Illusory revenues: Import tariffs in resource-rich and aid-rich economies

Where imports are financed predominantly by rents from resource extraction or aid the revenue generated by tariffs is illusory. Revenue earned by the tariff is offset by a reduction in the real value of aid and resource rents. Revenue is however moved between accounts in the government budget which, in the case of aid, may reduce the burden of donor conditionality. We demonstrate this proposition for a simple central case and show that the result is not overturned by generalisations around this case. We argue that trade policy formulation in such economies should recognize the illusory nature of tariff revenues.     

Dancing to the Donors' Tune? Policy Choice in Aid‐Dependent Countries

Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome‐oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case‐study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid‐seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context‐specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity.     

A larger country sets a lower optimal tariff

We develop a new optimal tariff theory that is consistent with the fact that a larger country sets a lower tariff. In our dynamic Dornbusch–Fischer–Samuelson Ricardian model, the long‐run welfare effects of a rise in a country’s tariff consist of the direct revenue, indirect revenue, and growth effects. Based on this welfare decomposition, we obtain two main results. First, the optimal tariff of a country is positive. Second, the optimal tariff of a country is likely to be decreasing in its absolute advantage parameter, implying that a larger (i.e., more technologically advanced) country sets a lower optimal tariff.     

Optimal Tariffs under a Revenue Constraint*

This paper examines the optimal tariff structure under a revenue constraint. When a fixed level of tax revenue has to be collected from the tariff alone, no adjustment in tariff rates can achieve an efficient resource allocation, even in a small open economy. Hence, the optimal tariff problem arises under a revenue constraint. We show that the revenue‐constrained optimal tariff structure is characterized by the following two rules: (i) the optimal tariff rate is lower for the import good that is a closer substitute for the export good, and (ii) the stronger the cross‐substitutability between imports, the closer the optimal tariff is to uniformity. This provides a theoretical explanation for the finding in empirical studies that the efficiency loss from a uniform tariff structure is negligible.     

The determinants of hospital size: a survivor analysis

A common criticism of foreign aid is that it reduces domestic tax effort. Empirical research on the issue has been hampered by the failure to tackle endogeneity issues effectively. We use measures of geographical and cultural distance to donor countries as instrumental variables to uncover the causal effect of aid on tax revenue in a panel of 93 countries. The tax to GDP ratio is found to decrease following aid inflows. This reduction in tax effort is statistically and economically significant; a one SD increase in aid causes a 0.52 percentage point drop in the tax-to-GDP ratio. The results indicate that the effect is driven by unconditional grants, whereas aid given as loans induces recipient governments to improve their tax effort. Our results are robust to changes in the sample and the use of a nearest neighbour matching technique to account for nonrandom assignment of aid. Our identification strategy is sharpened by the use of a difference-in-difference estimation strategy that leverages a natural experiment in which aid flows exogenously increased for some countries following the Iranian Revolution in 1979.     

INTERTEMPORAL COMPETITION AND AID

We study donor–recipient relationships in which the donor finances aid programs from which recipients want to divert funds in order to meet their own objectives. We analyze two economies. In the first one, the donor commits to a program budget for each period. In the second economy, the donor commits to a program budget for two periods. This introduces intertemporal competition among recipient officials. We show that intertemporal competition may weaken recipients' incentives to divert funds from aid programs. Furthermore, we show that this may occur even in the presence of regional competition among recipients.     

Ex post vs. ex ante pricing: Optional calling plans and tapered tariffs

We study optimal nonuniform pricing in a setting where a customer's demand at the start of a billing period contains a random variable whose realization becomes known by the end of the billing period. In this context, an optional calling plan is a tariff which the consumer must select based on his/her expectations about the random variable, whereas, under a tapered tariff, the consumer's choice of usage charge is made after he/she knows the realization of the random variable. We show that for low to moderate levels of uncertainty about the random variable entering the demand function, the optional calling plan approach to nonuniform pricing yields higher expected profit than does the tapered tariff approach, given risk-neutral consumers. We illustrate this finding with a case study and argue that it is consistent with the historical evolution of tariffs in the interexchange telecommunications market.     

DECENTRALIZED ONE-TO-MANY BARGAINING

We study a one-to-many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project. The order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period. Our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs. We also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously. Although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium, the rotating protocol is in general not self-enforcing.     

Does development aid increase military expenditure?

Using a new instrumental variable strategy, we examine whether bilateral development aid increases military expenditure in recipient countries. The instrument is the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid. The dataset includes new data on military expenditure for 124 recipient countries over the 1975–2012 period. When accounting for outliers, our results do not suggest that development aid affects military expenditure in the full sample. However, the effect of aid on military expenditure varies across characteristics of recipient and donor countries, even after excluding outliers. First, aid increases military expenditure in countries that depend on aid and are prone to conflicts. Second, aid provided by coordinated market economies increases military expenditure.     

The structure of optimal tariff rates in a large country with market power

We theoretically analyze the optimal tariff problem that arises in a large country with market power. By using a model with more than two traded goods, we derive (1) the condition for optimal import tariff rates to be ranked, and (2) the condition under which the optimum import tariff becomes uniform. These conditions are established in a three-good model and in an N-good model. The results are evaluated on the basis of compensated excess demand elasticity, and hence do not require information on income effects. I would like to thank Tatsuo Hatta, Makoto Okamura, Katsuhiko Suzuki and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Samaritan agents? On the strategic delegation of aid policy

Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the Samaritan's Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post. They therefore delegate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer

We consider a duopolistic trade model where a tariff induces the foreign firm to transfer its superior technology to the domestic rival. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, such a tariff raises consumers’ surplus relative to the free trade situation. We characterize the optimal tariff with and without precommitment on the part of the local government. Possibility of technology transfer reduces the optimal tariff rate compared to the no-transfer situation.     

Redistribution,state trading enterprises and ‘politically optimal’ tariffs

State trading enterprises (STEs) are widely used and can be viewed as instruments of trade policy. We analyse two aspects: the first is their potential trade distorting effect; the second is how they modify the case for the ‘politically optimal’ tariff. We show that the STE can reduce the need for a tariff designed for domestic redistribution. This result introduces some ambiguity about how STEs are interpreted: from a multilateralist perspective, they should be dealt with in the same way as other non‐tariff barriers; from a nationalistic perspective, they can reduce the need for ‘politically optimal.’     

Revenue-Constrained Combination of an Optimal Tariff and Duty Drawback

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.     

The structure of Nash equilibrium tariffs

This paper examines theoretically the structure of optimal (Nash equilibrium) tariff rates in a two-country economy with more than two traded goods. We provide a condition under which the equilibrium tariff rates are uniform in both countries, and explore the relative size of the equilibrium tariff rates in each country when the uniform tariff condition is not satisfied. The elasticities of compensated excess demand for goods play an important role in characterizing the structure of the equilibrium tariff rates. This paper undertakes the analysis using a dual approach.     

On the Equivalence of Ad Valorem Tariffs and Specific Tariffs under Duopoly*

Using a quantity conjectural variation model, this paper examines whether an ad valorem tariff and a specific tariff are equivalent under duopoly. We show that if the average per‐unit import tax is the same for the two tariffs, domestic output will be smaller while foreign output will be larger under an ad valorem tariff. We further show that for any value of a specific tariff, there is a Pareto‐superior ad valorem tariff for all values of conjectural variation except in the case of perfect competition where the two tariffs are equivalent.     

A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire

We consider the design of a nonlinear social tariff for residential water in Côte d'Ivoire, which is a case of a monopolistic private operator supplying a population of heterogeneous consumers. The proposed optimal tariff includes an initial “social” block with a low unit price, and higher consumption blocks with a monopoly pricing rule. This optimal nonlinear tariff is calibrated using econometric estimates of a panel-data residential water demand equation. Welfare changes associated with moving from the actual tariff to approximations of the optimal pricing system are computed under different tariff scenarios. We find that gains in consumer welfare would outweigh losses in producer surplus in a majority of Ivorian local communities.     

Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality

This paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical growth framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modeled as a limited enforceable dynamic contract. We define the contract to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that optimal self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the developing economy and substantially increases welfare. However, aid effectiveness comes at a high cost: to ensure enforceability, less benevolent political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds in return for a less intense conditionality.     

The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality: A Common Agency Model

The paper models the relationship between an aid‐providing international financial institution (IFI) and an aid‐receiving government whose economic policy choices are influenced by a domestic interest group. Two assistance schemes are evaluated: conditional aid in which the IFI makes assistance contingent on less‐ distorting economic policies and unconditional aid which is provided without such conditions. Conditional aid is shown to raise welfare of the receiving country and the world as a whole relative to unconditional aid. The paper also examines how conditional and unconditional aid schemes are influenced by the IFI's opportunity cost of providing assistance and the receiving government's political dependence on a domestic interest group.