Capital Gains Taxes and Equity Trading: Empirical Evidence

Individual investors have an incentive to defer selling appreciated stock until it qualifies for tax‐favored, long‐term capital gains treatment. Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002] show that these incentives can affect equity trading around public disclosures. This article provides some empirical support for their theory with evidence of price increases and equity constrictions around announcements of quarterly earnings and additions to the S&P 500 index. We find share returns rise and trading volume falls with the incremental taxes saved by deferring the sale of appreciated property. The price increases, however, are temporary, reversing in subsequent trading days. The results are consistent with buyers believing the compensation to sell before long‐term qualification (through higher prices) is less costly than holding an inappropriately weighted portfolio. This finding—that personal capital gains taxes affect equity trading—adds to a growing literature that challenges longstanding assumptions that firm value is independent of shareholders and their taxes.     

Optimal stock trading with personal taxes: Implications for prices and the abnormal January returns

The tax law confers upon the investor a timing option - to realize capital losses and defer capital gains. With the tax rate on long term gains and losses being about half the short term rate, the law provides a second timing option - to realize losses short term and gains long term, if at all. Our theory and simulation over the 1962–1977 period establish that taxable investors should realize long term gains in high variance stocks and repurchase stock in order to realize potential future losses short term. Tax trading does not explain the small-firm anomaly but predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume which maps into a seasonal pattern in stock prices, the January anomaly, only if investors are irrational or ignorant of the price seasonality.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

The capital gain lock-in effect with short sales constraints

This paper develops a post-tax asset pricing model under the assumption that investors cannot defer the taxation of capital gains by costlessly short selling tax exempt perfect substitute securities. Contrary to existing literature, it is demonstrated that trading rules of immediate realization of losses and voluntary deferral of gains may not be optimal. Further, equilibrium prices are shown to be higher for stocks held by investors with large accrued capital gains and lower for stocks held by investors with small accrued capital gains or losses.     

Does Anticipated Information Impose a Cost on Risk‐Averse Investors? A Test of the Hirshleifer Effect

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk‐averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk‐sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short‐term capital gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect.     

Dividends,taxes, and common stock prices: The ex-dividend day behavior of common stock prices before the income tax

This study examines the ex-dividend day behavior of common stock prices before the enactment of the federal income tax. On ex-dividend days during the pre-tax period, stock prices fell, on average, by the full amount of the dividend. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that (i) investors in the pre-tax period value dividends and capital gains as perfect substitutes and (ii) the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains has since caused investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends in relation to capital gains.     

Ex-Dividend Day Stock Price Behavior: The Case of the 1986 Tax Reform Act*

This paper analyzes the behavior of stock prices around ex-dividend days after the implementation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act that dramatically reduced the difference between the tax treatment of realized long-term capital gains and dividend income in 1987 and completely eliminated the differential in 1988. We show that this tax change had no effect on the ex-dividend stock price behavior, which is consistent with the hypothesis that long-term individual investors have no significant effect on ex-day stock prices during this time period. The results indicate that the activity of short-term traders and corporate traders dominates the price determination on the ex-day.     

Who Drove and Burst the Tech Bubble?

From 1997 to March 2000, as technology stocks rose more than five‐fold, institutions bought more new technology supply than individuals. Among institutions, hedge funds were the most aggressive investors, but independent investment advisors and mutual funds (net of flows) actively invested the most capital in the technology sector. The technology stock reversal in March 2000 was accompanied by a broad sell‐off from institutional investors but accelerated buying by individuals, particularly discount brokerage clients. Overall, our evidence supports the bubble model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), in which rational arbitrageurs fail to trade against bubbles until a coordinated selling effort occurs.     

Lost in translation: Delayed ex-dividend price adjustments of Hong Kong ADRs

Previous research documents that Hong Kong stocks have a full ex-dividend price adjustment consistent with dividends and capital gains being tax free. We examine ex-dividend price behavior of Hong Kong ADRs to assess the impact of differing tax environments in US and Hong Kong. These ADRs typically go ex-dividend before their underlying stock. They experience significant abnormal returns of 1.16% on their ex-day; the average ex-day price drop is only 30% of the dividend. However, ADR prices drop when the underlying stock goes ex-dividend subsequently. The cumulative ADR price drop is equal to the dividend. Thus, the ADR ex-dividend adjustment resembles that of the underlying stock, consistent with home country tax laws governing ADR price behavior. Neither liquidity nor transaction costs can explain the anomalous delayed ex-dividend adjustment of ADRs.     

Market Valuation of Tax-Timing Options: Evidence from Capital Gains Distributions

We examine a distribution that is taxed as a capital gain rather than as a dividend. Since the distribution induces a realized capital gain while the price change is an unrealized gain, ex‐day return behavior provides evidence of the value of tax‐timing capital gains. We show that investors are compensated 7¢ in unrealized gains for each dollar of realized capital gains, that is, $1 of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93¢ of unrealized gains. An investor with a tax rate on realized gains of 15% has an effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains of 8.6%.     

Taxes and the Pricing of Stock Index Futures

Stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models. This paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes. Capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized. As Constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper, this gives stockholders a valuable timing option. If the stock price drops, the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock. On the other hand, if the stock price rises, the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain. Since this option is not available to stock index futures traders, the futures prices will be lower than standard no-tax models predict.     

Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition Premiums: The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation

We exploit cross‐temporal differences in capital gains tax rates to test whether shareholder‐level capital gains taxes are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. We model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of target shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price‐setting shareholder as represented by the level of target institutional ownership. Consistent with a lock‐in effect for acquisition premiums, results suggest a unique positive association between shareholder capital gains taxes for individual investors and acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions, which is mitigated by target institutional ownership.     

Messages from market to management: the case of IPOs

An IPO's initial return contains new information about the true value of the firm and, hence, provides vital feedback for the investment decision. A high initial return encourages managers to expand, while a lower than expected post-IPO price leads to a reduction of the capital budget. Information production by market participants increases the precision of the market feedback captured in the first competitively determined stock price. Managers can entice investors to produce more information by selling larger stakes at lower prices. A too low offer price, however, attracts uninformed investors and decreases information production.     

On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long‐Term Return Reversals

Prior studies have linked long‐term reversals to the magnitude of locked‐in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked‐in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns.     

Short-sale refinancing and price adjustment speed to bad news: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Short selling may accelerate stock price adjustment to negative news. However, the literature provides mixed evidence for this prediction. Using short-sale refinancing and a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) model, this paper explores the effect of short selling on stock price adjustment. Our results show that (1) short-sale refinancing improves the speed of stock price adjustment to negative news. This result holds after we control for endogeneity. (2) The positive relationship between short-sale refinancing and stock price adjustment speed is significant in subsamples of stocks with higher earnings management or lower accuracy of analyst forecasts, indicating that firms with more opaque information are more likely to be targeted by short sellers. In subsamples of stocks with a higher ownership concentration or lower ownership by institutional investors, short selling is more likely to increase the speed of stock price adjustment, indicating that ownership structure may influence negative news mining. (3) As short-sale refinancing exacerbates the absorption of bad news by stock prices, it increases crash risk. This study enriches the research on the economic consequences of short selling and provides empirical evidence supporting regulations on short selling in China.     

The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News

This paper tests whether the “disposition effect,” that is the tendency of investors to ride losses and realize gains, induces “underreaction” to news, leading to return predictability. I use data on mutual fund holdings to construct a new measure of reference purchasing prices for individual stocks, and I show that post‐announcement price drift is most severe whenever capital gains and the news event have the same sign. The magnitude of the drift depends on the capital gains (losses) experienced by the stock holders on the event date. An event‐driven strategy based on this effect yields monthly alphas of over 200 basis points.     

Microstructure and reverse stock splits

In this paper we show that, similar to NYSE/AMEX stocks, NASDAQ stocks exhibit significant ex date returns for reverse stock splits. Although the 10-day cumulative return after the ex date is close to –10%, this does not violate market efficiency, because the average bid-ask spread for the reverse split stock is at least double this return. We also document that these large negative returns are mostly due to a drop in the ask price while bid prices barely change at all. Furthermore, the ex date returns are negatively related to trading volume.These results suggest that there is abnormal selling and a significant buildup of market makers' inventories near the ex date. To reduce the inventory buildup, market makers lower ask prices to induce buying by investors, resulting in the observed negative returns. Lowering bid prices, an alternative strategy for reducing inventories, is not attractive to market makers due to competitive factors and the reduction of commissions associated with a smaller number of transactions. Notably, selling investors have no incentives to sell their stocks early to avoid the observed negative ex date return, since this return is largely an ask price phenomenon and does not represent realized returns to sellers.     

The tax-loss selling hypothesis,market liquidity,and price pressure around the turn-of-the-year

In this paper, we use intra-day data for all stocks listed on the ISSM and provide new and direct evidence consistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. We find that (a) there is abnormal selling pressure prior to the year-end for stocks that have experienced large capital losses in the current and prior years (b) investors delay realizing capital gain by postponing the sale of capital gain stocks until after the new year (c) there is a significant decrease in the average trade size for stocks with large capital losses before the year-end and for stocks with capital gains in the new year, which suggests that individuals, rather than institutional investors, are the major sellers around the year-end (d) the tax-loss selling hypothesis, and not firm size or share price, is the fundamental explanation for abnormal January returns. Further, small or low share priced firms with capital gains do not experience abnormal returns in January. However, conditional on capital losses, small or low share priced firms magnify the turn-of-the-year effect (e) On average, the increase in selling activity adversely affects market liquidity by increasing bid-ask spreads and reducing depths. (f) The tax-loss selling pressure not only causes the price to be at the bid at the year-end, it also temporarily depresses the equilibrium price indicating the short run demand curve is not perfectly elastic (g) the year-end buying activity suggests that large investors buy capital loss stocks prior to the year-end to take advantage of the temporarily depressed price and capital gain stocks after the new year to reinvest the proceeds of the tax-loss selling.     

卖空机制能够约束内部人减持吗？——基于融资融券制度的经验证据

本文以我国放松卖空管制为视角,探究其对内部人减持的影响。研究表明,卖空机制能够抑制企业内部人减持行为。机制分析发现,卖空对内部人减持的抑制作用是通过缓解股权高溢价实现的。进一步研究表明,卖空能够抑制大股东、董事以及管理层减持,但对监事减持无影响;卖空能够降低内部人减持的获利程度,并且在内部人减持动机更大时,对内部人减持的抑制作用更强;卖空通过约束内部人减持提升了股票定价效率,还有助于降低内部人增持行为。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和内部人减持领域的文献,并对政府部门完善制度设计具有启示意义。     

Are imputation credits capitalised into stock prices?

We investigate whether imputation tax credits are capitalised into Australian stock prices by utilising discounted cash‐flow valuation models and examining the relation between earnings yields and imputation credit yields. While imputation credits are valuable to many investors, the evidence that they are reflected in share prices is at best mixed and largely unconvincing. Our results reveal that imputation credits fail to lower realised returns casting doubts over whether imputation credits are priced from the perspective of longer‐term buy‐and‐hold investors. If so, such investors can expect to fully benefit from their imputation credits, and imputation effects may not impact on the cost of capital.