Do stock price bubbles influence corporate investment?

Dispersion in investor beliefs and short-selling constraints can lead to stock market bubbles. This paper argues that firms, unlike investors, can exploit such bubbles by issuing new shares at inflated prices. This lowers the cost of capital and increases real investment. Perhaps surprisingly, large bubbles are not eliminated in equilibrium nor do large bubbles necessarily imply large distortions. Using the variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for the dispersion of investor beliefs, we find that increases in dispersion cause increases in new equity issuance, Tobin's Q, and real investment, as predicted by the model.     

Financing constraints, irreversibility, and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.     

Irreversible investment,managerial discretion and optimal capital structure

We explore the significance of employee compensation and alternative (reservation) income on investment timing, endogenous default, yield spreads and capital structure. In a real-options setting, a manager’s incentive to under(over)invest in a project is associated to labor income he has to forego in order to work on the project, the manager’s salary, his stake on the project’s equity capital and his subsequent income, should he decide to terminate operations. We find that the optimal level of coupon payments decreases with managerial salary and ownership stake while it is increasing in the manager’s reservation income. Yield spreads (optimal leverage ratios) are increasing (decreasing) in the manager’s salary and ownership stake, while they are decreasing (increasing) in the manager’s reservation income. Exploring agency costs of debt as deviations from a value-maximizing investment policy, we document a U-shaped relationship between agency costs of debt and the managerial compensation parameters: the manager’s reservation income, salary and ownership share.     

Collateral and capital structure

We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all.     

Dynamic risk management

Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay that need to be collateralized, resulting in a financing versus risk management trade-off. We study this trade-off in a dynamic model of commodity price risk management and show that risk management is limited and that more financially constrained firms hedge less or not at all. We show that these predictions are consistent with the evidence using panel data for fuel price risk management by airlines. More constrained airlines hedge less both in the cross section and within airlines over time. Risk management drops substantially as airlines approach distress and recovers only slowly after airlines enter distress.     

Cash flow,investment, and investment opportunities: New tests using UK panel data

The interpretation of the correlation between cash flow and investment is controversial. Some argue that it is caused by financial constraints, others by the correlation between cash flow and investment opportunities that are not properly measured by Tobin’s Q. This paper uses UK firms’ contracted capital expenditure to capture information about opportunities available only to insiders and thus not included in Q. When this variable is added to investment regressions, the explanatory power of cash flow falls for large firms, but remains unchanged for small firms. This suggests that the significance of cash flow stems from its role in capturing the effects of credit frictions.     

Bank connections,corporate investment and crisis

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.     

Corporate financing decisions, managerial market timing, and real investment

Both market timing and investment-based theories of corporate financing predict under-performance after firms raise capital, but only market timing predicts that the composition of financing (equity compared with debt) should also forecast returns. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the amount of net financing is more important than its composition in explaining future stock returns. In the time series, investment-based factor models explain abnormal stock performance following a variety of corporate financing events that previous studies link to market timing. At the aggregate level, the amount of new financing is also more important for future market returns than its composition. Overall, our joint tests reveal that measures of real investment are correlated with future returns and measures of managerial market timing are not.     

Investment cycles and startup innovation

We find that venture capital-backed startups receiving their initial investment in hot markets are more likely to go bankrupt, but conditional on going public, are valued higher on the day of their initial public offering, have more patents, and have more citations to their patents. Our results suggest that VCs invest in riskier and more innovative startups in hot markets (rather than just worse firms). This is particularly true for the most experienced VCs. Furthermore, our results suggest that increased capital in hot times plays a causal role in shifting investments to more novel startups by lowering the cost of experimentation for early stage investors and allowing them to make riskier, more novel, investments.     

Credit supply and corporate innovation

We present evidence that banking development plays a key role in technological progress. We focus on manufacturing firms' innovative performance, measured by patent-based metrics, and employ exogenous variations in banking development arising from the staggered deregulation of banking activities across US states during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that interstate banking deregulation had significant beneficial effects on the quantity and quality of innovation activities, especially for firms highly dependent on external capital and located closer to entering banks. Furthermore, we find that these results are strongly driven by a greater ability of deregulated banks to geographically diversify credit risk.     

Internal financial constraints,external financial constraints,and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms

This paper uses a panel of 24,184 UK firms over the period 1993–2003 to study the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different degrees of internal and external financial constraints. Our results suggest that when the sample is split on the basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between investment and cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial constraints faced by firms. Combining the internal with the external financial constraints, we find that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those externally financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds.     

Trading frenzies and their impact on real investment

We study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm's security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, in which speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large pressure on prices. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise.     

Hedging,financing, and investment decisions: Theory and empirical tests

In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.     

Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.     

Access to capital,investment, and the financial crisis

During the recent financial crisis, corporate borrowing and capital expenditures fall sharply. Most existing research links the two phenomena by arguing that a shock to bank lending (or, more generally, to the corporate credit supply) caused a reduction in capital expenditures. The economic significance of this causal link is tenuous, as we find that (1) bank-dependent firms do not decrease capital expenditures more than matching firms in the first year of the crisis or in the two quarters after Lehman Brother's bankruptcy; (2) firms that are unlevered before the crisis decrease capital expenditures during the crisis as much as matching firms and, proportionately, more than highly levered firms; (3) the decrease in net debt issuance for bank-dependent firms is not greater than for matching firms; (4) the average cumulative decrease in net equity issuance is more than twice the average decrease in net debt issuance from the start of the crisis through March 2009; and (5) bank-dependent firms hoard cash during the crisis compared with unlevered firms.     

Technology shocks and labor market dynamics: Some evidence and theory

A positive technology shock may lead to a rise or a fall in per capita hours, depending on how hours enter the empirical VAR model. We provide evidence that, independent of how hours enter the VAR, a positive technology shock leads to a weak response in nominal wage inflation, a modest decline in price inflation, and a modest rise in the real wage in the short-run and a permanent rise in the long-run. We then examine the ability of several competing theories to account for this VAR evidence. Our preferred model features sticky prices, sticky nominal wages, and habit formation. The same model also does well in accounting for the labor market evidence in the post-Volcker period.     

Stated and revealed investment decisions concerning retail structured products

We analyze the investment behavior of private clients with regard to retail structured products. To ascertain their stated and revealed preferences, we use a questionnaire and a field experiment. The real product issued in the field experiment is comparable to the hypothetical product in the questionnaire in terms of both payoff and communication. We find that a product described in simple words strongly motivates people to invest in structured products for the first time, and also eliminates gender differences. However, the real product attracts far fewer first-time buyers than we expected from the questionnaire results.