The market liquidity of DIAMONDS,Q's,and their underlying stocks

We investigate the market liquidity effects of the introduction of index-tracking stocks for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DIAMONDS) and the NASDAQ 100 index (Q's). Our main finding is liquidity of the underlying DJIA 30 index stocks improves after the introduction of the exchange-traded fund, largely because of a decline in the cost of informed trading. Further, we find the DIAMONDS has significantly lower liquidity costs over the first 50 days of trading as compared to the portfolio of its component stocks, again primarily because of lower adverse selection costs. Finally, we find weaker but qualitatively similar results for the Q's.     

Liquidity Provision and Noise Trading: Evidence from the "Investment Dartboard" Column

How does increased noise trading affect market liquidity and trading costs? We use The Wall Street Journal's “Investment Dartboard” column, which stimulates noise trading, as a natural experiment to evaluate models of the bid-ask spread. We find that substantial increases in trading volume and significant but temporary abnormal returns occur when analysts recommend stocks in this column, especially when recommendations come from analysts with successful contest track records. We also find an increase in liquidity and a decrease in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

The value of the floor

Existing theoretical literature suggests that floor trading has discernable benefits over electronic trading. In particular floor relationships lead to a reduction in asymmetric information and hence lower spreads. The ability of floor brokers to participate in incoming order flow without revealing their supply and demand curves increases total liquidity and dampens liquidity shocks leading to lower volatility. We develop hypotheses and test them on a sample of stocks that switch from floor trading to an electronic system with fairly identical rules and pre-trade transparency. We find strong support for existing theory and our hypotheses. In particular asymmetric information and volatility are significantly higher on the electronic system. This leads to an increase in investor transaction costs which dwarfs the operational cost advantages of the electronic systems. Our results are robust to tests involving samples that control for company specific factors and market wide trends.     

The trades of NYSE floor brokers

This paper studies the contribution of NYSE floor brokers to the Exchange's agency auction market. Floor brokers represent 44%, specialists 11%, and system orders 45% of the value of all executed orders in our sample. We analyze how the cross-sectional distribution of floor broker trading depends on liquidity, block volume, on- and off-exchange competition, volatility, and order flow internalization. Floor brokers participate in large trades, primarily in liquid stocks, and they trade more when volatility is high. They provide two-sided liquidity to the market and often provide liquidity that would otherwise have been supplied by NYSE specialists.     

THE CHOICE OF TRADING VENUE AND RELATIVE PRICE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING: ADRs VERSUS THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES IN THEIR LOCAL MARKETS

We address two important themes associated with institutions’ trading in foreign markets: (1) the choice of trading venues (between a company's listing in its home market and that in the United States as an American Depositary Receipt [ADR]) and (2) the comparison of trading costs across the two venues. We identify institutional trading in both venues using proprietary institutional trading data. Overall, our research underscores the intuition that the choice of institutional trading in a stock's local market or as an ADR is a complex process that embodies variables that measure the relative adverse selection and liquidity at order, stock, and country levels. Institutions route a higher percentage of trades to more liquid markets, and these trades are associated with higher cumulative abnormal returns. We also find that institutional trading costs are generally lower for trading cross‐listed stocks on home exchanges even after controlling for selection bias.     

Liquidity and risk sharing benefits from opening an ETF market with liquidity providers: Evidence from the CAC 40 index

This article examines how the introduction of an ETF replicating a stock index impacts on the liquidity of the underlying stocks when the ETF market involves liquidity providers (LPs). We find that index stock spreads decline, relative to those of non-index stocks, after the introduction of the ETF but this liquidity improvement is not driven by changes in adverse selection costs or recognition effects. By contrast, we show that it is mainly explained by a decrease in order processing and order imbalance costs. This most probably results from additional risk sharing capacities provided by increased cross-market trading and LPs' liquidity provision in low-liquidity times.     

Short-selling,margin-trading,and stock liquidity: Evidence from the Chinese stock markets

This paper examines the impacts of two forms of leveraged trading—margin trading and short selling—on the trading liquidity of individual stocks in China. We find that trading liquidity for relevant stocks generally improves after restrictions on leveraged trading are removed. However, margin trading and short selling have opposite impacts on liquidity. During ordinary periods, margin trading benefits liquidity, whereas short selling damages liquidity; however, during market downturns, their roles are reversed. We also provide evidence suggesting that short sellers are informed traders in China and that short selling reduces stock liquidity because of the increased risk of adverse selection faced by uninformed traders.     

Sources of liquidity for NYSE-listed non-US stocks

We examine the components of displayed (quoted) liquidity and the amount of non-displayed liquidity on the NYSE for a sample of non-US stocks. Consistently with prior work, non-US stocks have less displayed liquidity than similar US stocks. Extending prior research, we find that this is true both in the limit order book and on the floor. As Domowitz et al. [Domowitz, I., Glen, J., Madhavan, A., 1998. International cross-listing and order flow migration: Evidence from and emerging market. Journal of Finance 53, 2001–2027] posit, non-US stocks from transparent/linked home markets have more displayed NYSE liquidity when the home market is open but non-US stocks from opaque/non-linked home markets have more NYSE displayed liquidity when the home market is closed. Non-US and US stocks have similar supplies of non-displayed liquidity, consistent with the idea that the conditional nature of non-displayed liquidity allows NYSE traders to mitigate adverse selection problems inherent in trading non-US stocks. Our results imply that non-US stocks have less total (displayed plus non-displayed) liquidity than US stocks.     

City goes dark: Dark trading and adverse selection in aggregate markets

We investigate the impact of dark trading on adverse selection in an aggregate market for trading UK stocks. Dark trading is linked to lower adverse selection risk and improved informational efficiency and liquidity in the aggregate market, even as liquidity declines in the lit market with dark trading. However, there is a trading value-based threshold when dark trading starts to induce adverse selection. We estimate that this threshold varies from around 9% for the most liquid stocks to 25% for the least liquid stocks. The overall average threshold for the 288 FTSE 350 stocks in our sample is 14%.     

Trader Leverage and Liquidity

Does trader leverage drive equity market liquidity? We use the unique features of the margin trading system in India to identify a causal relationship between traders’ ability to borrow and a stock's market liquidity. To quantify the impact of trader leverage, we employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits threshold rules that determine a stock's margin trading eligibility. We find that liquidity is higher when stocks become eligible for margin trading and that this liquidity enhancement is driven by margin traders’ contrarian strategies. Consistent with downward liquidity spirals due to deleveraging, we also find that this effect reverses during crises.     

Market Response to Liquidity Improvements: Evidence from Exchange Listings

The study examines a sample of 895 stocks that moved from Nasdaq to the New York Stock Exchange or to the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1971 and 1994. We show how various measures of liquidity such as the bid‐ask spread, trading volume, and stock price precision improve in somewhat different ways upon transfer to NYSE (Amex). We also find that reductions in trading costs (percentage spread) and in pricing error volatility (Hasbrouck's σ₅) can explain most of stock market's positive response to exchange listing. Thus, liquidity has many facets and cannot be represented by the bid‐ask spread alone.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Market makers as information providers: The natural experiment of STAR

Market makers are financial intermediaries who are supposed to provide additional liquidity, but do not have any information-related obligation. This paper studies the unique case of the Italian Stock Exchange, where market makers are also obliged to facilitate information disclosure about the firms they cover. We focus on a group of small/medium capitalization stocks (STAR) that are assigned a designated market maker (DMM) starting from 2001. We show that their liquidity requirements are not binding during the sample periods and that the main impact of DMMs' introduction is due to their obligations on information provision. We find that DMMs' activity as information providers reduces spread and price volatility, the probability of informed trading (PIN), and the adverse selection component of the spread. An event study provides evidence that the information released through DMMs is perceived as useful by market participants.     

Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China

China's recent removal of short‐selling and margin trading bans on selected stocks enables testing of the relative effect of margin trading and short selling. We find the prices of the shortable stocks decrease, on average, relative to peer A‐shares and cross‐listed H‐shares, suggesting that short selling dominates margin trading effects. Contrary to the regulators' intention and recent developed market empirical evidence, liquidity declines and bid‐ask spreads increase in these shortable stocks. Consistent with Ausubel (1990), these results imply that uninformed investors avoid the shortable stocks to reduce the risk of trading with informed investors.     

Does the investment horizon of institutional investors matter for stock liquidity?

This paper examines the role of the investment horizon of institutional investors on stock liquidity of firms. We show that an increase in long-term institutional ownership is negatively associated with firm liquidity, while an increase in short-term ownership is positively related to a firm's stock liquidity. We identify the ownership-liquidity relationship by examining two major channels: the trading activity channel and the informational friction channel. Long-term investors reduce stock liquidity through low frequency trading and access to value-enhancing and private information, which induces adverse selection bias. In contrast, short-term investors improve liquidity through trading activity and competition with other investors, which lowers transaction costs. Our findings further suggest that the effects of an increase in long-term (short-term) institutional investors on liquidity weaken (strengthen) when a firm has more publicly available information. Finally, we show that the positive impact of an increase in long-term ownership on valuation is more pronounced for firms with higher liquidity and the valuation effect is persistent.     

Commonality in liquidity and multilateral trading facilities

We use the introduction of two multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) to examine the impact of market fragmentation on commonality in liquidity. We find that the introduction of MTFs following the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive increases the comovement of stocks’ liquidity with MTF liquidity, while the comovement with the home market liquidity generally decreases. We also find that the higher the MTF trading volume or the number of MTFs trading a stock, the stronger the effect. Further, we find that the commonality in liquidity remains unchanged for a matched control sample of stocks that do not trade on MTFs.     

A theory of the interday variations in volume, variance, and trading costs in securities markets

In an adverse selection model of a securities market with oneinformed trader and several liquidity traders, we study theimplications of the assumption that the informed trader hasmore information on Monday than on other days. We examine theinterday variations in volume, variance, and adverse selectioncosts, and find that on monday the trading costs and the varianceof price changes are highest, and the volume is lower than onTuesday. These effects are stronger for firms with better publicreporting and for firms with more discretionary liquidity trading.     

Why do companies transfer the trading compartment of their common stocks

We analyze the motives and determinants of voluntarily stock exchange section switching on the NYSE Euronext. By strategically deciding trading-section transfer when it is beneficial, managers expect to reduce their liquidity and invisibility costs, cost of capital, or their listing costs. We show that managers decide to change the trading compartment of their common stocks based on various factors including firm's size, liquidity level, debt ratio, and expected growth opportunities. Firms that move voluntarily from a less or non regulated compartments to a more regulated one are likely to have transferred to increase their credibility, improve their stocks’ liquidity, re-balance their leverage, and to finance their growth opportunities. Whereas those that move their common stocks toward a less-regulated compartments do it mainly for costs saving reasons.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

Ownership level,ownership concentration and liquidity

We examine the link between the liquidity of a firm's stock and its ownership structure, specifically, how much of the firm's stock is owned by insiders and institutions, and how concentrated is their ownership. We find that the liquidity-ownership relation is mostly driven by institutional ownership rather than insider ownership. Importantly, liquidity is positively related to total institutional holdings but negatively related to institutional blockholdings. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that while the level of institutional ownership proxies for trading activity, the concentration of such ownership proxies for adverse selection.