Incentive pay and rent in oligopoly

Our purpose is to examine strategic delegation in nonlinear Cournot oligopoly. The findings generalize earlier results and show that managerial contracts reward sales under the condition of a fixed input price. Alternatively, under a variable input price, owners might punish sales even when goods are strategic substitutes. We conclude that optimal strategic motivation depends critically on the input price. For example, motivation that supports positive owner profit under a fixed input price nullifies owner-profit if an upstream monopolist with convex costs sets the input price. In a vertical relationship between a duopoly and an upstream monopolist, strategic delegation punishes sales.     

Bankruptcy, Takeovers, and Wage Contracts

Takeovers give raiders the opportunity of breaking implicit contracts inside the firm. If implicit contracts are adopted by workers and management to reach more efficient outcomes, then the possibility of takeovers may cause a welfare loss. We show that, under some conditions, this argument can go through even if the firm and the workers can write explicit and complete contracts. The crucial assumption is that the profitability of the firm is linked to its financial situation, in the sense that a firm which has a high probability of bankruptcy will face fewer opportunities than a financially solid firm. In this framework, the possibility of takeovers imposes constraints on the set of feasible employment contracts, leading to inefficient outcomes.     

The strategic choice of payment method in takeovers: The role of environmental,social and governance performance

Payment method choice in takeovers is mainly driven by both asymmetric information between the acquirer and the target and the acquirer's financial capability. In this paper, we examine whether increased transparency and better access to finance induced by environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance are associated with the strategic choice of payment method in takeovers. More specifically, we investigate how the acquirer's and the target's ESG coverage and different levels of ESG performance affect the probability of cash offers in a sample of 836 US takeovers from 1992 to 2014. In examining the target, our results suggest that ESG coverage is positively associated with the probability of cash offers, whereas we find a negative relationship for ESG concerns and no effect for ESG strengths. Upon examining the acquirer, ESG coverage and ESG concerns both increase the probability of cash offers; however, we do not find results supporting our prediction regarding the acquirer's ESG strengths. We infer that ESG coverage and level affect strategic considerations in the choice of the payment method in takeovers because they not only reduce information asymmetry, but also enhance financing capability.     

资产流动性损失下财务危机重组研究

本文从资产结构的角度探讨资产流动性对财务危机重组的影响，建立了一个考虑资产流动性的财务危机模型。同时根据股东一经理人是否能与债权人协商及公司债务契约中有无优先偿债禁止条款，在不同情形下，分析了财务危机中各个请求权人因应策略和投资效率。本文研究表明，债权人会容忍某些程度的投资无效率以避免无谓的资产流动性损失；当债权人无法协商时，无论投资项目净现值为正或负，股东一经理人都将进行投资，使财务危机公司发生过度投资无效率问题；当债权人可协商时，虽然还是无法完全消除财务危机公司过度投资行为，但是可以改善上述问题。     

Probability of default in collateralized credit operations

The goal of this paper is to identify the major determinants of the probability of default in a mortgage credit operation, which is backed by collateral. We use an exclusive data set with 268,036 loan contracts and apply logistic regression and Cox proportional hazards model in the estimation. The discriminatory power of the estimated models is analyzed by several accuracy indicators. The inclusion of time-dependent macroeconomic variables in addition to covariates representing characteristics of the contract and individuals improved the overall performance. Logistic regression showed a higher discriminatory power than Cox proportional hazards model according to all accuracy indicators. It is worth mentioning the negative relationship between the probability of default and the economy base interest rate. Decreases in the base interest rate lead banks to lose revenue from treasury operations and expand credit operations to compensate the loss. This strategy brings individuals with a higher probability of default to the financial market.     

Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance

This paper examines auditor liability rules under imperfect information, costly litigation and risk-averse auditors. A negligence rule fails in such a setting, because in equilibrium auditors will deviate with positive probability from any given standard. It is shown that strict liability outperforms negligence with respect to risk allocation and the probability that a desired level of care is met by the auditor if competitive liability insurance markets exist. Furthermore, our model explains the existence of insurance contracts containing obligations a type of contract often observed in liability insurance markets.     

Selection into and across credit contracts: Theory and field research

Lenders may choose to encourage borrower side contracting using group, or co-signed, loans or discourage it using individual loans, so as to make relative performance comparisons. In this context wealth of the agents relative to outsiders, and wealth inequality among potential joint liability partners, are important factors determining the choice among loan contracts. In a related model of whether to borrow, higher covariance of returns mitigates an adverse selection effect. We test these models using relatively rich data gathered in field research in Thailand. The prevalence of joint liability contracts relative to individual contracts exhibits a U-shaped relationship with the wealth of the borrowing household and increases with the wealth dispersion. The likelihood of joint-liability borrowing increases the lower is the probability of project success, a direct affirmation of adverse selection. Higher correlation across projects makes joint liability borrowing more likely relative to all other alternatives. Strikingly, most of the results disappear if we do not condition the sample according to the dictates of the models, with selection into and across credit contracts.     

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.     

基于委托-代理模型的二次供水监管与激励研究

供水管理部门与物业管理公司在二次供水过程中有着明显的委托-代理关系,通过对二者的委托-代理关系进行模型构建与分析,得出结论认为物业管理公司的努力程度除受自身的经营管理能力和运营成本的影响外,还需要供水管理部门依据物业管理公司的能力系数、成本系数、风险偏好以及检验费用系数、不可控的环境条件等因素,设计合理的契约合同加强对二次供水过程的监管与激励,并提出相关建议。     

The impact of the disposition effect on asset prices: insight from the NBA

In this paper we examine the price movements of contracts that represent bets on NBA games and find that the disposition effect causes significant deviations between contract prices and values. The contracts under examination are listed on Tradesports, a prediction market which provides an ideal venue for testing this and other behavioral theories because of its asset properties, market structure, and the absence of the joint hypothesis problem. In our analysis, we forecast the projected final combined scores of both teams in a contest based on observed within-game scores and game time remaining. At all points in time throughout each game, mean future returns (measured as Ticks to Expiry) should be no different than zero. However, we find that contracts which have fallen off pace to exceed the stated contract total become overpriced and experience negative future returns. Likewise, we provide evidence that contracts on games in which teams are on pace to exceed the stated total become underpriced and experience significantly positive future returns. These findings are consistent with the disposition effect in which traders tend to hold losing positions to avoid realizing losses yet prematurely unwind winning positions to realize gains.     

Focused Firms and the Incentive to Innovate

This paper explores the possibility that a firm may make a credible strategic commitment to high levels of innovation by limiting its horizontal or vertical scope. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm decides whether to undertake an innovation that affects a system of products, which can also be interpreted as multiple stages of the production process. The products are technologically related, and innovation in the core product is assumed to impose costs on the producers of ancillary products, due to cannibalization of the old technology and redesign or retooling costs, for example. I demonstrate that a firm may optimally and credibly commit to innovate by choosing to be a focused firm and licensing the production of the ancillary product, even when licensees are inefficient. In stark contrast to the irrelevance results of the strategic delegation literature, this commitment may be credible even when licensing contracts are renegotiable, but only if licensees are sufficiently inefficient.     

Information, Control, and Organizational Structure

This paper investigates how a designer of an organization (referred to as the regulator) should organize a production activity in which two different units produce components and where each unit has private information about its costs. Three organizational structures are analyzed. In the first (informational consolidation), the regulator contracts with a consolidated unit that produces both components. In the second (informational decentralization), the regulator independently contracts with the producer of each component. In the third (informational delegation), the regulator contracts with one of the units, which in turn subcontracts with the other. In each case, the regulator's optimal mechanism consisting of payment and output schedules is fully characterized. Informational consolidation and informational decentralization yield different output schedules. Under informational decentralization, the optimal output schedule may not depend on the sum of the marginal costs of each component, but when it does, the regulator strictly prefers informational consolidation to informational decentralization. Informational delegation is shown to be equivalent to informational decentralization when the regulator can observe the contracting between the units.     

Delegation in first‐price all‐pay auctions

In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market

In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both decentralized and centralized bargaining. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty only licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing). We discuss the implications of positive opportunity costs of the licensees.     

The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain

This paper studies the impact of contract duration in determining scheduled payments in international transfers of technology. Analyzing a sample of contracts written by Spanish firms in 1991, the main empirical finding is a positive relationship between contract duration and the probability of the parties including variable payments in the first period of the agreement. This result suggests that the parties choose the type of payments to be made, whether fixed or variable, so as to avoid early termination of the relationship, even in the absence of opportunistic behavior or risk aversion.     

How Do Strengths and Weaknesses in Corporate Social Performance Across Different Stakeholder Domains Affect Company Performance?

The existing research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has largely focused on the positive aspect of corporate social performance (CSP) and company performance (CP) and ignored the relationship between actions that would qualify as negative CSP (or weakness in CSP) towards a stakeholder group and company performance. Using data from the KLD collected over a three‐year period, this study examines the relationship between both CSP weaknesses and strengths and CP across individual stakeholder domains. Results of the study suggest that strengths in CSP related to primary stakeholder domains are associated with superior company performance. However, this relationship is tenuous, at best, in the case of the secondary stakeholder domain. As for weaknesses in CSP, the results suggest that if a firm performs poorly in meeting the expectations of one or more stakeholders it is penalized in the form of poor performance. This finding generally holds true for both primary and secondary stakeholders. Implications of these findings for public policy and businesses planning to address social issues are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Costly State Verification with Varying Risk Preferences and Liability

Abstract.  In the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification, we examine how the properties of the set of states, different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments. In particular, we show that with risk‐averse debtors, a general set of states, a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability, the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low, which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states. If the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral, this non‐monotonicity of consumption disappears. Moreover, given the loan size, there is more monitoring under debtor‐risk aversion than risk neutrality. We present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor‐risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability. Finally, we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework.     

On existence and uniqueness of maximum likelihood estimates in quantal and ordinal response models

Summary For quantal and ordinal response models, conditions on existence and uniqueness of maximum likelhood estimates are presented. Results are derived from general results on direction sets and spaces associated with a proper concave function. If each summand of the log likelihood is in any direction either strictly concave or affine, necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained. If all cell counts are strictly positive, then it is shown that estimates always exist, and that they are unique if all parameters are identifiable. If estimates exist without being unique, results on uniquely estimable linear functions are given, paralleling corresponding results in linear regression. An extension of the maximum likelihood principle is outlined yielding similar results even if the likelihood does not attain its supremum. The logit model, the linear probability model, cumulative and sequential models and binomial response models are considered in detail.     

Active risk management and loan contract terms: Evidence from rated microfinance institutions

The aim of this article is to test the relationship among organizational architecture, joint liabilities contracts, and loan conditions. Based on a sample of 135 MFIs rated between 2003 and 2008, the study shows that solidarity lending and a decentralized credit decision have no significant influence on loan conditions. Being a village bank lender is significantly associated with higher interest rates charged, higher outreach, lower depth of outreach, and higher transaction costs. Results seem to highlight the existence of a trade-off between outreach and the average loan size per borrower when MFIs decentralize credit decisions or establish joint liability contracts.     

Labor turnover before plant closure: “Leaving the sinking ship” vs. “Captain throwing ballast overboard”

Involuntary job loss in administrative data is commonly identified by exploiting the exogenous nature of mass layoffs or plant closures. However, prior knowledge can lead to selection in the labor turnover of distressed firms. This paper proposes a simple method to determine if and when selective turnover sets in. Based on a rich administrative data set for Austria, we show that separations up to two quarters before plant closure should be included in the treatment group. Moreover, we find that early leavers are associated with significantly lower costs of job loss due to plant closure.