Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank.     

Why do firms switch underwriters?

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.     

Are there long-run implications of analyst coverage for IPOs?

Analyst coverage has been cited increasingly as an important attribute in the selection of an underwriter for a firm about to go public. However, it has also been alleged that affiliated analysts provide biased research. In this study, we examine these interrelated issues by examining the long-run performance of IPOs with coverage from their managing underwriters in a 1993–2003 sample. We find that (1) analysts’ research coverage from their managing syndicate is not related to long-run performance; (2) long-run performance is not different for firms that receive all-star analyst coverage; and (3) investors are not systematically worse off for following lead underwriter recommendations.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs,IPO Valuation,and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs

We empirically analyze the economic role of the underwriter in initial public offerings (IPOs), distinguishing between the “certification” and “market power” hypotheses. We find that equity in high‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs is priced higher and further away from intrinsic value than that in low‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous selection of firms to take public by underwriters. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis and reject the certification hypothesis, indicating that the role of underwriters is to obtain the highest possible valuation for the IPOs that they back rather than to price the equity close to intrinsic value.     

Why are IPO investors net buyers through lead underwriters?

In Nasdaq initial public offerings (IPOs) issued between 1997 and 2002, purchases of lead underwriter clients exceed sales by an amount equal to 8.79% of the total issue. We find that lead underwriter clients do not buy to build larger long-term positions, capitalize on superior execution quality, or because of clientele effects. However, characteristics of net buying that are at odds with these explanations and other behaviors (like institutional purchases of cold IPOs) are all consistent with lead underwriters engaging in quid pro quo arrangements with clients. Price contribution analysis shows that such client buying activity contributes significantly to first-day price increases.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

The influence of group affiliation and the underwriting process on emerging market IPOs: The case of the Philippines

In this paper we document underpricing and aftermarket returns of Philippine IPOs, discuss specific features of the Philippine IPO market, and investigate whether differential underpricing occurs due to certification considerations or potential conflicts of interest. We find that IPO underpricing is greater in cases where the offering firm is affiliated to a family business group, specifically when these affiliated firms use a foreign lead underwriter. Our results lead us to conclude that conflict of interest problems are recognized by market participants and that these conflicts of interest lead to differential underpricing.     

Price Discovery in Initial Public Offerings and the Role of the Lead Underwriter

We examine the price discovery process of initial public offerings (IPOs) using a unique dataset. The first quote entered by the lead underwriter in the five-minute preopening window explains a large proportion of initial returns even for hot IPOs. Significant learning and price discovery continues to take place during these five minutes with hundreds of quotes being entered. The lead underwriter observes the quoting behavior of other market makers, particularly the wholesalers, and accordingly revises his own quotes. There is a strong positive relationship between initial returns and the time of day when trading starts in an IPO.     

Informed Trading of Mutual Funds: Evidence from Fund‐Underwriter Relationships

This paper investigates whether the relationship between investment banks and their affiliated funds helps the funds deliver superior performance due to the information advantage or whether it costs the funds due to the conflict of interest. Using firms with class‐action lawsuits, I examine whether underwriter‐affiliated funds can avoid a potential economic loss from the underwriting clients’ fraudulent activities. Consistent with the information advantage hypothesis, I find that affiliated funds reduce their stakes in underwritten firms before the disclosure of the firms’ misconduct. Additionally, I find that significant selling activity by the affiliated funds can predict the outcome of a potential lawsuit.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Information Asymmetry is usually assumed in most explanations of the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). In Baron's (1982) model, the underwriter is better informed than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the IPO. The greater uncertainty associated with the demand will lead to a greater underpricing due to the enhanced value of the underwriter's expertise. In the case that the issuer is also an informed investment banker, Baron's hypothesis predicts no underpricing. Our results based on Canadian investment bankers do not support Baron's hypothesis.     

Friends can help: The effects of relationship in the Chinese book-building process

Using detailed bidding information in Chinese IPO book-building process, we find that institutional investors who have a close relationship with the underwriter are more likely to participate in bidding and their bidding prices are higher, compared to other institutional investors. We also find that related institutional investors bid higher when the underwriter is more likely to need or receive their support. Further analysis suggests that related institutional investors gain some benefits for their support to the underwriter, including receiving more shares in profitable IPOs, better timing their exit from the IPO in the open market, and receiving more optimistic earnings forecasts or stock recommendations from analysts of the underwriter. Regarding the economic consequence, we show that the underwriter is more likely to revise the offer price upward if related institutions bid higher. The evidence overall indicates the existence of relationship-driven bidding in the Chinese book-building process.     

Underwriting Relationships and Analyst Independence in Europe

This paper examines the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We document at least three key findings. First, we find strong evidence that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic than those provided by unaffiliated analysts. Second, we find that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter stocks than for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find evidence that these biases found within earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are not driven by one particular country. In short, these findings suggest that affiliated analysts are more optimistic perhaps to maintain investment banking relations.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.     

IPO Pricing and Share Allocation: The Importance of Being Ignorant

Since an underwriter sets an IPO's offer price without knowing its market value, investors can acquire information about its value and avoid overpriced deals (“lemon‐dodge”). To mitigate this well‐known risk, the bank enters into a repeat game with a coalition of investors who do not lemon‐dodge in exchange for on‐average underpriced shares. We (i) derive and test a quantitative IPO pricing rule (showing that tech IPOs were not excessively underpriced during the boom of the 1990s); and (ii) analyzing a unique multibank data set, find strong support for the conjecture that a bank preferentially allocates shares to its coalition.     

Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings

The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.     

Why are IPOs underpriced? Evidence from Japan's hybrid auction-method offerings

We document discretionary underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO prices in the public offer tranche of Japan's hybrid auction regime, in which investor information differences are not important, there are no roadshows, preferential allocations are negligible, institutional investing is low, and the public offer tranche cannot fail. The magnitude and variation of underpricing in our sample, which spans relatively hot and cold markets, are similar to those reported for US IPOs. The evidence is most consistent with underpricing arising from an implicit contract to allocate risk related to initial mispricing where, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price, the underwriter participates indirectly in upside performance. The results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the US.     

Underwriter Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis

This paper studies the relationships between underwriter reputation, underwriter spread, and IPO underpricing. We consider the information content of underwriter spread and find that it conveys information pertinent to IPO quality. Because underwriter spread is endogenous, underpricing and underwriter spread are jointly determined in a simultaneous equation system. Also, we examine the IPO market for evidence of segmentation, and our results suggest some market segmentation. Underwriter spread impacts initial underpricing for a group of medium-reputation underwriters, while underpricing affects underwriter spread for groups of low- and high-reputation underwriters. Consequently, high-risk IPOs may not be priced the same way as low-risk IPOs. We attribute this finding to regulation, competition, and/or market segmentation.     

IPO flipping in Australia: cross-sectional explanations

We access electronic share settlement records for each subscriber and aftermarket investor in 419 Australian IPOs to investigate whether initial subscribers flip their allocations, and we relate this flipping behaviour to issuer, shareholder, underwriter and market characteristics. We find that the main determinants are underpricing (consistent with the disposition effect, i.e., a tendency to realise gains before losses), whether the IPO market is “hot” (a proxy for the representativeness heuristic) and ex ante risk characteristics. When flipping is analysed separately for underpriced and overpriced IPOs we find that the most overpriced IPOs are flipped more than the less overpriced ones, a result which contrasts the disposition effect. This result is due to the action of institutional, rather than individual, investors. We also relate flipping activity to the firm's long-run return, and find that the flipping behaviour of large (informed) investors is unrelated to long-run returns, while uninformed investors consistently flip more of the IPOs that have better long-run returns.     

UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND REPETITIVE PUBLIC OFFERINGS

A recent examination of underwriter reputation and initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests that one of the reasons prestigious underwriters market low-risk IPOs is to increase the expected present value of subsequent offerings. There is a greater likelihood that a firm issuing low-risk IPOs will be a viable future operation with the potential for subsequent offerings than a firm issuing high-risk IPOs. I examine the hypothesis that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is negatively related to IPO risk. In addition to finding support for this hypothesis, I show that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is positively related to the IPO underwriter's reputation and negatively related to the IPO gross spread. Finally, I find that the likelihood of firms switching IPO underwriters for subsequent offerings decreases with increasing IPO underwriter reputation.     

Underwriting relationships,analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations

We examine the effect of underwriting relationships on analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. Lead and co-underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are not generally greater. Investors respond similarly to lead underwriter and unaffiliated `Strong buy' and `Buy' recommendations, but three-day returns to lead underwriter `Hold' recommendations are significantly more negative than those to unaffiliated `Hold' recommendations. The findings suggest investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend `Hold' when `Sell' is warranted. The post-announcement returns following affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations are not significantly different.