Cost‐Based Anti‐dumping as a Repeated Game

In this paper, we consider anti‐dumping (AD) duties as a tool to facilitate collusion between a domestic and a foreign firm in an infinitely repeated differentiated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observable and each firm receives a privately observed i.i.d. cost shock in each period. We consider second‐best scenarios, where market‐share or production arrangement with sidepayments is not allowed. We show that there exist equilibrium‐path reciprocal ADs. The collusive (trigger) price is distorted downward compared with complete information benchmark as a trade‐off between diminishing the incentive to deviate and ensuring off‐schedule deviation gains when private cost shocks are highly favourable. The model differs from Green and Porter ( 1984 ) and Rotemberg and Saloner ( 1986 ) in that it is the private cost shocks as opposed to public demand shocks that necessitate modifications of collusion. In conclusion, AD policy may encourage collusion, and therefore, unless the source of market imperfection is carefully examined, laissez faire might be a better choice.     

Export rivalry and exchange rate pass‐through

In this paper, we investigate the influence of market rivalry on firm‐level exchange rate pass‐through. Similar to Bloom et al. Econometrica, 80 , 1347–1393 (2013), we define market rivalry as product market proximity, and expect the cross market spillovers, that is, through leaked information or reputation, to affect firm‐level export price. Using a comprehensive dataset from Chinese exporters for the 2000–2007 period, we find that in response to a higher degree of market rivalry firms are less responsive to exchange fluctuations. This unresponsiveness suggests a higher degree of exchange rate pass‐through. The influence of market rivalry is stronger among firms that export consumption and heterogeneous products, and to developed countries. Our results are robust to different measures of market rivalry and specifications.     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.
     

PARTICIPATION IN WORKPLACE EMPLOYER‐SPONSORED TRAINING IN CANADA: ROLE OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND WORKER ATTRIBUTES

In this work, we study the role of firm characteristics and worker attributes in determining participation in workplace employer‐sponsored training in Canada using the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) of Statistics Canada. We attempt to answer the following questions using the rich information of firms that are available in WES data: Does firms' provision of workplace training encourage workers' participation in Canada? How do changes in market competition, organizational changes, and technological innovation affect workers' participation in workplace training in Canada? We find that firms' training provision significantly affects workers' participation in Canada. We also find that increased international competition, organizational changes, and technological innovation are significantly correlated with workers' training participation at workplaces. We note that workers in some sectors and in smaller firms have lower workplace training incidence and older, part‐time, production and marketing/sales workers and workers with preschool children participate less in workplace training. (JEL J080, J240, J290)     

Global Investment Environment of the Post‐Quantitative Easing World: The ‘new‐old’ and ‘new‐new’ Normal

Global markets since late 2007 are not ‘normal’, where normal means market conditions we would expect to observe going forward in the absence of any new economic shocks. Financial markets have been dominated by extraordinary central bank policies that were created to deal with challenging market conditions reflecting heightened risk aversion and illiquidity. Markets in the future will have some characteristics that look more like the market conditions observed in the pre‐crisis period, which I call the ‘new‐old normal’ and other conditions that differ from the past, which I call the ‘new‐new normal’. I first review what happened during the financial crisis in terms of developments in three asset classes, equities, fixed income and currencies, to place the forward‐looking view in proper context. Then the transition period from the quantitative easing (QE) era of exceptional monetary policy to post‐QE markets is discussed. Post‐transition, we will see some features of the post‐QE world that will resemble pre‐crisis market conditions, the ‘new‐old normal’ with higher policy interest rates, wider cross‐country interest differentials, lower cross‐asset return correlations and a resurgence of the importance of cross‐country differences in fundamentals in international investing. However, some features of the post‐QE investment environment will be unlike anything observed in the past: the ‘new‐new normal’ with reduced liquidity and more days of exceptionally large volatility and asset price moves due to regulatory effects resulting in a reduced ability of market‐makers to provide inventory buffers for counterparties and electronic trading venues that shut down trading in high volatility periods; low inflation; flatter yield curves; and emerging markets providing less opportunity for diversification gains as they converge to developed financial market characteristics.     

FOR‐PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS

We consider optimal pricing by a profit‐maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet, and bargain under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a bid–ask spread, can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary to both sides. The sum of buyers' and sellers' fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates of the marginal types, and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers' and sellers' bargaining weights. We also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare enhancing.     

DOES ADVERTISING MATTER? ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ON SMOKING AMONG YOUTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of cigarette advertising on smoking among youth in developing countries. Using micro‐level data from 19 developing countries, we examine the structural relationship between smoking behavior and advertising exposure and the reduced‐form relationship between smoking and advertising bans. Instrumental variables are used to address the endogeneity of advertising exposure. Country‐specific unobserved heterogeneity is further reduced by controlling for measures of antismoking sentiment and cigarette prices. After accounting for the endogeneity of advertising, we find that the positive correlation between smoking and advertising exposure in our sample can be largely explained by the disproportionately higher propensity of smokers to observe advertising rather than a direct causal effect of advertising on smoking. (JEL I12, I18)     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

Trade‐related intellectual property rights: industry variation and technology diffusion

Abstract This paper assesses how a strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects international technology diffusion by altering the volume of high‐tech exports into developing countries. A simple North‐South general equilibrium model in which industries differ in their imitation rates is developed. Stronger IPRs encourage Northern firms in a wider range of industries to start exporting. Exports in industries with the highest risk of imitation rise, while exports in other industries may fall. More technology diffuses to the South because new high‐tech products are introduced in the Southern market. This works against the reduction in technology diffusion caused by limited imitation.     

ON THE IMPACT OF FUNDAMENTALS,LIQUIDITY, AND COORDINATION ON MARKET STABILITY*

We develop a coordination game to model interactions between fundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets. We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimation of the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specific empirical application is carry trades in the yen–dollar market, including the turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, with low information disparities among agents. We observe occasional episodes of market fragility or turmoil with up by the escalator, down by the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behavior in the econometric model is also confirmed.     

MOVIES,MASS CONSUMERS,AND CRITICS: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF A TWO‐SIDED MARKET

Most analyses of the film market treat it as a single entity where producers make films based on average consumer interest while critics serve as forecasters or signalers of film quality to these consumers. We describe the film market as two‐sided—a mass market (average consumer) side and a high quality/artistic (cineaste) side—that each influence film maker production decisions and critical reviews as critics balance the preferences of mass market consumers and their own more artistic inclination. Using 1,824 films released during 2000–2014, we examine determinants of box office revenues and critical reviews, while addressing the overlap between them. Our results indicate that consumers and critics respond differently not only to film rating but also to film budgets, story sources, genre, and political content. We then use the dichotomy between average and high quality, artistic film consumers as a basis for understanding the normative views of the film markets relative to other two‐sided markets as well as the political economy of film regulation. (JEL C30, D10, Z11)     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

Unemployment and Labor–market Reform: A Contract Theoretic Approach

Why do many democracies fail to reform their labor–market institutions? To answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor–market regulations. Under asymmetric information, a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the pure costs of compensation that would arise under symmetric information. In this setting, unemployment may be constrained Pareto–efficient. Labor–market reforms may fail politically because none of the reform packages proposed wins the approval of a majority of voters. We also discuss the role of capital taxation in a reform program. JEL classification: D70; E61; J68     

AN OVER‐THE‐COUNTER APPROACH TO THE FOREX MARKET

The foreign exchange (FOREX) market is an over‐the‐counter market characterized by intermediation and significant bid–ask spreads. However, most of the existing international macroeconomics literature models the FOREX as a standard Walrasian market. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of intermediation in the FOREX market. We use our framework to compute standard measures of FOREX liquidity, such as bid–ask spreads and trade volume, and study how they are affected by macroeconomic fundamentals and market microstructure. We also study how FOREX market microstructure affects the volume of international trade and, consequently, welfare. Our empirical exercise offers support to the models' main predictions.     

SHORT‐RUN AND LONG‐RUN IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Opposing theoretical arguments exist regarding the effect of environmental regulation on financial performance. Some studies argue that environmental regulation constrains firms' abilities to exploit revenue‐enhancing or cost‐reducing opportunities. Other studies, representing the Porter hypothesis, argue that environmental regulation motivates firms to innovate, which ultimately improves financial performance. Although much of the debate focuses on long‐run effects, there are also important short‐run effects. This study provides empirical evidence regarding the short‐run and long‐run effects of Clean Water Act regulation on financial performance. To generate this evidence, we examine the effect of permitted wastewater discharge limits, on the return on sales, using panel data on publicly owned firms in the chemical manufacturing industries. We find that Clean Water Act regulation improves financial performance in both the short run and the long run with a stronger effect in the long run. These results suggest that some net benefits may be realized during a short‐run transition to comply with a tighter permitted discharge limit, with additional benefits accruing to the firm in the long run because the firm has more time to innovate. (JEL K23, L25, L51, L65, Q52)     

CROSS‐BORDER M&As AND FIRM VALUE: A COMPARISON OF CHINA‐ AND US‐JAPAN M&As

We examine the effect of M&As conducted by U.S. and Chinese bidders (US‐Japan and China‐Japan M&As) on the stock prices of Japanese targets. We find that both types of M&As tend to increase the stock prices of the Japanese targets and that market reactions are significantly greater for US‐Japan M&As than for China‐Japan M&As. Additionally, capital participation produces greater market reactions to China‐Japan M&As than other structures, while acquisition produces this effect in US‐Japan M&As. Our results are consistent with previous research indicating that market reactions increase for bidders operating in a developed country with high‐quality institutions and corporate governance. (JEL G32, G34)     

Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with Investment‐specific Technological Change

This paper examines a dynamically optimal subsidy policy in a continuous‐time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Krusell (Krusell, P. (1998) “Investment‐Specific R&D and the Decline in the Relative Price of Capital”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 131–141), in which investment‐specific technological progress occurs endogenously because of R&D performed by monopolistic firms. It is demonstrated that a combination of the time‐invariant subsidy for investment and the time‐variant subsidy for R&D enables the market equilibrium to replicate the socially optimal allocation.     

MEDIA ADVERTISING AND BALLOT INITIATIVES: THE CASE OF ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATION

Spending on political advertising increases with every election cycle, not only for congressional or presidential candidates, but also for state‐level ballot initiatives. There is little research in marketing, however, on the effectiveness of political advertising at this level. In this study, we conduct an experimental analysis of advertisements used during the 2008 campaign to mandate new animal welfare standards in California (Proposition 2). Using subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs as a proxy for their likely voting behavior, we investigate whether advertising provides real information to likely voters, and thus sharpens their existing attitudes toward the issue, or whether advertising can indeed change preferences. We find that advertising in support of Proposition 2 was more effective in raising subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs than ads in opposition were in reducing it, but we also find that ads in support of the measure reduce the dispersion of preferences and thus polarize attitudes toward the initiative. More generally, political ads are found to contain considerably more “hype” than “real information” in the sense of Johnson and Myatt [Johnson, J. P., and D. P. Myatt. “On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing and Product Design.” American Economic Review, 96, 2006, 756–84]. (JEL D12, D72, K32, L66, M37)