金融产品创新系列讲座之九总收益互换

总收益互换(total return swaps,TRS)是指总收益卖方(以下简称卖方)将特定参考资产的总收益支付给总收益买方(以下简称买方),作为交换,买方支付以浮动利率(即市场利率)为基础的总收益给卖方的一种信用衍生工具。     

金融双语

2006年2月8日，中国人民银行发布了《中国人民银行关于开展人民币利率互换交易试点有关事宜的通知》，明确了开展人民币利率互换交易的有关事项。     

金融双语

OTC——银行间即期外汇市场的新发展 中国人民银行宣布，自2006年1月4日起，在银行间即期外汇市场上引入询价交易方式（简称OTC方式），同时保留撮合方式。银行间外汇市场交易主体既可选择以集中授信、集中竞价的方式交易，也可选择以双边授信、双边清算的方式进行询价交易。同时，在银行间外汇市场引入做市商制度，为市场提供流动性。     

金融双语

融资融券 融资融券即保证金交易，其实质是利用杠杆效应放大投资者的市场参与程度。融资融券可增强市场活力，提高流动性；通过允许投资者卖空，还可有效提高价格弹性，改善二级市场定价机制。     

金融双语

信用风险缓释 信用风险缓释技术在新巴塞尔协议中占有相当重要地位，是新巴塞尔协议降低资本要求的主要方法。信用风险缓释技术是指通过采取抵押、担保、信用衍生工具以及净扣协议中冲销头寸的办法等降低信用风险的方法和技术。     

金融双语——关键利率久期

关键利率久期 我们知道,修正久期是用来衡量债券组合对收益率曲线平行移动的敏感性的一种方法.那么,如何来衡量债券组合对收益率曲线形状变化的敏感性呢？关键利率久期就是这样一种方法,它可以用来比较具有相同修正久期的两个（或多个）债券组合的收益率曲线风险.这种方法是在保持收益率曲线上其他收益率不变的情况下,改变特定期限的收益率,进而衡量债券组合对这种变化的敏感性.债券价格对特定收益率变化的敏感性称为利率久期.     

金融双语

银团机构与贷款交易协会定义担保贷款凭证为被多样化的公司贷款池所支持或担保的证券。实务中对其定义更宽泛，为被构造和聚集成一个多样化的担保贷款资产池以实现特殊目的的投资工具。其所聚集的担保由一系列的票据加权益的发行所支持。定级票据通常是被有序地分层，更高级的评级级别拥有着对担保池所产生的现金流的更优先的索取权以及对担保损失保护的更高程度的次级资本支持。通过对贷款池运用传统的资产支持的结构化技术，担保贷款凭证被有效地构造。     

金融双语

什么是信用衍生产品？信用衍生产品是属于场外交易的金融合约，其支付取决于特定发行者的信用等级变动。这里说的特定发行人一般不是参与信用衍生产品合约的某一方。信用衍生产品的种类很多，比如信用违约互换、总收益互换、资产支持的信用票据等。     

金融双语

内部评级法 内部评级法是巴塞尔新资本协议的一项核心内容，它允许商业银行通过内部评级体系确定自身的信用风险及最低资本要求。巴塞尔委员会推出内部评级法的目的之一就是将银行的资本要求与其内在信用风险的大小更加准确地结合在一起。     

金融双语

IPO即(新股)首次公开发行。在IPO之前，投资银行家通常组织全球“路演”来为即将发行的股票进行声势浩大的宣传和推介。“路演”一般有两个目的：一是投资银行家希望能够吸引潜在的投资者并为他们提供有关发行的信息；二是“路演”也有助于搜集关于股票上市定价的信息，为发行公司和承销商决策作参考。     

Pricing Inefficiencies in Private Real Estate Markets Using Total Return Swaps

Efficient markets should guarantee the existence of zero spreads for total return swaps. However, real estate markets have recorded values that are significantly different from zero in both directions. Possible explanations might suggest non-rational behaviour by inexperienced market players or unusual features of the underlying asset market. We find that institutional characteristics in the underlying market lead to market inefficiencies and, hence, to the creation of a rational trading window with upper and lower bounds within which transactions do not offer arbitrage opportunities. Given the existence of this rational trading window, we also argue that the observed spreads can substantially be explained by trading imbalances due to the limited liquidity of a newly formed market and/or to the effect of market sentiment, complementing explanations based on the lag between underlying market returns and index returns.     

Survivor Swaps

A survivor swap (SS) is an agreement to exchange cash flows in the future based on the outcome of at least one survivor index. This article discusses the possible uses of SSs as instruments for managing, hedging, and trading mortality‐dependent risks. SSs are especially useful for insurance companies, but also offer other interested parties low beta avenues into the acquisition of mortality risk exposure. The article also investigates vanilla SSs in some detail, and suggests how their premiums and values might be determined in an incomplete market setting.     

金融双语信用违约互换

Credit default swaps can be thought of as an insurance against the default of some underlying instrument1, or as a put option on the underlying instrument. In a typical credit default swap, as shown in figure, the party selling the credit risk (or the "protection buyer") makes periodic payments to the "protection seller" of a negotiated number of basis points , times the notional amount of the underlying bond or loan.     

The Default Risk of Swaps

We characterize the exchange of financial claims from risky swaps. These transfers are among three groups: shareholders, debtholders, and the swap counterparty. From this analysis we derive equilibrium swap rates and relate them to debt market spreads. We then show that equilibrium swaps in perfect markets transfer wealth from shareholders to debtholders. In a simplified case, we obtain closed-form solutions for the value of the default risk in the swap. For interest-rate swaps, we obtain numerical solutions for the equilibrium swap rate, including default risk. We compare these with equilibrium debt market default risk spreads.     

Swaps: Plain and Fanciful

The outstanding face amount of plain vanilla interest rate swaps exceeds two trillion dollars. While pricing and hedging of such swaps appear to be quite simple, many existing theories are based on the incorrect characterization of a swap as a simple exchange of a fixed for a floating rate note. This characterization is not consistent with standarized swap contracts and the treatment of swaps in bankruptcy. This paper provides an alternative perspective on swaps.     

Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending

Theories on loan portfolio swap hedging are based on a portfolio-choice approach. This paper presents an alternative: a firm-theoretic model for bank behavior with loan portfolio swaps. Our paper derives the optimal loan rate and rate-taking loan amount of the banks portfolio, and relates them to the market loan rate, counterparty loan rate, swap default risk, capital-to-deposits ratio, and deposit insurance. We find that in the bilateral default risk approach, the comparative static results are generated by four factors: the banks risk magnitude about the equity market value, loan composition in the swap contract, the substitution effect in the loan portfolio, and the income effect from the swap transaction. The results imply that changes in the payoff asymmetry in the event of swap default and the banks regulatory parameters have a direct effect on the banks loan portfolio for lending and swap transactions.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice.     

中国外汇交易中心公布外汇掉期曲线

2011年2月28日,由中国外汇交易中心编制的外汇掉期曲线在＂中国货币网＂（www.chinamoney.com.cn）正式对外公布。外汇掉期曲线以外汇交易系统成交价、双边报价和货币经纪报价为样本,真实反映了外汇掉期市场价格水平,可满足市场成员外汇掉期等外汇衍生产品估值需求。     

Optimal Portfolios with Credit Default Swaps

Using a continuous-time, stochastic, and dynamic framework, this study derives a closed-form solution for the optimal investment problem for an agent with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences for maximising the expected utility of his or her final wealth. The agent invests in a frictionless, complete market in which a riskless asset, a (defaultable) bond, and a credit default swap written on the bond are listed. The model is calibrated to market data of six European countries and assesses the behaviour of an investor exposed to different levels of sovereign risk. A numerical analysis shows that it is optimal to issue credit default swaps in a larger quantity than that of bonds, which are optimally purchased. This speculative strategy is more aggressive in countries characterised by higher sovereign risk. This result is confirmed when the investor is endowed with a different level of risk aversion. Finally, we solve a static version of the optimisation problem and show that the speculative/hedging strategy is definitely different with respect to the dynamic one.     

Capital Structure Swaps and Shareholder Wealth

We show how capital structure swaps can increase the wealth of a firm's long‐term shareholders when a firm's debt or equity is misvalued. We review the conventional rule that a firm should issue equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt (an equity‐for‐debt swap) when equity is overvalued, or repurchase equity with proceeds of new debt (a debt‐for‐equity swap) when equity is undervalued. We also analyse the more complex case where a firm's debt and equity are both undervalued, showing the optimal swap may be to issue undervalued equity, contrary to the conventional rule.     

Debt-for-Equity Swaps under a Rational Expectations Equilibrium

This paper analyzes LDC debt-for-equity swaps under a rational expectations equilibrium. Under full information, the swap can never be strictly preferred by the LDC, the MNC, and the bank. Under the postulated informational asymmetry assumptions the same results obtain, leading to the “lemons” market in reverse. Under rational expectations, the swap can only occur if the loan is correctly valued relative to all private information in the economy. Given that some swaps do occur, future models must reflect the unique features of swaps.