Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms Under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation

I examine the relative performance of call and continuous auctions under asymmetric information by manipulating trading rules and information sets in laboratory asset markets. I find significant differences in an environment that extends the Kyle (1985) framework to permit the exogenous liquidity trading motive to have a natural economic interpretation. The adverse selection costs incurred by noise traders are significantly lower under the call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price efficiency. This result suggests that discussions of the costs and benefits of insider trading should take place within the context of a specific trading mechanism.     

Reporting Discretion and Private Information Communication through Earnings

We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms.     

再论出口退税--从理论到实践

国际通行的"出口退税 进口征税"做法是有缺陷的,但它却在国际法领域得到了承认,因此我国的退税政策也将持续下去。但出口退税率需要进一步得到优化,退库机制也应该伴随着分税制的进一步深化改革而重新回到原来由中央财政负担全部退税款的模式。     

Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice

We survey 336 chief financial officers (CFOs) to compare practice to theory in the areas of initial public offering (IPO) motivation, timing, underwriter selection, underpricing, signaling, and the decision to remain private. We find the primary motivation for going public is to facilitate acquisitions. CFOs base IPO timing on overall market conditions, are well informed regarding expected underpricing, and feel underpricing compensates investors for taking risk. The most important positive signal is past historical earnings, followed by underwriter certification. CFOs have divergent opinions about the IPO process depending on firm‐specific characteristics. Finally, we find the main reason for remaining private is to preserve decision‐making control and ownership.     

The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset Prices: An Experimental Study

A complete understanding of security markets requires a simultaneous explanation of price behavior, trading volume, portfolio composition (ie., asset allocation), and bid-ask spreads. In this paper, these variables are observed in a controlled setting—a computerized double auction market, similar to NASDAQ. Our laboratory allows experimental control of information arrival—whether simultaneously or sequentially received, and whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We compare the price, volume, and share allocations of three market equilibrium models: telepathic rational expectations, which assumes that traders can read each others minds (strong-form market efficiency); ordinary rational expectations, which assumes traders can use (some) market price information, (a type of semi-strong form efficiency); and private information, where traders use no market information. We conclude 1) that stronger-form market models predict equilibrium prices better than weaker-form models, 2) that there were fewer misallocation forecasts in simultaneous information arrival (SIM) environments, 3) that trading volume was significantly higher in SIM environments, 4) and that bid-ask spreads widen significantly when traders are exposed to price uncertainty resulting from information heterogeneity.     

农户小额信贷运行机制及其评价与分析——以湖北省ZX市为例

本文通过对湖北省ZX市的农户问卷调查,并运用计量经济模型.测算出了农村信用社农户小额信贷对农户收入增长的影响力,定量分析了两者的互动过程.计量结果显示,农村信用社农户小额信贷能够促进农户收入增长,中央银行可以通过窗口指导意见,加大支农再贷款投入力度,促进农村信用社信贷支农,并以此为基础实现农业与农村金融业的良性互动.     

Risk A version and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets

This study investigates the differences in the behaviors between the speculative investors and the conservative investors in two separate experimental markets. Although the market for speculators shows greater price volatility in both bid/ask spread within a trade as well as with intraperiod variances, it exhibits several desirable properties. Specifically, the price patterns tend to converge closer, and at a greater speed to either the prior information equilibrium price or the rational expectation equilibrium price. It also achieves better allocational efficiency. And, it is also less likely to be misled by potentially “false” price information.     

Mechanisms of Board Turnover: Evidence From Backdating

Regulators and governance scholars often regard the high rates of reelection among those nominated for boards of directors (and the small percentage of nominated directors who lose elections) as persuasive evidence of limited shareholder power. To correct this perceived imbalance against shareholders, some corporate governance advocates have undertaken a number of efforts to reform the director election system, most recently by proposing “proxy access” regulation to facilitate contested board elections. The authors take a close look at the board turnover within companies implicated in stock‐option backdating to assess the effectiveness of board elections. What they find is that, despite high reelection rates among nominated directors, board turnover is in fact substantial—but it takes place almost entirely before the board elections. Because of the apparently high costs associated with losing such an election, board nominees generally are not renominated for election (or reelection) unless success is quite likely. And whereas independent directors generally leave boards by not being renominated, management directors generally resign. For this reason, reelection rates tell us very little about the effectiveness of shareholder voting. But what the authors' findings do show is that directors involved in stock‐option backdating experience reductions in both the number and prestige of their future directorships. Thus, the authors' findings suggest that the board of director election process functions more effectively than shareholder advocates typically claim, that criticism of the responsiveness of the board‐election process to shareholder interests is overstated, and that reform efforts are therefore likely to be misplaced.     

关于县域普惠金融信用信息系统的思考——基于兰考县实践

近年来,随着互联网、大数据、云计算的快速发展,征信机构掌握了社会公众大量的行为数据、社交数据、支付数据等,为金融服务提供了客户画像。然而社会公众并不会同步进入大数据时代,整个世界被割裂成大数据世界、小数据世界和无数据世界,农村地区由于基础设施条件差等因素,农民运用互联网和智能手机的能力较低,"数字鸿沟"[1]现象较严重。基于兰考信用信息中心的实践,提出要把农户征信体系建设作为一项公共政策,从而有效推动普惠金融发展。     

我国银行业私人银行业务的实践与发展

私人银行业务是以财富管理为核心,面向高净值客户提供的顶级专业化的、以财富管理和财富保障为中心的一揽子金融服务,具有高利润率和较少的资本金要求等特点.     

Public—Private Partnerships in Ireland: Policy and Practice

Ireland's National Development Plan 2000–2006 includes a significant programme of public—private partnerships (PPPs). The Irish Government's policy on PPPs has been shaped to ensure that capital investments under PPP are not included when calculating key fiscal aggregates. This article traces the origins of Ireland's PPP programme and outlines the extent of PPP activity to date. It details how the PPP programme has failed to make an impact in terms of addressing Ireland's infrastructure deficit and examines three particular cases where the PPP model has been applied.     

Communication in Private-Information Models: Theory and Computation

Communication and no-communication versions of a two-stage principal-agent model are compared. The models contain a risk-averse agent and two sources of private information, a shock to preferences followed by a productive action. Both models are formulated as linear programs, which are then used to compute solutions to examples. For the communication model, an alternative method of accounting for the utility from off-equilibrium strategies is derived. This method greatly reduces the size of the linear program. For the no-communication model a Revelation-Principle like proof is provided. In simple cases, a sufficient condition for communication to be valuable is derived. In these cases, communication improves risk-sharing in bad states of the world. In more complicated cases, computed examples demonstrate how communication may also alter labor supply. Further examples demonstrate how action and consumption lotteries may separate agents by their shock.     

Enabling Continuous and Discontinuous Innovation: Learning From the Private Sector

Much of the research on innovation to date has been on the private sector (and, within that, biased towards manufacturing) but the processes involved are equally relevant to the public as well as the private sector. This article looks at how innovation is organized and managed, at the routines needed to accomplish the task and at challenges posed by different types of innovation under 'steady-state' and 'discontinuous' conditions. It argues that there is a strong case for learning across public and private sectors, not just in terms of transferring well-proven lessons (adaptive learning), but also for 'generative learning'—building on shared experimentation and comparison of experiences around discontinuous innovation.     

消费者信用信息权理论探析

消费者信用信息权的基础是控制私人信息的权利，即拥有知情权、防范权和修改权；正是这些权利受到了由于联合征信而使个人信息成为商品的威胁；国家应高度重视信用征信的相关法律法规的建设，对征信机构来说，如果没有法呆障就很通信班有效实现其服务目标。