Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

International differences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be justified by different local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by different preferences for public spending. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon tax be added to these local taxes to correct the global warming externality? We address this question in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods have to be financed through distortionary taxation and the cost of public funds has to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show that when lump‐sum transfers between countries are allowed for, the second best tax on the polluting good may be decomposed into three parts: one, country‐specific, dealing with the local negative externality, a second one, country‐specific, dealing with the cost of levying public funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality and which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution is to show that the uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. Nevertheless, if lump‐sum transfers between governments are impossible to implement, international differentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take care of equity concerns.     

Should Bangladesh Export to Countries with Better Institutional or Comparatively Similar Institutional Form?

Using panel data for the years 2006–2015, this study empirically investigates the effect of rule of law as an institution on Bangladesh's exports to 28 European Union countries (EU28) based on gravity model analysis. Two-step econometric results suggest that institutional rule of law is strongly associated with Bangladesh's exports, and institutional quality provides evidence of this significant effect. Furthermore, exports of Bangladesh are driven by economic size, market size, and the real exchange rate as well as rule of law. These results are suggestive of an important joint role for both trade and institutions in the long run.     

Should we reallocate patent fees to the universities?

In knowledge economies, patent agencies are often viewed as a relevant instrument of an efficient innovation policy. This paper brings a new support to that idea. We claim that these agencies should play an increasing role in the regulation of the relation between private R&D labs and public fundamental research units especially concerning the question of the appropriation of free usable research results. Since these two institutions work with opposite institutional arrangements (see P.S. Dasgupta and P.A. David. 1987. Information disclosure and the economics of science and technology. In Arrow and the accent of modern economic theory, ed. G.R. Feiwel, 519–42. New York: State University of New York Press), we essentially argue that there is, on the one hand, an over-appropriation of these results while, on the other hand, there is also an under-provision of free usable results issued from more fundamental research. We show how a public patent office can restore efficiency.     

How Green are Exporters?

There is a well‐established theoretical and empirical literature that shows that exporters are more innovative than otherwise equivalent non‐exporters. In this article, we ask whether this is also true when it comes to the effects of adopting greener production techniques. Using an instrumental variables strategy based on UK firm level data, we find robust evidence that exporters are more likely to report their innovation as having a ‘high/very high’ environmental effect.     

Should refusal to sell be illegal?

We analyse a private firm's decision of whether to refuse to sell to a particular group of consumers whose interaction with other consumers generates negative externalities. The literature has rarely incorporated this motive directly into the firm's profit-maximisation problem. Discriminatory refusal-to-sell policies can increase profits and consumer utility among those affected by the negative externality. Of course it also reduces utility among consumers who are refused, raising the possibility of an indeterminate effect on social welfare. We obtain a stark and rather surprising result: The refusal-to-sell policy is socially optimal whenever it is individually optimal for a profit-maximising firm to adopt such a policy. No legislation or regulation is required from a social-welfare perspective (under the assumptions used in the specification of the social welfare function). We prove this result analytically for the case of linear demand functions. Numerical simulations show that the result also holds for constant-price-elasticity demand functions.     

Theory Analysis of Model for Price Fluctuations in a Single Commodity Market

The price model for a single commodity market is a very important economic model that describes the basic rules for price fluctuations in a single commodity market. In this paper, we investigated the general case for the model, and proved that every positive solution is bounded and we obtained a necessary and sufficient condition for oscillation of every positive solution concerning positive state solution.     

Should public policy respond to positional externalities?

A nice suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by others in the same local environment. More generally, a positional good is one whose utility depends strongly on how it compares with others in the same category.¹A positional externality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated.² For example, if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom-tailored suits, a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers. From any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others, lest her chances of landing the job fall. But this outcome may be inefficient, since when all spend more, each candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. All may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful.In such cases, however, it is often impractical to negotiate private solutions. Do positional externalities then become legitimate objects of public policy concern? In attempting to answer this question, I employ the classical libertarian criterion put forth by John Stuart Mill³, who wrote the state may not legitimately constrain any citizen's freedom of action except to prevent harm to others. I argue that many positional externalities appear to meet Mill's test, causing not just negative feelings but also large and tangible economic costs to others who are ill-equipped to avoid them. I also discuss an unintrusive policy remedy for positional externalities, one modeled after the use of effluent charges to curb environmental pollution.The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 notes the deep similarity between the conditions that give rise to positional arms races and those that give rise to conventional military arms races. Section 2 follows with a review of evidence concerning the strength of concerns about relative position. Section 3 describes some of the tangible economic costs that people experience as a result of positional externalities arising from such concerns. Section 4 takes up the question of whether collective action directed against positional externalities is consistent with respect for individual rights. Section 5 describes how a progressive consumption tax could neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities.     

Commodity trade between Pakistan and the US: is there evidence of the J-curve?

A few studies that have attempted to estimate the short-run (J-curve) and long-run impact of exchange rate depreciation on Pakistan’s trade balance are either based on aggregate trade data between Pakistan and the rest of the world or between Pakistan and her bilateral trading partners. The findings are mixed at best. Considering the trade balance between Pakistan and the US, as one of its major partners, no significant effects have been discovered. Suspecting that the trade flows between the two countries could suffer from another aggregation bias, we disaggregate their trade flows by commodity and consider the trade balance of 45 industries that trade between the two countries. We find significant short-run effects of currency depreciation on the trade balance of 17 industries. The short-run effects last into the long run in 15 cases. The largest industry that account for more than 10% of the trade seems to benefit from real depreciation in the long run.     

Are Commodity Prices Driven by Fundamentals?

Physical scarcity is hardly sufficient to explain commodity price swings. However, despite of clues of commodity market inefficiency in the last decade, excess volatility in commodity markets emerges only under strong assumptions. When we allow for non‐stationarity in commodity prices and time variation in commodity‐specific risk premia, evidence of commodity market inefficiency becomes significantly weaker. Moreover, there is some evidence of commodity‐specific regime changes in commodity markets, with negligible or even positive correlation between efficiency and market liquidity.     

Should the dangers of deflation be dismissed?

Deflation has emerged as a concern for Asian policy makers. The traditional view is this concern is warranted – that deflation can lead to a vicious cycle of falling demand and prices, and is therefore a dangerous condition. However, another revisionist school of thought emphasizes the role of positive supply shocks in deflation and takes a more benign view of the phenomenon. In a recent paper, Borio et al. (2015) find some evidence which casts doubt on the traditional view. In this paper, we re-visit these findings using alternative measures of deflation. While we find some grounds for concern about the harmful effect of deflation on growth, our results also raise significant questions about the revisionist view.     

Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective

Even among themselves, criminals are not seen as trustworthy. Consequently, a criminal organization needs to incentivize its members, either by threats of violence or by rewarding good behavior. The cost of using violence depends on the resources police allocate to investigating intraorganizational violence. This means that the police may affect the choice of an incentive scheme by the criminal organization. The design of the optimal strategy for crime control has to take this into account. We develop a model of an infinitely repeated criminal labor market where (i) a criminal organization hires and incentivizes members, and (ii) peripheral crime (crime outside the criminal organization) is a stepping stone to a career in organized crime. We establish that there are two possible optimal strategies for the police. (i) There are situations in which the optimal strategy for the police is to use all of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals. (ii) In other situations, the optimal strategy for the police is to spend the minimum amount of resources to ensure that the criminal organization cannot punish disloyal criminals, and spend the rest of their resources to decrease the efficiency of criminals.     

Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?

Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will substantially weaken the impact of the Central Bank's actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than undermine each other.     

Should we transfer resources from college to basic education?

We analyze public intervention in two educational levels: basic education and college education. The government decides per capita expenditure at each level and the subsidy for college education. We explore the effect of transferring money from one level to the other on equity and efficiency. We prove the existence of an Equity-Efficiency Frontier (EEF), and analyze which policy reforms are optimal when the society is not at the EEF. For developed countries, this policy consists of transferring resources from college education to basic education.     

Do Price Barriers Exist in the European Carbon Market?

It is generally thought that psychological prices in markets primarily traded by professional participants should play a limited role. The authors investigate the existence of key reference points in the European Carbon Market, which can be considered as a market with highly qualified stakeholders. They document the presence of key levels and barrier bands around European Union Allowances (EUA) prices. It appears that traders tend to consider these price levels as resistances in upward movements and as supports in downward movements. Furthermore, the authors have observed that the existence of price barriers affects both return and volume dynamics. Therefore, the results indicate that there exist certain EUA prices that do, in fact, modify the behavior of European Carbon Market participants.     

Is Price Transmission in the Indian Pulses Market Asymmetric?

Journal of Quantitative Economics - Pulses form an integral part of the Indian diet. In the recent past, the domestic wholesale-retail price differential has risen rapidly. The retail prices...     

Price convergence in the EMU? Evidence from micro data

The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was widely expected to cause price convergence among member states. In an investigation of this claim, the present study avoids problems of comparability and representativeness by using an extremely detailed and comprehensive scanner database on washing machine prices and sales volumes for 17 European countries. A hedonic regression yields country-specific time series for quality-adjusted price differentials. Statistically and economically significant deviations from the Law of One Price emerge. Log t tests firmly reject price convergence among EMU countries. Small convergence clusters can be identified but they are unrelated to EMU membership.     

Should central bankers discount the future? A note

Optimal monetary policy under discretion is analysed in a New Keynesian model with rule of thumb pricing. The paper finds that social welfare increases if the policy maker does not discount the future. The welfare improvement rises with the extent of intrinsic inflation persistence.     

How Should the Graduate Economics Core be Changed?

The authors present suggestions by graduate students from a range of economics departments for improving the first-year core sequence in economics. The students identified a number of elements that should be added to the core: more training in building microeconomic models, a discussion of the methodological foundations of model-building, more emphasis on institutions to motivate and contextualize macroeconomic models, and greater focus on econometric practice rather than theory. The authors hope that these suggestions will encourage departments to take a fresh look at the content of the first-year core.