Licensing standard-essential patents with costly enforcement

We study the interaction between the holder of a standard-essential patent (SEP) and two downstream firms using the patented technology to design standard-compliant products. The SEP holder approaches the downstream firms simultaneously in the shadow of patent litigation and is subject to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licensing requirements. We show that the patent holder faces a litigation credibility constraint and a license acceptability constraint when setting its licensing terms. For patents of intermediate strength, there is no royalty that allows the patent holder to reconcile these constraints. Consequently, it cannot license its technology and must go to court against infringers. We show that the availability of an injunction improves the patent holder's ability to license its technology, but it tends to inflate the royalty rate for implementers.     

Licensing and innovation with imperfect contract enforcement

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.     

Little Firms and Big Patents: A Model of Small‐Firm Patent Signaling

Patent strategies of small technology‐intensive firms are difficult to explain with standard incentive arguments based on intellectual property rights. This paper develops a rationale for patent filing as a disclosure strategy. We develop a two‐sender signaling game to study patenting incentives of two technology start‐ups to file in a large‐scale patent system with the goal to attract a user firm. Both start‐ups may decide to invest in costly modification of their patent application before filing. The paper identifies a separating equilibrium in which the high‐quality inventor files and so separates from its technology competitor. Of particular interest is the study of pooling and semi‐separating equilibria, as well as the impact of subsidies. We find that a higher quality of a country's inventions, reflected in the possible innovative steps and thus in higher expected profits for foreign user firms, may increase the chance of the relatively lower‐quality inventor to enter international technology markets.     

Dynamic Effects of Patent Policy on Sequential Innovation

When one patented innovation enables another, endogenous delay of the latter has important implications for the economics of patent life and scope, if licensing is negotiated ex post. Optimal patent life may be finite under competition, even if the royalty imposes no deadweight loss and there is no competitive dissipation of rent. Reduced scope of the first patent eliminates delay of costly enabled innovations, whether monopolized or competitive, and a combination of limited scope and infinite life can be optimal. If the second innovation is negotiated ex ante, its patentability can increase or decrease the first innovator's profit, depending on cost and market structure of the second innovation, and patent life.     

REAL OPTIONS AND PATENT DAMAGES: THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF NON-INFRINGING ALTERNATIVES, AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Abstract.  Patent litigation has become an increasingly important consideration in business strategy. Damage awards in patent litigation are supposed to compensate the patent owner for economic harm created by infringement and are therefore important for protecting returns to innovation. We analyze the effects that a recent court decision in the United States, called Grain Processing , has had on the incentives of potential infringers to infringe and innovators to innovate. We find that Grain Processing has decreased the expected value of damages awards in patent cases by conferring a 'free option' on infringers. Grain Processing also concluded that the patent owner in the case did not suffer lost profits due to the infringement because the infringer would have adopted an (inferior) non-infringing technology had it not infringed. We demonstrate that this conclusion is inconsistent with standard economic models.     

Markets for standardized technologies: Patent licensing with principle of proportionality

In this paper, we study the licensing of standard-related patents among companies that employ a two-level licensing model where (i) the aggregated value of technology in the end product is divided among the integrated technologies in the product, and (ii) the value of each technology is then shared among the patent owners in proportion to the strengths of their patent portfolios in these technologies. Specifically, we develop a system dynamics simulation model for analyzing the effects of licensing costs on product and technology markets. This model is based on the modeling of three types of companies whose interactions are analyzed using non-cooperative game theory. The numerical results suggest that none of the three companies benefit from very low or very high royalty rates. In this setting, our model for two-level proportional sharing of licensing payments helps identify royalty rates which benefit all types of companies and which provide incentives for technology development and innovation.     

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.     

Pricing training and development programs using stochastic CVP analysis

This paper sets forth, analyzes and applies a stochastic cost‐volume‐profit (CVP) model specifically geared toward the determination of enrollment fees for training and development (T+D) programs. It is a simpler model than many of those developed in the research literature, but it does incorporate one advanced component: an ‘economic’ demand function relating the expected sales level to price. Price is neither a constant nor a random variable in this model but rather the decision‐maker's basic control variable. The simplicity of the model permits analytical solutions for five ‘special prices’: (1) the highest price which sets breakeven probability equal to a minimum acceptable level; (2) the price which maximizes expected profits; (3) the price which maximizes a Cobb–Douglas utility function based on expected profits and breakeven probability; (4) the price which maximizes breakeven probability; and (5) the lowest price which sets breakeven probability equal to a minimum acceptable level. The model is applied to data provided by the Center for Management and Professional Development at the authors' university. The results suggest that there could be a significant payoff to fine‐tuning a T+D provider's pricing strategy using formal analysis. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

试论专利文献的竞争情报价值

文章从专利与专利文献的概念与特点、专利文献信息的竞争情报功能和专利文献在竞争情报研究中的作用等3个方面论述了专利文献在竞争情报研究中的价值,重点探讨了专利文献的法律、技术、经济功能及在企业竞争对手分析、企业专利战略、行业技术发展趋势与水平、避免重复研究等4方面的价值。     

Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement

The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation. The patent is valuable because it can be used to influence the entrant's location decision in a way that is profitable for the incumbent. In addition to showing that a patent need not be legally enforced to be valuable, the paper shows that the lower is the entrant's R&D cost, the smaller is the innovator's incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the lower is the R&D cost, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering imitation.     

Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry

We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others’ investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short‐ or a long‐term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a short‐term project cuts into firm j's market in the short‐term but frees‐up firm j's long‐term market, and vice versa. Our results show that, even in the absence of an owner–manager conflict, the owner anticipates the product market rivalry and optimally compensates their managers with short‐ as well as long‐term compensation. Although the optimal compensation design induces myopic investment decisions, it is shown to be in the owners’ best interest. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The moderating effects of supplier portfolio characteristics on the competitive performance impacts of supplier-facing process capabilities

We draw on the interorganizational relationship management literature to examine how contextual characteristics of the supplier portfolio (portfolio concentration, relationship length, and supplier substitutability) moderate the impacts of process alignment and partnering flexibility – two of a firm's key supplier-facing process capabilities to manage supplier relationships – on a product line's competitive performance. Our analysis of survey data on a firm's supplier portfolio for a major product line indicates that the impacts of process alignment and partnering flexibility on competitive performance are moderated by the three supplier portfolio characteristics. Specifically, while concentrated relationship portfolios, long-term relationships, and supplier substitutability amplify the positive effect of process alignment on competitive performance, concentrated relationship portfolios and long-term relationships attenuate the competitive benefits that firms derive from partnering flexibility. While long-term relationships and concentrated supplier portfolios enhance the competitive benefits of process alignment, operations managers also need to recognize the detrimental effects of these supplier portfolio characteristics on the competitive benefits of partnering flexibility.     

基于当前形势下有竞争优势的船舶报价研究

首先明确具有竞争优势的船舶报价的特点,然后从该特点出发以逻辑流程的形式详细指出在接到船东询价后,前期如何充分准备、中期怎样灵活反应以及后期如何精心总结,以帮助船厂提高自身报价水平,在众多竞争者中争得订单,扩大市场份额,改变被淘汰的命运。     

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Generalized Oligopolistic Case

The main purpose of this paper is to disclose the properties of the equilibrium outcomes in the differentiated‐products model with two stages: (i) owner‐shareholders negotiate managerial compensation with their managers that comprises their profits and sales (sales delegation) and (ii) they engage in their market competition. The other purpose of this paper is to study the differentiated goods model in which an owner bargains the managerial compensation with her/his manager that comprises her/his profit and her/his rival's profit (relative performance delegation). We further investigate the situation wherein the firm with sales delegation and the firm with the relative performance delegation coexist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisiting the role of modular innovation in technological radicalness and architectural change of products: The case of Tesla X and Roomba

The management literature defines modular innovation as a way to make technological changes in product modules that does not necessarily change the product architecture. However, engineering science shows that new product modules not only change the product architecture, but they can also be used for technologically radical next generation products. Therefore, there seems to be a misalignment in how the role of modular innovation is seen as an innovation management phenomenon and the actual practice of product design and engineering. We revisit the role of modular innovation by combining management and engineering approaches. We demonstrate the applicability of this approach through two cases that utilize patent data of two recent technologically innovative products: Tesla's Model X and iRobot's Roomba automated vacuum cleaner. The examples show, in detail, how the changes in product modules and functions have led to broader changes at the system architecture level, leading to new functionalities. The findings contribute to the innovation management literature by identifying a more nuanced role of modular innovation by embedding it in the product architecture, thus broadening the discussion on architectural innovation and technological radicalness.     

Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction

This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.     

The impact of government financial support on the performance of new firms: the role of competitive advantage as an intermediate outcome

This research examines the influence of government financial support on new firms' performance. Extant empirical research on the topic has found mixed results, which warrants an exploration of the theoretical basis for the impact of support policies on new firms' performance. Grounding the theoretical model in the resource-based view and institutional theories, this study contends that performance outcomes – e.g. revenues or profits – should not be the first outcomes of public policies to be examined. Instead, competitive advantage formation is suggested as a link between support policies and new firms' performance. Using new firms from the USA, we examine the impact of government financial support measures – government loans, guarantees and government equity – on firms' overall competitive advantage and more specific types of competitive advantage based on innovation, licensing-in, marketing and human capital. Controlling for family funding, bank financing, equity of business angels and venture capitalists, industry, size as well as entrepreneur's characteristics, the results reveal that government guarantees and government equity have a direct effect on new firms' competitive advantage and only an indirect impact on performance. Our results suggest to policy-makers to focus on helping new firms build the necessary capabilities to compete successfully in the marketplace.     

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals’ beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation.     

Optimal Licensing Contracts and the Value of a Patent

We extend Kamien and Tauman's (1986) analysis of the value of a patent. We find that an inventor can always design a fixed fee plus royalty contract such that his revenue is equal to the profit a monopoly endowed with the innovation could make on the market. This implies that the social value of a patent can be strictly negative whenever the patented innovation is of bad quality. We also explain why a principal can have an interest in using performance-based contracts although the principal and the agents are risk-neutral, information is symmetric, and agents' actions are verifiable.     

Bait and ditch: Consumer naïveté and salesforce incentives

We analyze a model of price competition between a transparent retailer and a deceptive one in a market where a fraction of consumers is naïve. The transparent retailer is an independent shop managed by its owner. The deceptive retailer belongs to a chain and is operated by a manager. The two retailers sell an identical base product, but the deceptive one also offers an add‐on. Rational consumers never consider buying the add‐on while naïve ones can be “talked” into buying it. By offering the manager a contract that pushes him to never sell the base good without the add‐on, the chain can induce an equilibrium in which both retailers obtain more‐than‐competitive profits. The equilibrium features price dispersion and market segmentation, with the deceptive retailer targeting only naïve consumers whereas the transparent retailer serves only rational ones.