Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment

While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In a public good experiment we compared alternative punishment institutions and found (1) higher cooperation levels under a consensual punishment institution than under autonomous individual punishment; (2) similar cooperation levels under sequential and simultaneous punishment institutions.     

Cooperation,Trust and Economic Development: An Experimental Study in China

Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e. whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination of public goods, gambling game and trust game experiments, we investigate the links among cooperation, trust and economic development in four regions of China. Our results suggest that, first, there is a U‐shaped or V‐shaped relationship between cooperation and economic development. Second, on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other hand, more cooperative behaviour may be created by rewarding trusting behaviour. Third, men are more cooperative and trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used ‘GSS trust’ question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions ‘GSS fair’ and ‘GSS help’ have weak predictive power for trusting behaviour but not for cooperative behaviour.     

Conflict technology in cooperation: The group size paradox revisited

This paper studies the implications of punishment‐induced conflict in a public goods game. It shows, under plausible assumptions, how larger group size sometimes enhances punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence supports higher levels of cooperation. Unlike existing approaches that focus on uncoordinated punishment, I consider punishment as a coordinated activity that may be resisted by those being punished and study the implications of punishment‐induced conflict situations. Developing a conflict model of punishment and combining it with a standard public good game, I show that coordinated punishment can yield the concentration effect of punishment, leading to a larger group advantage; that is, the larger the group, the easier it becomes to organize cooperation. The key idea is that when punishers coordinate their punishment, punishers as a coalition successfully divide defectors and punish each defector one by one. Surprisingly, even when coordination among punishers decays as group size increases, as long as the rate of decaying remains relatively slow the larger group advantage still obtains.     

分布式创新的合作博弈分析

分布式创新作为一种新型的技术创新模式,已被许多跨国公司和大型企业所积极运用和实践.分布式创新的合作受多种因素影响,是一个博弈过程.基于博弈理论,通过参与分布式创新的企业间的一次性合作博弈、重复合作博弈和合作协议约束下的合作博弈模型的分析,阐释了分布式创新合作机制形成的机理.博弈模型分析表明:企业之间的一次性合作博弈不能建立分布式创新的合作机制,重复合作博弈为通过市场机制自发形成分布式创新的内在合作机制提供了可能,而合作协议的事先引入则更有利于分布式创新合作机制的形成和合作的稳定.根据以上分析,从重视和加强合作协议和合同的管理、构建分布式创新信任机制、建立惩罚和退出机制三个方面提出了构建分布式创新合作机制的对策.     

The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating

In this study, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. We run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, we analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly. In particular, we wonder whether, even under anonymity and in the absence of reputational concerns, (a) players rate others' contribution decisions in the expected direction and (b) the peer rating mechanisms under study foster cooperation and welfare. Our findings reveal that, in the two costless rating treatments, peer rating concerns lead to higher contributions and efficiency, compared to our control. Introducing a small fixed cost for assigning rating points results in a very high percentage of subjects deciding not to rate others' behavior, so that cooperation cannot be enforced.     

校企合作创新网络运行机制调查分析——以河南省为例

根据河南省60家创新型企业的调查数据,从校企合作创新网络的信任机制、学习机制、利益分配机制、激励机制、协调机制这5个方面对校企合作创新网络运行机制进行了分析。调查分析结果显示:企业已成为自主创新的主体,但参与校企合作的积极性有待进一步提高;高校的科研成果过于注重理论,不能满足企业的需求。最后,提出了促进我国校企合作创新网络发展的对策和建议。     

Dissertation abstract: Reputational benefits of altruism and altruistic punishment

Recent studies in experimental economics have shown that many people have other-regarding preferences, potentially including preferences for altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. It is useful to investigate why people possess such preferences and what functional purpose they might serve outside the laboratory, because evolutionary and social learning perspectives both predict that cooperative sentiments should only exist if they bring benefits that outweigh the costs of other-regarding behavior. Theories of costly signaling suggest that altruistic acts may function (with or without intention) as signals of unobservable qualities such as resources or cooperative intent, and altruists may benefit (possibly unintentionally) from the advertisement of such qualities. After reviewing the theories that could potentially account for the evolution of altruism (Chapter 1), I test some predictions about cooperation derived from costly signaling theory. In Chapter 2, I show that participants in experimental public goods games were more cooperative when they had cues that they could benefit from having a good reputation, and that there was apparently some competition to be the most generous group member. Furthermore, in subsequent trust games, people tended to trust high public goods contributors more than low contributors. Chapter 3 failed to find evidence that granting high status to people makes them more likely to contribute to public goods or punish free-riders, but there was suggestive evidence that physical proximity to the experimenter affected contributions and punishment. In Chapter 4, I found that people tended to trust others who were willing to incur costs to punish those who free-ride on group cooperation provided that such punishment was justified, and men were more punitive than women. In Chapter 5, I show that women find altruistic men more desirable than neutral men for long-term relationships. Together, these results suggest that humans do treat altruism as a signal of willingness to be cooperative. These findings are discussed with respect to the adaptive design of cooperative sentiments as well as the current debate over group selection. Dissertation: Department of Psychology, Neuroscience & Behaviour, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontarion Currently: Post-Doc, Department of Neurobiology & Behavior, Cornell University     

从被动到主动 ——关系型信任及其对企业合作的影响

社会的变迁使我国社会结构和利益关系发生了巨大的变化,社会主体之间的关系型信任也有很大的改变。本文通过深入的实证研究,揭示了关系型信任的结构、来源以及对企业合作的影响。研究结果表明,关系型信任中的主动型信任是在被动型信任的基础上发展而来的,企业合作关系的建立主要依赖于主动型信任而非被动型信任。良好的声誉有利于建立被动型信任,有助于企业选择合作伙伴,企业间沟通和互惠对主动型信任有显著的积极影响,最终促进企业间的持续合作。本文的研究不仅丰富了关系型信任理论,也为企业在管理实践中建立和改进与合作伙伴之间的信任关系提供了有益的借鉴。     

企业战略导向对其合作创新绩效的作用机理

将战略导向、网络位置、组织间信任和合作创新绩效纳入同一研究框架,研究了企业不同的战略导向对合作创新绩效的差异性影响,以及网络位置在其中的中介作用和组织间信任的调节作用,并提出研究假设。利用中国企业合作创新的实际调研数据,通过回归分析对研究假设进行实证检验。结果表明,市场导向与合作创新绩效显著正相关,适当的企业家导向有利于企业获得更高的合作创新绩效;网络中心位置有利于提升企业的合作创新绩效;组织间信任在战略导向影响合作创新绩效的过程中起重要的调节作用。     

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of second-order free-riding: indeed, the sanctioning system itself is a common good which can be exploited. Most investigations, so far, considered peer punishment: players could impose fines on those who exploited them, at a cost to themselves. Only a minority considered so-called pool punishment. In this scenario, players contribute to a punishment pool before engaging in the joint enterprise, and without knowing who the free-riders will be. Theoretical investigations (Sigmund et al., Nature 466:861–863, 2010) have shown that peer punishment is more efficient, but pool punishment more stable. Social learning, i.e., the preferential imitation of successful strategies, should lead to pool punishment if sanctions are also imposed on second-order free-riders, but to peer punishment if they are not. Here we describe an economic experiment (the Mutual Aid game) which tests this prediction. We find that pool punishment only emerges if second-order free riders are punished, but that peer punishment is more stable than expected. Basically, our experiment shows that social learning can lead to a spontaneously emerging social contract, based on a sanctioning institution to overcome the free rider problem.     

Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?

A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.     

Feedback,punishment and cooperation in public good experiments

A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings of their peers leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers. This is despite the fact that the feedback format does not affect incentives. The data suggest that this happens because the feedback format acts as a coordination device which influences the contribution standards that groups establish.     

Trust and foreign ownership: Evidence from intra‐European foreign direct investments

We use a novel firm‐level dataset to test whether trust affects the volume and the ownership structure FDI across Europe. Our methodology deals with the endogeneity of trust from the investor to the recipient country. We expect such a trust measure to affect investment decisions, and the associated knowledge capital, differently across types of foreign investors. In particular, this effect is expected to be stronger for industrial investors who possess transferable knowledge capital. The data confirm our predictions. Higher trust increases the number and volume of FDIs, but also the probability of co‐investing with a partner from the recipient country.     

高技术产业集群非正式网络治理机制研究

信任文化和声誉机制是高技术产业集群非正式网络治理机制的重要内容。高技术产业集群的信任体系结构包含实践知识、理性计算、身份认同、制度及伦理道德等五个层次。建立高绩效网络最重要的要求是信任或社会认同,信任机制可以降低交易成本,更可以促进高技术企业之间的合作创新。高技术产业集群以知识共享和协作为特征的网络具有开放性,声誉机制的扩散效应更为明显,高技术产业集群声誉机制的重要含义在于扩大了交易范围,为技术创新提供了更多的资源选择,使潜在交易对象可以演变为现实的可利用资源。     

研发合作企业间知识共享与合作绩效的关系

分析了研发合作企业间知识共享的4个过程:社会化、外化、整合、内化,探讨了影响企业知识共享的情境因素:企业环境、组织结构、企业文化、信任机制,提出了研发合作企业间知识共享与合作绩效的关系模型,并根据此模型提出了相应的理论假设,为进一步的实证研究提供了理论基础。     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

Cooperation Norms in Multiple‐Stage Punishment

We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people’s punishment behavior in a social‐dilemma game with multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self‐contained episodes of interaction, we are able to disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm‐related punishment. An additional treatment provides information on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Partly confirming previous findings, punishment behavior and bystanders’ opinions are guided by an absolute norm. This norm is consistent over decisions and punishment stages and requires full contributions. In the first punishment stage, our results suggest a higher personal involvement of punishers, leading to a nonlinearity defined by the punishers’ contribution. In later punishment stages, the personal‐involvement effect vanishes and retaliation kicks in. Bystanders generally apply the same criteria as punishers in all stages.     

Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.     

创业网络中信息交互行为的协作博弈分析

设计了基于预期和规范规则的合作竞争博弈模型,并利用仿真方法进一步分析创业网络中的信息博弈协作行为。仿真结果显示:在创业网络中,采取合作策略的创业者的成功率一直大于采取不合作策略的创业者。指出在创业网络中有效利用和管理创业者的信用度会使创业网络中的信息交互行为更为规范和有效。     

项目导向型供应链跨组织合作行为激励机制

在假定项目型组织平等合作的基础上,运用委托-代理理论和博弈论,纳入总承包商给予专业分包商基于监控信号的奖惩结构,构建了基于监控信号的项目导向型供应链跨组织合作激励模型,并与传统激励模型进行比较,通过数据模拟与模型算例,研究了监控信号对激励契约设计的影响。研究表明：通过引入监控信号,总承包商可以收集到更多有关专业分包商行为选择的信息,通过调整对专业分包商的奖励和惩罚力度,可以促进专业分包商采取合作行为,降低其机会主义行为,也可以降低总承包商对专业分包商激励的盲目性。