Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.     

Immediate Disclosure or Secrecy? The Release of Information in Experimental Asset Markets

This paper reports the results of experimental asset markets designed to investigate how the public disclosure of uncertain information affects market and individual outcomes. In some markets, no information is released as trading starts, and in others, an imperfect pre‐announcement is disclosed. The reliability of the pre‐announcement varies across markets. Our data indicate under‐reaction to a pre‐announcement that is highly reliable and over‐reaction to one with much lower reliability. Price volatility is higher and allocational efficiency is lower with a pre‐announcement that reflects substantial uncertainty. Furthermore, when the reliability of the pre‐announcement is low, traders extract a smaller proportion of the total attainable profit. Thus, in a highly uncertain environment better outcomes may result when information is withheld. These results have important policy implications regarding the disclosure of information by the Federal Reserve. In a highly uncertain environment, better outcomes may actually result with less information.     

政府会计信息披露研究

随着我国政府体制改革的不断进行,我国对于政府会计信息披露的要求也会随之提上日程,本文对我国政府会计信息披露的必要性进行了说明,并对我国现行的政府会计信息披露存在的问题进行了阐述和反思,以此作为改革的理论和现实基础,同时在这一基础上提出了一些相应的建议,希望对我国政府会计信息披露有所帮助。     

Heterogeneity of Funds and Information Disclosure: Evidence

Institutional investors, especially public funds, play an important role in governing listed firms as they grow in Chinese stock markets. We classify each fund as “dedicated,” “transient,” or “mixed,” according to the concentration, turnover, and profit sensitivity of their stock holdings. We find that listed firms with more shares held by dedicated funds have a higher disclosure quality, while firms with more shares held by transient funds have a lower disclosure quality. These findings are consistent in different model settings. In addition, dedicated funds improve the disclosure quality of non-state-owned enterprises more than state-owned enterprises. Dedicated funds can benefit from the lower debt-financing cost and higher stock liquidity of firms with better disclosure quality.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization

The so-called disclosure principle is a 'puzzle' in the accounting literature: Game theoretic models of financial markets show that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. Yet, the result is not convincing. Researchers have therefore built sophisticated models in order to demonstrate for which reasons the disclosure principle might fail. This note shows that even in the original model there are multiple equilibria. In those equilibria good types disclose and bad types do not. The commonly known full disclosure equilibrium is a limit point of the equilibrium set.     

公平信息披露与分析师预测精度——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

证券分析师是证券市场重要的信息加工者和传播者,他们的信息行为对中小投资者和市场效率有重要影响。本文基于2003~2009年分析师的年度盈利预测数据,运用面板计量模型实证检验了公平信息披露规则的实施对分析师预测精度的影响。研究结果表明:分析师预测精度在规则实施后显著下降了;而且,随着规则实施时间的推移,分析师预测精度进一步下降;另外,分析师对信息披露水平较差的上市公司的预测精度下降幅度更大。     

交易透明度与信息揭示制度：国际趋势与启示

由于经济文化环境、交易制度、市场结构，技术模式和投资者分布等方面的差异，不同交易所在交易信息揭示的种类，数量和程度方面有所区别。本文首先总结了采取指令驱动的主要交易所的交易信息揭示制度和市场透明度，在比基础上分析了交易所交易信息揭示制度变革与市场透明度的发展趋势．希望能对我国证券市场交易信息揭示制度的发展提供一点有益的借鉴和启示。     

上市公司分部信息披露动因与约束

分部信息的披露主体主要是上市公司.公司出于竞争投资者有限的资金等目的有自愿披露分部信息的动因.由于分部信息披露存在成本,在没有管制的情况下,企业出于自身利益最大化考虑,将通过对收益和成本的权衡来决定分部信息披露.由于分部信息披露的外部性、分部信息分布的不对称性等,不能完全依赖于自愿披露,必须对分部信息披露进行适度的管制,强制公司披露分部信息.     

试论上市公司信息披露差异化

差异化的信息披露是证券市场公平与效率的体现,有助于全面保护投资者利益,降低上市公司信息披露成本,增加监管的针对性。上市公司质量是信息披露差异化的衡量标准,上市公司信息披露的差异化体现为证券信息是否披露、披露方式和披露重点的判断和认定。为了构建我国的差异化信息披露制度,要明确信息披露的法律依据,规范和强化信息披露差异化的认定,建立信息披露差异化的等级制度。     

银行信息披露制度与银行系统稳定性研究

建立商业银行信息披露制度是我国金融改革中较重要的一环,一般的认识是信息制度的建立将使金融机构运作更审慎,有利于提高整个金融系统的稳定性;但本文通过博弈模型证明:赋予我国商业银行国家信用与进行信息披露制度之间存在着一定的冲突,目前我国对金融体系的过度保护反而会降低商业银行信息披露的对银行体系稳定性的改进,合适的改革次序应是国家信用在金融机构中的先行退出也即建立一个合适的存款保险制度,其次才是规范的信息披露制度的建立.     

The Interpretation of Information and Corporate Disclosure Strategies

This paper analyzes a setting in which a firm's manager can credibly disclose facts, but not their valuation implications. Consequently, he is uncertain as to how those disclosed facts will be interpreted by investors. Introducing such uncertainty affects the manager's disclosure strategy in two important ways. First, it becomes a function of the market's prior valuation of the firm since that valuation provides a clue as to how future disclosures are likely to be interpreted by investors. Second, the disclosure strategy is no longer characterized, in general, by a single good news/bad news partition of the manager's private information.     

我国上市银行内部控制信息披露的国际借鉴与路径选择

上市商业银行内部控制信息披露是公开信息披露的核心和防范金融风险的第一道防线。近年来,美国上市银行的内部控制信息披露制度发生了巨大的变革,主要表现在内部控制信息披露由自愿向强制转变、进一步规范了内部控制信息披露的内容与格式、内部控制信息披露须经验证并由首席执行官和首席财务官宣誓保证及萨班斯法案的影响等。本文通过相关研究发现我国存在内部控制信息披露不规范、披露不充分及对内部控制信息披露的认识和理解不一致等问题。因此,建议我国应通过整章建制、以市场为主导及更新观念来分阶段、分步骤推进我国上市银行的内部控制信息披露制度。     

分工与证券市场信息披露

本首先从对信息披露制度的争论提出问题，然后以新兴古典经济学视角研究证券市场信息披露制度。股东与经理之间的分工导致信息不对称，为消除信息不对称、为减少股东与经理之间交易协调失灵的风险，需要证券市场信息披露制度。章最后从减少内生交易费用和限制外生交易费用的角度，指出我国信息披露制度应该完善的地方。     

Investment Opportunity Set and Voluntary Disclosure of Prospective Information: A Simultaneous Equations Approach

Abstract:   This paper examines empirically the relationship between the level of disclosure of prospective information and the investment opportunity set for firms in New Zealand. Using a systems (two‐stage least squares) approach that explicitly controls for potential endogeneity between disclosure and IOS, we find that the level of prospective information disclosure is significantly and positively related to IOS in both specifications in our simultaneous analysis. Further, we document that prospective information disclosure is positively related to firm size and new security offerings, and is not related to inside ownership and firm profitability. IOS is positively impacted by a firm's investments in fixed assets and its profitability. Finally, we find that forward looking disclosure levels are positively related to the proportion of outside directors on the board and negatively related to barriers to entry, but these findings are not robust across alternative model specifications.     

上市公司主动信息披露行为的博弈分析

本文从同业竞争的简单博弈模型出发进行分析,得出了上市公司主动披露"好消息"但不主动披露"坏消息"的结论.而后,对市场监督机制存在的情况下对上市公司主动信息披露的行为进行博弈分析, 、得出了市场可预测与不可预测情况下上市公司的纳什均衡.最后,对外界监督压力存在的情况进行了博弈分析.上市公司一般会选择主动披露"好消息",但主动披露"坏消息"的行为则随约束条件的不同而变化.增强上市公司的同业竞争,提高上市公司对声誉的依赖性,提高监督效率,降低监督成本,提高监督的覆盖面,对提高上市公司主动信息披露行为会起积极作用.     

我国金融资产管理公司信息披露研究

随着金融改革的不断推进和市场的全面对外开放,我国金融资产管理公司作为商业化转型中的政策性国有金融企业,其信息披露不仅在开放的市场中不可或缺,而且也关系到其自身的经营绩效和后续发展。我国金融资产管理公司应充分认识到信息披露的意义,剖析现有信息披露制度的缺陷,通过各方共同努力提升信息披露水平。     

A Real Effects Perspective to Accounting Measurement and Disclosure: Implications and Insights for Future Research

Accounting measurement and disclosure rules have a significant impact on the real decisions that firms make. In this essay, we provide an analytical framework to illustrate how such real effects arise. Using this framework, we examine three specific measurement issues that remain controversial: (1) How does the measurement of investments affect a firm's investment efficiency? (2) How does the measurement and disclosure of a firm's derivative transactions affect a firm's choice of intrinsic risk exposures, risk management strategy, and the incentive to speculate? (3) How could marking‐to‐market the asset portfolios of financial institutions generate procyclical real effects? We draw upon these real effects studies to generate sharper and novel insights that we believe are useful not only for the development of accounting standards, but also for guiding future empirical research.     

Public Disclosure of Forward Contracts and Revelation of Proprietary Information

Financial executives of firms engaged in forward contracting have raised concerns that mandated disclosure of those contracts would reveal proprietary information to rival firms. This paper considers the basis for those concerns in the framework of a duopoly in which one privately informed producer enters the forward market prior to production. In choosing its forward position, the firm considers the effects of that position on the forward price and second stage product market competition with its rival. Two regimes are considered: mandated disclosure and no disclosure. Under the former, the contracting firm faces a tension between exploiting its information advantage in the forward market and attempting to influence the production decision of its rival. On average, in equilibrium, the contracting firm gains a first-mover advantage, but at the cost of revealing its private information to its rival and extracting less expected gains from uninformed forward market participants. In contrast, with no disclosure, the contracting firm cannot influence rival firm beliefs, but extracts more expected gains from its private information in both the forward and product markets. On balance, the contracting firm prefers no disclosure. Moreover, parameterizations exist such that the rival also prefers that regime. These findings explain the opposition of respondents to draft proposals of Statement of Financial Standards No. 133.     

Information and capital asset pricing

Investors in a market frequently update their diverse perceptions of the values of risky assets, thus invalidating the classic capital asset pricing model's (CAPM) assumption of complete agreement among investors. To accommodate information asymmetry and belief updating, we have developed an empirically testable information-adjusted CAPM, which states that the expected excess return of a risky asset/portfolio is solely determined by the information-adjusted beta rather than the market beta. The model is then used to analyze empirical anomalies of the classic CAPM, including a flatter relation between average return and the market beta than the CAPM predicts, a non-zero Jensen's alpha, insignificant explanatory power of the market beta, and size effect.     

上市公司信息披露内部性的经济分析及实证检验

由于上市公司与股东之间交易合同的明确程度受限,公司信息生成与信息披露这一期间市场异常收益的产权没能得到明确界定,所以信息占优的上市公司管理层就会通过故意延迟信息披露攫取这部分产权未被界定的收益,这就是上市公司信息披露的内部性现象。本文以上市公司年报公告这一事件为例,通过理论模型推导和实证检验两种方法证实了其内部性的存在,以期对证券市场监管部门的信息披露监管选择和侧重提供参考。