Deposit insurance scheme and banking crises: a special focus on less-developed countries

This study analyzes the effect of an explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) on the probability of a banking crisis in a country while taking the country’s overall economic development into account. The panel data for the period of 1980–2003 include all the countries having the data on an EDIS. The major finding is that if the interaction between a country’s overall economic development and its use of an EDIS is not controlled for, the country’s use of the EDIS increases the probability of a banking crisis. This increase is greater the more inefficiently designed the EDIS is. However, once the interaction between the overall economic development and the use of the EDIS is controlled for, it is found that the EDIS itself is not a significant factor of a banking crisis. In that case, the less developed the country is that is using an EDIS, the higher the probability of a banking crisis.     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

加强银保合作 整合资源优势

开展银保合作的必然性可从客户、银行、保险实现“三赢”的角度来论证。我国银保合作目前已经有了初步发展，但由于政策面及业务上的诸多原因，在模式选择及业务运作上，还存在一些问题，深化银保合作需要选择正确的途径和措施。     

Capital and liquidity in a dynamic model of banking

This paper analyzes capital requirements in combination with a particular kind of cash reserves, that are invested in the risk-free asset, from now on, compensated reserves. We consider a dynamic framework of banking where competition may induce banks to gamble. In this set up, we can capture the two effects that capital regulation has on risk, the capital-at-risk effect and the franchise value effect (Hellman et al., 2000). We show that while capital alone is an inferior policy, compensated reserves, will complement capital requirements, by creating franchise value, and are therefore efficient in solving moral hazard problems.     

Price regulation in insurance markets with asymmetric information

The paper presents and discusses a regulatory policy in insurance markets. It is based upon a two-sided rule: each company must propose at least one contract with full coverage and a ceiling is imposed on the level of premiums.     

Poverty trap and global indeterminacy in a growth model with open-access natural resources

In this paper we use global analysis techniques to analyze an economic growth model with environmental negative externalities, giving rise to a three-dimensional dynamic system (the framework is the one introduced by Wirl (1997) [53]). The dynamics of our model admits a locally attracting stationary state , which is, in fact, a poverty trap, coexisting with another stationary state possessing saddle-point stability. Global dynamical analysis shows that, under some conditions on the parameters, if the initial values of the state variables are close enough to the coordinates of , then there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories approaching and one trajectory approaching . Therefore, our model exhibits global indeterminacy, since either or can be selected according to agent expectations. Moreover, we prove that conditions guaranteeing the attractivity of also imply the saddle-point stability of . However, when is not attractive, numerical simulations show the possible existence of one or two limit cycles: an attractive one surrounding and one endowed with a two-dimensional stable manifold surrounding .     

The equity price channel in a New-Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions and banking

This paper studies the role of the equity price channel in business cycle fluctuations, and highlights the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium models with financial frictions and, as a result, emphasizes the systemic influence of financial markets on the real economy. We develop a canonical dynamic general equilibrium model with a tractable role for the equity market in banking, entrepreneur and household economic activities. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data over the sample period 1982Q01–2015Q01. We show that a dynamic general equilibrium model with an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle. The model reproduces the strong procyclicality of the equity price. The equity price channel significantly exacerbates business cycle fluctuations through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels. Our results support the increasing emphasis on common equity capital in Basel III regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.     

Democracy,regulation and competition in emerging banking systems

This paper develops a political economy framework to analyse the relations among democracy, financial regulation and banking competition in the emerging banking systems of Central and Eastern Europe. We develop extensive new yearly non-structural indices of bank competition instead of concentration indices as in the previous literature that show its evolution over time with the level of democracy. In addition, we directly test for linkages between democracy, financial regulation and banking competition. Using an unbalanced panel data set over the period 1994–2016 for 617 banks, we show that more democratic countries with better regulatory framework lead to the enhancement of competition. We also find significant support for the core hypothesis that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment is inadequate. Given that financial regulatory framework in a “partially” democratic environment can be inadequate we find a U-shaped relation in the sense that there is a threshold level of democracy beyond which banking systems in those countries are more competitive.     

A continuous time model of European growth,integration and technology diffusion: The role of distance

Economists have been devoting increasing attention to the diffusion process of knowledge in economic activities. However, the models till now developed concentrate mostly on the dynamics determined by the steady state, when dealing with the interaction among many countries. Instead, we present a non-linear model where explicitly formalize the disequilibrium as starting point. We evaluate theoretically and empirically, with a continuous time analysis applied to panel data, the integration process of some main European countries by considering a simultaneous interaction among output, technology and business services. In this process we take particular care of distance, as a strategic variable over time, and of the following consequences on the convergence to the steady state. On this subject we also show a closed form solution in presence of a linear constraint on technology among countries.     

Public debt in a basic endogenous growth model

We work out the mechanism that makes public debt affect the allocation of resources in the long-run. To do so we analyze an AK growth model with elastic labor supply and a government sector. The government levies a distortionary income tax and issues bonds to finance lump-sum transfers and non-distortionary public spending. We show that the long-run growth rate is the smaller the higher the debt ratio if the government adjusts public spending to fulfill its inter-temporal budget constraint. If the government adjusts lump-sum transfers the public debt ratio does not affect the balanced growth rate.     

Harmonizing national options and discretions in the EU banking regulation

The European Central Bank strives to harmonize over 160 national options and discretions (O&Ds) that contribute to the fragmentation of banking union’s regulatory framework. National authorities seem prepared to accept it, despite previously insisting on the inclusion of all O&Ds into the EU legislation. We analyze a sample of O&D choices and their correspondence to cleavages pertinent to the political economy of EU banking. We find that the 11 post-communist member states use O&Ds more stringently to protect capital and liquidity in the local subsidiaries of foreign-own banks, which may complicate their potential opt-in to the banking union.     

Cost efficiency and banking performances in a partial universal banking system: application of the panel smooth threshold model

This paper studies the cost efficiency of bank in a partial universal banking system (PUBS), Taiwan. Instead of assuming one common technology in the bank cost function, two technologies are assumed to be imbedded in the cost function. Fee revenues are used as threshold to divide the banks into two technologies. A bank whose fee revenues exceeding the threshold is designated as universal bank technology while falling below the threshold is designated as traditional deposit-loan technology. The panel smooth transition model is adopted, which allows banks to smoothly adjust between the two technologies. Two criteria are suggested, overbanking and the trend-toward-fee revenues, to assess the new model's performances. With respect to scale economies, the results do find a panel smooth transition model yield more reasonable results than the conventional OLS and random effect of panel data approach. Based on the panel smooth transition model, the optimal fixed asset size is around ten billion New Taiwan dollars.     

A field experiment on the impact of weather shocks and insurance on risky investment

We conduct a framed field experiment in rural Ethiopia to test the seminal hypothesis that insurance provision induces farmers to take greater, yet profitable, risks. Farmers participated in a game protocol in which they were asked to make a simple decision: whether or not to purchase fertilizer and if so, how many bags. The return to fertilizer was dependent on a stochastic weather draw made in each round of the game. In later rounds a random selection of farmers made this decision in the presence of a stylized weather-index insurance contract. Insurance was found to have some positive effect on fertilizer purchases. Purchases were also found to depend on the realization of the weather in the previous round. We explore the mechanisms of this relationship and find that it may be the result of both changes in wealth weather brings about, and changes in perceptions of the costs and benefits to fertilizer purchases.     

Solvency regulation in the property-liability insurance industry

This paper evaluates guaranty funds and solvency regulations. One main question addressed is how solvency regulations will benefit consumers. Many previous studies have found that most forms of solvency regulations do not have significant deterrent effects on insolvency. Even when solvency regulations are effective, they might still adversely affect consumers. This could happen because increasing the probability of solvency usually requires raising premiums. Therefore, it is interesting to see how regulators should design insurance regulations that benefit consumers. Insolvency of insurance firms provides a unique environment under which one is able to analyze the effects of solvency regulations and guaranty funds on the quality of insurance products and on consumers. This paper shows that guaranty funds are always desirable, but solvency regulations are of certain value only when they have the effect of protecting guaranty funds and alleviating the disincentives which they create.     

Public provision of health insurance and aggregate saving in an overlapping generations model with endogenous health risk: The South Korean case

This paper examines the effect of expanding public health insurance in South Korea on medical expenditures and aggregate saving using an overlapping generations model with endogenous health risk. South Korea had a substantial underinsured population, which is aging rapidly. Higher public health insurance benefits reduce individual medical expenditure and health risks but lead to a modest decline in individual and aggregate saving. Even after the expansion, the medical care coverage remains incomplete, and the elderly face a substantial risk of out-of-pocket medical expenditures.