The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady‐state debt to follow a random walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady‐state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi‐commitment policy, which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises.     

Fiscal Positions and Government Bond Yields in OECD Countries

We examine the effect of fiscal positions, both the level of debt and the fiscal balance, on long‐term government bond yields in the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD). To control for the endogenity of fiscal positions to the business cycle we utilize forward projections of fiscal positions from the OECD's Economic Outlook. In a panel regression over the period from 1988 to 2007, we find a robust and significant effect of fiscal positions on long‐term bond yields. Our estimates imply that the marginal effect of the projected deterioration of fiscal positions adds about 60 basis points to U.S. bond yields by 2015, with effects on other G‐7 bond yields generally being smaller.     

The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages*

We survey the recent empirical literature concerning the cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area, finding large differences in results. We show that these differences are heavily influenced by the choices made in modelling fiscal behaviour. We make a case for the use, in assessing policies and in the EMU context, of the standard modelling choice where the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy is directly estimated. Models where the overall reaction to the cycle – which includes the effects of both discretionary actions and automatic stabilisers – is directly estimated tend to suggest either strong pro‐cyclical or strong counter‐cyclical discretionary reactions, depending on how this component is identified. Within the standard model and for the years 1994 to 2008, we show that results are significantly affected by the data vintage (ex post or real‐time). With ex post data, we find an unambiguous indication of a‐cyclicality. Using real‐time data, we find that the output gap matters. However, depending on whether we assess policy intentions or actual policies, euro‐area governments' behaviour radically changes. A plausible interpretation is that in the implementation phase, governments loosen their fiscal stance, giving in to political pressures that are proportional to the scale of the economic difficulties in bad times and the size of the ‘growth dividend’ in good times.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination,Macroeconomic Stability,and Sovereign Risk Premia

In standard macroeconomic models, equilibrium stability and uniqueness require monetary policy to actively target inflation and fiscal policy to ensure long‐run debt sustainability. We show analytically that these requirements change, and depend on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, when government debt is risky. In that case, budget deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Consequently, countercyclical fiscal policies reduce the parameter space supporting stable and unique equilibria and are feasible only if complemented with more aggressive debt consolidation and/or active monetary policy. Stability is more easily achieved, however, under procyclical fiscal policies.     

Sub-nationals' risk premia in fiscal federations: Fiscal performance and institutional design

The recent debt crisis in Europe highlighted the importance of institutional design and, in particular, bail-out clauses in determining States' risk premia in fiscal or quasi-fiscal federations. This paper examines the determinants of sub-national governments' risk premia in fiscal federations using secondary market data for the USA, Canada, Australia and Germany. It finds that, as for central governments, fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of risk, and sub-national governments with higher public debt and larger deficits pay higher premia. However, this relationship is not uniform across federations and it differs with institutional arrangements. In particular, market pricing mechanisms are less effective in presence of explicit or implicit guarantees from the central government. We show that when sub-national governments depend on high transfers from the central government (i.e., when there is some form of implicit guarantee from the center), markets are less responsive to sub-national governments' fiscal fundamentals. Using primary market data, the paper also shows that high transfer dependency lowers the probability of sub-national governments to borrow on capital markets.     

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency

This paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed‐exchange‐rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).     

On the Consequences of Pro‐Cyclical Fiscal Policy

There is widespread evidence that pro‐cyclical fiscal policies have been prevalent in developing countries and often in some industrial nations. It is therefore surprising that, in contrast to the wealth of studies on the sources of pro‐cyclical policy, potential consequences of such seemingly suboptimal policies have been largely ignored in the existing literature. By utilising a comprehensive set of indicators from 114 countries for 1950–2010, we aim to address the following important question: does it matter whether a country adopts a pro‐cyclical fiscal policy stance rather than a counter‐cyclical one? Our results produce a resounding ‘yes’ to this question. We find that fiscally pro‐cyclical countries have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility and higher rates of inflation.     

Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset

Institutions that aim to constrain policy discretion in order to promote sound fiscal policies are once again at the forefront of the policy debate. Interest in fiscal councils – independent watchdogs active in the public debate – has grown rapidly in recent years. In this paper, we present the first cross‐country dataset summarising key characteristics of fiscal councils among International Monetary Fund members. The data document a surge in the number of fiscal councils since the 2008–09 economic and financial crisis, and also illustrate that well‐designed fiscal councils are associated with stronger fiscal performance and better macro‐economic and budgetary forecasts. Key features of effective fiscal councils include operational independence from politics, the provision or public assessment of budgetary forecasts, a strong presence in the public debate and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal policy rules.     

Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Government Financing

This paper investigates the dynamic properties of intergovernmental financing during a fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among local governments, which operates with soft budget constraints because of concessionary region-specific transfers from a central government. The existence of intergovernmental transfers induces the free-riding behavior of local governments, thereby bringing considerable deficits to the central government. Raising local and/or national taxes is desirable for fiscal reconstruction, but is unable to attain the Pareto-efficient fiscal reconstruction. Taxes on lobbying activities, combined with uniform transfers, induce earlier concession and can attain the Pareto-efficient outcome in the long run.     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers and Local Incentives and Responses: The Case of Indonesia

Indonesian policymakers are convinced that a number of perverse incentives are embedded in their system of intergovernmental transfers. Officials in countries throughout the developing world have similar views about their own intergovernmental frameworks. In Indonesia, perverse incentives are thought to negatively influence a wide range of local government fiscal behaviours, including as regards own‐source revenues, spending and savings. An empirical analysis of the local government response to transfers, however, offers only mixed support for the existence and strength of the presumed incentives. Overall, the findings in this paper highlight the benefits to central governments of rigorously examining assumed perverse incentives in their intergovernmental frameworks before embarking on attempts to expunge them.     

我国化解流动性过剩的财税政策研究

流动性过剩已经成为当前宏观经济运行中亟待解决的问题。2007年6月13日召开的国务院常务会议首次明确提出,要综合运用金融、财税政策等手段引导资金流动,缓解流动性过剩,可见财税政策在抑制流动性过剩中的重要作用。本文以财税政策作为基点,从贸易顺差、资本流入、外汇占款、进入房市和股市的沉淀资金等方面,分析当前流动性过剩的成因并探讨缓解流动性过剩的财税政策。     

Spending Reversals and Fiscal Multipliers under an Interest Rate Peg

This paper examines whether fiscal stimuli are more effective when the monetary policy is less responsive to inflation. First, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that, in the period of U.S. passive monetary policy, a positive government spending shock was followed over time by a spending cut. Second, our theoretical analysis reveals that the pegged nominal interest rate is not a sufficient condition to generate a large fiscal multiplier. An increase in government spending could increase the long‐run real interest rate, if it is associated with a government spending reversal and a less responsive monetary policy. Consequently, the response of private consumption can be negative and the government spending multiplier is not necessarily greater than 1.     

Debt, Death and Taxes

Does the level of government debt affect living standards and if so, to what extent? We quantify the impact of the U.S. federal debt using an open economy overlapping generations model in which consumers have long but finite lifetimes. A demographic structure allows fiscal policy changes to have different effects on different agents, and reveals the linkages between public debt, output and international trade. We find that reducing the debt has relatively modest impacts on aggregates, while reducing government spending substantially raises U.S. incomes and welfare. Therefore, this paper contributes to the current debate regarding whether U.S. federal government budget surpluses should be used to retire government debt.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Empowerment: Evolving Concepts and Alternative Measures*

Decentralisation reforms are among the most common and significant public sector reforms, particularly in developing and transitional countries around the world. Despite the importance of the topic to policy practitioners and academic researchers alike and the extensive empirical research on the topic, there is consensus in the literature that the measures of decentralisation that are currently used are unsatisfactory. In response, we propose an alternative measure of fiscal decentralisation based on the notion that decentralisation is more than simply the inverse of centralisation. Following Bahl (2005), we consider fiscal decentralisation as ‘the empowerment of people by the [fiscal] empowerment of their local governments’. Accordingly, we develop a measure of fiscal empowerment that allows us to quantify fiscal decentralisation as the gain in empowerment due to devolution and we analyse the proposed measures of empowerment and decentralisation for a cross‐section of developing, transitional and industrialised countries.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from a Fiscal Reform in China

This paper uses a fiscal decentralisation reform in China – namely, the province‐managing‐county (PMC) reform – to examine the effects of fiscal decentralisation on local economic growth. The PMC reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to the county level. Exploiting a county‐level panel data set over 2001–11, we find that the reform has led to a significant increase in the GDP growth rate. The effect is considerably more pronounced in regions with superior initial institutional quality. We also identify channels: the PMC reform induced county governments to exert lower tax burdens on firms and increase spending on infrastructure construction.