufficient to have information about price distributions.Received: 5 November 2003, Revised: 1 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D81, G00, J33, M21.
Correspondence to: Luis H.B. BraidoWe thank Renée Adams, Heitor Almeida, Carlos E. da Costa, Andrew Horowitz, Paulo K. Monteiro, Walter Novaes, Sergio O. Parreiras, Rodrigo R. Soares, and especially Marcos Tsuchida for many helpful comments. 相似文献
9.
Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always
reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented –
and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that
even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”
We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal
contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA). 相似文献
10.
John Geanakoplos 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):585-603
Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's
Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when
there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,”
i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's
theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974,
and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I
had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995.
RID="*"
ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis 相似文献
11.
Kin Chung Lo 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):1-20
Summary. Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability
measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing
this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium
bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model,
it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.
Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: February 19, 1997 相似文献
12.
We study the relationship between commodity taxation and the effect of entry with imperfect competition. We develop a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition in which consumers have variety preferences. As a result, we see that introducing specific taxes increases social welfare. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax rule is contrary to the inverse elasticity rule.Acknowledgement We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 相似文献
13.
Oishi Hidetsugu 《Economic Theory》2007,31(3):587-596
This study provides a new framework and a new equilibrium concept, which are able to describe the situation where people have
various images of the society and have various solution concepts for social outcomes, and where people accept the social outcomes.
In socially subjective equilibrium, people have a coherence of their own norms in two senses. One is the consistency of the norm itself. Imagined outcomes should
satisfy a certain (subjective) solution concept. The other is the consistency between the imagined outcomes and realized one.
These are the main features of our equilibrium concept.
This paper forms a part of my doctoral thesis, which is titled “On socially subjective equilibrium”. The first person I would
like to thank is my direct supervisor Professor Ken Urai (Osaka University). I obtained a basic idea of the main concept of
my doctoral thesis, that is, the solution concept scheme, from Professor Urai. I am grateful to Professor Hiroaki Nagatani
(Osaka University) and Professor Ken-Ichi Shimomura (Kobe University), who monitored my works and took efforts in providing
me with valuable comments on earlier versions of my thesis. I also obtained a fruitful advice from Professor Kenichi Amaya
(Kobe University). Lastly, I specially thank to Kozo Shiraishi (Osaka University). 相似文献
14.
Pierfederico Asdrubali 《Economic Theory》1996,8(3):565-575
Summary Bergstrom [3] has showed that the Lindahlian approach to the analysis of public goods may also be used to analyze a model of wide-spread externalities in which agents have preferences defined on allocations rather than on individual commodity bundles. He has provided versions of the first and second welfare theorem for adistributive Lindahl equilibrium and also presented sufficient conditions for its existence. However, we shall show that, in contrast to Foley's [4] result on the core stability of a Lindahl equilibrium, a distributive Lindahl equilibrium need not satisfy coalitional stability. We will provide a robust example in which the unique, distributive Lindahl equilibrium does not belong to the -core defined either as in Scarf [11] or as in Yannelis [12].I would like to thank F. Canova, R. Serrano, M. Spagat, R. Vohra at Brown University, P. C. Padoan at University of Rome and an anonymous referee for their comments. I am also grateful to the participants at the Third Annual MeetingColloquia on Economic Research at I.G.I.E.R. in Milan, Italy, and to the participants at the Citibank Workshop in Economic Theory at Brown University. 相似文献
15.
Armando Levy 《Empirical Economics》2003,28(1):3-22
This paper proposes a semi-parametric approach to estimation in Tobit models. A generalized additive Tobit model of residential local long distance (intra-LATA) telephone demand is estimated on a cross-section of residential telephone
consumers across twenty-eight states. While past studies of telecommunications demand have used fully parametric models, the
model presented here is non-parametric in two dimensions: first no distributional assumption is made for the error distribution,
and second, the demand equation is non-parametric with respect to price. We find that the elasticity of demand is substantially
lower (in absolute value) that found in previous studies for a 40% cut in tariffs.
First version received: July 2000/Final version received: March 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank the referee and Associate Editor for suggestions which improved the paper.
The views expressed here are of the author and not Analysis Group | Economics. 相似文献
16.
Sophie Bade 《Economic Theory》2005,26(2):309-332
Summary. This paper investigates Nash equilibrium under the possibility that preferences may be incomplete. I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences. These games with complete preferences can be derived from the original game by a simple linear procedure, provided that preferences admit a concave vector-representation. These theorems extend some results on finite games by Shapley and Aumann. The applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with examples from oligopolistic theory, where firms are modelled to aim at maximizing both profits and sales (and thus have multiple objectives). Mixed strategy and trembling hand perfect equilibria are also discussed.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 24 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D11, C72, D43.I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Benôit, Juan Dubra, Alejandrio Jofre, Debraj Ray, Kim-Sau Chung and the seminar participants at NYU and at the Universidad de Chile for their comments. I am most grateful to Efe Ok, for his comments, criticism, suggestions and questions. 相似文献
17.
Random Price Discrimination 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ferdinando Colombo 《Journal of Economics》2003,78(3):205-222
When a monopolist randomly sorts customers, price discrimination “concavifies” the revenue function of the firm, so that it may be optimal for a monopolist
to divide customers into groups that have the same demand function and charge them different prices. It is impossible to rule out this type of result whenever the revenue function is somewhere convex in the “economically
relevant” set of quantities, because there always exists a non-decreasing cost function that leads to that conclusion. It
is also impossible to rule out the case where, with respect to monopoly, the firm raises or lowers price to all classes and,
accordingly, the case where the social welfare decreases or increases.
Received December 13, 2001; revised version received June 3, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003
I am indebted to Carlo Beretta, Giuseppe Colangelo, Umberto Galmarini, Guido Merzoni, Gerd Weinrich and especially to Carla
Peri for helpful discussions and comments. I have also benefited from insightful suggestions of three anonymous referees.
Finally, I wish to thank participants to seminars at the Catholic University of Milan and University of Bologna. The usual
disclaimer applies. Funds from MIUR are gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
18.
Eduardo Zambrano 《Economic Theory》2008,36(1):147-158
Suppose we know the utility function of a risk averse decision maker who values a risky prospect X at a price CE. Based on this information alone I develop upper bounds for the tails of the probabilistic belief about X of the decision maker. In the paper I also illustrate how to use these expected utility bounds in a variety of applications, which include the estimation of risk measures from observed data, option valuation, and the
study of credit risk.
I would like to thank John Cochrane, Tom Cosimano, Amanda Friedenberg, George Korniotis, Markus Brunermeier and Paul Schultz
for helpful discussions and to participants at two Notre Dame seminars, at the 2006 Spring Midwest Economic Theory and International
Economics Conference, and at the 2006 Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society for their very useful comments. I began
working on this project during a year-long visit to the Central Bank of Venezuela. I gratefully acknowledge their hospitality
and financial support. 相似文献
19.
This paper examines situations in which a seller might make a second chance (take-it-or-leave-it) offer to a non-winning bidder at a price equal to their bid at auction. This study is motivated by the take-it-or-leave-it second chance offer rules used by eBay and a number of state procurement agencies. Equilibrium bidder behavior is determined for IPV sealed bid first price, second price, English, and Vickrey auctions when a second chance offer will be made with an exogenous probability $p$ . In all but the Vickrey auction (which elicits the dominant strategy of bidding one’s value) equilibrium bids are lower than if there were no possibility of a second chance offer and higher than if a second chance offer will be made for certain. Further, the possibility of a second chance offer erodes the strategic equivalence between second price bids and English auction drop out levels. If bidders are risk averse (with CRRA preferences), this difference leads to expected revenue dominance of the second price over the English auction, both of which dominate the Vickrey auction. The first price auction is also shown to revenue dominate the Vickrey auction, and moreover, numerical results and intuition from existing literature suggest that the first price auction revenue dominates the second price auction. 相似文献
20.
Jacob S. Sagi 《Economic Theory》2006,27(2):305-320
Summary. In the literature on choice under unforeseen contingencies, the decision maker behaves as if she aggregates possible instances of future rankings indexed by a set S. The set S is interpreted as a subjective state space even though subsequent rankings need not conform to any one of the aggregated utilities. This paper proposes a definition for a subjective state space under unforeseen contingencies that is topologically unique, derives its existence from preference primitives as opposed to the representation of preferences, and does not commit to an interpretation in which states correspond to future realized rankings. The definition topologically concurs with and extends the identification of the essentially unique subjective state space due to Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [4].Received: 28 October 2003, Revised: 13 October 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D11, D81, D91.I thank Eddie Dekel, Alan Kraus, Bart Lipman, Chris Shannon, and the referee for some helpful remarks. 相似文献