高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角,将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下,以产权性质为依据,收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据,分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系,以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用,并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业;股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用,而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。     

关键高管薪酬差距、环境规制与企业创新——基于煤炭上市公司数据

煤炭工业是我国的重要基础产业,在其转型发展过程中,建立适当的薪酬分配制度是提升治理有效性并推动创新发展的重要方式,关键高管薪酬差距对煤炭企业创新行为所产生的影响值得深入研究。基于社会比较理论,以2011—2020年A股煤炭上市公司为样本,检验了CEO与关键下属高管间薪酬差距对企业创新的影响,并探讨了环境规制对二者的调节效应。结果表明:煤炭企业CEO与关键下属高管间的薪酬差距越大,企业进行创新的可能性就越小,验证了社会比较理论在我国煤炭企业中的适用性;且该薪酬差距对企业创新的抑制作用会随煤炭企业受到环境规制的强度增加而减弱。进一步发现,与煤炭企业CEO和其他所有高管间薪酬差距相比,CEO与关键下属高管间的薪酬差距对企业创新的作用效果更明显。     

研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬——业绩敏感性

企业研发投资会影响高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性。本文以2010～2014年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性之间的关系。研究结论表明,研发投资与企业风险呈正相关关系;增加研发投资导致企业风险加大,高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性会有所降低;进一步地,企业风险在研发投资与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性的负向关系中起中介作用。本文不仅丰富了高管薪酬--业绩敏感性影响因素的研究,也为企业针对研发活动设计合理薪酬契约提供了决策支持。     

董事会资本、高管薪酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据

董事会资本、高管激励契约与研发投入之间的关系一直是国内外学者研究的热点和焦点问题。论文基于资源依赖理论和委托代理理论的双重视角,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用两阶段最小二乘法,考察了董事会资本对研发投入的影响,以及高管薪酬激励对二者关系的调节作用。实证研究结果显示：（1）董事会资本宽度对企业的研发投入具有显著的正向影响;（2）董事会资本深度对企业的R&D投入具有显著的正向影响;（3）进一步分析发现,高管薪酬激励对董事会资本和研发投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用。     

转轨经济下管理层权力影响高管-员工薪酬差距的研究

企业高管薪酬一直是学术界热议的话题之一,近几年学者把目光更多地放在了研究高管薪酬与普通员工薪酬差距的方面。产品市场竞争作为一种非标准的外部治理机制,正日益受到越来越多学者的关注。本文以2006-2010年我国上市公司为研究样本,对企业内高管与普通员工薪酬差距越来越大的现象进行实证研究。结果表明,在国有企业中,管理层权力对薪酬差距的影响大于非国有企业,而产品市场竞争程度在非国有企业中对薪酬差距扩大有较好的缓解作用。在产品市场竞争越激烈、管理层权力越高的国有企业,高管与普通员工薪酬的差距依然很大。     

企业集群环境下的公司创业研究——网络资源与创业导向对集群企业绩效的影响

环境复杂性和动态性的加强,导致更多的企业采取公司创业战略以获取持续竞争优势。然而,大多数研究忽视了网络资源对公司创业日趋重要的影响．尤其在企业集群环境下,仅从组织内部因素和产业环境因素难以解释公司创业的前因后果。基于网络视角,本文首先对公司创业的三种资源获取方式进行比较。认为网络资源是公司创业活动受益于企业集群的内在原因;进而对网络资源、创业导向与集群企业绩效的关系进行探索性研究;最后对浙江省集群企业的实证研究表明：创业导向、网络资源均与企业绩效有显著正相关性．网络资源显著提高了创业导向对企业绩效的贡献。     

企业集群环境下的公司创业研究——网络资源与创业导向对集群企业绩效的影响

环境复杂性和动态性的加强,导致更多的企业采取公司创业战略以获取持续竞争优势。然而,大多数研究忽视了网络资源对公司创业日趋重要的影响,尤其在企业集群环境下,仅从组织内部因素和产业环境因素难以解释公司创业的前因后果。基于网络视角,本文首先对公司创业的三种资源获取方式进行比较,认为网络资源是公司创业活动受益于企业集群的内在原因;进而对网络资源、创业导向与集群企业绩效的关系进行探索性研究;最后对浙江省集群企业的实证研究表明:创业导向、网络资源均与企业绩效有显著正相关性,网络资源显著提高了创业导向对企业绩效的贡献。     

科技创业者创业动机与新创企业绩效的关系研究

创新创业过程中离不开创业动机的开发和创业机会的识别。本文从创新创业的视角出发, 探讨了创新创业过程中不同维度的科技创业者的创业动机和创业机会识别对新创企业绩效的影响和作用机制, 并对 282家科技新创企业的样本数据进行了实证检验。研究结果表明： 创业者创业动机中机会型动机和成就型动机对新创企业绩效具有显著正向影响, 而生存型动机对绩效的影响则不显著, 但是３ 个维度的创业动机均对创业机会识别具有积极作用; 创业机会识别完全中介了创业者创业动机与新创企业绩效之间的正向关系; 创业能力可以在创业机会识别与新创企业绩效间起正向调节作用, 创业能力越高, 创业机会识别对新创企业绩效的积极影响就会越大。研究结论对致力于取得较高创业绩效的创业者具有一定实践启示。     

防范中国式肥猫

高管薪酬问题是一个世界性难题,尤其是金融行业高管薪酬,一直让世界各国政府头疼不已。一方面,企业内部高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距日益增大,相差100倍的例子屡见不鲜,收入差距的扩大给经济的持续发展和社会稳定造成了很大威胁;另一方面,高管薪酬易涨难跌的现象非常普遍,企业盈利的时候高管的收益丰厚,而企业亏损的时候高管可以通过辞职、跳槽逃避责任,薪水却丝毫不受影响,这种收益和风险极不对等的事情造成了高级经理人市场的扭曲,也损害了社会公平。最有代表性的例子是2008年金融危机之后,那些巨亏银行的高管一边在接受政府的巨额纾困,一边还领取天价薪酬,新闻一爆出顿时让美国民众愤慨不已,进而掀起了轰轰烈烈的占领华尔街运动。     

家族上市公司高管薪酬对公司绩效影响的实证分析

本文以2004年度沪、深324家家族控股上市公司为研究样本,建立了高管薪酬激励对公司绩效影响的模型.实证研究结果表明,家族公司的高管薪酬与公司绩效呈显著的倒U型曲线关系.我国大部分家族公司的高管薪酬处于与公司绩效正相关的阶段,提高高管的薪酬,有利于提高公司绩效.     

Entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality: comparing investment practices and performance of corporate and independent venture capitalists

This paper investigates the effect of compensation of corporate personnel on their investment in new technologies. We focus on a specific corporate activity, namely corporate venture capital (CVC), describing minority equity investment by established‐firms in entrepreneurial ventures. The setting offers an opportunity to compare corporate investors to investment experts, the independent venture capitalists (IVCs). On average, we observe a performance gap between corporate investors and their independent counterparts. Interestingly, the performance gap is sensitive to CVCs' compensation scheme: it is the largest when CVC personnel are awarded performance pay. Not only do we study the association between incentives and performance but we also document a direct relationship between incentives and the actions managers undertake. For example, we observe disparity between the number of participants in venture capital syndicates that involve a corporate investor, and those that consist solely of IVCs. The disparity shrinks substantially, however, for a subset of CVCs that compensate their personnel using performance pay. We find a parallel pattern when analyzing the relationship between compensation and another investment practice, staging of investment. To conclude, the paper investigates the three elements of the principal‐agent framework, thus providing direct evidence that compensation schemes (incentives) shape investment practices (managerial action), and ultimately investors' outcome (performance). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于资源视角的创业研究框架构建

通过对现有创业研究成果的回顾发现,目前,创业研究主要关注创业团队和创业机会,而从创业资源视角的研究较少。基于资源视角的创业研究既是创业研究的理论前沿问题,也是推动创业实践的现实需要。本文在理论回顾的基础上,以创业资源开发过程、创业周期及创业情境为三个维度构建了基于资源视角的创业研究框架。     

中小企业自主创新能力提升策略研究——基于企业家社会资本的视角

本文从中小企业家社会资本的视角探讨其自主创新能力提升的对策。从结构、资源、策略三个层面剖析企业家社会资本的构成因子,阐述企业家关系网络、企业家社会资源、创新机会策略分别从控制利益、信息利益、策略有效性等方面建构获取创新赢利机会的结构能力、资源能力和策略能力。并基于结构洞理论推导结构自治、非冗余性、结构洞策略等相应的影响因子及作用路径,进而构建企业家社会资本影响机制理论结构模型,初步建立了企业家社会资本增殖范式下自主创新能力提升的理论分析框架。在此基础上,遵循中小企业家社会资本的修补脉络,聚焦于联系紧密化、联系差异化、联系细分化设计了中小企业自主创新能力提升三种策略。通过辨析补洞策略、寻洞策略、析洞策略的作用和差异,从策略实质与策略优选两方面论述了中小企业全面提升自主创新能力的实践架构。     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context‐specific phenomenon that results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of U.K.‐listed firms, we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance‐sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy‐related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk taking and confidence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations' indifference to women's performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于创业型企业的内部治理结构研究——以上海市创业型企业为例

当前，在我国经济高速发展的时期，创业活动已成为经济增长的内生动力。然而，创业型企业，尤其是新创企业，在当前竞争激烈的市场经济环境下，很难在市场上长久的生存下去。究其原因，创业型企业在融资、产销、市场等方面都存在着一些问题，同时，创业型企业自身的特点决定着其内部治理结构也存在着较强的特殊性。文章通过对上海的11家创业型企业的调查研究。从企业的控制权、股权安排、员工激励、管理制度以及企业文化等五个方面对创业型企业的内部治理结构进行分析研究，总结出创业型企业内部治理结构的特点，为我国的创业活动提供一定的指导和支持。     

Revisiting the gender gap in CEO compensation: Replication and extension of Hill,Upadhyay, and Beekun's (2015) work on CEO gender pay gap

Research Summary: The increasing number of women chief executives motivates considerable interest in examining possible gender differences in CEO compensation. Recently, Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun reported that female CEOs receive greater compensation than male CEOs, which runs counter to common wisdom that the gender pay gap in the labor market favors men over women. With the goal of contributing to cumulative knowledge development in this area, we seek to reexamine Hill et al.'s finding about gender differences in CEO compensation by extending the analyses further in time, using a larger sample of firms and more rigorous empirical analyses. Our findings, which are robust to different statistical procedures and econometric specifications, do not reveal reliable evidence for differences in compensation paid to male and female CEOs. Managerial Summary : For years, a lively debate has centered on the issue of gender pay gap. The ubiquity of the pay gap between men and women has recently been questioned by Hill et al. who identify the chief executive officer (CEO) role as a workplace position where women receive greater compensation than men. Our investigation examines whether women CEOs are indeed compensated substantively more than male CEOs. We seek to replicate earlier work by Hill and colleagues, using an expanded dataset over a longer period of time and with more rigorous analytical tools. We do not find reliable evidence for a difference in compensation paid to male and female CEOs, suggesting that claims about gender gap in CEO compensation favoring women over men may be premature.     

国有企业工作经历、企业家才能与企业成长

人力资本的高效配置和企业家才能的充分发挥关系到经济的可持续发展,制度建设如果能促进资源合理流向具有企业家才能的企业家,就能创造更多就业和社会财富。基于全国1997—2016年的私营企业调查数据,本文考察企业家的国有企业工作经历对企业成长的影响。研究结果显示,企业家的国有企业工作经历使得企业在市场扩张和盈利能力等方面表现更好,带来了更高水平的企业成长。机制讨论表明,企业家行为带有明显的烙印效应,国有企业工作经历为企业家带来了更多的社会资本和更高的公司治理水平,从而促进了企业成长。为了缓解由于选择性偏误等带来的内生性,本文采用倾向得分匹配、处理效应模型、代理变量、双差分模型等方法进行处理,结论仍然稳健。中国经济要向资源配置效率改善型模式转变,企业家才能的发挥至关重要,国有企业改革不仅应注重产权等方面的改革,同时也要充分重视国有企业改革带来的人力资本溢出效应。在不断深化国有企业改革的大背景下,本文从企业家才能培育和人力资本配置效应的角度考察国有企业改革问题,倡导国有企业改革进程中进一步营造企业家才能发挥的空间和制度安排,提高人力资本配置效应,从而促进中国经济健康可持续发展。     

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.