Central Bank Digital Currency: optimization of the currency system and its issuance design

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) contributes to optimizing payment functions of fiat money, reducing reliance on payment services provided by the private sector, alleviating regulatory burdens and pressure on the central bank, and strengthening the authority of fiat money. Moreover, issuance of CBDC helps to address dilemmas of modern monetary policies, including inefficiencies in policy transmission, difficulties in countercyclical control, flow of currency away from the real economy to the virtual economy and inadequate management of policy expectations. This paper proposes a CBDC issuance framework based on forward contingencies. The incorporation of time, sector, and loan rate contingencies in the activation of CBDC will realize real-time transmission of monetary policy, enable targeted supply of money and prevent the currency from circulating beyond the real economy. The economic state contingency makes it possible to exercise countercyclical control of currency. The embedment of these contingencies also enables currency to perform the function of forward guidance.     

Deflationary policy under digital and fiat currency competition

I examine the implications of digital and fiat currency competition on optimal monetary policy according to the Friedman rule (a standard deflationary policy) in a Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches (2016) framework, with no search friction. Consistent with the existing literature, first, I find that monetary equilibrium under a purely private arrangement of digital currencies will not deliver a socially efficient allocation. Second, I place restrictions on the available supply of digital currencies and find that a socially efficient allocation is possible only if the upper bound on digital currency circulation is equal to the rate of time-preference, albeit some degree of government intervention is required to curb the profit-maximizing incentive of the miners. Third, I find that optimal monetary policy at the Friedman rule will be socially inefficient when digital currencies compete with government-issued fiat money. Finally, I show that the Friedman rule is a socially desirable policy only in a purely fiat monetary regime.     

The theory of fiat money and private money as alternative media of exchange

A random-matching model with a clearinghouse is constructed to investigate the impact of private money on economic efficiency and social welfare in three monetary regimes. A subset of agents, called bankers, whose credit histories are recorded by the clearinghouse, are allowed to issue private banknotes in order to consume. Those private liabilities may serve as media of exchange, either by themselves, or alongside a stock of fiat money. Under certain conditions, welfare in a monetary steady state with private money is strictly higher than that attained in a steady state where private money is prohibited.     

On the private provision of fiat currency

This paper considers whether fiat money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing monopolist in an environment where money is essential. Two questions arise concerning the private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning the feasibility question, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality question, the model suggests that any private organization of the market for fiat currency is suboptimal.     

The nature and role of monetary policy when money is endogenous

This paper considers the nature and role of monetary policywhen money is modelled as credit money endogenously createdwithin the private sector. There are currently two schools ofthought that view money as endogenous: one has been labelledthe ‘new consensus’ in macroeconomics, and the otheris the Keynesian endogenous (bank) money approach. The paperfirst explores the analysis of monetary policy in the ‘newconsensus’ macroeconomic model, followed by an examinationof the effectiveness of monetary policy in that analysis. TheKeynesian view of endogenous money is discussed, and the rolefor monetary policy in a Keynesian endogenous monetary policyanalysis is considered, including discussion of the objectivesand instruments of monetary policy.     

The distribution of money and prices in an equilibrium with lotteries

Summary. We construct a tractable fundamental model of money with equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible tokens and can offer lotteries on monetary transfers. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can analytically characterize the monetary distribution. Interestingly, such distributions match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity.Received: 16 April 2003, Revised: 11 February 2004JEL Classification Numbers: D30, D83, E40.A. Berentsen, G. Camera, C. Waller: The paper has benefitted from insightful comments of two anonymous referees, whom we thank. We also thank participants at the conference Recent Developments in Money and Finance, held at Purdue University in May 2003, and the EPRI/University of Western Ontario Money Conference held in October 2003. Correrspondence to: G. Camera     

Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.     

Inside and outside fiat money, gains to trade, and IS-LM

Summary. We build a one-period general equilibrium model with money. Equilibrium exists, and fiat money has positive value, as long as the ratio of outside money to inside money is less than the gains to trade available at autarky. We show that the nominal effects of government fiscal and monetary policy can be completely described by a diagram identical in form to the IS-LM curves introduced by Hicks to describe Keynes' general theory. IS-LM analysis is thus not incompatible with full market clearing, multiple commodities, and heterogeneous households. We show that as the government deficit approaches a finite threshold, hyperinflation sets in (prices converge to infinity and real trade collapses). At the other extreme, if the government surplus is too large, the economy enters a liquidity trap in which nominal GNP sinks and monetary policy is ineffectual. Received: January 2, 2002; revised version: April 8, 2002 Correspondence to: P. Dubey     

Endogenous supply of fiat money

We consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long-lived self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that monetary equilibria with no overissue do not exist when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that in the absence of commitment overissue happens infinitely often in any monetary equilibrium. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained with commitment.     

A model to analyse financial fragility

Summary. This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse financial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 6 October 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D52, E4, E5, G11, G21.C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos: We are grateful to T.F. Bewley, S. Bhattacharya, F. Hahn, C. Mayer, H.S. Shin and seminar participants at the Bank of Austria, Bank of England, Bank of Norway, Bank for International Settlements, Brown University, the 7th Annual Macroeconomic Conference, Crete, EcoMod-IIOA International Conference, Brussels, the 2nd Oxford Finance Summer Symposium and Nuffield, Oxford, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, Purdue University, the University of Birmingham, the VI SAET Conference, Rhodes, Yale University, and especially an anonymous referee and H.M. Polemarchakis for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England. Correspondence to: D.P. Tsomocos     

The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering money market rates during the financial crisis

The financial crisis has deeply affected money markets and thus, potentially, the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering euro area money market rates by looking at (i) the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations and (ii) the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. We find that during the crisis money market rates up to 12 months still respond to revisions in the expected path of future rates, even though to a lesser extent than before August 2007. We attribute part of the loss in monetary policy effectiveness to money market rates being driven by higher liquidity premia and increased uncertainty about future interest rates. Our results also indicate that the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures as of October 2008 were effective in addressing the disruptions in the euro area money market. In fact, our estimates suggest that non-standard monetary policy measures helped to lower Euribor rates by more than 80 basis points. These findings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary policy in times of crises.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

The payment mechanisms and liquidity effects

A general equilibrium model with multiple means of payment in segmented markets is constructed to study the liquidity effects. It is shown that, under certain conditions, stored value – money issued by private entrepreneurs weakens, but does not completely eliminate the liquidity effects that exist when stored value is prohibited. The Friedman rule can be optimal in the regime with floating stored value. The impact of monetary policy now depends not only on the monetary intervention of the central bank, but also on the quantity of the outstanding private money and its velocity.     

Monetary policy: Why money matters (and interest rates don’t)

Since the late 1980s the Fed has implemented monetary policy by adjusting its target for the overnight federal funds rate. Money’s role in monetary policy has been tertiary, at best. Indeed, several influential economists suggest that money is irrelevant for monetary policy because central banks affect economic activity and inflation by (i) controlling a very short-term nominal interest rate and (ii) influencing financial market participants’ expectation of the future policy rate. I offer an alternative perspective: Money is essential for monetary policy because it is essential for controlling the price level, and the monetary authority’s ability to control interest rates is greatly exaggerated.     

An empirical procedure to evaluate monetary management under exogenous changes in the money supply

This article proposes an empirical procedure to evaluate central banks’ monetary management in a presence of exogenous changes in the money supply. Monetary shocks deviate the market interest rate from the target, and the monetary authority decides its optimal intervention in the money market, bearing in mind the benefits and costs of re-establishing its target interest rate. According to monetary management theory, typically a central bank will allow for variation in the interest rate within a range around the target interest rate, thereby intervening in the money market when the interest rate trends toward a point outside that range. In this context, we develop an empirical strategy to analyse central bank’s reactions to exogenous money changes by making a statistical comparison of the actual and the estimated intraday shift in the money supply. We also employ our method to test the reactions of the Brazilian Central Bank to liquidity shifts caused by changes in the Treasury Single Account (TSA) balance. Using different metrics of analysis, the applications of our procedure confirms the predictions of the optimal monetary management theory.     

Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain,who might lose,and why?

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33     

Carl Menger's theory of the evolution of money: some problems

The Austrian economist Carl Menger suggested that money, law and language may all evolve without state intervention. A preliminary task of this article is to clarify what is meant by ‘evolve’ in this context. It is further argued that there is a gap in the Mengerian argument: a neglect of potential quality variation in the emerging monetary unit. Attention to this factor suggests a role for intervention in the monetary system, by the state or another overarching authority such as a central bank, to police the currency against debasement, and to legitimate its value. Furthermore, the argument suggests why law is not an entirely spontaneous institution and may require state sanction that is not generally necessary in the case of language.     

The causal nexus of money,output and prices in Malaysia

Using Geweke's approach to Wiener–Granger causality,bidirectional causation between money supply and nominal output were detected. Inflation in Malaysia is essentially a monetary phenomenon. The empirical findings suggest that by controlling money supply, the central bank might be able to successfully maintain price stability at producer's level but not at consumer's level unless narrow money stock is bring targeted. Serious attempts by the central bank to tighten money supply could have a strong feedback on real output and even instaneous impact on nominal output     

Why is there money? Endogenous derivation of `money' as the most liquid asset: a class of examples

Summary. The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium. Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction costs and market segmentation in trading posts (with a separate budget constraint at each transaction). Commodity money arises endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value from its acceptability for tax payments. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity) money in equilibrium. Received: February 15, 2002; revised version: August 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful remarks at the University of California - Santa Barbara, University of California - San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin - Madison, SITE at Stanford University-2001, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic Theory Conference at UC - Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California - Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University. It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of Henning Bohn, Harold Cole, James Hamilton, Mukul Majumdar, Harry Markowitz, Chris Phelan, Meenakshi Rajeev, Wendy Shaffer, Bruce Smith, and Max Stinchcombe.