Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Distorted Trade Barriers: A Dissection of Trade Costs in a “Distorted Gravity” Model

It is common in the trade literature to use iceberg transport costs to represent both tariffs and shipping costs alike. However, in models with monopolistic competition these are not identical trade restrictions. This difference is driven by how the two costs affect the extensive margin. We illustrate these differences in a gravity model. We show theoretically that trade flows are more elastic with respect to tariffs than transport costs and find a linear relationship between the elasticities with respect to tariffs, iceberg transport costs, and fixed market costs. We empirically validate these results using data on US product‐level imports.     

A Stackelberg Game Model of Trade in Renewable Resources with Competitive Sellers*

We model international trade in renewable resources between a single buyer and competitive sellers as a Stackelberg differential game. The buyer uses unit and ad valorem tariffs to indirectly encourage conservation of the renewable resource under study. First, we show that the efficacy of these trade policy instruments in promoting conservation depends fundamentally on whether harvesting costs are stock dependent or independent. When harvesting costs are stock independent, the optimal open‐loop tariffs are dynamically consistent. In contrast, when harvesting costs are stock dependent, the optimal open‐loop tariffs are dynamically inconsistent. Secondly, we point out that whether the terminal value of the resource stock is higher with the stock independent or the stock dependent cost function cannot be resolved unambiguously. Thirdly, we show that it does not make sense for the buyer to use both tariffs simultaneously. Finally, we discuss the implications of these and other findings for renewable resource conservation in general.     

Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm

Determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unobservable tastes is a difficult task. This paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products is large. Moreover, such tariffs take a simple form: (i) when taste parameters are independently distributed across products, the almost optimal tariff is a single cost-based two-part tariff which can extract virtually all consumer surplus; (ii) when tastes are correlated across products, perhaps because of income differences across consumers, the almost optimal tariff can be implemented as a menu of two-part tariffs each of which has prices proportional to marginal costs.     

THE DYNAMIC AND DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF IMPORT TARIFFS

We use a dynamic trade model with two sectors and two types of workers to analyze the optimal setting of income‐generating tariffs. We study dynamic and distributional aspects focusing on the time horizon of policymakers and workers. The level of tariffs preferred by workers depends on the sector where they are employed as well as their skill class, with the relative weight of both aspects determined by the time horizon of the workers. Unskilled workers in the unskilled‐intensive sector are the ones most in favor of protectionism and might even benefit from a trade war.     

Efficiency and Equity in Natural Resources Pricing: A Proposal for Urban Water Distribution Service

This paper focuses on the design of optimal prices for urban water distribution service. In this context, pricing should be aimed at achieving efficiency, equity, financial aspects, and/or public acceptability and transparency. The proposed tariffs are based on the theoretical frameworks suggested by Ramsey (1927) and Feldstein (1972). As a prior step, estimations of urban water demands and water costs are carried out for the Spanish municipality of Seville. Finally, an empirical comparison, in welfare terms, is conducted between the proposed tariffs and those applicable in the year 2000.     

Energy prices and the expansion of world trade

The share of merchandise output that is internationally traded has significantly increased while tariffs have fallen. However, standard trade models have surprising difficulty linking these two facts. Trade growth slowed in the 1970s as tariffs fell relatively sharply while after the late 1980s trade grew quickly as tariffs fell slowly. This pattern implies that the price-import elasticity has changed over time. Also, tariffs have not fallen enough to generate such a large increase in trade given estimates of this elasticity. Changes in transport costs can resolve both puzzles. I present a vertical specialization trade model with an energy-using transportation sector. In the simulated model, trade growth slows from 1974 to 1985. The oil shocks raised transport costs, offsetting falling tariffs, so the price-import elasticity no longer needs to change. It also generates the observed volume of trade growth since transport costs have fallen over the long run.     

Trade policy and industrial development: iron and steel in a small open economy, 1870−1913

In this paper we argue that effective tariff protection associated with the 1879 National Policy and the 1887 Tupper tariffs triggered investment in new, technologically advanced blast furnaces that were capable of accommodating rapid output expansion. This conclusion is based on an appreciation of the timing of late nineteenth‐century investments in Canada and their connection to changes in government policy and other demand determinants. In our empirical investigation we use new information on westbound transatlantic freight rates, intra‐continental transport costs, and furnace‐specific micro‐data, and we acknowledge the endogenous relationships linking investment to domestic demand, labour costs, and tariffs.     

Have Falling Tariffs and Transportation Costs Raised US Wage Inequality?

To gauge the effect of international trade on the rising US skill premium, the paper analyzes the sector bias of price changes induced by changes in US tariffs and transportation costs. It is found that, in both the 1970s and 1980s, cuts in tariffs and transportation cost levels were concentrated in unskilled‐intensive sectors. Despite this suggestive evidence, the authors estimate that price changes induced by tariffs or transportation costs mandated a rise in inequality that was mostly statistically insignificant. Thus, they do not find strong evidence that falling tariffs and transport costs, working through price changes, mandated rises in inequality.     

Misreporting trade: Tariff evasion,corruption, and auditing standards

Official international trade statistics report commerce between every pair of countries twice: once for the importing country and once for the exporter. In principle, the two values differ only by transport costs, but as has long been recognized, they also differ systematically with product‐level tariffs. We aggregate across products to construct a dataset of annual aggregate bilateral trade, separately for the importer and exporter reports. With these data, we show that the reporting differences also vary systematically with country characteristics aside from tariffs: incomes, auditing standards, corruption, and trade agreements.     

Utilitarianism and horizontal equity: The case for random taxation

This paper reports on the use of an algorithm to compute optimal policies in the areas of commodity taxation, international trade and public shadow pricing for a government which is interested in redistributing income but has limited powers of taxation. The algorithm is applied to selected LDC data using a highly simplified general equilibrium model. Some insight into the relationships between constraints on taxation and other areas of government policy is provided by analyzing models where domestic tax restrictions can make inefficient public production or tariffs on international trade desirable.     

Systematic Political Grass–Root Support for Tariffs

The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.     

THE WELFARE PERFORMANCE OF SEQUENTIAL PRICING MECHANISMS*

Consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved. Since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous, this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers. Results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits. Furthermore, evidence suggests that a menu of optional two‐part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective.     

TRANSPORTATION COSTS,AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY,AND CROSS‐COUNTRY INCOME DIFFERENCES*

I study the role of transportation for development by introducing regional trade and a transportation sector into the standard two‐sector model of agriculture–nonagriculture. Low transport productivity can distort the allocation of resources across geographically dispersed production units within sectors and between agriculture and nonagriculture. I infer cross‐country transport productivity disparities from observed domestic transport costs and transport infrastructure stocks. “Endowing” rich countries with the transport productivity of poor countries would reduce their income by 10%. Combining transport productivity disparities with disparities in nonagricultural productivity and arable land the model yields a 50% higher rich–poor income ratio than the two‐sector model.     

VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.     

Multiproduct tariffs

Necessary conditions characterizing optimal nonlinear multiproduct tariffs are derived from aggregate data about customers' responses to linear tariffs. These conditions are amenable to numerical solution with standard software by using a discrete formulation of an associated nonlinear optimization problem cast in terms of the marginal prices charged for incremental bundles. This approach avoids integrability restrictions that otherwise encumber the computations. However, this method does not ensure that customers' second-order conditions for optimality of their demands are satisfied. Some numerical examples are provided, and the extension of the method to Ramsey pricing is also demonstrated.     

National Border Effects: Location, Not Nationality, Matters

A recent literature documents the downward impact of national borders on trade. This paper probes the relative importance of two potential sources of border effects: (1) pure locational factors, such as transport costs and tariffs; and (2) an inherent disadvantage for a firm selling in a foreign market. I am able to make this decomposition by using data on the local sales of foreign affiliates of US multinational enterprises, on US bilateral exports, and on domestic sales by host‐country firms. The “border effect” arises almost entirely from locational factors. If a firm establishes and sells from a subsidiary located in the foreign country, its local sales are about on a par with those of domestic firms in that market.     

Welfare-optimal pricing and capacity selection under an ex ante maximum demand charge

This paper deals with the simultaneous determination of welfare-optimal pricing and investment rules under a multi-period ex ante maximum demand charge by allowing the possibility of purchasing electricity from third party generators at some cost when excess demand occurs. I show that at the optimal size of capacity, expected short-run marginal shortage cost and long-run marginal capacity cost should be equal. The optimal maximum demand tariff does not entail marginal cost pricing. In general, it is shown that maximum demand charges are welfare superior to marginal cost pricing when tariffs must be set ex ante, before demand is known.     

Competition over Time-Inconsistent Consumers

How do firms respond to consumers' time inconsistency? This paper studies the optimal design of nonexclusive contracts under competition. It shows that nonexclusivity creates a stark asymmetry between immediate‐costs goods and immediate‐rewards goods. For immediate‐cost goods nonexclusivity does not affect the equilibrium and, when consumers are sophisticated, the efficient allocation is achieved. When consumers are partially naive, the optimal sales tax may be either positive or negative and depends on parameters that are hard to estimate. In the case of immediate‐rewards goods, however, the equilibrium features marginal‐cost pricing and is always inefficient. Moreover, the optimal tax does not depend on the consumers' degree of naiveté and is a function of parameters that are easy to assess.     

WELFARE ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE*

For timeless economies where technology provides economies of scale, it is shown that, under a variety of circumstances, an allocation is optimal if and only if it is a free-entry monopsonistic equilibrium, in which producers take account of labour costs rising with the level of employment. The results refine Fujita's one-commodity theory, and extend it to many commodities and a heterogeneous population. Production takes place in towns. When transport costs for commodities are zero, one good is produced in each town. Land use and worker travel costs are allowed. For the equivalence theorem to hold, all production and property in a town should have a single owner. Models with transport costs are also discussed. For them, it is shown that in general there is no equilibrium.