The real effects of credit default swaps

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.     

The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk,liquidity, and trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market

This paper examines the impact of central clearing on the credit default swap (CDS) market using a sample of voluntarily cleared single-name contracts. Consistent with central clearing reducing counterparty risk, CDS spreads increase around the commencement of central clearing and are lower than settlement spreads published by the central clearinghouse. Furthermore, the relation between CDS spreads and dealer credit risk weakens after central clearing begins, suggesting a lowering of systemic risk. These findings are robust to controls for frictions in both CDS and bond markets. Finally, matched sample analysis reveals that the increased post-trade transparency following central clearing is associated with an improvement in liquidity and trading activity.     

The delivery option in credit default swaps

Under standard assumptions the reduced-form credit risk model is not capable of accurately pricing the two fundamental credit risk instruments – bonds and credit default swaps (CDS) – simultaneously. Using a data set of euro-denominated corporate bonds and CDS our paper quantifies this mispricing by calibrating such a model to bond data, and subsequently using it to price CDS, resulting in model CDS spreads up to 50% lower on average than observed in the market. An extended model is presented which includes the delivery option implicit in CDS contracts emerging since a basket of bonds is deliverable in default. By using a constant recovery rate standard models assume equal recoveries for all bonds and hence zero value for the delivery option. Contradicting this common assumption, case studies of Chapter 11 filings presented in the paper show that corporate bonds do not necessarily trade at equal levels following default. Our extension models the implied expected recovery rate of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and, applied to data, largely eliminates the mispricing. Calibrated recovery values lie between 8% and 47% for different obligors, exhibiting strong variation among rating classes and industries. A cross-sectional analysis reveals that the implied recovery parameter depends on proxies for the delivery option, primarily the number of available bonds and bond pricing errors. No evidence is found for a direct influence of the bid-ask spread, notional amount, coupon, or rating used as proxies for bond market liquidity.     

Arbitrage-free credit pricing using default probabilities and risk sensitivities

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities are obtainable for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices can be backed out from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, single-obligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.     

Recovery rates,default probabilities,and the credit cycle

In recessions, the number of defaulting firms rises. On top of this, the average amount recovered on the bonds of defaulting firms tends to decrease. This paper proposes an econometric model in which this joint time-variation in default rates and recovery rate distributions is driven by an unobserved Markov chain, which we interpret as the “credit cycle”. This model is shown to fit better than models in which this joint time-variation is driven by observed macroeconomic variables. We use the model to quantitatively assess the importance of allowing for systematic time-variation in recovery rates, which is often ignored in risk management and pricing models.     

A simple model of credit contagion

We propose a simple model of credit contagion in which we include macro- and microstructural interdependencies among the debtors within a credit portfolio. The microstructure captures interdependencies between debtors that go beyond their exposure to common factors, e.g., business or legal interdependencies. We show that even for diversified portfolios, moderate microstructural interdependencies have a significant impact on the tails of the loss distribution. This impact increases dramatically for less diversified microstructures.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

Valuation of credit default swaps and swaptions

This paper presents a conceptual and general framework for valuation of single-name credit derivatives. The general subfiltration approach of [J-R] to modelling default risk, which includes the Cox-process setting of [L], is integrated with a numeraire invariant approach. Several known results are reformulated and extended in this framework. New concepts and results are presented for change of numeraire in presence of default and valuation of credit swaptions. A new formula on fractional recovery of pre-default value is derived, generalizing that of [D-S]. A Black-Scholes formula for credit default swaptions due to [S] is shown to serve as a least-squares approximation to the general case.Received: 1 November 2003, Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B28, 60G44, 60G40JEL Classification: E43, G13I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements

Using a large sample of private credit agreements between U.S. publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. The accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.     

The reaction of emerging market credit default swap spreads to sovereign credit rating changes

This paper examines the effect of sovereign credit rating change announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. We find that positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day period surrounding the event, and are more likely to spill over to other emerging countries. Alternatively, CDS markets anticipate negative events, and previous changes in CDS premiums can be used to estimate the probability of a negative credit event. The transmission mechanisms for positive events are the common creditor and competition in trade markets.     

Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

Mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China

Mutual funds have emerged and rapidly developed since 2000 in China. This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2001–2005. We find that equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on firm performance. The result is robust to several measures of firm performance and various estimations. Our finding supports recent regulatory efforts in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggests that pooling diffuse minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via mutual funds is beneficial.     

Exploring the components of credit risk in credit default swaps

In this paper, we test the influence of various fundamental variables on the pricing of credit default swaps. The theoretical determinants that are important for pricing credit default swaps include the risk-free rate, industry sector, credit rating, and liquidity factors. We suggest a linear regression model containing these different variables, especially focusing on liquidity factors. Unlike bond spreads which have been shown to be inversely related to liquidity (i.e., the greater the liquidity, the lower the spread), there is no a priori reason that the credit default swap spread should exhibit the same relationship. This is due to the economic characteristics of a credit default swap compared to a bond. Our empirical result shows that all the fundamental variables investigated have a significant effect on the credit default swap spread. Moreover, our findings suggest that credit default swaps that trade with greater liquidity have a wider credit default swap spread.     

How the Subprime Crisis went global: Evidence from bank credit default swap spreads

How did the Subprime Crisis, a problem in a small corner of U.S. financial markets, affect the entire global banking system? To shed light on this question we use principal components analysis to identify common factors in the movement of banks' credit default swap spreads. We find that fortunes of international banks rise and fall together even in normal times along with short-term global economic prospects. But the importance of common factors rose steadily to exceptional levels from the outbreak of the Subprime Crisis to past the rescue of Bear Stearns, reflecting a diffuse sense that funding and credit risk was increasing. Following the failure of Lehman Brothers, the interdependencies briefly increased to a new high, before they fell back to the pre-Lehman elevated levels – but now they more clearly reflected heightened funding and counterparty risk. After Lehman's failure, the prospect of global recession became imminent, auguring the further deterioration of banks' loan portfolios. At this point the entire global financial system had become infected.     

Short sales and speed of price adjustment: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock market

We present empirical evidence that short sales contribute to market efficiency by increasing the speed of price adjustment to not only private/public firm-specific information but also market-wide information. Shortable stocks are characterized by weaker trade continuity and stronger quote reversals. They adjust faster to new information than non-shortable counterparts. These findings remain robust even in an “up” market condition in which short sales are not binding. The amount of information incorporated in each trade is also significantly higher for shortable than non-shortable stocks in both “up” and “down” market conditions. After controlling for firm size, trading volume, liquidity, price and option trading, short sales stand out as one of the significant factors that speed up the price adjustment.     

Industry contagion in loan spreads

Spreads on new and renegotiated corporate loans are significantly higher when the loan originates (or is renegotiated) in the two years surrounding bankruptcy filings by industry rivals. This industry-specific contagion is particularly severe in the middle of industry bankruptcy waves. Furthermore, this contagion in loan spreads is mitigated in concentrated industries, consistent with the hypothesis and evidence in Lang and Stulz (1992) that bankruptcy filings in concentrated industries can have positive consequences for rivals (increased market share and/or power). There is also some evidence that contagion affects non-spread terms in loan contracts.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

Crises,contagion and cross-listings

We investigate whether cross-listing shares in the form of depositary receipts in overseas markets benefits investors in emerging market countries during periods of local financial crisis from 1994 to 2002. We regress cumulative abnormal returns for three windows surrounding the crisis events on the cross-listing status while controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm age, trading volume, foreign exposure, disclosure quality and corporate governance. Further, we examine cross-listing effects in countries popularly thought to experience contagious effects of these crises. We find that cross-listed firms react significantly less negatively than non-cross-listed firms, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. The results on contagious cross-listing effects are however mixed. Our findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of market segmentation as well as differential disclosure/governance between developed and emerging markets. We do not find evidence that foreign investors “panic” during a currency crisis.     

Hedging structured credit products during the credit crisis: A horse race of 10 models

Pricing and hedging structured credit products poses major challenges to financial institutions. This paper puts several valuation approaches through a crucial test: How did these models perform in one of the worst periods of economic history, September 2008, when Lehman Brothers went under? Did they produce reasonable hedging strategies? We study several bottom-up and top-down credit portfolio models and compute the resulting delta hedging strategies using either index contracts or a portfolio of single-name CDS contracts as hedging instruments. We compute the profit-and-loss profiles and assess the performances of these hedging strategies. Among all 10 pricing models that we consider the Student-t copula model performs best. The dynamical generalized-Poisson loss model is the best top-down model, but this model class has in general problems to hedge equity tranches. Our major finding is however that single-name and index CDS contracts are not appropriate instruments to hedge CDO tranches.     

Good news, bad news and rating announcements: An empirical investigation

In this paper we employ a new approach to test the contribution of information in rating announcements. This is the first study to test and corroborate how the CDS market responds to rating actions after controlling for the presence of concurrent public and private information. We show that since the clustering of rating announcements characterizes economically significant developments, the common practice of using “uncontaminated” samples underestimates market response. As in previous studies, we find that the market response to bad news is stronger than to good news. Nevertheless, bad news and negative rating announcements tend to cluster. Therefore, the residual contribution of negative rating announcements is small and in some cases insignificant. Positive rating announcements are less frequent and less clustered, though their residual contribution is still significant.