均衡、演化与度--经济学研究范式演变的美学解读

本文通过对“均衡”和“演化”这两个截然不同的经济范式的演进进行美学剖析,从中折射出古典美学和现代美学思想对经济学的指引,以及演化经济学对以新古典经济学为代表的主流经济分析模式的超越,并尝试以“中和美”中“度”的思想来弥补西方“和谐美”二元对立指导的经济研究范式的不足。     

西方主流经济学的范式危机

长期以来倡导并践行西方主流经济学的美国发生了金融危机并影响着全球经济,更加凸显对当代西方主流经济学范式及其危机予以剖析的重要性。西方主流经济学的范式危机体现于"现象经济学"倾向、方法论的形式化、环境假定的绝对化、"价值中立"的先天不足,以及均衡分析和静态分析的有限性等方面。西方主流经济学的范式危机,预示着其进一步演化的转换方向。     

论凯恩斯经济学的重新定向

随着主流凯恩斯主义经济学的流行,原创性的凯恩斯经济学实际上已经“夭折”了,但它的革命思想并没有得到真正的阐发与传播。凯恩斯经济学的进一步研究需要方法论上的重新定向,即以不确定性和货币非中性思想为核心,建立货币经济学的宏观分析框架,并探索一种制度的、历史的和演化的经济学范式,从而为凯恩斯经济学研究奠定现实主义的微观行为基础。     

经济学两种研究范式的碰撞与演革——再论经济学的"工具理性"与"演化视角"的矛盾统一

在经济学长期发展的演革中,一直存在着两种研究范式的争论:一种是以"经济人"逻辑演绎为基础的主流经济学;另一种是以"演进理性"的历史主义-制度主义-演进主义为基础的非主流经济学.这两种经济学研究范式争论和碰撞了上百年.其实,我们应该用一种新的视角来看待二者.主流经济学的演绎逻辑分析框架适合于分析诸如经济活动的短期优化、市场关系和企业静态结构之类的可自我实施性问题;而后者的演化分析框架则适合于分析动态的宏观经济社会问题和人类社会经济活动的演进问题等.     

均衡增长理论与演化经济增长理论比较研究

目前,西方经济学在经济增长研究中形成了均衡增长理论和演化经济增长理论两种范式,前者包括索洛模型和内生增长理论,后者是由演化经济学做出的。两种范式有着共同点,但也在哲学基础、基本假定、分析框架、分析方法和政策建议等方面存在很大差异。我国的经济增长和创新政策制定应从两种范式的比较和借鉴中获得启发。     

经济学范式的转换及其异同:马克思和凯恩斯

在经济思想发展史上,经济学分析范式的转换经历了多次更迭与交替。与居于现代主流经济学地位、以强调技术关系分析为核心的新古典范式不同,马克思经济学和凯恩斯经济学基于市场经济或资本主义经济竞争的博弈规则,认为资本主义生产目的即在于获取按货币价值计算的利润或货币增殖;通过对现实资本主义经济关系的剖析,马克思和凯恩斯强调了资本主义货币经济的本质,并表明了有效需求问题的根源。相反,建立在生产函数基础上的新古典理论完全脱离了资本主义竞争的分析框架,其异质品模型的加总悖论直至20世纪50-60年代的“剑桥资本争论”公布于众。从范式意义上讲,马克思经济学与凯恩斯经济学都是对主流理论的一次思维范式的革命,它们各自确立的经济学体系都通过对新古典理论的扬弃建立了一种新的经济学范式基础、理论体系和分析方法,这正是其经济学革命之共同意义所在。     

基于知识的演化经济学——对基于理性的主流经济学的挑战

相对于以理性为基础、以单向因果与独立作用形成的静态均衡为核心的主流经济学范式而言,20世纪80年代逐渐兴盛起来的演化经济学,则是建立在以知识为基础的、以循环因果和协同互动为特征的一个总体演化范式:基于有限知识的更优目标和创新策略的微观适应行为;基于知识分工的差异结构和合作秩序的中观功能结构;基于知识积累的经济发展的宏观动态过程.     

从主流范式到比较制度分析 --法律经济学理论思维空间的拓展

文章对法律经济学的主流范式在当代的思想流变及其理论困境作了阐述,指出了法律经济学理论未来发展的趋向是,从主流范式的注重对法律的新古典主义经济分析走向比较制度分析,而且在研究对象方面应将法律经济学的研究对象确立为治理制度和合作秩序,只有如此,法律经济学才能从主流范式的封闭思维和意识形态偏见中走出来;最后,文章指出了法律经济学的比较制度分析范式的未来发展所面临的新挑战和新命题.     

均衡范式:主流经济学的半机制

主流经济学的理论危机在于其均衡范式的危机,而均衡范式又是其“半机制”——片面强调经济中的负反馈而忽略正反馈机制——的必然结果,经济学的进一步发展需要重视正反馈的作用,并赋予正、负反馈以同等的重要性从而构建一个更一般化的理论,在这个理论中,目前的主流经济学将成为一个特例。     

转轨背景下制度分析的理论转向

在转轨背景下,通过对制度理论史的考察指出:既有的制度分析范式必须实现一种理论转向。新古典及新制度经济学所采取的均衡制度观,本质上是对制度的一种误解;而旧制度经济学和奥地利学派尽管强调了制度型构的自发演化并否定了群体理性创设制度的可能性,但他们将人类理性排除在制度演化过程之外的观念,同样难以令人信服。转轨现实所需要的是一种能够立足于制度现象的制度理论。这需要在制度研究的范式上,从新古典经济学的机械主义均衡的制度观走向一种制度演化分析的范式。而这种制度范式转向的实现需要两个阶段性转换:(1)从新古典的均衡制度观向演化制度观的转换;(2)从基于达尔文进化论的“无意识演化”向“有意识演化”转换。     

Evolution of the Masters in Economics

In this article, the authors update their previous study of terminal master's degree in economics programs to determine whether changes in the characteristics and students or the desired outcomes of master's programs have occurred during the decade between the two studies. The authors find that there are now fewer programs and on average, there has been a reduction in rigor in terms of degree requirements. They also find some evidence for increased diversity of faculty in these programs. The average number of students in programs remained about the same over the decade, but the average number of faculty serving these students decreased. While some differences are found, overall the authors conclude that master's in economics programs have not dramatically changed over the past 10 years.     

The Evolution of the Social Contract

Two transitions in the evolution of the social contract are considered, the first from the dominance hierarchies of the great apes (used as a proxy for our prehuman ancestors) to the egalitarian political structure of non-sedentary hunter-gatherer bands, and the second, to the reintroduction of hierarchical institutions of governance, primarily a result of living in fixed settlements after the inception of agriculture. The first transition was a product of biological and cultural evolution, which brought about big brains, language, higher consciousness, and a lower rate of time preference that enabled early man to sustain an egalitarian social contract and thereby escape the domination that confronted his prehuman ancestors. The second transition was a product of cultural evolution alone. The high costs of enforcing the hunter-gatherer social contract caused it to break down and be replaced by hierarchy when the domestication of plants and animals gave rise to a sedentary existence and increased populations. However, it is shown that the very biological and cultural adaptations that made hunter-gatherer egalitarianism possible were a necessary foundation for the spontaneous creation of complex culture and the evolution of institutions that would once again eventually make freedom possible and economic prosperity possible.     

知识网络演进视角下企业技术创新能力进化及政策建议

企业技术创新能力具有类生物进化的属性,基于该思想,以知识网络演进为背景,研究了知识网络对企业技术创新能力进化的作用,探讨了企业技术创新能力进化过程,进一步构建了企业创新能力进化的逻辑模型。研究发现,知识网络的循环演进通过知识获取、知识处理、知识共享和知识整合,促进企业技术创新能力不断进化。最后,分别从政策制定者角度和微观创新者角度,提出了促进企业技术创新能力进化的建议。     

演化与人的本性

本文从生物演化的角度,分析了经济学中偏好、信念和理性的形成和演化特点,揭示了人类经济行为的生物学基础。     

Early Evolution of the Assumption of Non-satiation

The paper explores the mostly tacit transmission of the assumption of non-satiation from the outset of classical political economy to the advent of marginal analysis in Great Britain. The evolution of the assumption is traced back to contributions to the philosophy of mind in the early British enlightenment, which provided scientific ground not only to the economic agent's insatiable nature but also to a delusional dynamic of association that challenges the causality between acquisitiveness and pleasure. The paper claims that, because there is evidence that such delusional aspect was known to the early political economists, the assumption of non-satiation might have become a mainstay in economics not only for its scientific status but also as a result of a strategic choice that can only be explained within the political, cultural, and social context in which it was made. Had this been the case, the exportability of the assumption through time and space must be further questioned. The consistent inclusion of non-satiation in economic theories, policies, and institutions may have had extraordinary consequences, and may have nurtured rational behaviors that in fact fulfill the assumption itself.     

Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation

In this paper, we analyze a team trust game with coordinated punishment of the allocator by investors and where there is also a final stage of peer punishment. We study the effect of punishment on the reward and the investment decisions, when the effectiveness and cost of coordinated punishment depend on the number of investors adhering to this activity. The interaction takes place in an overlapping‐generations model with heterogeneous preferences and incomplete information. The only long‐run outcomes of the dynamics are either a fully cooperative culture (FCC) with high levels of trust and cooperation and fair returns or a non‐cooperative culture with no cooperation at all. The basin of attraction of the FCC is larger; the higher the institutional capacity of coordinated punishment, the higher the level of peer pressure and the smaller the individual cost of coordinated punishment.     

Achievement Bias in the Evolution of Preferences

Currently, economists' models of the evolutionary selection of utility function parameters are generally based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that utility parameters must serve Darwinian fitness, in the sense that individuals who maximize utility are also maximizing their biological survivability. Second, it is assumed that utility parameters accurately reflect well-being, in the sense that individuals who maximize utility also maximize their happiness. However, there is a large literature in anthropology, biology, and psychology suggesting that these two assumptions may not be warranted. Focusing on utility and happiness, the paper uses models of cultural selection to show that there is no guarantee that our evolved preference must be the preferences that maximize our happiness. Instead, there are plausible mechanisms of cultural selection that will allow immiserating preferences to persist in steady state equilibrium. These mechanisms are generally related to the concept of social achievement: those who achieve more in society will have a greater influence on the utility parameters of the next generation, and this influence is independent of the achievers' well-being. Thus, a preference is more likely to survive if it satisfies some mix of achievement goals and happiness goals, rather than just happiness goals alone. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.