Pharmaceutical regulation under market integration through parallel trade

In this paper, I study the effect of parallel trade (cross-border resale of goods without the authorization of the manufacturer) on pharmaceutical regulation. Governments may restrict prices directly (price caps) or limit third-party payer reimbursement for the drug (reimbursement limits). I find that parallel trade may relax regulation in the source country of parallel imports under both instruments and intensify regulation in the destination country under a reimbursement limit. I also find that parallel trade may change regulatory preferences: under no parallel trade, both the source and destination country set price caps, and under parallel trade, the source country sets a price cap but the destination country sets a reimbursement limit, thereby enforcing a higher price cap in the South. This implies that drug prices are higher under parallel trade in both source and destination countries.     

Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy

This study investigates the effect of a country's suppression of competition in its market for nontradables. It assumes that the initial equilibrium is stationary and demonstrates that if competition is suppressed in a small country, the country's trade surplus increases in the short run. In the large country case, the same change creates an excess demand for future tradables and affects the relative price between present and future tradables. Using a two‐country model, the study shows that this price change redistributes real wealth from the country with a trade deficit to the country with a trade surplus.     

Tax Principles and Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies Under Imperfect Competition

We construct an exporting monopoly model to compare destination‐ and origin‐based commodity taxes in a context of a trade and domestic tax reform. We show that an export tax reduction and a change in destination (resp. origin) tax that fix the world price is strictly Pareto‐improving (resp. deteriorating), which holds whether markets are integrated or segmented. This result may provide a new rationale for preferring the destination‐based consumption tax to the origin‐based production tax that has been discussed in the literature of tax harmonisation and tax competition.     

Sunk costs of exporting and the role of experience in international trade

This paper estimates the importance of destination‐specific sunk costs of exporting and investigates the role of firms' previous experience in international trade for the decision to export to a market. While destination‐specific sunk costs are important, firms' experience in international trade can help to overcome these costs more easily. In particular, import experience from a market is found to facilitate exporting to this country and export experience from other markets can increase the probability of exporting to a country. This latter effect turns out to be conditional on the characteristics and number of markets served by a firm.     

The Loss from Trade under International Cournot Oligopoly with Cost Asymmetry

This paper examines the efficiency and welfare effects of intra‐industry trade in the presence of imperfect competition and heterogeneous technologies. We show that when a Southern country has a relatively less concentrated industry and faces low demand, the output of the Northern country may contract after initiating trade. Production inefficiencies can outweigh the gain effected by trade‐induced competition and lower price in trade, resulting in a net loss in the global welfare. In some circumstances, voluntary technology transfer, managed trade through VERs, or the introduction of a tariff can improve both trading partners' welfare.     

Strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy

Abstract In a two‐country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm’s profit is higher when it cannot price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently bigger than the domestic one. The key mechanism in the model is that the home firm’s incentive to keep its domestic price close to the optimal monopoly price affects its behavior during price competition abroad. We also analyze the welfare implications of PI policies and show that our key insights extend to quantity competition.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Vertical Production and Trade*

This paper explores the optimal monetary policy response to domestic and foreign technology shocks in an open economy with vertical structure of production and trade. We find that any stage‐specific productivity shock in one country may have a transborder spillover effect on the other country via the vertical trade. So when choosing optimal monetary rules, each monetary authority should respond to both home and foreign productivity shocks. Also, the flexible exchange rate cannot replicate the flexible price equilibrium, even under producer currency pricing, due to price stickiness in multiple stages. We also find that the existence of a transborder spillover effect depends on the currencies of price setting. Finally, vertical trade may affect the value of exchange rate flexibility under PCP and LCP setting.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Fragmentation and Welfare in Monopolistic Competition

We examine the welfare effect of fragmentation with a general‐equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. Using the efficiency property of monopolistic competition models, we develop a diagram that is used to show that fragmentation of production arises, i.e. firms in a country specialize in developing blueprints and out‐source the manufacturing of their products to the other country. Such fragmentation allows countries to benefit from trade due to two different sources: comparative advantage and product diversity. We show how these two sources result in gains from trade induced by this production fragmentation.     

Pecking order and core‐periphery in international trade

This paper analyzes the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows. A multi‐country trade model with firm‐level heterogeneity in productivities and countries’ market potential provides a simple micro foundation for the link between these variables. In the model, market size and trade costs jointly determine a country‐specific pecking order of exporters serving their destination countries. In a counterfactual setting where bilateral trade costs are homogeneous across country pairs, market size predicts a common ranking of exporters among destination countries. This leads to a unique core‐periphery structure of the world trade network. With heterogeneous trade costs, we illustrate the impact of market size and trade costs on bilateral trade flows and its margins in a simple gravity‐like setting. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that both market size and trade costs (measured through the network position of countries) have a significant impact on bilateral exports: countries in the core bilaterally trade more with other countries in the core than with peripheral countries, conditional on typical observables.     

Globalization,product differentiation,and wage inequality

Abstract This paper develops a two‐country, general equilibrium model of oligopoly in which the degree of horizontal product differentiation is endogenously determined by firms’ strategic investments in product innovation. Consumers seek variety and product innovation is more skill intensive than production. Stronger import competition increases innovation incentives, and thereby the relative demand for skill. An intra‐industry trade expansion following trade liberalization can therefore increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. As long as some industries remain shielded from international competition, the welfare implications of globalization are found to be generally ambiguous.     

Migration,trade and spillover effects

This paper identifies a new channel through which migrants can affect the import demand of goods in the host country. In migrating from origin to destination country, migrants observe a change in the price of the bundle of consumable goods. In particular, the migration decision can imply a reduction in the price of imported goods for the consumption bundle of migrants: emigration towards less (tariff) protected countries allows the consumption of products that were prohibitively protected in the origin countries of migrants. To test this channel we estimate the import demand effect of migrant groups coming from third high (tariff) protected countries. Our empirical results strongly confirm this channel and suggest a new perspective about how migration can affect welfare and trade in destination countries.     

Impact of international trade under dual labor markets

A country's unemployment rate can be affected by technology choice and the opening of international trade. This general equilibrium model examines the impact of international trade with the presence of dual labor markets in which manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies with different marginal and fixed costs to maximize profits. In a closed economy, it is shown that an increase in labor market efficiency or a population increase induces manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies and the wage rate in the manufacturing sector increases. With the existence of a continuum of technologies, technology choice is not a source of firm heterogeneity. The opening of international trade leads to an increase in the wage rate in the manufacturing sector and the price of the agricultural good. When countries are identical, international trade always increases national welfare.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

旅行社价格战的博弈分析

旅行社是旅游产品设计、组织和销售的渠道商以及消费者之间的桥梁.旅行社对旅游业具有重要影响，旅行社之间的价格竞争日益严重，盈利率低。随着我国加入世贸组织，越来越多的外国旅行社进入我国、针对我国旅行社如何走出困境，本文从博弈角度分析旅行社的价格竞争及其对策。     

Why exporting countries agree to voluntary export restraints: the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier

This paper studies the impact of VER on an exporting country. It shows that a VER at the free‐trade level favours the concentration of industry, allows firms with an export licence to expand, causes the contraction of the size of the firms producing for the domestic market only, and raises the price mark‐up in the domestic market. The impact on welfare is indeterminate depending upon the effect on global efficiency. If a VER is binding, also the price mark‐up in the foreign market rises and this effect on terms of trade, ceteris paribus, is welfare improving. An applied general equilibrium model for Turkey supports the conjecture that with a VER the increased oligopolistic power of incumbent firms with an export licence, the higher price mark‐up in the domestic market and a possible social welfare gain, are the key elements in understanding the rationale behind VERs. However, if authorities induce firms to engage in unproductive profit‐seeking activities, rent dissipation occurs and the impact on social welfare becomes negative.     

DOMESTIC COMPETITION POLICY AND TARIFF POLICY COMPARED*

M. Yano and F. Dei have demonstrated that, by controlling the degree of competition in a non‐tradables market (competition policy), a country can influence the terms of trade so as to increase its welfare, relative to free trade. Using their model, this study compares the extent of this effect with that of a tariff policy. It demonstrates that a competition policy can achieve a higher utility than a tariff policy if tariff rates are at levels currently tolerated in the real world. This demonstrates that domestic competition policy may play an important role as a substitute for tariff policy.     

Sustaining Collusion under Economic Integration*

In this paper, we aim at investigating from a game‐theory perspective whether trade liberalization can promote a collusive two‐way trade. We show that, under Cournot competition, economic integration is anti‐competitive if collusive trade is a possible outcome of the repeated game; under price competition, the likelihood of collusive trade is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trade liberalization to be pro‐competitive. Furthermore, we show that economic integration may increase the scope for collusion irrespective of the firms’ strategic variable.     

FACTOR ACCUMULATION AND THE TERMS OF TRADE: APPLICATIONS TO THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of population growth and capital accumulation on trade and welfare. In the absence of a terms of trade effect, an population increase reduces the standard of living and causes a reduction in welfare. An increase in population causes deterioration in the terms of trade of a labour abundant country, whereas capital accumulation improves them, regardless of the source of growth. Moreover, an increase in the South's population is immiserizing.