CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.     

Board composition,family ownership,institutional distance and the foreign equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs

In much of the developing world, families represent the dominant form of firm ownership. This study investigates how this influences equity ownership strategies when firms venture abroad. Drawing on agency theory and institutional theory, we investigate the direct effect of board composition and family ownership on the equity-based ownership strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in their affiliates, and how institutional distance may moderate this. Examining foreign affiliates of listed Turkish MNEs, we find that a high ratio of independent directors is negatively linked to levels of equity ownership of MNE affiliates. We also find that a high ratio of inside directors on the board is positively associated with the equity stake of MNEs in their affiliates. The significant interaction effect between board composition, family ownership and institutional distance helps explain the unexpectedly weak effects of institutional distance.     

The relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover

We study the relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that the slope of the compensation contract and forced turnover may be complements. Our results support this prediction. We find that incentives and turnover are positively related. This relationship however, varies with the equity ownership of CEOs and does not hold for CEOs who own more than 5% equity. Moreover, this relationship is stronger if the firm under performs its industry. Our results suggest that high-powered incentives may increase the signaling power of performance measures and lead to higher likelihood of turnover.     

CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior

This study examines an important, yet understudied relationship between CEO duality and corporate diversification. Results based on the data collected from Fortune 1000 U.S companies indicate that CEO duality is positively associated with corporate diversification into unrelated industries. Further analyses reveal that this relationship is moderated by a number of corporate governance mechanisms. We find that board equity ownership and institutional ownership concentration weaken the initially positive relationship between CEO duality and unrelated diversification while CEO tenure and board independence strengthen this relationship.     

Corporate Social Performance and Economic Cycles

This paper examines the influence of CEO career horizon problems on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We assume that as CEOs are getting older, they tend to disengage in CSR due to their shorter career horizons. We further argue that high levels of industry-level discretion (ILD) and blockholder ownership amplify the negative effects of CEO age on CSR. Using a panel sample of US-based firms over 2004–2009, we do not find the main effect of CEO age on CSR, but find support for the moderating effects, such that CEO age is negatively associated with CSR when there are high levels of ILD and blockholder ownership. Therefore, results suggest that CEO career horizon problems matter for CSR when (1) CEOs have sufficient discretion over the firm’s strategic decisions and (2) outside blockholders put more pressure on CEOs to engage in financial earning management.     

Towards a behavioral theory of MNC response to political risk and uncertainty: The role of CEO wealth at risk

Drawing on behavioral agency research, we examine how CEO equity wealth at risk of loss in the form of restricted stock influences the response of multinational corporations (MNCs) to political risk and political uncertainty. In a sample of 14,765 cross-border greenfield investments and full acquisitions announced by U.S. firms from 2004 to 2016, we find that while greater CEO equity wealth at risk of loss in the form of restricted stock strengthens the (positive) relationship between political risk and MNCs’ choice of greenfield investments over full acquisition, CEO equity wealth at risk of loss does not influence the relationship between political uncertainty and MNCs’ choice of greenfield investments. We contribute to international business theory by introducing a behavioral theory of MNC responses to adverse host country political environments. As such, unlike previous studies that have treated political risk and political uncertainty interchangeably, our study highlights the need to differentiate between political risk and political uncertainty as related yet distinct concepts.     

Factors influencing the choice between founder versus non-founder CEOs for IPO firms

Despite the innate advantage founder CEOs have by virtue of their founding vision, organizational influence, positive image, and ownership stakes to lead their firms at their initial public offering (IPO), extant empirical evidence indicates that between a third to half of IPO firms go public with non-founder CEOs at the helm. Relatively little however, is known regarding factors that influence the choice of founder versus non-founder CEO for firms issuing IPOs. This study examines the impact of factors such as founder characteristics, size of founding team, governance structure, ownership structure, top management team independence, venture capitalist influence, and the demand for equity financing on the probability of founder CEO at IPO.     

Founder CEOs,personal incentives,and corporate social irresponsibility

This study integrates organizational identity (OI) theory and upper echelons theory to explore the impact of CEOs’ founder status on corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We theorize that compared with other CEOs, a founder CEO is more likely to generate a high degree of OI with the firm, which will drive the founder CEO to actively avoid CSI that may damage the positive image and long-term development of the firm. Furthermore, we argue that CEO duality and CEO ownership will strengthen the aforementioned relationship by increasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. Conversely, CEO underpayment will weaken the relationship between founder status and CSI by decreasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. We obtained empirical evidence in support of our arguments from a large Chinese private listed company dataset. Overall, this study’s theory and evidence clearly show that founder status and personal incentives can jointly shape CEOs’ CSI decisions, thereby providing useful insights for corporate shareholders and government agencies to better prevent and govern firms’ CSI.     

Insurance of Techno-Organizational Ventures and Procedural Ethics: Lessons from the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Deepwater Horizon</Emphasis> Explosion

Some argue that managers over-invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to build their personal reputations as good global citizens. Others claim that CEOs strategically choose CSR activities to reduce the probability of CEO turnover in a future period through indirect support from activists. Still others assert that firms use CSR activities to signal their product quality. We find that firms use governance mechanisms, along with CSR engagement, to reduce conflicts of interest between managers and non-investing stakeholders. Employing a large and extensive sample of firms within Russell 2000, S&500 and Domini 400 indices during the 1993–2004 period, we find that consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis, the CSR choice is positively associated with governance characteristics, including board independence, institutional ownership, and analyst following. In addition, after correcting for endogeneity of CSR engagement, our results show that CSR engagement positively influences operating performance and firm value, supporting the conflict-resolution hypothesis as opposed to the over-investment and strategic-choice arguments. We find only a weak support of the product-signaling hypothesis as a major motive of CSR engagement.     

The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

Founder management and the market for corporate control for IPO firms: The moderating effect of the power structure of the firm

This study draws on agency and stewardship theory to evaluate the relationship between alternative governance regimes (founder versus non-founder CEO) adopted at the time of going public on post-IPO economic outcomes in the market for corporate control. We find that the presence of founder CEOs reduces the likelihood of post-IPO change of control but enhances target IPO firm wealth by increasing acquisition premiums. Additionally, we examine whether measures of CEO power over the board moderate the relationship between founder management and target IPO firm wealth. Our results suggest that CEO duality is the most effective instrument of CEO power available to founder CEOs to positively influence target firm wealth. Further, we find that while founder CEOs utilize power derived from CEO duality to increase acquisition premiums, non-founder CEOs use board leadership power to expropriate shareholder wealth.     

Founder retention as CEO at IPO in emerging economies: The role of private equity owners and national institutions

We integrate the institutional perspective with research on the governance role of private equity firms in an investigation of Founder-CEO successions in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in emerging markets. Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African continent between January 2000 and August 2016, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology and find that higher levels of private equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention as CEO, especially in the context of low-quality formal institutions. Further, in societies with high tribalism, higher private equity ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention. Voids in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as a key organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which in turn confers on the firm an ability to access required resources.     

CEO power and its effect on performance and governance: Evidence from Chinese banks

This study investigates whether CEO power matters in Chinese banks. We find that the effects of four power dimensions on banks' performance and board structure vary in their own unique ways. The CEOs with structural power are negatively related to performance but positively related to gender-diversified boards. Moreover, CEOs with ownership power enhance performance but are negatively associated with professionalism and diversification in the boards. Banks that have CEOs with expert power perform well and have gender-diversified boards. Meanwhile, CEOs with prestige power are likely to appoint politically connected directors to the board.     

Political Affiliation and Pay Slice: Do Blue CEOs Accept Less Green?

We examine the relationship among CEO political alignment, compensation, and pay disparity (relative to other high‐earning executives) and find that Democratic CEOs accept less pay and a significantly lower pay slice. That is, left‐leaning CEOs put their money where their mouth is regarding the Democratic ideology of economic and social equity. This smaller pay gap is not a function of variations in managerial ability; if anything, Democratic CEOs are more talented than Republican CEOs. Results suggest that Democratic CEOs may be more effective at running firms in which collaboration among top executives is more valuable than are the potential gains from tournament incentives.     

CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.     

Outward foreign direct investment of publicly listed firms from China: A corporate governance perspective

This study examines the influence of key corporate governance factors on the internationalization decisions of emerging economy (EE) firms. By integrating the resource-based view and agency theory, it investigates the effects of controlling owner identity, non-controlling shareholder ownership, and the interactions of these with CEO power, in order to reveal their individual and joint effects on the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) propensity of EE firms. This empirical study of 224 Chinese publicly listed firms found positive effects of ownership of domestic institutional investors and foreign corporations on the OFDI propensity of the firms, which were moderated by the power of the CEOs in these firms.     

Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

CEO personality and language use in CSR reporting

We explore the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) personality traits and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. Upper echelons theory indicates that the values, experiences, and personalities of top organizational managers influence their organization's strategic decisions and effectiveness. We utilize IBM Watson Personality Insights software to infer CEOs’ personality traits based on their responses to questions raised by analysts during year-end conference calls; we obtain CEOs’ Big Five personality traits—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism—from which we compute a measure of their risk tolerance. Using a longitudinal dataset of Standard and Poor's 500 firms for 2008–2015, we document that high CEO risk tolerance is related to lower CSR report readability and smaller CSR disclosure volume. This finding indicates that executives who are comfortable with greater risk are more willing to supply stakeholders with reports that are shorter and require greater effort to understand. Exploration of the association between CEO Big Five personality traits and CSR report readability and disclosure volume allows key stakeholders to better comprehend CSR disclosures and connotations thereof. Overall, our results contribute to the debate on how CEO personality traits affect organizations’ CSR disclosure reporting strategies, and support upper echelons theory in the CSR setting.     

Media Depictions of CEO Ethics and Stakeholder Support of CSR Initiatives: The Mediating Roles of CSR Motive Attributions and Cynicism

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) functions as a positive signal to stakeholders that a firm is a responsible corporate citizen. However, CSR is increasingly becoming an ambiguous signal of organizational goodwill because many companies engage in CSR purely out of self-interest, rather than genuine altruism. In this paper, we integrate attribution theory with signaling theory to explore how stakeholders react when they receive additional signals that contradict the company’s intended positive CSR signal. Specifically, we argue that morally questionable CEO ethics in the media negatively influences stakeholders’ CSR motive attributions, which in turn results in increased cynicism that ultimately impacts CSR support intentions and behaviors. We find support for our hypotheses in a quasi-experimental study of stakeholder media exposure to different types of CEOs (morally questionable, ethical, and ethics-unknown). Our findings demonstrate that stakeholders consider CEO ethics an important signal of CSR motives, and will shun the CSR initiatives of morally questionable CEOs.     

Dollars and sense: The implications of CEO compensation for organizational performance

Crafting a compensation package for an organization's chief executive officer (CEO) that will help the firm maximize its performance is a vexing challenge for a board of directors. Management theory offers boards several practical hints. A board can put its CEO and the firm in the best position to be successful by (1) creating strong incentives for the CEO to act in the firm's best interest at all times; (2) benchmarking a CEO's performance and compensation relative to that of very high performing CEOs in the industry; (3) diagnosing and responding to CEOs’ feelings about equity relative to their peers; (4) paying a CEO with uniquely valuable knowledge, skills, and ability at the top of the market; (5) offering retention incentives if a proven performer with unique skills is leading a company; (6) resisting the temptation to simply mimic the compensation packages that work for leading firms; and (7) considering candidates’ social ties when recruiting a new CEO.