Location for Foreign Direct Investment in Vertically Related Markets

This paper studies a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) location decision in a vertically related market with endogenous vertical technology transfer (VTT). We show that, even though VTT is more costly in a less developed country, an MNE can transfer more technology there than in a developed country (DC). When the opposite occurs, the MNE sometimes locates in a DC where, although it faces stronger competition, it obtains the input at better terms. Therefore, by arguing that the MNE's decision can be crucially affected by the upstream market's outcomes, an alternative explanation is provided for the commonly observed foreign direct investment (FDI) in DCs.     

Optimal Trade Policies and Production Technology in Vertically Related Markets*

This paper shows that optimal trade policies for vertically related markets depend crucially on production technology. By employing a production function with variable‐coefficient technology, it shows that return to scale is crucial in determining the direction of government intervention. Therefore, the assumption of fixed‐coefficient production technologies, which has been popular in industrial organization and trade literature when modeling vertically related markets, should be used with caution.     

Differentiated Products,Vertical Related Markets,and Optimal Export Policy

This paper studies the optimal export policy in the context of a vertically related industry with differentiated products, and analyzes the effects of the degree of product substitutability and market structure on the determination of such a policy. It is shown that the results obtained in a similar model with homogeneous goods rivalry no longer hold when the goods are differentiated. Indeed, the degree of product substitutability plays an important role in the determination of export policies, and also determines whether a country can be better off under a trade policy war compared to free trade. The use of a differentiated product setting also allows one to compare export policies and countries' welfare levels under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. It is found that the results of the comparison are also sensitive to the degree of product substitutability.     

Optimal Privatization Design and Financial Markets

This paper provides a simple general equilibrium analysis of privatization, exploring its real effects. They derive from the expansion of risk‐sharing opportunities (within an incomplete markets setting) that are created by the addition of a market in the public project property rights. The principal conclusion is that an optimal combination of voucher and share issue privatization can implement the first‐best.     

纵向关联市场间的价格传递

本文运用均衡移动模型研究农业生产者与食品零售商之间的纵向价格传递关系。模型建立在如下假设之上：即农产品（食品）营销企业在零售环节拥有寡占卖方力量、在农产品收购环节拥有寡占买方力量、营销企业所需要的农产品投入与其他营销投入之间存在一定替代关系并拥有规模报酬可变的技术。结果表明，市场力量和规模报酬对价格传递的影响十分复杂，一方面取决于农产品供给函数和食品需求函数的具体形式，另一方面还取决于外生冲击作用下农产品收购环节与食品零售环节市场力量变化的相对幅度。     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Vertically Related Markets

The paper provides a theoretical framework which addresses exchange rate pass-through within the setting of vertically related markets. In particular, foreign firms' price adjustment in response to an exchange rate shock is evaluated. This permits study of the importance of cost effects of the exchange rate shock. Recent empirical evidence indicated the relevance of these cost effects. It is shown that one can decompose the effects of an exchange rate shock on the final goods market into direct and indirect components. The indirect effect works through the input market. The degree of pass-through then depends on the relative importance of direct and indirect effects, which in turn depends on the nature of vertical structures and strategic firm behavior. It is shown that the institutional aspects of vertically related markets play a role in explaining incomplete price adjustments in both intermediate and final goods markets and the failure of PPP in the short run.     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

竞争政策与跨国最优技术授权策略

本文探讨当前中国在知识产权领域实施(宽松)竞争政策的理论基础。基于本国国有企业和私营企业与具有成本优势的外国企业进行古诺竞争的寡头模型,分析生产型外国企业如何将降低成本的专利技术分别授权给本国的两家企业。我们的研究表明:当不能歧视性授权时,外国企业总是偏好特许权收费方式;当能够歧视性授权时,外国企业在技术创新程度较大时会偏好固定收费方式。由于在歧视性授权下,外国企业将更多的利润转移到母国,因此本国福利在不允许歧视性授权下更高,但全球福利却相反。因此,本国政府从本国福利极大化的角度往往会强化竞争政策,限制歧视性授权;尽管从全球角度看,不限制歧视性授权的宽松竞争政策能够提升全球福利。     

Quality-Differentiated Inputs and Trade In Vertically Related Markets*

This paper presents an international trade model of vertically related markets with quality differentiation at the stage of the intermediate good. Domestic input producers are at a disadvantage relative to higher quality foreign suppliers in providing inputs to a domestic final-good producer. the input producer may be driven out of the market unless policies enacted by the domestic government can encourage domestic final-good firms to use the domestic input. Results show that multiple tariffs and direct production subsidies are the most beneficial policy options.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

This paper investigates strategic export intervention in a final-good industry which uses an intermediate good supplied by a foreign monopolist. An export tax-cum-subsidy leads to horizontal and vertical rent extraction. The optimal government intervention in the final-good market is shown to depend on the pricing scheme employed by the intermediate-good producer.     

贸易自由化、纵向关联市场与战略性环境政策——环境税对发展绿色贸易的意义

本文在一个两国出口至第三国的连续双寡模型中,研究贸易自由化对均衡环境政策及社会福利的影响。分析发现:(1)战略性环境政策的租金攫取效应可通过中间产品出口实现,但不一定会通过最终产品出口实现。(2)当污染的环境损害程度不大时,贸易自由化将降低各国环境税,从而使各国的环境保护出现"向底线赛跑";当环境损害系数较大时,贸易自由化将提高各国环境税。(3)社会福利水平为双边关税壁垒的凹函数(呈"倒U型"),贸易自由化对社会福利的影响不确定。此外,本文还分析了合理征收环境税对发展我国绿色贸易的意义。     

Vertically Related Markets: Export Rivalry Between DC and LDC Firms*

We present a model of export rivalry in vertically related markets where a DC firm produces a high-quality good as well as a key input utilized by an LDC firm to produce a low-quality export good. the DC firm acts as a Stackelberg leader by setting the price of the input and the quantity of its export good. We show that the DC firm's decision on vertical supply depends on the cost, demand, and quality parameters of both producers, and that the LDC government should tax either its final good exports or its key input imports.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

Market Size,Local Sourcing and Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment

This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign‐owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the large country does not. We show that whether a country will win foreign direct investment (FDI) competition is determined by the interaction between relative transport costs of intermediate and final goods and the market size of the large country relative to that of the small country; and policy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries.     

Optimal Trade Policy under Homogeneous Bertrand Competition*

In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re‐examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.     

跨国企业投资、政府招商行为与最优引资政策选择

通过构建一个以东道国利益为核心的博弈理论分析模型,从静态与动态两个方面对跨国企业投资与东道国政策选择之间的均衡问题进行了研究.研究结果发现,在其他条件不变的情况下,东道国外资优惠政策的最优水平与资本缺口的大小以及对外资需求的迫切程度成正比,与投资环境的优越程度成反比.因此,对于东道国而言,外资政策应朝向合理、有效且注重优化投资环境的方向发展.