Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?

Libertarian paternalists hold that biases and distortions in human decision-making justify paternalistic interference affecting individuals’ decisions. The aim of this paper is to analzye to what extent an evolutionary outlook supports libertarian paternalism. I will put forward three arguments in favour of libertarian paternalism and six objections that strongly oppose it. While evolutionary economists should take seriously the contention that our positive knowledge of real-world decision-making will have to influence our normative assessment of these decisions, the objections against libertarian paternalism brought forward in this paper serve as a cautionary note. Contrary to the claims of its proponents, libertarian paternalism is neither inevitable, nor does it provide an adequate measuring rod of normative rationality. It is prone to abuse by anchoring its standard of rationality pragmatically to norms and can thus promote conservative bias and stifle innovative exploration. It also presents the policy-maker with a compounded Hayekian knowledge problem. Finally, from a dynamic point of view, libertarian paternalism’s manipulative shaping of preferences might lock-in individuals into heteronomous preference learning paths without them being even aware of it.     

Some flaws in the doctrine of classical liberalism: Reviewing Charles Murray’sWhat it means to be a libertarian: A personal interpretation

In the course of a review of Charles Murray’sWhat It Means to Be a Libertarian, the following paper presents a critique of some of the assumptions underlying the political economy and laissez-faire policy recommendations of modern libertarian thought. After considering the role and importance of asymmetric information, relative immobility of labor, and unemployment in the formation of labor and consumption goods markets, this paper concludes that there is a positive role for the state in the construction of just and efficient markets. The paper argues that a regime of laissez-faire would be most unlikely to result in enhanced economic growth and prosperity, to say nothing of the more extravagant claims that Murray makes, such as a diminution of racism, crime, and welfare dependence, with an enhanced sense of community and family values.     

Estimation of a German money demand system – a long-run analysis

This study presents a multivariate analysis of the stability of long-run relationships between variables that influence the conduct and transmission process of the German monetary policy. The initial VAR comprises the variables real money M3, real GNP, the inflation rate, a long-term and a weighted short-term interest rate. A multivariate approach has been chosen, as this allows for more than one cointegration relationship and to test restrictions on the cointegration space. In contrast to most other studies on German monetary policy, three stable and economically plausible cointegration relationships are obtained simultaneously within the framework of the Johansen procedure: a money demand relationship, a long-run Fisher effect and a long-run relationship between the short- and the long-term interest rate. It is apparent that the structural break of German reunification can be modelled incorporating dummy variables in the model. First version received: October 1996/final version received: July 1997     

Experts with a conflict of interest: a source of ambiguity?

We present an experimental design where uncertainty is generated from the advice of experts with conflicts of interest. In this experiment clients are faced with a variant of a multi-armed bandit problem with a random end-time. On the known arm (the “task screen”), clients can earn a certain payment per completion of a decoding task. However, clients may also opt for the unknown arm where they earn an uncertain amount if they end the experiment on this “expert screen”. The amount is uncertain to the clients because the value is being communicated through an “expert” with conflicted incentives. A control session provides for direct transmission of the value to the clients. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is alive-and-well in this environment. Also, when we vary the wage rate on the known arm we find that higher opportunity cost clients are less likely to heed the advice of conflicted experts.     

Easter Island’s collapse: a tale of a population race

The Easter Island tragedy has become an allegory for ecological catastrophe and a warning for the future. In the economic literature the collapse is usually attributed to irrational or myopic behavior in the context of a fragile ecosystem. In this paper we propose an alternative story involving non-cooperative bargaining between clans to share the crop. Each clan’s bargaining power depends on its threat level when fighting a war. The biggest group has the highest probability of winning. A clan’s fertility is determined ex ante by each group. In the quest for greater bargaining power, each clan’s optimal size depends on that of the other clan, and a population race follows. This race may exhaust the natural resources and lead to the ultimate collapse of the society. In addition to well-known natural factors, the likelihood of a collapse turns out to be greater when the cost of war is low, the probability of succeeding in war is highly responsive to the number of fighters, and the marginal return to labor is high. We analyze whether these factors can account for the difference between Easter and Tikopia Islands. The paper also makes a methodological contribution in that it is the first fertility model to include strategic complementarities between groups’ fertility decisions.      

Can a corrupt ruling party win a re-election through vote buying?

In many developing countries, it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes. We develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade-off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party’s chances of being re-elected. The results show, because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians, politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle.